FACTCHECK: Tariffs Canceled — 65 billion in refunds Still Owed to Importers

Maxime Marquette

2026-06-24 13:08:51

The IEEPA is not a tariff weapon—the Court has made that clear

The February 20, 2026, decision in Learning Resources, Inc. et al. v. Trump (consolidated with Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc.) established a fundamental principle: the IEEPA allows the President to regulate imports in the event of a national emergency, but it does not grant him the power to set tariffs. Chief Justice John Roberts, author of the majority opinion, articulated the idea with a brevity of language worthy of great constitutional decisions. The White House’s argument—that imposing tariffs was a justified response to a national emergency—was swept aside.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh, in his dissenting opinion, warned, however, that the decision left a considerable “mess” regarding the reimbursement mechanism. He was not wrong. The ruling invalidated all tariff programs based on the IEEPA: the reciprocal duties applied to nearly every country, country-specific tariffs, and the anti-fentanyl duties imposed on China, Canada, and Mexico. Section 232, Section 301, and antidumping duties remain in effect—but the bulk of the aggressive trade policy of the Trump 2.0 era collapsed in a single day.

What the Ruling Invalidates—and What It Does Not Affect

To be clear: the Supreme Court did not invalidate all of Trump’s trade policies. It limited its ruling solely to the IEEPA as a basis for tariffs. Duties based on Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962—which cover imports of steel, aluminum, and copper on national security grounds—remain intact. The same applies to Section 301 duties targeting China’s unfair trade practices. These distinctions are crucial for importers: only the IEEPA component is refundable, not the other duties that sometimes overlapped with the same imports.

In practice, this means that the basis for calculating refunds is more complex than it appears. An importer who paid IEEPA duties in addition to Section 301 duties on Chinese goods will be reimbursed only for the IEEPA component. This is a nuance that many companies discover when filing their claims in the CAPE system—and one that reduces, sometimes significantly, the amount actually recoverable by each individual importer.

What Kavanaugh foresaw—and what we are now experiencing—is that major legal victories do not automatically translate into money in people’s pockets. The ruling was clear. The “chaos” surrounding its implementation, however, is intentional. There is a difference between a court that lays down the law and an executive branch that decides to enforce it at its own pace. I’m not naive: no government—whatever it may be—easily returns $166 billion. But there is an ethical line between administrative complexity and deliberate sabotage.

166 billion: The True Scale of the U.S. Tariff Liability

Mind-boggling figures

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had collected approximately $166 billion in tariffs under the IEEPA—including $134 billion in 2025 alone. This is an unprecedented amount in modern U.S. tariff history, collected from some 330,000 importers over the course of about one year. On March 4, 2026, the Court of International Trade (CIT)—in the case of Atmus Filtration, Inc. v. United States—ordered CBP to reassess all affected entries and refund the overcharged duties, with interest, to all importers, not just the plaintiffs.

The CIT then extended the scope of its order to all representative importers who had paid the IEEPA duties—a universal injunction of rare scope. It is precisely this universality that lies at the heart of the current legal dispute. While 330,000 importers are theoretically eligible, experts estimate that the total potential refunds, including interest, could reach $175 billion. Giants like Costco, FedEx, and Amazon are among the largest potential beneficiaries. Startups and small and medium-sized businesses are also on the list—but with far fewer resources to fight for their rights.

The Reality of the 53 Million Affected Customs Entries

Beyond the dollar amounts, the logistical scale of the refund is measured in the number of customs entries. According to the TariffsTool portal, which compiles CBP data, the pool of IEEPA entries covers approximately 53 million customs entries in total. Declarations filed via the CAPE system and that had passed file validations covered nearly 16 million entries as of June 10, 2026. Of this number, approximately 8.5 million entries had already been cleared or re-cleared without IEEPA duties. On average, CBP processed in six weeks what it would normally process in tariff entries over an entire fiscal year—approximately 338,000 entries in total.

This comparison illustrates the colossal administrative effort required of an agency that, by its own admission, lacked the necessary computer systems to process refunds on this scale in real time. Deputy Commissioner Susan Thomas explicitly told Judge Eaton: “We can’t do everything at once.” This administrative honesty is worth noting—though it must be weighed against the administration’s decision to simultaneously challenge the very orders that mandate this refund.

One hundred sixty-six billion dollars. To put that in perspective: that’s more than Hungary’s annual GDP. It’s the money that American companies—large and small—paid in customs duties on goods that were legally imported into the United States, under a law that the Supreme Court ruled had been misapplied. These companies had absorbed these costs, passed them on to their customers, and restructured their supply chains. And now? The government says, “We’ll reimburse you”—but the process is starting to look more and more like a game of financial hide-and-seek.

The CAPE System: 16 million entries to process, a three-phase process

The Refund Tool: A Deliberately Phased Architecture

To manage the logistical scale of the refund, the CBP created a dedicated portal called CAPE—Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries—which launched on April 20, 2026. The system is built in several phases. Phase 1, active since launch, covers entries that have not yet been cleared and those cleared within 80 days prior to the filing of the claim. According to data provided to the CIT by CBP on June 10, 2026, CAPE filings that have passed file validations cover nearly 16 million entries, of which approximately 8.5 million have already been cleared or re-cleared without IEEPA duties.

Phase 2 is scheduled for June 29, 2026. It expands the portal to include reconciliation entries and entries related to antidumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD), with an estimated potential refund of approximately an additional $28.7 billion, covering 2.8 million additional entries. Phases 1 and 2 combined are expected to cover approximately $130 billion of the total $166 billion. Phase 3, expected by the end of July 2026, will cover so-called definitively settled entries—but only for importers who have filed a lawsuit with the CIT. That’s where the problem lies.

Bottlenecks: ACH, Reconciliation, and AD/CVD

The CAPE process is not without its hiccups. One major obstacle identified is the bottleneck in bank registration: more than 4,000 consolidated refunds had not been forwarded to the U.S. Treasury due to a lack of valid ACH (Automated Clearing House) bank transfer information in the ACE portal—CBP’s secure data system. Since each of these blocked refunds can cover hundreds of individual entries, the financial impact is significant. Importers are urged to ensure that their ACH information is correctly recorded before submitting their claims.

A second obstacle concerns reconciliation and AD/CVD entries excluded from Phase 1: these entries are subject to complex interactions between CBP’s liquidation procedures and the liquidation schedules of the U.S. Department of Commerce, which oversees antidumping duties. CBP cannot process IEEPA refunds on these entries without risking interference with Commerce’s liquidation timeline—hence their exclusion from Phase 1 and their planned inclusion in Phase 2. This technical complexity is real and cannot be attributed to a lack of goodwill.

The logic behind the phased approach warrants closer examination. CBP first processes the simplest cases—clean, automatable entries. Then it moves on to the more complex cases. Finally, the disputed cases. This is a reasonable approach from a technical standpoint. Except that in this specific case, the “disputed cases” potentially represent more than $30 billion and involve importers who, in many cases, could not afford to file a lawsuit. The system structurally favors large players with legal teams. I’m not accusing anyone of designing it this way on purpose—but I can’t ignore that the effect is exactly what the administration intended.

20 billion reimbursed, 146 billion pending: status as of June 22, 2026

What Has Been Paid — and What Remains Due

According to the CBP’s court filing dated May 26, 2026, the CAPE system had accepted approximately $85 to $90 billion in potential and certified refunds for processing. Of this amount, $20.6 billion had been transferred to the U.S. Treasury for disbursement as of May 22, 2026—a figure later updated to approximately $23 to $24 billion according to data from Holland & Knight dated June 15, 2026. Democratic Senators Markey and Wyden, in their June 10, 2026, letter to CBP Commissioner Rodney Scott, cited approximately $146 billion remaining to be refunded.

Susan Thomas, CBP’s Executive Deputy Commissioner, testified before Judge Eaton on June 9, 2026, that the refunds the agency was currently able to process were expected to exceed $60 billion by the end of June. It is this figure—rounded to $65 billion in some analyses—that represents the mid-range of expected short-term refunds. But a major bottleneck remains: more than 4,000 consolidated refunds have not been forwarded to the Treasury due to a lack of valid ACH banking information—each refund may cover hundreds of entries.

Midpoint progress: less than 15% reimbursed after four months

To put this in context: as of May 22, 2026, approximately 20% of the potential 166 billion had been accepted into the CAPE queue—and only a fraction of that amount had actually been transmitted to the Treasury. In raw figures: 20.6 billion transferred out of a potential 166 billion represents approximately 12.4% of the total. By comparison, in the weeks leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision, the U.S. government had collected these tariffs with near-instantaneous efficiency—each tariffed entry was debited as soon as it cleared customs. The refund process, however, takes infinitely longer than the collection process.

CBP also clarified that the administration had argued before Judge Eaton that at least 40 billion would have been disbursed by the end of June 2026 according to its own projections—a commitment made during the June hearings. If this target is met, the total reimbursed as of June 30, 2026, would represent approximately 24% of the total liability. This is certainly progress—but it still leaves more than 120 billion outstanding with no specific timeline for resolution.

Twenty billion repaid out of a potential 166 billion—or about 12%—after four months of operations. At this rate, full repayment would take years. Some experts estimate two to four years. I understand the technical complexity. But I maintain a reasonable doubt: when an administration simultaneously challenges the authority of the court ordering the repayments, appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals, and invokes procedural obstacles at every turn—this is a stalling strategy, not a technical constraint.

The DOJ's Role: Challenging the CIT's Authority to Order Blanket Refunds

The Argument That the Universal Reimbursement Order Is Unconstitutional

On June 2, 2026, the Department of Justice formally filed a notice of appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit challenging the CIT’s order requiring universal refunds. The central argument: the CIT exceeded its jurisdiction by extending the refund proceeding to importers who had not filed claims, and by ordering the refund of entries that had been definitively cleared more than 80 to 180 days prior. On May 29, 2026, the DOJ argued that the CIT’s blanket order was equivalent to a prohibited nationwide injunction—citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. CASA (2025), which had specifically limited the power of lower courts to issue such injunctions.

In practice, if the DOJ’s argument prevailed, refunds for entries that have been definitively liquidated—estimated at over $30 billion—would be available only to importers who had individually obtained an order from the CIT. Government attorney Claudia Burke summed it up at the June 9 hearing: “The issue is before the federal circuit.” ” Translation: Get in line and wait for the courts to decide while your money remains in federal coffers.

The practical consequences for non-plaintiff importers

The DOJ explicitly stated in its filing: “CBP has no authority to reassess or refund funds without a court order.” This position creates a clear divide between two categories of importers. Those who have filed a claim with the CIT—approximately 4,000 importers, according to Holland & Knight—will benefit from Phase 3 of CAPE for their definitively assessed entries. The others—the vast majority of the 330,000 eligible importers—could find themselves in a situation of indefinite limbo regarding this category of entries.

The law firm Holland & Knight has warned that the deadline for filing a protective action with the CIT is itself limited. Every day of inaction increases the risk that additional shipments will be reclassified as definitively cleared—and fall into the legal gray area that the administration is specifically working to protect. The irony is biting: it is the most proactive importers—those who had the resources to file a complaint—who will be fully reimbursed. The others are waiting for leniency from a government that is simultaneously appealing its own obligations.

The DOJ’s argument is technically sophisticated—and politically cynical. Using the Trump v. CASA precedent to block the reimbursement of funds collected under a law that the Supreme Court has just struck down based on rulings by Trump himself… that’s a level of legal circularity that deserves a perverse kind of admiration. They’re fighting the consequence of one ruling by invoking another ruling from the same court. And meanwhile, 146 billion sits idle in federal coffers. I know the term for that: it’s called unjust enrichment—on a national scale.

Definitively Written-Off Receivables: The Gordian Knot of the Disputed 11.4 Billion

Final Assessment: A Technical Concept at the Heart of the Standoff

Under U.S. customs law, assessment is the final determination of the amount of duties owed on an import entry. It generally occurs 314 days after the date of entry. An import is considered definitively assessed once 180 days have elapsed since that initial assessment—the period during which an appeal could be filed. Once this period has passed, according to the position of CBP and the DOJ, the agency no longer has the legal authority to reassess an import or refund funds without a court order specific to that import.

Susan Thomas clarified in her testimony that definitively assessed entries accounted for approximately 6.9% of total IEEPA duties, or about $11.4 billion. DOJ attorney Claudia Burke confirmed before Judge Eaton: “6.9% is the only area of dispute today.” ” But the attorneys representing the importers put forward a strong counterargument: since the tariffs were illegal from the outset, the statutory framework for final liquidation simply does not apply. The constitutional ruling must take precedence over ordinary procedural rules. Judge Eaton had also stated: “The time has come to ensure that all duties are refunded.”

The legal paradox: procedural rules that protect illegality

The argument put forward by the importers’ attorneys deserves to be explored in its full logical scope. If the IEEPA tariffs were unconstitutional ab initio—from the moment they were imposed, without ever having had a valid legal basis—then the liquidation mechanism built around them is itself flawed. One cannot apply the procedural deadlines of an ordinary legal regime to funds collected in violation of the Constitution. The law firm Holland & Knight framed this argument as follows: “To the extent there is a conflict between the liquidation statutes and the Supreme Court’s decision, the constitutional ruling prevails.”

This is precisely the issue the Federal Circuit will have to decide in the coming months. The government’s initial briefs were due on June 17, 2026, with a full brief expected on August 3, 2026. An appellate decision is likely in 2027. Until then, the affected importers find themselves in an uncomfortable legal limbo: they are potentially entitled to refunds that the government refuses to issue, while they wait for a court to decide whether the government had the right to refuse them.

This is the crux of the paradox: if the tariffs were illegal ab initio—from the moment they were imposed—then the entire settlement mechanism built around them is, in a sense, tainted at its source. You cannot invoke the procedural rules of a valid law to protect funds collected under an invalid law. This is what the importers’ attorneys are arguing. And it is, in my view, the strongest argument in this case. The Constitution does not stop at the gates of the CBP’s computer system.

Alleged Obstruction: Senators Markey and Wyden Sound the Alarm

A scathing letter sent to the CBP Commissioner

On June 10, 2026, Senators Edward Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts) and Ron Wyden (Democrat, Oregon) sent a letter to CBP Commissioner Rodney Scott, demanding that refunds be paid without further delay, obstruction, or complications. Their tone was scathing. They accused the administration of “deliberately slowing down the refund process from the very beginning,” citing the CIT’s April 7, 2026, order, which had required universal and immediate refunds. In their letter, the two senators stated: “American businesses should not be forced to bear the cost of the Administration’s unlawful tariff scheme and subsequent legal defeat. The courts have spoken.”

Even more seriously, Markey and Wyden raised the issue of the potential reallocation of illegally collected funds. They asked CBP to confirm whether any communications had taken place with the Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), or other federal agencies regarding an alternative use of unreimbursed tariff revenues—specifically to fund immigration operations or other policy priorities of the administration. A response was expected by June 24, 2026. As of this writing, no public response has been made available.

Seven Embarrassing Questions for the White House

The June 10 Senate letter poses seven specific questions to Commissioner Scott, several of which are particularly explosive from an institutional standpoint. The sixth question asks whether CBP has communicated with the Treasury, the OMB, or other agencies regarding the retention, transfer, or reallocation of unrefunded tariff revenues. The seventh question seeks information on the safeguards in place to ensure that these funds are not used for political priorities not authorized by Congress. These questions imply a hypothesis: that the administration might be tempted—or may already have been tempted—to temporarily use these funds for other purposes.

The senators also highlighted the broader context: in their view, the administration had already been documented as seeking to divert billions of dollars intended for military preparedness, global health, and other missions authorized by Congress, in favor of mass deportation operations and other favored priorities. If illegal tariff funds were diverted in the same way—even briefly—we shift from an administrative dispute to a constitutional crisis of the highest order.

The question posed by Markey and Wyden is the most explosive aspect of this entire affair. If the administration has used—even temporarily—illegally collected tariff funds to finance deportation operations or other budget items, we are facing a constitutional violation of the utmost gravity. I’m not saying this has been proven. I’m saying the question deserves an answer, and that the administration’s silence at this stage is, in itself, an alarming sign. Trump is a necessary evil for the West in the face of its external adversaries—but necessary does not mean above the law.

The Role of Michael Lowell and Private Lawyers: Guardians of Importers' Rights

When Commercial Law Becomes a Combat Sport

In this legal battle of rare complexity, law firms specializing in commercial law are playing a leading role. Michael Lowell, chair of the Global Regulatory Enforcement Group at Reed Smith, has been one of the clearest voices in deciphering the situation. He warned that while the DOJ’s appeal creates uncertainty for Phase 2 and Phase 3 payments, Phase 1 reimbursements—covering approximately $85 to $90 billion—should not be directly affected by the appeal. He articulated the administration’s strategy with chilling clarity: “The endgame is clear: the government is trying to retain as much of the remaining funds as possible.”

The practical recommendation from Lowell and firms like Holland & Knight: don’t wait. Importers whose entries are not covered by Phase 1 should seriously consider filing a protective action with the CIT—a step that does not prevent them from continuing to use CAPE in parallel, but which preserves their independent legal rights. Holland & Knight clarified: Importers who do not file a complaint risk being permanently excluded from refunds on entries that have been definitively liquidated if the government’s position prevails on appeal.

Small Businesses Sacrificed on the Altar of Procedural Complexity

The recommendation to file a protective action is reasonable for large companies—but financially and operationally out of reach for the majority of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Filing a complaint with the International Trade Court involves significant legal costs, a thorough understanding of customs clearance mechanisms, and the ability to navigate lengthy and complex procedures. Companies like Atlanta-based Kids2 have opted to sell their refund rights to investment funds—at a discount—rather than wait years for an uncertain legal outcome.

This trend of selling refund rights reveals an emerging secondary market surrounding IEEPA tariffs. Private equity firms have realized that these claims are potentially very lucrative—and that small businesses, pressed by their need for immediate cash, are willing to accept significant discounts. The irony is that it is these very same small businesses that have suffered the most from the illegal rates—and that will proportionally recover the least from their refunds.

There is a bitter irony in this situation: small businesses—those that suffer the most from the illegal tariffs, those that have passed these costs on to their customers, sometimes teetering on the brink of bankruptcy—are precisely the ones with the fewest resources to file a protective lawsuit. Large companies like Costco or FedEx have entire legal teams working on this issue. A small business in Atlanta or Minnesota that imports electronic components? It must first understand what a “definitively liquidated entry” is before realizing that it may be losing its right to a refund. This is a systemic injustice that lawmakers should correct.

Replacing IEEPA Tariffs: Section 122, Already Under Attack

Trump didn’t wait for the ruling to come up with a Plan B

The Supreme Court’s ruling was handed down on February 20, 2026. In the hours that followed, the Trump administration invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974—a provision that had never been used since its enactment—to impose a blanket 10% tariff on virtually all imports. This section caps tariffs at 15% and requires congressional approval after 150 days. Section 122 is therefore structurally more restrictive than the IEEPA—but it allows the administration to maintain tariff pressure during the transition.

On May 7, 2026, a three-judge CIT panel ruled that Section 122 was also unlawful as applied. But on June 11, 2026, the Federal Circuit granted a stay of that decision pending appeal, finding that the government had demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on appeal. Section 122 duties therefore continue to be collected for the time being, with a statutory expiration date scheduled for around July 24, 2026—unless Congress intervenes to extend them. This is a second front of potential refunds looming on the horizon.

Section 301, Section 232: The Alternative Tariff Arsenal Already in Place

The Trump administration did not limit its response to Section 122. It simultaneously announced new Section 301 investigations targeting 60 countries for unfair trade practices, as well as an extension of Section 232 duties on industrial equipment. Specific investigations have been launched against Brazil and Vietnam. The strategic objective is clear: to maintain maximum tariff pressure on trading partners while building a more solid legal foundation—by using legislative authorities whose constitutionality is less contested than that of the IEEPA.

The practical result for importers is a growing overlap of distinct tariff regimes. A shipment that was subject to an (refundable) IEEPA duty, to which a (non-refundable) Section 301 duty was added, is now potentially subject to a new Section 301 or Section 232 duty in its place. The net outcome for an importer may therefore be less favorable than the 166 billion in gross refunds would suggest—as the new substitute duties erode a portion of the expected gains.

There is a certain tactical ingenuity to this sequence of events. The administration loses on the IEEPA, so it immediately invokes Section 122. It temporarily loses on Section 122, so it fights the decision on appeal. At the same time, it announces new Section 301 investigations into 60 countries, expanded Section 232 duties, and investigations against Brazil and Vietnam. This is a strategy of judicial and regulatory saturation: maintaining maximum trade uncertainty while the courts scramble to keep up. Trump may be a necessary evil—but this kind of manipulation of constitutional rules does not bolster the credibility of the West, of which he claims to be the champion.

Democrats in Congress and Political Pressure on the CBP

Schumer, Markey, Wyden: A Multi-Pronged Legislative Offensive

Political pressure isn’t coming solely from the courts. Back in March 2026, Senator Markey had already led a coalition of Democratic senators in calling for an automatic refund process that wouldn’t impose additional burdens on small businesses. In April, he directly called on major retailers—Amazon, FedEx, Walmart, Costco, DHL, and UPS—to pass on the refunds they received to their customers and the small businesses that had absorbed the costs of the illegal tariffs. The response from many companies was disappointing: no firm commitment to reimburse their own customers.

In June, along with Wyden, Markey stepped up the pressure. The seven questions sent to Commissioner Scott—the most sensitive of which concerned possible communications regarding the reallocation of unreimbursed tariff funds toward the administration’s policy priorities—constitute an unprecedented indirect indictment. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, for his part, had helped release a report in April on the damage caused by the “Liberation Day” tariffs one year after their announcement. The political dynamic is clear: Democrats have turned the issue of refunds into a tool for exerting institutional pressure.

The Limits of Parliamentary Theater in the Face of an Unresponsive Administration

The Democrats’ letters, reports, and inquiries have undeniable merit: they document, for the record, the administration’s conduct regarding its legal obligations. But their immediate practical effectiveness remains limited. Without a Senate majority to force a legislative vote, Markey and Wyden can only expose and document—not compel. The administration’s response to the seven questions was due by June 24, 2026; in the absence of a public response by that date, political pressure will have to give way to other enforcement mechanisms.

The most promising avenue, however, remains legislative: a law that would mandate automatic and universal reimbursement without requiring individual legal action would put an end to the DOJ’s entire stalling strategy. But in a Congress where the Republican majority is reluctant to challenge the administration on this issue, this option remains politically hypothetical in the short term. Importers are therefore waiting for the justice system to do its job—slowly, but surely.

I am among those who find parliamentary battles often theatrical. But in this specific case, the questions raised by Markey and Wyden are legitimate and necessary. A government that collects funds under a law declared unconstitutional has a moral and legal obligation to refund them promptly. If that same government begins to use that money—even temporarily—for other purposes, it ceases to be a matter of trade policy and becomes a matter of the rule of law. The West derives its legitimacy from this principle. When its leaders violate it, they undermine the very foundation of what they claim to defend.

Large Companies and Reimbursements: Who Benefits and Who Is Left Waiting?

Costco, FedEx, Amazon: Billions at Stake for Retail Giants

Among the 330,000 potentially eligible importers, large U.S. companies occupy a strategic position. FedEx saw some of its cross-border trade activities drop by 25 to 35 percent due to IEEPA tariffs—a massive operational impact. UPS has already launched its own reimbursement process for eligible shipments, in coordination with CBP, covering payments made on or after January 30, 2026. Costco, whose business model relies heavily on low-cost imports, is among the biggest beneficiaries in terms of regained liquidity.

But major retailers face additional pressure: will they reimburse their own customers? An analysis of supply chain structures reveals that, in most cases, the tariffs have been passed down the chain: from the importer to the wholesaler, from the wholesaler to the retailer, and from the retailer to the end consumer. The amounts reimbursed by the government to major importers do not necessarily correspond to the losses incurred by downstream players. At this stage, the industry’s response is disappointing: many large companies will likely retain most of their reimbursements as replenished equity—rather than passing them on to their customers.

The question no one wants to ask: Who reimburses end consumers?

In response to Senator Markey’s inquiries, many major retailers have responded without making any commitments. Amazon, FedEx, Walmart, Costco, DHL, and UPS have, for the most part, made no firm commitment to pass on their IEEPA reimbursements to their customers or downstream business partners. Legally, this is their right: the designated importers are the legal recipients of the reimbursement. But morally, the situation is troubling: American consumers have been financing these illegal tariffs through higher prices for over a year. And that money will not be returned to them.

Class-action lawsuits are one avenue, but a long and uncertain one. Consumer lawsuits have already been filed against certain major importers—Kavout notes that consumer class actions are adding another layer to the already complex reimbursement process. These proceedings could take years. And in the meantime, large companies will cash their government reimbursement checks, improve their balance sheets, and continue doing business as usual.

This is the hidden side of this issue that the business media has failed to adequately cover. The refunds go to the designated importers—not to the consumers who paid higher prices for a year. This isn’t a glitch in the system—it’s a structural feature of U.S. customs law. But in a democracy that claims to uphold the free market and protect its citizens, there is something deeply unsatisfying about the idea that large corporations are cashing in on billions in refunds without any obligation to redistribute them. I’m not advocating for socialism—I’m advocating for rhetorical consistency.

The Truth About Trump's Tariff Promises: True, False, or Somewhere in Between?

Separating Political Rhetoric from Legal Reality

Several claims made by the Trump administration regarding its tariff policy warrant rigorous fact-checking. Claim 1: The tariffs were imposed to protect the U.S. economy. Partially true in intent, but the Supreme Court ruled that the law invoked—the IEEPA—simply did not grant the president that authority. Claim 2: The administration is reimbursing importers quickly and efficiently. False. After four months of processing, less than 15% of the total amount owed had been forwarded for disbursement, according to data from May 22, 2026. At the same time, the administration is appealing to limit the scope of its reimbursement obligations.

Claim 3: The Court of International Trade exceeded its authority by ordering blanket refunds. Disputed—and this is precisely what the Federal Circuit will have to decide. The DOJ relies on the Trump v. CASA (2025) precedent, but the importers’ attorneys argue that the normal rules of liquidation do not apply to funds collected under an unconstitutional law. Claim 4: The tariffs generated significant revenue for the government. Technically true—$166 billion collected. But if this revenue must be refunded with interest, the operation becomes a net liability for the U.S. Treasury.

The factual summary: four claims, four verdicts

A summary of this fact-check in four clear verdicts. On the legality of the tariffs: the Supreme Court has ruled—the IEEPA tariffs were illegal. This point is no longer debatable. On the speed of refunds: false—less than 15% refunded after four months, with parallel appeals slowing down the process for the most complex cases. On the CIT’s authority: contested before the Federal Circuit—verdict expected in 2027. On the net profitability of the tariffs for the state: negative in the long term—the fees collected, plus interest, represent a liability greater than the revenue generated, not to mention the administrative costs of reimbursement and legal proceedings.

A fifth conclusion is warranted to wrap up this overview: regarding the administration’s good faith in the reimbursement process, the evidence points to a deliberate strategy of minimization. Challenging the CIT’s authority, invoking Trump v. CASA to limit beneficiaries, resisting the CBP commissioner’s appearance in court—each of these elements, taken in isolation, may have a legal justification. Together, they paint a coherent picture of institutional obstruction that Senators Markey and Wyden have summarized in unequivocal terms.

This fact-check reveals a constant in Trump’s rhetoric on tariffs: assertion comes before the law, and the law catches up afterward. A policy is announced with great fanfare, defended politically as a victory, and when the courts blow the whistle to end the game, it is downplayed, delayed, and appealed. I’m not saying that U.S. trade policy didn’t need an overhaul. I’m saying that governing through a state of perpetual emergency—by invoking powers that the Constitution does not grant—is not firmness: it’s constitutional improvisation that ends up costing a great deal, literally.

Conclusion: 65 billion on hold, a democracy put to the test by its own laws

What This Case Reveals About the Rule of Law in the United States in 2026

The IEEPA tariff refund case is not merely a technical dispute between customs officials and importers. It reveals a fundamental tension within the U.S. institutional system: an executive branch that resists enforcing court decisions that go against it, while invoking the rule of law to justify its own actions. The Supreme Court has ruled against the IEEPA. The CIT has ordered the refunds. The DOJ is appealing to limit their scope. And in the meantime, $130 to $146 billion remains stuck in the pipes of an administrative system that moves at its own pace—deliberately.

The coming weeks will be decisive. Phase 2 of CAPE begins on June 29, 2026, and it will significantly expand the number of importers eligible to file claims. CBP’s responses to the seven questions posed by Senators Markey and Wyden were expected on June 24. And the Federal Circuit’s decision on the DOJ’s appeal is on the horizon for 2027. The West, of which the United States claims to be the leader, derives its credibility from its ability to uphold its own laws—even, and especially, when they run counter to the political priorities of the administration in power.

The Time Has Come for Congress to Act

Judicial pressure alone will not suffice. The procedural timelines in the Federal Circuit—with briefs due in August 2026 and a decision possibly expected in 2027—mean that hundreds of thousands of importers could face months, or even years, of further delay. Senators Markey and Wyden are right to demand transparency. But a law mandating automatic and universal reimbursement—without requiring individual legal action—would be the most direct way to close this chapter.

The money belongs to the importers. The courts have said so. The Supreme Court said so first. Now we need to find the political will to return it—promptly, in full, and without gamesmanship. To paraphrase Senators Markey and Wyden: the courts have spoken, the money belongs to the importers from whom it was illegally taken, and the administration’s obligation is to return it. The rest is politics.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist