INVESTIGATION: The Senate Votes on Housing — and Sneaks in a Ban on CBDCs

Maxime Marquette

2026-06-24 13:07:39

When Young Americans Can No Longer Dream of Homeownership

To understand why this bill has received such bipartisan support, one must look at the reality of the U.S. housing market. Senator Tim Scott spoke on the floor about his childhood in poor neighborhoods in South Carolina, crammed into small rental units, and the feeling that the American Dream was out of reach for him. He then drew a parallel with today’s generation: young people who are delaying marriage, giving up on having children, and failing to put down roots anywhere—not because of a lack of ambition, but because housing prices have become unaffordable.

The crisis is real and well-documented. Federal regulations account for about a quarter of the cost of building a new home. Institutional investment funds have acquired a growing share of the single-family housing stock. The rental market is suffocating tenants. The ROAD to Housing Act directly addresses these three issues: deregulating construction, prohibiting large institutional investors from purchasing additional single-family homes if they already own 350 or more, and pilot programs to fund renovations and affordable housing.

Elizabeth Warren, the Unexpected Convert

Senator Elizabeth Warren stated from the Senate floor: “The bill we are passing today sends a clear message to every American struggling to find affordable housing: our elected officials understand the problem and are actually doing something to solve it.” ” She also relished the moment regarding private equity funds: “Congress has never held private equity accountable for anything—today, that changes.”

Warren is a fierce opponent of CBDCs in certain forms—at least of overly supervisory versions. Her acceptance of the anti-CBDC clause in this bill is therefore symbolic: the Democrats gave in on digital currency to secure what mattered most to them regarding housing and Wall Street regulation. That’s the price of compromise in an America where majorities are fragile and every vote counts double.

Warren has built her career on protecting consumers from financial abuse. Seeing her name attached to a bill that bans a potential tool for monetary surveillance—even as some libertarian Republicans would have defined it as exactly that—is a delightful paradox that speaks volumes about the state of the American political debate.

Section 1001: Two Pages Worth Billions

The exact wording of the ban

The ban on CBDCs is contained in Title X, Section 1001 of the final text. Two pages out of 303. But two potentially decisive pages. The text stipulates that “the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or any Federal Reserve Bank may not issue or create a central bank digital currency or any digital asset substantially similar to a central bank digital currency, either directly or indirectly through a financial institution or other intermediary.”

The expiration date is set for December 31, 2030. The law provides an explicit exception for dollar-denominated digital currencies that are “open, permissionless, and private”—in other words, stablecoins such as USDC or Tether, which align with the vision of a privately driven digital economy. This is not a ban on the digital dollar in general. It is a ban on the state-issued digital dollar—a distinction that is by no means coincidental.

An Unparalleled Legislative Precedent

The Bipartisan Policy Center, in its analysis of the May 5, 2026, legislation, emphasizes that the ban constitutes “the most significant legal restriction ever imposed on the development of a U.S. CBDC.” Prior to this vote, the Federal Reserve operated in a regulatory vacuum: neither authorized nor prohibited, it could theoretically move forward with research and pilot projects. With Section 1001, this ambiguity disappears. Any move toward a digital dollar issued by the Fed is formally illegal until 2031—unless a new Congress amends the law.

The scope is comprehensive: both direct issuance and indirect issuance via financial intermediaries are covered. The phrase “substantially similar” closes any backdoors. Congress clearly wanted to avoid the creative workarounds that a narrower formulation would have made possible.

Two pages. That’s all it took to reset a decade of digital monetary policy in the United States. In legislative terms, that’s almost nothing. In the history of the dollar, it’s potentially everything.

Trump's January 2025 Executive Order: The Executive Precedent

When a President Signs What a Candidate Promised

To understand the origins of this legislative ban, we must go back to January 23, 2025. Three days after taking office for his second term, Donald Trump signed an executive order titled “Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology.” In Section 5, the executive order was crystal clear: “Except as required by law, agencies are hereby prohibited from taking any action to establish, issue, or promote CBDCs within the jurisdiction of the United States or abroad.”

It also ordered the immediate termination of any ongoing plans or initiatives within any federal agency related to the creation of a CBDC on U.S. soil. This executive order simultaneously revoked Executive Order 14067 issued by the Biden administration, which had launched research into the digital dollar. In a single document, Trump wiped out four years of exploratory work on the government’s digital currency.

From Campaign Promise to State Policy

Trump had been as explicit as possible during his campaign. On January 17, 2024, during a speech, he declared: “As your president, I will never authorize the creation of a central bank digital currency. Such a currency would give the federal government absolute control over your money. It would be a dangerous threat to freedom—and I will prevent it from coming to America.” It was a radical promise, and he kept it from the very first hours of his term.

But an executive order remains vulnerable: it can be revoked by the next president. That is precisely why conservative Republicans in the House have pushed for legislative codification. A law passed by Congress is much harder to undo than an executive order. The current effort, therefore, is to set in legislative stone what Trump began with an executive pen.

There is a profound irony in the fact that Trump—often accused of using executive orders to circumvent Congress—is, in this instance, the president whose actions have served as the catalyst for a rare bipartisan congressional mobilization. A necessary evil can sometimes also be a useful catalyst.

The House vs. the Senate: The Standoff Over the Office of the Speaker

The Republicans wanted a permanent solution, not a temporary one

The bill’s journey through both chambers reveals internal divisions within the Republican Party. When the Senate passed its version in March 2026—89 in favor, 10 against—with a temporary ban through 2030, a group of conservative Republicans in the House immediately spoke out. Led by members close to the House Freedom Caucus and by Majority Whip Tom Emmer, they demanded a permanent ban.

Representative Ralph Norman summed up the group’s sentiment in a letter sent to the leaders of both chambers: “A CBDC would give unelected bureaucrats unprecedented power over Americans’ finances and threaten fundamental economic freedoms.” Twenty-nine members of Congress co-signed this letter in March 2026. For them, a ban set to expire in 2030 was a partial victory that left the door ajar for a hypothetical Democratic successor.

The House Votes on Its Version—and It All Starts Over

In May 2026, the House passed its own amended version of the bill, which sought a permanent ban. It also removed the requirement to resell properties built for rental after seven years—a major sticking point with real estate developers. The House bill returned to the Senate, which now had to decide: accept the House’s amendments, or force a conference committee.

That is where the mechanics of the final compromise came into play. Ultimately, the version adopted on June 22, 2026, maintains the temporary ban through 2030—as desired by the Senate and championed by Warren—but includes other concessions to House Republicans, notably the removal of the requirement to sell build-to-rent properties after seven years. Compromise never comes for free.

American democracy operates through a series of compromises that leave each side with something and dissatisfied with something else. It’s frustrating. But that’s also what makes it resilient in the face of extremes.

Scott Bessent and the White House: The Stablecoin as an Alternative

Treasury Secretary Shifts Toward Private Stablecoins

The Trump administration did not take a passive stance on this issue. From the very start of the congressional debates, the White House issued a Statement of Administration Policy supporting the bill and its anti-CBDC provisions. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has been even more direct, recently reiterating that a government-issued digital dollar is out of the question, while positioning dollar-backed stablecoins as the instrument for extending U.S. monetary sovereignty into the global digital economy.

This logic is consistent with the Trump administration’s doctrine on the digital economy: let the private sector innovate, ensure that innovations remain denominated in dollars, and avoid any instrument that would give the government granular control over individual transactions. This is a libertarian vision of digital currency, which paradoxically aligns with progressives’ fears regarding financial surveillance—even if the motivations of the two camps are very different.

The Stablecoin as a Trojan Horse for the Dollar

Some analysts take a more cynical view of this strategy. The ban on CBDCs, combined with the promotion of stablecoins, is seen not so much as a victory for financial freedom as a transfer of monetary sovereignty from the central bank to large private companies—Circle, Tether, and potentially Big Tech in the future. As one financial analyst interviewed by Cointelegraph observed, the question is not whether the dollar will be digital, but who will control that digital dollar.

The Federal Reserve, for its part, had no active plan to roll out a CBDC anyway. Its chairman, Jerome Powell, had publicly stated that he would never issue a CBDC on his own initiative without explicit authorization from Congress. The legislative ban is therefore partly preventive—a fence erected around a field that no one was plowing yet, to ensure that no one plows it tomorrow.

The stablecoin argument troubles me. Privatizing the digital dollar is not necessarily less risky than nationalizing it. The history of major financial crises has consistently shown that the private sector can create systemic risks that the taxpayer ultimately ends up paying for. Something to keep an eye on.

Tim Scott and Warren: A Union of Opposites

How Two Senators on Opposing Sides Co-Authored a Legislative Revolution

The image remains striking: Tim Scott, a conservative Republican and ardent advocate for banking deregulation and the financial interests of the South, and Elizabeth Warren, a progressive Democrat from Boston and architect of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, co-authored one of the most ambitious pieces of legislation in the current Congress. Their collaboration illustrates the best that American politics has to offer when external pressure—in this case, a housing crisis suffocating voters on both sides—becomes intense enough.

Scott advocated for deregulation of the construction industry and for an end to the bureaucratic red tape weighing down on developers. Warren secured the restriction on institutional investors, protecting individual buyers from Wall Street. Each gave ground on something. Scott agreed with Warren on the ban on large investment funds. Warren agreed with Scott on the anti-CBDC clause—a bitter pill she swallowed to avoid derailing the entire housing compromise.

The five “no” votes: the opposition camp

Five Republicans voted against the final bill: Tommy Tuberville (Alabama), Ron Johnson (Wisconsin), Rick Scott (Florida), Rand Paul (Kentucky), and Mike Lee (Utah). For most of them, the problem wasn’t the CBDC provision but the bill as a whole, which they deemed too interventionist—particularly the restrictions on institutional investors and the new land regulations. Rand Paul, true to his staunch libertarianism, reportedly saw this as too much federal interference in a market that should be self-regulating.

Their opposition illustrates the limits of compromise: when you try to please everyone, you inevitably end up losing the extremes on both sides. But an 85-to-5 vote, in a deeply fractured U.S. Senate, remains a remarkable result that attests to the political clout of the housing issue in 2026.

I respect Rand Paul’s consistency. Even when he votes against something that is socially beneficial, he does so on principle. This is not the same as partisan opportunism. In a political class dominated by short-term electoral calculations, ideological consistency deserves at least a mention.

Trump's Role: A Necessary Evil as a Centripetal Force

How the President’s Priorities Reshaped the Bill

The final bill bears the unmistakable mark of Trump’s priorities. The ban on companies with investment control over 350 single-family homes or more from purchasing additional homes directly codifies an executive order that Trump had signed to “stop Wall Street from competing with Main Street buyers.” The administration made this priority a condition of its support, and both parties agreed to enshrine it in law.

The ban on CBDCs, similarly, aligns with the executive policy he had launched in January 2025. The White House supported the bill precisely because it transformed his executive orders into law—a form of institutional durability that an executive order cannot provide. Trump understood that his digital and real estate policies would not survive his term without bipartisan legislative backing.

The Risks of Compromise: When Trump Puts His Credibility on the Line

Trump’s support for the bill was not straightforward. In March 2026, he had publicly declared that he would not sign any legislation until Congress sent him separate legislation on voting restrictions—a form of legislative blackmail. This stance had cast doubt on the bill’s chances of passing. Ultimately, he changed his stance, and the June 22, 2026, vote confirms that the administration chose a victory on housing over a political stalemate.

The question remains: to what extent did Trump personally influence the outcome? His support clearly facilitated the convergence of House Republicans, who knew that the White House had endorsed a temporary rather than a permanent ban on CBDCs. He was the one who drew the line for an acceptable compromise—and Congress followed suit.

Trump is a necessary evil for those who believe, as I do, that the West must remain the world’s driving force. His rhetoric is often destructive to institutions. But on the issue of CBDCs and the protection of private property against state surveillance, he has drawn a line that I do not find illegitimate—far from it.

CBDCs Around the World: Why the U.S. Ban Matters Globally

A Message to Beijing, Brussels, and the IMF

The U.S. decision is not just a domestic matter. In a world where China is actively rolling out its digital yuan (e-CNY) in dozens of countries, where the European Central Bank is moving forward with the digital euro, and where the IMF is pushing developing economies to adopt digital payment systems, the United States’ decision to block its own CBDC sends a powerful geopolitical signal.

Washington is essentially saying: individual financial freedom takes precedence over the efficiency of a state-issued digital currency. This is a stance taken in the war of standards that shapes global technological and geopolitical competition. China is using the e-CNY precisely for the reasons that U.S. Republicans cite against their own hypothetical CBDC: complete traceability of transactions, the ability to regulate the currency’s use, and real-time monitoring. Blocking the U.S. CBDC also means refusing to play on China’s turf.

Private Stablecoins: America Bets on Its Private Sector

By banning the public CBDC while allowing private stablecoins, the United States is making a strategic bet: its tech and financial giants—Circle, Coinbase, Tether—will build the infrastructure for the digital dollar better than the Fed ever could. If this strategy succeeds, the United States could dominate the global digital economy without having sacrificed civil liberties on the altar of government efficiency.

This is the liberal West’s gamble against the authoritarian digital model. America is betting on its private companies rather than on its government. China is betting on its government to control its companies and citizens. The two models are clashing on a global scale, and the vote on June 22, 2026, has just made it clear—at least for the next four years—which side Washington has chosen.

I am convinced that the fight against the state-issued CBDC is a fight for civil liberties—not just a technological battle. What is at stake here is the fundamental question of whether a liberal democracy can accept that its government has real-time access to every transaction made by every citizen. My answer is no.

The Mechanics of the Legislative Rider: An Old Technique, New Challenges

When a Rent Law Carries Monetary Policy

In parliamentary law, the term “legislative rider” refers to a provision slipped into a bill that has no direct connection to its main purpose. Section 1001 of the ROAD to Housing Act is a rider of a special kind: it is not secret—it is openly acknowledged—but it was deliberately wrapped up in the popularity of the housing issue to facilitate its passage. No standalone anti-CBDC bill has ever survived the Senate—Tom Emmer’s Anti-CBDC Surveillance State Act had passed the House but was languishing in the Senate without a vote.

The tactic is politically astute: Democratic senators who had voted against a standalone anti-CBDC bill could, by accepting the rider in a housing bill they needed, save face with their progressive base while giving Republicans what they wanted. Elizabeth Warren saw right through it—she explicitly told her colleagues that, to her knowledge, no changes to the CBDC provision were planned, thereby signaling her own tactical capitulation on this point.

The Bipartisan Policy Center Sounds the Alarm

In its analysis published on May 5, 2026, the Bipartisan Policy Center noted that Section 1001 on the CBDC was “among the issues most frequently cited by those seeking further amendments” to the bill. This is not an enthusiastic endorsement—it is a political observation: Section 1001 is a thorn in the side of some lawmakers, but a thorn too small to justify derailing the entire housing bill.

It’s the “lesser of two evils” calculation at the legislative level. You don’t craft great legislation by demanding perfection on every provision. You identify what’s essential, negotiate on the rest, and accept losing on the margins to win on the essentials. Housing was the essential. The CBDC was a margin—a margin that held great value for a certain camp.

Legislative riders are often portrayed as a perversion of the democratic process. Sometimes that’s true. But sometimes, it’s also the only way to advance necessary reforms in a system gridlocked by polarization. I’m not defending the method—I’m simply observing it.

Republican Dissidents: The Battle for the Party Headquarters Continues

Tom Emmer and the camp advocating a total ban

The law passed on June 22, 2026, does not satisfy everyone in the Republican camp. Representative Tom Emmer of Minnesota, author of the Anti-CBDC Surveillance State Act and House Majority Whip, had pushed for a permanent ban without a sunset clause. In his view, a ban lasting only until 2030 is an invitation for a future Democratic administration to launch its own CBDC the very day after the law expires.

Senator Mike Lee of Utah had introduced his own bill as early as February 2025, the No CBDC Act (S. 464), aimed at a permanent ban on any CBDC issued by the Fed or the Treasury. That bill had stalled in committee. His vote against the final bill on June 22, 2026, is consistent with this position: a half-measure is almost worse than inaction, because it creates a false sense of security.

Will the battle be reignited in 2029?

The political logic of the Republican dissidents is clear: if a Democratic administration takes office in the fall of 2028, it will have two years to prepare for the launch of a federal CBDC as early as January 1, 2031. Current law will not prevent this. By accepting the temporary compromise, the moderate Republican camp is betting that the next four years will be enough to embed opposition to CBDCs in American political culture.

The issue will therefore be raised again before 2030. The CBDC’s staunch opponents will have to secure either an extension or a permanent ban. They will have at least one compelling argument: every year that passes without a U.S. CBDC will reinforce the idea that the United States does not need one. Time is potentially on their side—provided the next administration does not radically change the political landscape.

The sunset clause is the true Achilles’ heel of this law. By 2029, the political landscape may have changed completely. In politics, four years is an eternity. I understand the impatience of conservatives who wanted a permanent solution—even though I also understand why the compromise was inevitable.

The Federal Reserve: Silent but Concerned

Jerome Powell in a Tough Spot

The Federal Reserve has not publicly commented on the June 22, 2026, vote, which is not surprising: central banks generally do not issue statements on laws that limit their scope of action. But the Fed’s situation is objectively uncomfortable. Its Chair, Jerome Powell, had already stated that he would never issue a CBDC without explicit authorization from Congress—thereby voluntarily complying with the restriction that Congress has now made mandatory.

The Fed had conducted theoretical and academic research on CBDCs, notably through its Project Hamilton program with MIT, and through work published in its annual reports. This research is not prohibited by law—Section 1001 prohibits the issuance and creation of a CBDC, not the study of it. But the political climate does not encourage venturing into this territory.

Central Bank Independence Under Pressure

The ROAD to Housing Act also raises a fundamental question about the Fed’s institutional independence. By enshrining a specific ban on a monetary tool in law, Congress is effectively reducing the central bank’s room to maneuver. Economists point out that the best monetary policy decisions are made free from short-term political pressures—and that a legislative ban is, by definition, a political intrusion into the monetary sphere.

The argument holds water in theory. But its proponents counter that the CBDC is not a traditional monetary policy tool—it is a tool for social oversight and control potentially as powerful as anything history has ever seen. In that case, they say, democratic oversight via Congress is not only legitimate but necessary.

Central bank independence is a value I defend—for interest rate policy and for price stability. But a CBDC is not a purely monetary instrument. It is a tool for social control on an unprecedented scale. On this specific point, I believe Congress had the right—and even the duty—to legislate.

The Finish Line in Sight: Trump, the Pen, and the Finish Line

The bill is expected to reach the House as early as June 23, 2026

Following the Senate vote on June 22, the bill returned to the House of Representatives for a final vote. Sources close to majority leaders indicated that the House was ready to vote as early as Tuesday, June 23, 2026. The path seemed clear: bicameral negotiators had already finalized their compromises, and Republican leaders had signaled their agreement. Once the House had voted, the bill would go directly to the president’s office.

The targeted timeline allowed for a presidential signature before the end of the week of June 22—a political victory strategically timed before the July 4 congressional recess. For the Trump administration, this would represent a rare bipartisan legislative victory in a second term marked by turbulence: a law on affordable housing, a ban on CBDCs in line with its doctrine, and the codification of its executive order on institutional investors.

Implications for Signing and Implementation

Once signed, the law will take effect with certain delays. The ban on large institutional investors takes effect 180 days after enactment and automatically expires 15 years after the effective date. Section 1001 on CBDCs takes effect immediately. Fines for violating the institutional purchase ban can reach up to $1 million per violation or three times the purchase price of the property in question, whichever is higher.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) will be responsible for developing best practices in zoning and land use to help local communities remove barriers to real estate development. Pilot programs for residential renovation and the conversion of abandoned buildings into housing are supported by a seven-year innovation fund.

Trump’s signature on this bill will carry symbolic weight: it will embody the convergence between his vision of protecting private property and the reality of a housing market in crisis that even his wealthiest allies cannot ignore. This is not a reconciliation of truth and politics—but it is at least their temporary coincidence.

Conclusion: America has made its choice—but for how long?

A Real Victory, but the Ground Remains Contested

The vote on June 22, 2026, marks a concrete victory on two fronts: the housing crisis is finally receiving a serious legislative response, and the government-backed digital dollar has been blocked for at least four years. This is not a revolution—neither on housing, where structural problems far exceed what the ROAD to Housing Act can resolve, nor on the CBDC, where a temporary ban leaves all questions open for 2030. But it is a concrete, documented step, signed by both parties, which in contemporary America is already a remarkable achievement.

The compromise hidden at the heart of this bill is nothing to be ashamed of—it is the very nature of democratic governance. The Republicans secured a ban on CBDCs. The Democrats secured restrictions on Wall Street investors. Trump secured the codification of his executive orders into permanent law. And Americans looking for housing have secured a law that is imperfect but real. In such a fractured political system, that may be all we can hope for.

2030: The Inevitable Showdown

In four years, the issue will be back on the table. The sunset clause in Section 1001 ensures that the debate over the U.S. CBDC is not over—only postponed. The administration that takes office after the November 2028 elections will have the opportunity to restart the process as early as January 2031. Proponents of a permanent ban will need to act before that deadline: either extend the law or secure a new, more robust one.

What this vote does confirm, however, is that opposition to the digital central bank currency has become a bipartisan stance in the United States—at least as of 2026. Warren did not fight to save the CBDC. She chose housing. This political priority reveals the depth of the U.S. housing crisis: it is so severe that it has managed to push a monetary battle—one that seemed fundamental—into the background. For now, housing has won. And with it, without much fanfare, the ban on a financial surveillance tool that few Americans would have wanted to see in the hands of their government.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist