GEOPOLITICS: China Is Going All In on North Korea

North Korea’s Shield Against U.S. Encirclement

Asian geopolitics has shifted dramatically. The alliance between the United States, Japan, and South Korea has never been stronger, and Xi Jinping is well aware of this. In 2023, the three countries signed the Camp David Pact, a historic agreement that strengthens their military and technological cooperation. Since then, joint military exercises have increased, intelligence-sharing has intensified, and Seoul and Tokyo no longer hesitate to openly discuss the possibility of preemptive strikes against North Korean nuclear sites. In this context, North Korea is no longer just an ally—it is a bulwark.

For China, a strong and independent North Korea is a strategic necessity. It helps divide U.S. forces in Asia, prevent the unification of the peninsula under South Korean leadership (which would mean a permanent NATO presence on its borders), and maintain a buffer zone between its territory and U.S. military bases in Japan and South Korea. Without Pyongyang, Beijing would be directly exposed to US Navy missiles and aircraft carriers. With Kim Jong-un as an ally—even an unstable one—China gains leverage against Washington. A nuclear North Korea is a risk, but a pro-Russian North Korea would be a catastrophe.

Imagine for a moment a map of Asia without North Korea as a buffer state. U.S. missiles in Seoul would be just minutes away from Beijing. U.S. Navy aircraft carriers could patrol the Yellow Sea. And China, that giant that sees itself as invulnerable, would find itself as vulnerable as a colossus with feet of clay. That is why Xi Jinping must shake Kim Jong-un’s hand, even if that handshake burns his fingers.

The Unfulfilled Economic Dream of Northeast China

It’s not just geopolitics that’s driving Xi Jinping to visit Pyongyang. There’s also the economy—and more specifically, Northeast China, a region that was once prosperous but is now in decline. Manchuria, the industrial cradle of Maoist China, has seen its economy stagnate for decades, stifled by an aging population, inefficient state-owned enterprises, and a lack of openness. Yet this region has one major asset: its border with North Korea.

If relations between Beijing and Pyongyang improve, and if North Korea agrees to open its borders—even if only partially—northeastern China could finally catch its breath. The port of Rajin in North Korea could become a gateway to the Sea of Japan, offering China direct access to a new trade route. The Rason Special Economic Zone, long neglected, could be revitalized, creating jobs and attracting investment. And the Tumen River, which marks the border between China, North Korea, and Russia, could finally become an economic artery connecting Northeast Asia. Putin and Xi discussed this very issue during their last meeting, proof that the matter is being taken seriously.

However, all of this remains hypothetical. Kim Jong-un has never shown much enthusiasm for Chinese-style economic reforms. And even if China is ready to invest heavily, international sanctions and North Korea’s isolation make any large-scale cooperation extremely difficult. But Beijing has no choice: if it wants to revitalize its Northeast, it must go through Pyongyang. And if it wants to keep Pyongyang within its sphere of influence, it must offer it economic prospects that Moscow cannot provide.

A Pariah Leader’s Quest for Legitimacy

Kim Jong-un has nothing left to prove within his own country. After eliminating his rivals, silencing the opposition, and establishing a cult of personality even more absolute than that of his father or grandfather, his power is unchallenged. Yet, abroad, things are quite different. The North Korean leader remains a pariah, a man whom the international community treats with suspicion, even contempt. And that is precisely why he needs Xi Jinping.

Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea in 2024 was a masterstroke for Kim Jong-un. For the first time in years, a leader of a major power extended a hand to him without demanding immediate concessions. Putin even signed a mutual defense pact with Pyongyang, promising a military response in the event of an attack on North Korea. Yet, as symbolic as it may be, this alliance has its limits. Russia is a giant with feet of clay: isolated, sanctioned, and at war in Ukraine, it lacks the means to offer North Korea what it truly needs—sustainable economic development.

Kim Jong-un knows this: Putin is a useful ally, but not enough. Russia can supply him with weapons, military technology, and protection against external strikes. But it cannot offer him what China can: markets, investments, and a gateway to the world. And above all, it cannot offer him the international legitimacy he desperately needs.

The difficult choice: Moscow or Beijing?

For Kim Jong-un, the question is not about choosing between China and Russia, but about making the most of both. Putin offers him what Xi Jinping cannot or will not give him: unconditional military support, recognition of his nuclear status, and an alliance against the West. But Moscow has its own limitations. Russia is a country in relative decline, whose economy depends largely on energy exports and whose influence in Asia remains limited. China, on the other hand, is the world’s second-largest economy, a key player on the international stage, and the only country capable of making North Korea a viable state.

Yet Kim Jong-un is no fool. He knows that Beijing has long hesitated to recognize him as a full-fledged partner, and that Xi Jinping delayed his visit for years. This hesitation is a weakness, and Kim Jong-un intends to take full advantage of it. By welcoming Xi with full honors, he is sending a clear message: North Korea is not a vassal state, but a full-fledged partner, courted by the major powers. And if Beijing wants to maintain its influence, it will have to pay the price—whether in terms of economic support, political recognition, or security guarantees.

For Kim Jong-un, the stakes are twofold. First, to consolidate his regime by securing assurances from the major powers. Second, to prepare for the future. If North Korea ever decides to open up to the world—which remains a distant possibility—it will turn to Beijing, not Moscow. Russia is a partner of convenience; China is a long-standing partner. And Kim Jong-un knows this full well.

The Inevitable Escalation with Seoul and Tokyo

A rapprochement between Beijing and Pyongyang will not be without consequences. South Korea and Japan, already on high alert in the face of the North Korean threat, will view this visit as yet another provocation. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has already warned that any official recognition by China of North Korea’s nuclear status would be considered a direct threat to his country’s security. Tokyo, for its part, has strengthened its defense capabilities, notably through the acquisition of cruise missiles capable of striking targets in North Korea.

The most likely response will be an acceleration of military cooperation between Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. Already, the three countries are conducting increasingly frequent joint exercises, and the United States has deployed nuclear submarines to South Korea for the first time since 1981. If Beijing strengthens its ties with Pyongyang, the U.S. alliance in Asia could harden further, creating a vicious cycle in which every move by one side triggers a reaction from the other. The Korean Peninsula could then become the scene of a new arms race, with all the risks that entails.

China is playing with fire. By drawing closer to North Korea, it hopes to gain a strategic ally. But above all, it risks triggering a chain reaction that could lead to increased militarization in Asia, or even open conflict. And in this dangerous game, it is the people—Koreans, Chinese, and Japanese—who will pay the highest price.

The Trap of Dependence on Pyongyang

There is another risk, more subtle but just as real: China could find itself trapped by its own strategy. By relying too heavily on Pyongyang to counter U.S. influence in Asia, Beijing is giving Kim Jong-un leverage he has never had before. North Korea has already shown that it is willing to play the major powers off against one another. If Xi Jinping makes too many concessions to Kim Jong-un—whether in terms of economic support, political recognition, or military guarantees—he could find himself in a situation where Pyongyang dictates the terms of the relationship.

Then there is the question of China’s international image. Beijing presents itself as a defender of peace and stability in Asia. Yet by supporting a regime as repressive and unpredictable as Kim Jong-un’s, it risks undermining its credibility on the world stage. The United States and its allies will undoubtedly highlight this contradiction, and Southeast Asian countries—already wary of China—might view this rapprochement as further proof that Beijing is willing to sacrifice its principles for strategic interests.

Finally, it must not be forgotten that North Korea remains an unpredictable state. Kim Jong-un has shown on several occasions that he is willing to defy the international community, whether by conducting nuclear tests, launching ballistic missiles, or carrying out cyberattacks against its neighbors. If Beijing aligns itself too openly with Pyongyang, it could find itself drawn into crises beyond its control. China needs North Korea, but North Korea may well end up costing China more than it brings in.

North Korea, the Pivot of the New Cold War

Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang takes place within a context far broader than the simple bilateral relationship between China and North Korea. It is a symptom—and perhaps a catalyst—of the new Cold War taking shape in Asia. The United States, China, and Russia are engaged in a ruthless competition for control of the region, and the Korean Peninsula is one of the main battlegrounds.

For Washington, the stakes are clear: to prevent China from dominating Asia. The United States has therefore strengthened its alliances with Japan and South Korea, while seeking to isolate North Korea and limit Beijing’s influence in the region. For Beijing, the goal is to break this encirclement by relying on partners such as Pyongyang and Moscow. And for Putin, North Korea represents an opportunity to destabilize the West and strengthen his alliance with China, while obtaining weapons and technology for his war effort in Ukraine.

In this great game, North Korea is no longer merely a pawn: it has become a full-fledged player. Kim Jong-un has realized that his country’s geographic position and nuclear arsenal give him unprecedented leverage. And he intends to use it to maximize his gains, whether in terms of security, the economy, or international recognition. Xi Jinping’s visit is therefore much more than a mere diplomatic trip: it is a pivotal moment in the reconfiguration of the balance of power in Asia.

Asia is dividing into blocs, just as Europe did during the Cold War. And in this new world, North Korea could well be the Berlin of tomorrow: a flashpoint where tensions between the major powers risk escalating into open conflict. The question is no longer whether China needs North Korea, but whether the world is prepared to pay the price for this alliance.

Toward a Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang Axis?

One of the most pressing questions is whether China, Russia, and North Korea are forming a military and political axis in Asia. The signs are there: meetings between Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin are becoming more frequent, Sino-Russian military cooperation has never been stronger, and Pyongyang is supplying Moscow with weapons for its war effort in Ukraine. If Xi Jinping openly aligns himself with this dynamic, Asia could slip into an era of direct confrontation between the blocs.

Yet such an axis would have its limits. China and Russia have converging interests—weakening U.S. influence, challenging the international order—but also deep differences. Beijing has no interest in Moscow becoming too powerful in Asia, and Putin has no desire to see China dominate the region. As for Kim Jong-un, he has no desire to become a vassal of either side. His goal is to remain in control by playing the major powers off against one another.

Nevertheless, the momentum has been set in motion. And if Xi Jinping isn’t careful, he could find himself caught in a spiral where every concession to Pyongyang or Moscow brings him a little closer to a direct conflict with Washington and its allies. China needs North Korea, but it must also ask itself how far it is willing to go to keep it on its side.

A cold-hearted but necessary calculation

Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea is a gamble—a risky but necessary one. For Beijing, the challenge is to rethink its relationship with Pyongyang in light of new geopolitical realities. North Korea is a nuclear power, whether China likes it or not. Moscow is an increasingly prominent partner in Asia, and Washington will not fail to exploit even the slightest crack in the Sino-North Korean alliance. In this context, Xi Jinping has no choice: he must act, or risk seeing his influence on the Korean Peninsula erode permanently.

However, this gamble carries major risks. A rapprochement with Pyongyang could exacerbate tensions with Seoul and Tokyo, strengthen the U.S. alliance in Asia, and undermine China’s international credibility. It could also give Kim Jong-un a leverage he has never had before, transforming North Korea into a client state that is as burdensome as it is indispensable. And then there is the ultimate risk: that of an open conflict, in which China would find itself dragged into a war it has neither the means nor the desire to wage.

China is walking a tightrope. On one side lies the abyss of a loss of influence in Asia. On the other, the precipice of a confrontation with the West. And in the middle, Kim Jong-un, that little dictator with the air of a puppeteer, pulling the strings with a smirk. Xi Jinping knows he has no choice. But he also knows that every step forward could be one step too far.

Asia at a Crossroads

Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang marks a turning point in Asian history. China has chosen its side: that of realpolitik, where principles give way to strategic interests. Pyongyang, for its part, has gained a level of recognition it has never had before. And Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo now know they will have to reckon with an increasingly assertive Beijing-Pyongyang axis.

Yet the story is not yet written. Kim Jong-un remains an unpredictable partner, and Putin an unreliable ally. China could well find itself trapped by its own calculations, and Asia could plunge into an era of confrontation from which no one would emerge a winner. One thing is certain: the great Asian game has just entered a critical phase. And Xi Jinping’s visit is its first act.

When Xi Jinping shakes hands with Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang, it will not merely be a handshake between two leaders. It will symbolize a world in upheaval, where old certainties are crumbling and new alliances are being forged in the shadows. China needs North Korea. But North Korea, for its part, needs no one. And that is the real problem.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist