COLUMN: DRAGON, the Ukrainian air defense system that combines Soviet and Western technology

Maxime Marquette

2026-06-22 15:22:02

R-73, AIM-9M, R-60: A Trinity of Air-to-Air Missiles

The DRAGON fires three missiles: the R-73 (range of 10 to 15 km), the AIM-9M (8 to 10 km), and the R-60 (5 km).

All three missiles are equipped with infrared seeker heads. They lock onto the thermal signature of a drone or enemy aircraft.

The modernized R-60: range confirmed at 6.5 km from the ground

The Soviet R-60 has undergone a digital modernization as part of the DRAGON program. Range from the ground: 6.5 kilometers, validated in live-fire tests.

This modernization transforms an obsolete Soviet missile into an active component of a 21st-century system. Ukraine has extracted value from an abandoned legacy.

Taking a Soviet missile from the 1970s, giving it a digital brain, and firing it at an Iranian drone in 2026—that is survival engineering in its purest form.

The BALOO Trailer: Extended Range and Firepower

Six to eight missiles, 240 liters of nitrogen

The BALOO trailer carries six to eight missiles—eight AIM-9s or four AIM-9s plus two R-73s—and 240 liters of nitrogen.

The nitrogen cools the seeker heads. Without nitrogen, the missiles cannot lock onto a target. The BALOO ensures firing autonomy in remote areas.

Deploys in fifteen minutes, active for eight hours, on standby for fourteen days

Deploys in fifteen minutes. Operational for eight hours. Stands by for fourteen days without major maintenance.

Rapid deployment, long standby—ideal for mobile air defense in a war of shifting positions.

Fifteen minutes to deploy, fourteen days on standby—the DRAGON does not defend a fixed point. It tracks combatants, covers their movements, and disappears before counter-battery fire can strike.

Wired Command and Starlink: Total Remote Control

Wired or satellite remote control

The DRAGON is controlled by a wired remote control or via Starlink. The operator remains in a safe location, far from the launcher.

“Fire-and-forget” principle: once fired, the operator leaves. The missile guides itself. The launcher is either recovered or abandoned.

Immediate evacuation after launch: surviving counter-battery fire

Immediate evacuation is a core tenet of the DRAGON system. Russian radars can pinpoint a launcher in a matter of seconds. Staying behind means certain death.

By leaving immediately after firing, operators minimize their exposure. This doctrine has been validated since 2024.

Fire and flee—this is the doctrine that has saved hundreds of lives in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now in Ukraine. DRAGON has integrated it into its very design.

DRAGON vs. Shahed: Documented Results

A system designed for saturation drones

Iranian Shahed drones are slow, noisy, and have a distinct infrared signature—exactly the kind of targets for which infrared-guided missiles were designed.

DRAGON covers the blind spots of conventional systems in Ukraine’s air defense.

Complementarity with NATO systems

The DRAGON does not replace the Patriot, NASAMS, or IRIS-T systems. It complements them by covering low-altitude and short-range threats.

This complementarity creates a layered defense where each threat is met by the appropriate system.

A seamless air defense shield is the sum of about a hundred complementary systems. The DRAGON is one of the pieces of the puzzle that Ukraine has been assembling for the past two years.

The HMMWV variant: the Dragon H73 MAZRK mobile vehicle

Two R-73 launchers, thermal imaging, electronic warfare

The 3rd Separate Assault Brigade operates the Dragon H73 MAZRK: two R-73 rail guns mounted on an HMMWV, with integrated thermal imaging and electronic warfare capabilities.

This version transforms the DRAGON into a mobile air defense escort system. It fills a gap in Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.

Integrated electronic warfare: blind the enemy before striking

The Dragon H73 MAZRK’s electronic warfare system disrupts enemy communications before the strike. It follows the same logic as the Scorpion V5 on the Sirena.

Electronic jamming and kinetic strikes on a single vehicle—something Western militaries have been seeking for years with far larger budgets.

An HMMWV equipped with two R-73 missiles, a thermal camera, and a jammer—this is the ground-based version of what industrial defense contractors take ten years to approve. Ukraine did it in eighteen months.

The SeaDRAGON naval version: toward a sea without limits

Sirena and SeaDRAGON: The DRAGON Sets Sail

The SeaDRAGON on the Sirena is the maritime version of the DRAGON. It carries AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles adapted for an unmanned naval platform.

Unveiled at Eurosatory 2026 alongside the land-based DRAGON, the SeaDRAGON demonstrates the system’s scalability.

The Convergence of Combat Domains

DRAGON on land, SeaDRAGON at sea, H73 MAZRK on wheels—same missile, three distinct operational domains.

This convergence of domains is NATO’s multi-domain defense doctrine. Ukraine has implemented it under real-world constraints, ahead of any institutional framework.

Same missile, three platforms, three domains—the DRAGON has become a full-fledged family in less than three years. Western weapons system designers would do well to take note.

Upcoming integrations: AIM-9X Block II and ST-100

Next-Generation Missiles on the DRAGON

The DRAGON will soon be equipped with the AIM-9X Block II—the most advanced air-to-air missile in the U.S. arsenal, offering superior range and lethality.

The Ukrainian ST-100 missile, currently under development, is intended for the DRAGON. Ukraine will soon have a fully Ukrainian-made missile on this platform.

A system that evolves with the war

Every update to the DRAGON increases its range, lethality, and resistance to countermeasures. It is not a static system.

Russia cannot predict which version of the DRAGON will be in service six months from now. This unpredictability is a tactical advantage.

Integrating the AIM-9X Block II into the DRAGON means putting NATO’s most advanced missile in the hands of Ukrainian fighters for twenty thousand dollars per platform. A decisive investment.

Taras Chmut and Come Back Alive: When Civil Society Funds the Defense Effort

The First Orders in 2023

The first DRAGON systems were ordered in 2023 by Taras Chmut of the Come Back Alive association—the largest civilian fundraising organization for the Ukrainian military.

An NGO ordering a weapons system—this demonstrates that operational urgency takes precedence over all institutional procurement procedures.

From Civilian Fundraising to Military Integration

Less than two years after Come Back Alive placed its first orders, the DRAGON was integrated into the Ukrainian armed forces. This is unprecedented in the history of modern weaponry.

Ukrainian civil society funded a revolution in light air defense. An unprecedented model of crowdfunding.

A citizens’ association orders an anti-aircraft system, and two years later it is in service with the armed forces—this is Ukrainian civilian mobilization at its most extraordinary.

The DRAGON at Eurosatory 2026: A Strategic Presence

Paris as a Showcase for Allies

The presentation at Eurosatory 2026 aims to convince NATO partners to purchase, co-develop, or fund future versions.

For nations seeking a lightweight, mobile air defense system, the DRAGON combines low cost, proven performance, and combat experience that no competitor can match.

A combat record that speaks for itself

The DRAGON is not a prototype. It has eighteen months of real-world experience against Shahed drones, cruise missiles, and enemy aircraft.

This combat record is the most powerful selling point at Eurosatory. No competitor offers such a recent and verifiable track record.

Eighteen months of real combat against Russia’s best weapons—the DRAGON has passed the test that exhibition booths cannot simulate. This track record is worth more than any brochure.

What the DRAGON Reveals About Ukraine's Defense Doctrine

Innovation Driven by Necessity as a Model

DRAGON was born out of a constraint: Ukraine lacked short-range air defense capabilities. The solution: repurpose existing Soviet and Western missiles.

This model of innovation born of necessity—adapting rather than developing from scratch—produced an effective system in a fraction of the usual time.

Stealth, mobility, cost-effectiveness: the Ukrainian triad

The DRAGON embodies the Ukrainian triad: stealth (rapid deployment, immediate withdrawal), mobility (land, sea, wheeled), and economy (recycled missiles).

This triad stands in contrast to the Russian doctrine of mass and human sacrifice. Two philosophies clash every day on the same front.

Stealth, mobility, economy—the DRAGON is the Ukrainian doctrine embodied in metal and silicon. Faced with Russian mass, Ukraine has chosen intelligence. And it’s working.

The Geopolitical Impact: A Message to Moscow and Beijing

Russia must now defend its aircraft against ground-based threats

With the DRAGON, Russian aircraft flying at low altitudes are no longer safe. An operator can engage a Su-25 or a helicopter from ten kilometers away.

This threat is forcing the Russian Air Force to change its tactics, flight altitudes, and approach routes. The DRAGON has changed the rules of engagement.

An exportable system for nations under pressure

Taiwan, the Baltic states, and partners under pressure—they see the DRAGON as a system suited to their budgetary constraints.

SpetsTechnoExport at Eurosatory 2026: available now, at prices Western arsenals cannot compete with.

While Russia buys North Korean missiles and Iranian drones, Ukraine is exporting its own innovations at the world’s most prestigious defense exhibitions. The technological balance of power has shifted.

The Human Dimension: DRAGON Operators on the Front Lines

Train operators in just a few weeks

The DRAGON can be trained in a matter of weeks, not months. This accessibility allows for its large-scale deployment within an army at war.

On the front lines, with rapid unit rotations and heavy casualties, a system that can be learned quickly remains effective under constant pressure.

Fire-and-forget: a doctrine that protects operators

The “fire-and-forget” principle protects the operator, the launcher, and the missiles in the BALOO trailer. Leaving the position saves lives.

This doctrine makes every DRAGON operator a survivable combatant. The survival of experienced combatants is just as strategic as the destruction of the enemy.

A DRAGON operator who fires and disappears before the counter-battery fire arrives—that is the 21st-century fighter. Effective, survivable, technologically advanced. Ukraine is training hundreds of them every month.

The Future of DRAGON: Toward a National Air Defense System

From a Niche Weapon to a Layered National Defense System

The DRAGON began as a niche weapon. It is now becoming a component of the national air defense system, alongside the Patriot, NASAMS, and Gepard.

With the integration of the AIM-9X and ST-100, the DRAGON will cover increasing ranges. It is no longer merely a supplementary weapon.

The Ukrainian Model as a Benchmark for NATO

NATO has been seeking a lightweight, mobile air defense system for years. The DRAGON is that solution—proven in live-fire conditions.

If NATO draws inspiration from it, Ukraine will have redefined the standards for allied air defense.

Ukraine did not wait for peace to innovate. It innovated during the war. And what it built under bombardment could well become the standard for light air defense across the entire West.

Conclusion: DRAGON proves that necessity is the mother of invention

A system that would never have existed without the war

The DRAGON would never have been developed in peacetime. It took the urgency of total war and Ukrainian ingenuity to bring it into being.

From “Come Back Alive” in 2023 to Paris in 2026—a journey that takes other nations a decade to complete.

What the world should take away from this system

The DRAGON isn’t just Ukrainian. It symbolizes what the West can achieve when it stops dithering and builds to survive.

The next war will be won by the forces that innovate quickly, adapt better, and learn from their mistakes. Not by those with the biggest budgets.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist