INVESTIGATION: Gasoline Shortage in Moscow — Record Price Hike and Rationing in 53 Regions

Maxime Marquette

2026-06-22 15:20:26

Forty percent of refining capacity is offline

According to Euromaidan Press: 40% of Russian refining capacity was out of service in early June 2026. This is the cumulative result of Ukrainian strikes since 2024.

May 2026: 4.58 million barrels per day, the lowest level since 2009. Early June: below 4 million—the lowest in 21 years.

A series of strikes on refineries

Ukrainian drones struck eight of the ten largest refineries in May 2026. The TANECO refinery (Tatneft, Tatarstan) was struck on June 12.

The Kapotnya MNPZ, Moscow’s main refinery, was struck on June 16 and 18: 100 percent of its capacity was neutralized in two days.

Forty percent of refining capacity is out of service in a country whose war economy relies on oil—this is not a temporary crisis. It is a deliberate structural collapse.

Tatneft limits sales: 20 liters of gasoline, 40 liters of diesel

An Unprecedented Rationing Measure

Following the strike at TANECO, Tatneft has imposed sales limits: 20 liters of gasoline and 40 liters of diesel per customer.

A major distributor is rationing its own customers. This is an admission that supply is no longer guaranteed.

Rationing extended to other regions

Rationing in Moscow and Northern Russia had begun as early as the start of June 2026, reports The Moscow Times. Sales caps were in place even before June 12.

The crisis was already escalating before Kapotnya. Previous airstrikes had depleted reserves. Kapotnya precipitated the collapse.

Twenty liters of gasoline per customer at Tatneft stations—that is the rationalization of industrial defeat. In Russia, gasoline is not rationed in times of victory.

The shortage is spreading: fifteen to twenty-five regions in five days

The spread documented by Euromaidan Press

As of June 6: 15 regions affected. As of June 11: 25 regions. In five days. The spread was rapid and well-documented.

As early as the beginning of June: Saint Petersburg, Belgorod, Kursk, and occupied Luhansk—militarily sensitive border regions.

Fifty-three regions affected by mid-June

As of June 19, 2026, according to Al Jazeera: 53 Russian regions facing shortages—more than half the country’s territory.

The Russian logistics network is collapsing. Russia does not have the strategic reserves to simultaneously compensate for 40% of its capacity being out of service.

Fifteen regions on June 6, twenty-five on June 11, fifty-three on June 19—this increase is not linear. It is exponential. And no one in the Kremlin is in control of it.

Yaroslav Kabakov: “A Real Fuel Crisis”

A Russian Economist Shatters the Denial

Yaroslav Kabakov, a Russian economic analyst: Russia is experiencing a “real fuel crisis.” That phrase speaks volumes.

In Russia, it’s rare to admit to a systemic crisis linked to the war. When an analyst uses the word “crisis,” the numbers have made denial impossible.

Peskov denies it: “Supply and demand are balanced”

The Kremlin, via Dmitry Peskov: “Supply and demand are balanced.” This came on the very same day that gas stations were rationing sales.

The usual gap between the official line and the line of people waiting. Drivers are stuck in line. Peskov lives in the press release.

Kabakov calls it a “real fuel crisis.” Peskov says “supply and demand are balanced.” One looks at the lines. The other looks at his teleprompter. It’s not the same country.

The sharpest price increase since 2018

SPIMEX Figures

SPIMEX reports a monthly increase of 3.93% for gasoline: the sharpest rise since 2018.

Year-to-date: diesel +43%, jet fuel +40%. These increases can no longer be masked by government subsidies.

The 700 billion rubles in subsidies

The Russian government: 700 billion rubles ($9.7 billion) in subsidies in 2026. Without this injection, the market would collapse.

Even with subsidies, price increases are reaching record levels. The 700 billion rubles are keeping prices from plummeting. This is disaster management.

Subsidizing with billions to keep prices at “only” +3.93% per month—that’s how low things have sunk. And the Ukrainian harvest season isn’t even over yet.

Russian Railways Sets Up a Crisis Response Team

Russian Railways Mobilizes

Russian Railways has set up a crisis task force to manage fuel shortages across its network, according to The Moscow Times.

A railway system setting up a crisis task force for its fuel supply—in an oil-producing country. That fact says it all.

Agricultural and Military Shipments Take Priority

Agricultural shipments and military needs take precedence over civilian sales. Fuel is becoming a strategic resource allocated by the state.

This approach is reminiscent of the Soviet war economy. Putin’s Russia is reverting to 20th-century scarcity-era reflexes.

When Russian Railways sets up a crisis task force for its fuel, it means the superpower is managing a shortage economy—just as it did in the Soviet era.

Aksionov Suspends Civilian Sales in Crimea

June 21: Civilians No Longer Have Access to Fuel

On June 21, 2026, Governor Aksionov (occupied Crimea) suspends all sales to civilians. The military is given absolute priority.

In Crimea, war is no longer an abstraction. It is the inability to fill up on gas. Military priority is a daily reality.

Alyona in Sevastopol: a voice that sums it all up

Alyona, a driver in Sevastopol, told Reuters: “How can this be resolved? Only if the special military operation ends.”

Coming from a foreign journalist, this statement is remarkable. Even in Russia, some are drawing a line between war and scarcity.

Alyona isn’t an activist. She’s a driver who can’t fill up her tank. And she’s saying what analysts have been saying for two years: war and scarcity are one and the same.

Lukoil is halting sales of gasoline in cans throughout the country

The Most Radical Measure in the Oil Industry

Russia’s largest oil company, Lukoil, has stopped selling fuel in cans across its entire national network, according to Euromaidan Press.

Official reason: “seasonal demand.” Real reason: to prevent speculative buying and informal stockpiling, which are exacerbating the shortage.

What this move reveals about the state of reserves

When the leading company stops selling fuel in cans, reserves are under pressure. The decision is operational, not symbolic.

The Russian oil sector is operating in emergency mode. Companies are implicitly rationalizing without calling it by name.

Lukoil has stopped selling in cans. Tatneft has limited sales to twenty liters. Aksionov has suspended sales to civilians. These three measures paint a clear picture: Russia is rationing its own oil.

The Impact on Border Cities and Military Zones

Belgorod, Kursk: Shortages at the Front Lines

Belgorod and Kursk—border regions—are among the first to be affected. These cities rely on fuel for military operations and civilian logistics.

The shortage there is militarily significant: Russian logistics vehicles are drawing from the same reserves as civilian gas stations.

Saint Petersburg: The second city affected as early as the beginning of June

Saint Petersburg, Russia’s second-largest city, faced shortages as early as the beginning of June 2026, according to Euromaidan Press. Rationing is in effect at the city’s gas stations.

St. Petersburg and Moscow simultaneously: the crisis is not limited to the outskirts. It is striking the centers of Russian power.

Shortages in Moscow and Saint Petersburg simultaneously—it is no longer just the outskirts that are suffering. It is the very heart of Russian power. And the Kremlin must deal with this head-on.

Russia as an Importer of Refined Fuel

The world’s third-largest producer buys from abroad

Russia was planning to import refined products by sea in June 2026. Reported by Reuters.

This marks a symbolic turning point in this war. The world’s third-largest producer is buying gasoline because its refineries are shut down. In industrial terms—a defeat.

Sanctions as a structural amplifier

Western sanctions are blocking the flow of spare parts. Repairs take months. Every month is another month of shortages.

This is the synergy between Ukrainian strikes and Western sanctions—two levers that reinforce each other to deprive Russia’s war economy of its fuel.

Ukrainian drones are destroying refineries. Western sanctions are blocking spare parts. Together, they are causing the most severe shortage since 2018. This is a coordinated strategy.

The Economic Impact on the War Economy

A Skyrocketing Budget Deficit

Russian economy: contracted in Q1 2026 for the first time in three years. Deficit: six trillion rubles, 2.6% of GDP, exceeding the projected level by 60%.

Shortages and subsidies are widening this deficit. The Bank of Russia is pursuing a contradictory monetary policy: supporting the war while containing inflation.

Russian associations are calling for an emergency rate cut

Russian associations have asked the Bank of Russia to cut its interest rate by one percentage point—to prevent the economy from “coming to a complete standstill.”

Fuel costs and borrowing costs are rising simultaneously. Russian industrial production is suffering as a result.

Russian associations begging their central bank not to let their economy freeze up—that’s not the language of an economy marching toward victory. It’s the language of an economy struggling to avoid collapse.

What the Shortage Says About the State of the War

The Ukrainian campaign has achieved its economic objectives

By striking refineries since 2024, Ukraine has achieved what no financial sanctions had managed to do so quickly: a nationwide fuel shortage.

Ukraine’s strategy targets infrastructure that takes a long time to repair—equipment whose parts are blocked by sanctions. This is precision economic warfare.

Pressure on the Russian population

“Russia’s Hunger Games for Gasoline”—a phrase coined by independent Russian media—became a reality in June 2026 across 53 regions.

Every citizen standing in line for twenty liters calculates the cost of the war. The Kremlin controls television. It does not control the gas pump.

The Kremlin can shut down the internet, control television, and arrest dissidents. But it cannot fill the gas pumps when its refineries are burning. That is the limit of absolute power.

The Issue of Russia's Strategic Reserves

Reserves Insufficient to Compensate

Russia maintains strategic reserves. But they are not large enough to cover a nationwide shortage affecting 53 regions simultaneously.

The rail and pipeline networks cannot quickly reroute flows. Crisis logistics take time—time that the refineries do not have.

The Kremlin’s Dwindling Options

The Kremlin can subsidize, ration, or import. Each option comes at a cost. Subsidies widen the deficit. Rationing fuels discontent.

The Moscow Times, June 2026: “The crisis is manageable, but the Kremlin’s options are narrowing.”

“The Kremlin’s Options Are Narrowing”—that’s the headline of a Moscow-based newspaper. When even pro-Russian analyses acknowledge that options are narrowing, the situation is more serious than is officially admitted.

Conclusion: The Gasoline Shortage—Ukraine's Most Effective Weapon in 2026

A strategy that produces lasting results

The Ukrainian drone campaign has triggered the most severe Russian fuel crisis since 2018. The figures are verifiable and cumulative.

The Ukrainian strategy: targeting infrastructure whose repair depends on blocked parts. Strike, wait, strike again.

The issue of allied support remains central

The more advanced systems and funding the allies provide, the more Ukraine can scale up the campaign. The shortage may be just the beginning.

Russia can hold out. But holding out is becoming increasingly costly. That is what economic warfare is supposed to do.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist