ANALYSIS: Iran Under Attack — When Moscow and Beijing Are on Opposing Sides

2026-06-20 19:02:46

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A Partnership Built on the War in Ukraine

To understand Moscow’s position on the Iranian crisis, it is essential to put the true nature of the relationship between Russia and Iran into context. This relationship has accelerated dramatically since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Cornered by Western sanctions and diplomatically isolated, Russia has sought arms suppliers and economic partners capable of circumventing the cordon sanitaire imposed by Washington and Brussels. Iran responded enthusiastically to this call. The Shahed drones—those formidable flying machines that have been sowing terror in Ukrainian cities for months—have become the most visible symbol of this military convergence. Thousands of them have been delivered to Moscow, transforming the conflict in Ukraine and signaling to the entire world that the Russia-Iran axis has reached a concrete operational milestone.

But this intense military cooperation masks a reality that is more fragile than it appears. Russia has never formally guaranteed Iran’s security. There is no defensive alliance treaty between the two countries comparable to NATO’s Article 5. Their relations are governed by a logic of immediate mutual benefit rather than by deep ideological solidarity. Moscow needs Iranian drones to hold its ground in Ukraine. Tehran needs Russia’s diplomatic protection on the UN Security Council and access to the Russian energy market. It is an alliance of merchants, not brothers in arms. And when the Iranian conflagration threatens to engulf everything, the merchants calculate their losses.

Why a War in Iran Is a Nightmare for Putin

Vladimir Putin now finds himself in a dreadfully uncomfortable position. His army is deeply entrenched in Ukraine, his military resources are stretched to the limit, and his war economy is absorbing a considerable portion of the Russian federal budget. The last thing he needs is a new major hotbed of instability that would shift the focus of international attention and, above all, disrupt global energy flows—on which the financing of his war effort still partly depends. A military escalation in Iran could trigger a closure—even a temporary one—of the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s oil passes. This would be an oil shock with unpredictable consequences—one that could benefit Moscow by driving up crude prices, just as much as it could destabilize it by triggering a global recession that would reduce demand for Russian hydrocarbons. The calculation is therefore deeply ambiguous, and Putin knows it.

Putin is walking a tightrope over an abyss. Supporting Iran too openly means exposing himself to new sanctions and risking the disruption of his drone supply line. Not supporting Iran means losing a valuable strategic partner. He has no good options—only bad ones at different paces.

China and Iran: Stability as the State Religion

Beijing and Tehran: A Relationship Based on Oil and Caution

While the relationship between Moscow and Tehran is an alliance of convenience forged in the crucible of the war in Ukraine, the relationship between Beijing and Tehran follows an even colder and more calculated logic. China is Iran’s largest trading partner and its main buyer of oil. It absorbs a massive share of Iran’s oil exports, which often arrive in Beijing at reduced prices thanks to mechanisms designed to circumvent U.S. sanctions. It is a highly profitable economic relationship for both parties. But for Xi Jinping, this relationship is above all instrumental: it serves China’s energy and geopolitical interests, without Beijing ever feeling the need to go beyond a superficial show of solidarity.

China also maintains significant and growing ties with several of Iran’s regional rivals. Its partnership with Saudi Arabia, in particular, serves as a significant counterweight to its ties with Iran. In fact, it was Beijing that orchestrated, in March 2023, the diplomatic surprise of the year: the reconciliation between Riyadh and Tehran, which had severed diplomatic relations seven years earlier. This masterstroke by China perfectly illustrates Xi Jinping’s doctrine in the Middle East: to play all sides, maintain open channels with all parties, and preserve regional stability at all costs—a stability that guarantees the security of energy supplies on which China’s economic growth depends.

The Obsession with Stability vs. the Risk of a Blaze

For Beijing, an all-out war in Iran represents a worst-case scenario on several fronts simultaneously. First, on the energy front. China relies heavily on oil imports from the Persian Gulf, and any serious disruption to maritime routes passing through the Strait of Hormuz or the Red Sea would have direct repercussions on its economy, already weakened by a slowdown in growth. Second, from a financial and commercial perspective. China has invested billions of dollars in infrastructure and contracts throughout the Middle East as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. A major regional conflict would jeopardize these colossal investments and disrupt the land and sea trade routes that form the backbone of this monumental geopolitical and economic project. Finally, on the diplomatic front. Beijing has carefully cultivated an image as a responsible power—an alternative to American hegemony—that promotes a multipolar world order and respects the sovereignty of states. An all-out conflict in Iran unfolding before its helpless eyes would significantly tarnish this image.

China does not want to save Iran. It wants to save its oil contracts, its trade routes, and its image as a global mediator. These are two very different things—and Iranian leaders know this full well.

The Strategic Divergence at the Heart of the Crisis

When Interests Diverge on the Nuclear Issue

One of the most significant points of divergence between Moscow and Beijing concerns precisely the Iranian nuclear issue. Russia’s position on this subject is more ambiguous. On the one hand, it does not want to see a nuclear-armed Iran in its immediate vicinity—nuclear proliferation poses a systemic risk that even Moscow cannot ignore. On the other hand, a nuclear-armed Iran would be a formidable deterrent against the United States and its allies in the region, which would indirectly serve Russian interests by creating a new front of U.S. tension to manage. This Russian ambivalence is reflected in a policy of providing partial technical support for Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—Russia built and operates the Bushehr nuclear power plant—while formally maintaining a position in favor of nonproliferation.

China, for its part, takes a more clearly hostile stance toward Iran’s nuclearization. Not out of idealism, but out of pure calculation. A nuclear Iran would trigger a chain reaction in the region: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and potentially other Gulf states would seek to acquire their own nuclear capabilities. This cascading regional proliferation would be a strategic nightmare for Beijing, which would lose all control over the stability of a region vital to its energy supply. In this sense, Chinese interests regarding the Iranian nuclear issue partially align with those of Western nations—which is a source of genuine concern for Tehran’s leadership.

Military Support: Words Without Deeds

Declarations of solidarity from Moscow and Beijing toward Tehran are a constant in diplomatic circles. But when one looks at concrete actions, the picture is far less impressive. Neither Russia nor China has supplied Iran with the advanced air defense systems that would have enabled it to better withstand Israeli strikes. Discussions regarding the delivery of Russian S-400 systems to Iran have been ongoing for years and have never come to fruition. Beijing, for its part, has carefully avoided supplying Tehran with offensive weapons that could provoke a direct confrontation with the United States or Israel. This military caution reveals the real limits of a solidarity that manifests itself primarily through votes in the Security Council and press releases—not through actions capable of shifting the balance of power on the ground.

There is something deeply revealing about the gap between Moscow’s and Beijing’s rhetoric on Iran and their actual actions. That gap is the real message. And it simply says: You are useful, but not to the point where we would risk anything for you.

Energy Issues: The Real Key to Success

The Strait of Hormuz, a Vital Artery for the World

To understand why neither Russia nor China can ignore the Iranian crisis, one must appreciate the colossal importance of the Strait of Hormuz in the global energy landscape. This maritime chokepoint, barely 33 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, is the only route for approximately 20 to 21 million barrels of oil per day—about 20% of global consumption. Any closure—even a temporary one—of this strait would trigger an immediate and dramatic spike in crude oil prices, with cascading repercussions across the entire global economy. Iran has the capability—and has demonstrated in the past the willingness—to threaten this strait during periods of tension. In 2019, oil tankers were attacked or detained in the region amid extreme tensions with the United States.

For China, which imports approximately 10 million barrels of oil per day—a large portion of which transits through the Strait of Hormuz—a prolonged blockade of the strait would be an economic catastrophe of the first order. But even for Russia, where one might think that rising oil prices would boost export revenues, the situation is ambivalent. A too-sharp and prolonged rise in energy prices would trigger a global recession that would automatically reduce overall demand for hydrocarbons, ultimately offsetting any short-term gains. Economists have modeled this type of scenario on several occasions, and the results are consistently negative in the medium term, even for oil-exporting countries.

Iranian Oil and Beijing’s Strategic Dependence

Over the years of international sanctions, China has become Iran’s main economic lifeline. According to available data, Beijing imports between 700,000 and 1.5 million barrels of Iranian oil per day, often at prices significantly below market rates, in exchange for a form of diplomatic protection and access to technological and industrial goods. This relationship of mutual dependence has created strong economic ties between the two countries—but it has also given Beijing considerable leverage over Tehran. If China were to significantly reduce its purchases of Iranian oil, the mullahs’ regime would find itself in an even more difficult economic situation than it already is. This is a reality that Iranian leaders cannot overlook when assessing the true depth of Chinese support.

The Iranian oil that Beijing buys at bargain prices is not an act of solidarity. It is a business deal. And as with any business deal, loyalty ends where profits begin to decline.

The Saudi-Iranian Peace Agreement: China's Masterstroke in Jeopardy

March 2023: When Beijing Was Reshaping the Middle East

To gauge just how much the current Iranian crisis is thwarting Beijing’s strategic ambitions, we must look back at one of the most remarkable diplomatic initiatives of recent years. In March 2023, following secret negotiations, Beijing announced the conclusion of a diplomatic normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which had severed ties in 2016 after Saudi Arabia executed a Shia cleric. This Chinese diplomatic masterstroke caused a sensation in Western foreign ministries. For the first time, China demonstrated in concrete terms its ability to play a mediating role in regional conflicts in the Middle East—a role that the United States had long monopolized. It was a strong signal to the entire world: the era of American dominance over regional diplomacy was over, and Beijing was ready to take the reins.

This agreement also represented a considerable strategic investment for China. By bringing Riyadh and Tehran closer together, it hoped to stabilize the entire Persian Gulf, reduce regional tensions that threatened its energy and trade interests, and consolidate its image as a responsible and constructive power. War in Iran—or at least the prospect of a regional conflagration directly involving Tehran—risks undoing this diplomatic investment. If the region plunges back into a spiral of violence, the entire architecture of stability that Beijing had patiently built will collapse. And with it, a significant portion of the diplomatic prestige that China had accumulated on the international stage.

Saudi Arabia Caught in the Crossfire

Saudi Arabia’s position in this crisis adds an extra layer of complexity to Beijing’s calculations. Riyadh maintains very significant economic and security ties with the United States and, more discreetly, with Israel, as part of a convergence of anti-Iranian interests. But at the same time, the 2023 diplomatic reconciliation with Tehran had opened up attractive prospects for regional stability for a kingdom seeking to diversify its economy and attract massive foreign investment as part of its Vision 2030. A war in Iran would plunge Riyadh back into the cycle of regional tension and insecurity that it is precisely trying to overcome. For Xi Jinping, losing both Iran as an economic partner and Saudi Arabia’s trust as a diplomatic partner would be an unacceptable double blow.

In just a few weeks, the Iranian crisis has jeopardized one of China’s greatest diplomatic successes of the decade. Beijing is watching its investment in the Middle East go up in smoke with the frustrated helplessness of someone who has staked everything on stability in a world that refuses to remain stable.

Russia, Ukraine, and Iran: An Equation with Three Unknowns

Shahed Drones: A Link Between Two Wars

One of the most striking aspects of Russia’s position in the Iranian crisis is the physical, tangible link represented by the Shahed drones. These drones, manufactured in Iran and used extensively by Russian forces in Ukraine, have become a symbol of a military interdependence from which Moscow can no longer easily extricate itself. If Iran were weakened, destabilized, or forced by war to redirect its military industrial capabilities toward its own defense, the flow of Shahed drones to Russia could dry up or be significantly reduced. Given that the Russian military is consuming these drones at a breakneck pace on the Ukrainian front, this logistical dependence has become a real strategic vulnerability for Moscow.

But there is an additional paradox. Russian-Iranian military cooperation, precisely because it is well-known and documented, exposes Russia to additional political and diplomatic pressure from Western countries. Every new batch of Shahed drones delivered to the Russian military, every image of these drones shot down over Ukraine, fuels calls for tougher sanctions against both countries. By making itself dependent on Iranian drones, Russia has tied its strategic fate to that of Iran in a way that now limits its room for maneuver. It can neither publicly and strongly support Tehran without triggering new Western reactions, nor abandon it without risking the loss of its main supplier of ammunition for the war in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Front as a Distorting Lens

The war in Ukraine profoundly distorts Russia’s perception of and response to the Iranian crisis. In the context of all-out conflict, every resource—financial, military, diplomatic—is carefully accounted for and allocated primarily according to the needs of the Ukrainian front. Vladimir Putin cannot afford to open a new major diplomatic or military front in the Middle East without weakening his position in Eastern Europe. His generals need his full political attention, all available budgetary resources, and all remaining diplomatic capital. Taking a strong stance in support of Iran would consume this precious capital for an ally whose support, as we have seen, is itself calculated and self-serving.

Putin is in the position of a poker player who has bet all his chips on a hand and who, while looking at his cards, sees someone overturning the table next to him. He cannot leave the game. He cannot stop everything to deal with the overturned table. He is stuck.

Beijing's Diplomatic Stance: The Impossible Balancing Act

Calls for Calm and Diplomatic Cover

Faced with growing tensions, Beijing has adopted its usual diplomatic stance: calls for de-escalation, condemnation of any use of force, and pleas for a political and diplomatic solution. These statements are sincere in their logic—China genuinely wants to avoid a regional conflagration—but they are also wholly insufficient given the scale of the crisis. Xi Jinping has stepped up telephone contacts and diplomatic messages with various actors in the region, attempting to keep all channels of communication open. Chinese emissaries have traveled to Tehran, Riyadh, Tel Aviv, and European capitals, carrying a consistent message: the world cannot afford another war in this region, and China stands ready to help find a diplomatic solution.

But this intense diplomatic activity faces a fundamental contradiction. To be a credible mediator, one must have real influence over all parties. Yet China has no significant influence over Israel—Sino-Israeli relations are strained and have deteriorated since the start of the conflict in Gaza. Nor does it have decisive influence over the United States, which is Israel’s main supporter and views China’s diplomatic advances in the Middle East with growing suspicion. Beijing thus finds itself in the paradoxical position of a mediator whom one of the main protagonists refuses to listen to. Its influence, while real in certain areas, proves insufficient to change the course of events in this specific crisis.

The Temptation of a Favorable Postwar Era

It would be naïve to think that Beijing is not also calculating the potential benefits of a postwar era. If Iran emerges weakened from a major conflict, its dependence on China for economic and industrial reconstruction could increase even further. Massive reconstruction contracts, even more direct access to Iranian oil resources, and a strengthened Chinese presence in the country—these prospects are certainly part of the calculations of Beijing’s strategists. But they are largely offset by the risks of regional instability that we have described. China is first and foremost a mercantile power that prefers stability and steady trade flows to the uncertain profits of post-conflict reconstruction. It will therefore remain in the camp of those who want to put out the fire—while closely monitoring the opportunities the crisis might create.

China is like a businessman who witnesses a fire in his neighborhood. He wants it to stop, because his own business is threatened. But in the back of his mind, he’s already calculating the reconstruction contracts. It’s human. It’s strategic. And it’s perfectly cynical.

The United States in the Equation: The Invisible Pivot

Washington Balances Support for Israel with Efforts to Prevent Escalation

Any analysis of the Iranian crisis would be incomplete without considering the central role of the United States. It is largely the U.S. position that determines the room for maneuver available to Moscow and Beijing. Washington finds itself in a familiar yet uncomfortable position: supporting Israel’s right to defend itself against Iranian threats, while trying to prevent an escalation that would turn a regional conflict into an all-out war with unpredictable consequences. The U.S. administration—whatever form it takes—must balance support for its Israeli ally with legitimate concern for a global economy that cannot absorb a major oil shock without severe damage.

For Russia and China, the crucial question is the extent of U.S. involvement. If the United States remains on the sidelines and allows Israel to conduct its operations relatively autonomously, the two powers can maintain their current stance: verbal condemnations, diplomatic support for Iran in international forums, but no direct military engagement. If, on the other hand, the United States becomes militarily involved in the conflict, the calculus changes entirely. A direct U.S.-Iranian confrontation would pose existential questions for Moscow and Beijing regarding the kind of support they are prepared to provide to an ally under pressure.

A Test of Alliance Credibility

The Iranian crisis is becoming a test of credibility for all the alliances and partnerships that shape the contemporary world. The Sino-Russian partnership will be judged on its ability to translate rhetoric of solidarity into concrete actions. The U.S.-Israeli alliance will be evaluated based on the consistency between its stated support and the limits that Washington actually imposes on Israeli operations. Europe’s relations with all these actors will be scrutinized to gauge European strategic autonomy—or the lack thereof. And Iran’s own credibility will be tested by its ability to turn its rhetoric of resistance into an effective defense of its sovereign territory. All these tests are unfolding simultaneously, creating a situation of dizzying analytical complexity.

Crises reveal the truths that ordinary diplomacy carefully conceals. We are learning right now who is truly friends with whom, who is willing to pay the price for genuine solidarity, and who prefers to hide behind press releases. It is a brutal but necessary lesson.

The Iranian People: The Forgotten Ones in Geopolitical Calculations

88 million people at the center of the global chessboard

Amid all these geopolitical, strategic, and economic calculations, it’s easy to forget that we’re talking about a country of 88 million people. The Iranian population—young, educated, and often urban—is largely overlooked in geopolitical analyses that reduce Iran to a pawn on the global chessboard. These millions of men and women have lived for decades under the weight of an authoritarian regime, growing international isolation, an economy ravaged by sanctions and mismanaged, and now military strikes on their territory. The massive protests of 2019 against rising fuel prices and the uprisings of 2022–2023 following the death of Mahsa Amini have revealed the extent of deep-seated popular discontent that goes far beyond the issue of regional tensions.

The Iranian people have no say in the negotiations taking place among the major powers regarding their future. Neither Moscow nor Beijing consults ordinary Iranians when calculating their interests. Neither Washington nor Tel Aviv tailors its strikes to the democratic aspirations of an Iranian civil society that has repeatedly demonstrated its desire to live differently. This is one of the fundamental injustices of great-power geopolitics: people bear the consequences of decisions they did not make, conflicts they did not want, and alliances formed in their name without consulting them.

The Mullahs’ Regime Facing Internal and External Pressure

For the regime of the Islamic Republic, the current military crisis presents a paradoxical dynamic. On the one hand, the Israeli strikes on Iranian territory constitute a national humiliation that could theoretically rally the population behind the regime in a classic nationalist reflex. On the other hand, they reveal the limitations of Iran’s air defenses and the reality of a country that, despite its rhetoric of heroic resistance, finds itself unable to protect its own airspace. This exposure of the regime’s military weaknesses—made visible to millions of Iranians who are following events on social media despite censorship—could paradoxically undermine the legitimacy of a regime that bases part of its authority on its role as the invincible defender of the Islamic nation.

Ordinary Iranians deserve to be seen beyond the calculations of the major powers. They are not pawns. They are human beings held hostage between their own regime and the strategic ambitions of powers that care about them only insofar as they serve a purpose.

Possible Scenarios: From De-escalation to All-Out Conflict

The Scenario of Calculated Restraint

The most likely scenario in the short term remains that of calculated restraint. Despite the intensity of Israeli strikes and the inflammatory rhetoric from all sides, de-escalation mechanisms are at work. The United States is exerting constant pressure on Israel to prevent an escalation that would exceed the control capabilities of all parties involved. China is stepping up discreet diplomatic contacts to keep communication channels open. Even Russia, despite its rhetoric of solidarity with Tehran, is sending signals of moderation behind the scenes. The Iranian regime itself, aware of its military and economic vulnerabilities, is calibrating its responses to avoid provoking direct U.S. intervention, which would be catastrophic for its survival. In this scenario, the crisis stabilizes at a high level of tension without escalating into all-out war, and the major powers preserve their vital interests at the cost of a status quo that is painful for the populations involved.

This scenario of restraint presupposes that all actors remain rational in their calculations, that no accident or uncontrollable incident comes along to inflame the situation, and that the implicit red lines that structure interactions between major powers continue to hold. These are significant assumptions, and recent history teaches us that they can be undermined by unpredictable events—a miscalibrated strike, an ill-timed statement, or a maritime incident in the Persian Gulf.

The Scenario of Uncontrolled Escalation

The alternative scenario is that of uncontrolled escalation. If Iran decides to respond to Israeli strikes in a way that directly threatens U.S. or Saudi interests—for example, by attacking oil facilities in the Gulf or attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz—the dynamics could quickly spiral beyond the control of all parties involved. In this scenario, neither Moscow nor Beijing could remain on the sidelines. Beijing would face a potentially serious energy crisis. Moscow would have to choose between its Iranian ally and its interests in regional stability. The United States would likely be drawn into a direct conflict that it had been seeking to avoid. This scenario is still considered a long shot in analysts’ probability calculations, but it cannot be ruled out—and the mere possibility of it is enough to explain the intensity of behind-the-scenes diplomatic activity.

Scenarios that experts deem impossible have an unfortunate tendency to come true. August 1914. September 2001. February 2022. Each time, experts had explained why it couldn’t happen. Let us be wary of certainties in times of crisis.

What This Crisis Reveals About the Emerging Multipolar World

Multipolarity Put to the Test

Beyond the Iranian crisis itself, what we are witnessing right now is a full-scale test of the multipolar world that Moscow and Beijing have been calling for for years. In the official rhetoric of both countries, multipolarity represents an international system that is fairer, more stable, and more respectful of state sovereignty than U.S. unipolar hegemony. But the Iran crisis starkly reveals the limits of this vision. A multipolar world in which each great power protects its own interests at the expense of the common good is not necessarily more stable than a unipolar world. On the contrary, it may be more fragmented, more unpredictable, and more difficult to govern collectively—precisely because there is no mechanism for coordination among powers that share nothing but their hostility to American dominance, not a shared vision of the world order they wish to build.

China wants stability to protect its economy. Russia wants freedom of maneuver to pursue its objectives in Ukraine. Iran wants the survival of its regime and recognition of its regional power. Israel wants to eliminate an existential threat. The United States wants to maintain its regional influence without getting involved in a new, costly conflict. These interests do not naturally converge toward a stable equilibrium. They clash, collide, create friction, and pose unpredictable risks of escalation. This is the reality of the multipolar world currently taking shape—less romantic than its theoretical description.

The UN and Multilateral Institutions Confronted by Their Structural Powerlessness

The Iranian crisis confirms what many observers have long denounced: the structural impotence of multilateral institutions in the face of crises that directly pit major powers against one another. The UN Security Council is paralyzed by the veto powers of Russia and China, which block any binding resolution against Iran. In turn, the United States blocks any resolution that might constrain Israel. The result is an institution incapable of acting collectively precisely at the moments when its action would be most needed. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose role is to monitor Iran’s nuclear program, operates in a context where its reports are regularly contested or ignored by the parties involved. All these institutions reveal their fundamental limitation: they can function during periods of cooperation, but they fade into the background as soon as the major powers choose confrontation.

We established international institutions to prevent world wars. They succeeded, to a certain extent, for 80 years. But in a world where the major powers are once again becoming direct rivals, these institutions are showing their cracks. The 21st century will either have to reform them thoroughly or watch them become obsolete.

Conclusion: Two Giants, One Lie, and a Hard Truth

The Lie of the Unbreakable Alliance

The Iranian crisis has laid bare, with brutal clarity, the great lie of the Sino-Russian alliance as it is often described: the idea that Moscow and Beijing form a coherent, united, and strategically aligned bloc against the West. The reality is infinitely more nuanced, more fragile, and more self-serving than this image suggests. Both countries share a genuine hostility toward American dominance, but their visions of the alternative world order they wish to build differ. Russia wants a world in which it can reestablish a regional sphere of influence and regain the great-power status it lost with the end of the USSR. China wants a world in which it can become the world’s leading economy and exercise global leadership, without necessarily upending all the rules of the international game. These two visions are not incompatible, but neither are they identical—and crises such as the one in Iran reveal their profound differences.

As for Iran, it is gradually discovering what it really means to have partners who value you more for your strategic utility than for your well-being. Moscow needed the Shahed drones for Ukraine, not to defend Iranian territory. Beijing needed cheap Iranian oil, not to protect the Islamic Republic from Israeli strikes. These harsh realities come as no surprise to Iranian strategists, who have long been aware of the nature of these partnerships. But seeing them laid bare so starkly in the context of an existential crisis has a revelatory effect that is redrawing the contours of the global geopolitical landscape.

The Hard Truth of a World in Transition

The hard truth that this crisis forces upon us is that we are living in a particularly dangerous period of geopolitical transition. The old world order, dominated by the United States since the end of the Cold War, is crumbling. The new multipolar order that claims to replace it has not yet been born—and its birth is likely to be painful. In this limbo, crises like the one in Iran thrive, fueled by ambiguous alliances, competing interests, and the absence of effective mechanisms for collective risk management. The war in Iran—or what could become one—is not merely a regional crisis. It is a symptom of this global transition, a manifestation of the tectonic tensions running through an international system undergoing profound change. To understand this is to begin to understand the century unfolding before us—with all its uncertainties, risks, and unprecedented possibilities.

Signed, Jacques Pj Provost

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