The May 29 memo: based on violence and a lack of legal consultation
The decision memo drafted by career officials at DHS on May 29, 2025, was explicit. According to documents now submitted to the Supreme Court, this memo recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security authorize an “automatic extension” of Haiti’s TPS status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(C). The rationale was based on two specific findings: first, “the recent escalation of violence” and “the rapidly evolving nature of the security environment” in Haiti made any permanent decision premature; second, the State Department had not yet provided its assessment of conditions or its recommendation to fulfill the legal requirement for consultation. This last point is crucial: without consultation with the State Department, the termination of TPS would be technically illegal under the very terms of the statute.
The recommendation was supported by TPS and country conditions experts within USCIS—specialists whose job is precisely to evaluate this data. This was not an ideological position: it was a professional analysis, based on concrete data, consistent with thirty-five years of institutional practice. According to the disclosed documents, an internal email dated June 2, 2025—sent after the Secretary’s decision—confirmed that “the State Department’s recommendation regarding Haitian TPS has not arrived,” and that she had “chosen to terminate Haitian TPS without” receiving any information on conditions in the country from the State Department.
May 30: A verbal directive, with no written record, that overturns everything
On May 30, 2025, Joseph Edlow—a political appointee who would later become director of USCIS—rejected the decision memo drafted by career officials. The instruction he gave to staff is documented: they were to “implement the changes provided verbally.” There was no written record of the changes themselves. An oral, undocumented directive that would overturn a professional recommendation based on legal and factual evidence. Within hours, according to documents revealed in the case NTPSA v. Noem, the new memo recommended termination—rather than extension. Two internal emails cited in the motion to the Supreme Court sum up the reality of that moment: one DHS official reported that “the stance changed late last week,” and another simply stated that “the reversal happened quickly.”
The magnitude of this reversal can be gauged by what it entailed: hundreds of thousands of Haitians living and working legally in the United States, a 35-year-old institutional system, and a specific law governing decision-making procedures—all of which were superseded by a single phone call. The motion filed with the Supreme Court specifies that the USCIS decision document was also drafted by Robert Law, a political appointee whom a federal court had found, during Trump’s first term, to have been “proactively mad-libbing official documents”—in other words, manipulating official documents—to justify a previous attempt to terminate Haitian TPS. Robert Law was no stranger to this practice.
A verbal directive. No email. No record. Just an oral instruction that, in a matter of hours, undid the legal and factual work of trained professionals. Is this what we call governance in a democracy? I’m asking this in all seriousness.
Robert Law: An Institutional Offender at the Heart of Documentary Manipulation
Trump’s First Term: Already Diving into the Memos
Robert Law’s history with Haitian TPS does not begin in 2025—it begins in 2017. During Trump’s first term, Law was a senior policy advisor at USCIS. He had received a decision memo prepared by the agency’s country conditions experts—a memo based on concrete data—that recommended extending Haitian TPS. His reaction, documented in internal emails and cited in court proceedings: this memo was “overwhelmingly weighted for extension, which I do not think is the conclusion we are looking for”—in other words, he was seeking not to evaluate the facts, but to reach a predetermined conclusion. In less than thirty-five minutes—according to documents submitted during the 2019 trial—Law had rewritten the memo so that it “fully supported termination.” He said so himself, in his own words.
A federal court later concluded that Law had “proactively mad-libbed official documents” to justify the termination of the Haitian TPS during Trump’s first term. This legal term—“mad-libbing,” like the word-filling game—accurately describes what happened: the insertion of politically desired conclusions into documents that were supposed to reflect a factual analysis. This is not just an ethical problem. It is a violation of the very principle that underpins the legitimacy of federal agencies: the separation of professional judgment from political pressure.
2025: Law Returns, Same Case, Same Method
Eight years later, Robert Law was back in the loop. According to documents revealed in June 2026, he was involved in last-minute changes to the decision memo on Haitian TPS in May–June 2025. His involvement in this case is significant: it signals the continuity of these practices. The same individual, with the same documented legal history, was once again in a position to influence an official document on the same subject—Haitian TPS. The motion to the Supreme Court explicitly cites him, referring to the earlier court decision Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 372, as context for understanding the significance of his re-involvement in this case.
This detail reveals something systemic about the Trump administration’s immigration policy: not only were practices of document manipulation repeated, but the individuals who engaged in them were retained—or even promoted—within the decision-making structures. The institutional message is clear: bypassing career civil servants and altering official documents comes at no cost—and may even pay off. It is this message that constitutes the true institutional cost of the politicization of federal agencies.
There is a profound indecency in rehiring, for the same case, someone whose manipulation of documents has been documented by a court. This is not negligence—it is a deliberate signal sent to career civil servants: your recommendations do not matter.
The Phantom Consultation: The DHS Lies in the Federal Register
What the law requires: genuine consultation with the State Department
TPS status—8 U.S.C. § 1254a—is explicit on this point: before making a decision to terminate or extend TPS, the Secretary of Homeland Security must consult with the State Department. This is not an administrative formality: it is a fundamental procedural safeguard, designed to ensure that TPS decisions are based on a rigorous analysis of conditions in the country of origin—an analysis that the State Department is institutionally positioned to provide. This consultation is the legal backbone of the program. It has been upheld for thirty-five years by both Republican and Democratic administrations.
In the case of the termination of Haitian TPS in July 2025, this consultation did not take place. This fact is established by DHS’s own internal documents. An email dated June 2, 2025, cited in the motion to the Supreme Court, confirms that “the State Department’s recommendation regarding Haitian TPS has not arrived”—and that Secretary Noem had “chosen to terminate Haitian TPS without” the State Department’s information on conditions in the country. The legally required consultation was, quite simply, absent.
The Lie in the Federal Register: A Deliberately False Statement
What turned a procedural irregularity into an institutional scandal was what came next. On July 1, 2025, the termination notice published in the Federal Register—the official record of the U.S. federal government—stated that the Secretary had made her decision “after consultation with the appropriate government agencies.” The DHS press release dated June 27, 2025, went further, stating that the decision had been made “in consultation with the State Department.” Both of these statements were factually false. According to internal documents, no such consultation had taken place. And according to the motion filed with the Supreme Court, this false statement was deliberate rather than inadvertent.
The UCLA School of Law, which represents the plaintiffs in this case, summarized the situation bluntly in a June 22, 2026, statement: “DHS lied when it published in a press release and in the Federal Register that it had conducted the required consultation on country conditions, including with the U.S. Department of State. In fact, no such consultation took place.” This is not a legal opinion: it is a conclusion based on DHS’s own internal documents. The falsification was in the federal public records. In black and white.
Lying in the Federal Register—the most solemn official document of the U.S. federal government—is crossing a line that even the most aggressive administrations on immigration had not crossed. This is more than just immigration policy. It is institutional falsification.
The Logic of the "National Interest": An Unprecedented Innovation
Thirty-five years of practice and a complete turnaround
Since TPS was established in 1990, decisions to extend or terminate the program have always been based on an analysis of conditions in the country of origin—the security situation, natural disasters, and political instability. This approach was consistent with the program’s very purpose: to provide temporary protection to people who cannot safely return home. Under both Trump’s first and second terms, under Obama, under Bush, under Clinton, and under both Bushes—the analytical framework was the same: country conditions.
The termination of Haitian TPS effective July 1, 2025, introduced a new criterion, unprecedented in the program’s thirty-five-year history: “U.S. national interest.” Not that conditions in Haiti had improved—DHS documents explicitly acknowledge that conditions remained “of concern.” It was not that the legal criteria were no longer met. It was simply that allowing Haitians to remain temporarily in the United States was deemed contrary to the national interest. According to an internal email cited in the motion, a DHS official had himself noted: “Haiti is the first”—thus confirming the unprecedented nature of this justification.
A Post-Hoc Rationalization That Changes the Rules of the Game
This conceptual shift is far from trivial. By substituting the “country conditions” criterion with that of “national interest,” the Trump administration fundamentally redefined the TPS program—not through legislation, not through a federal regulation subject to public comment, but through a unilateral discretionary decision. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals struck down this shift in January 2026 in the case National TPS Alliance v. Noem, concluding that the Secretary had exceeded her statutory authority. Judge Ana Reyes of the federal court in Washington, D.C., was even more direct in her February 2, 2026, ruling, noting that Noem’s rationale was “fundamentally flawed” because it ignored TPS holders living legally in the United States.
What is striking about this sequence of events is the speed with which a program built on decades of rigorous administrative practice can be subverted. Career officials had built this program on precise foundations: fact-based assessments, interagency consultations, and documented memos. The reversal of their recommendations within twenty-four hours, via a verbal directive, followed by the replacement of their analytical framework with a new rationale lacking legal precedent—all of this illustrates what the politicization of a federal agency can produce when taken to the extreme.
The “national interest” as grounds for terminating TPS—without any improvement in conditions in the home country—is a semantic sleight of hand that strips the program of its substance. If the criterion can be unilaterally redefined, no TPS is ever truly secure. That is the real danger.
The human cost: 350,000 lives hanging in the balance of a verbal directive
Hundreds of thousands of people, lives built over the years
Behind the memos, internal emails, and court filings are real people. When Joseph Edlow issued his verbal directive on May 30, 2025, government projections estimated that the termination of Haitian TPS would affect approximately 352,959 Haitians living and working legally in the United States. These people did not arrive illegally—they held legal status recognized by the U.S. government. They had enrolled in schools, signed employment contracts, and begun medical treatments—in good faith, based on the U.S. government’s official assurances regarding the duration of their protections.
Federal Judge Ana Reyes explicitly emphasized this in her February 2, 2026, ruling: “When the government grants a benefit for a fixed period, a beneficiary may reasonably expect to receive that benefit at least until the end of that period.” This fundamental principle of legitimate expectations—which U.S. law recognizes—was ignored by the administration. Haitian TPS holders, many of whom have lived in the United States since the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, found themselves in a state of constant legal uncertainty for months, not knowing whether their right to work, to remain, and to exist legally on U.S. soil would be maintained or revoked from one day to the next.
The Structural Vulnerability of a Legally Present Population
What makes this situation particularly troubling is that Haitian TPS holders were not in a legal gray area: they were legally present, legally authorized to work, and legally protected from deportation. Their status had been granted, renewed, and redesignated by the U.S. government on multiple occasions—under George W. Bush after the 2010 earthquake, under Obama, and under Biden in July 2024. Yet, despite this explicit and documented legal status, they were treated as priority targets of a deportation policy disguised as an administrative decision.
Judge Brian Cogan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York noted in his July 1, 2025, ruling that the early termination of TPS—before the expiration of the last valid extension—had caused immediate harm by disrupting lives built on trust. This judicial finding confirms what internal DHS documents also reveal: concern for the well-being of TPS holders was not a factor in the policy decision. It was an obstacle to be circumvented.
Hundreds of thousands of people, legally present, who have built lives based on the U.S. government’s word—and who are discovering that this word can be erased by an undocumented verbal directive issued within twenty-four hours. If that doesn’t tell us anything about the state of our institutions, I don’t know what would.
The Politicization of Federal Agencies: A Scourge Plaguing the United States
The Institutional Safeguard Framework and Its Limitations
Over the course of the 20th century, the United States developed a complex framework of institutional safeguards designed to preserve the independence of federal agencies from direct political pressure. The career civil service—protected by the Merit Systems Protection Board and governed by specific ethical rules—is one of the cornerstones of this framework. The idea is simple: certain decisions must be based on facts, not on electoral preferences. Decisions regarding country conditions for TPS were precisely this type of decision. They were designed to be shielded from political cycles.
But institutional safeguards have their limits. They work when political actors accept the rules of the game—when they recognize the authority of professional analyses, when they follow consultation procedures, and when they document their decisions. When a political appointee can issue a verbal directive—without a written record—that overturns a rigorous professional recommendation in a matter of hours, institutional safeguards are no longer enough. All that remains are the courts. And the courts, in this case, played their part: they blocked the repeated terminations. But every judicial block is an admission of institutional failure.
The Precedent and Its Implications for the U.S. Rule of Law
The Haiti TPS case is not an isolated incident. It is part of a broader pattern of transformation within federal agencies during the two Trump administrations. Career civil servants have been sidelined, fired, or forced to resign. Consultation processes that had existed for decades were bypassed. Official documents have been manipulated—sometimes by the same individuals, on the same cases, across two consecutive administrations. What the DHS internal documents reveal in the Haiti TPS case is that this transformation is not merely a matter of immigration policy: it is a matter of the rule of law.
When a career civil servant produces a rigorous analysis, based on legal and factual data, and that analysis is overturned by an undocumented verbal directive—the rule of law is undermined. When an official document published in the Federal Register states that a consultation took place, while internal emails show that it did not—the rule of law is undermined. The West may criticize China, Iran, or Russia for their disregard for legal institutions. It loses moral credibility every time it allows its own institutions to be subverted from within.
I am pro-West. I believe that the West is, despite all its flaws, the best system humanity has produced for organizing collective life. But the West does not defend itself by imitating its adversaries—it defends itself by remaining true to what it claims to be. And what is described here is the opposite of that.
Trump, Noem, and the Logic of Predetermination
A decision made even before the analyses were conducted
Several federal courts—including the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia—have concluded, to varying degrees, that the decision to terminate Haitian TPS was predetermined. In other words, the conclusion was set in stone before the analyses were conducted, and the analyses were manipulated to justify a conclusion that had already been reached. The motion to the Supreme Court in the Miot case echoes this conclusion: “newly disclosed DHS documents provide additional evidence that the decision to terminate Haitian TPS was predetermined.”
This logic of predetermination is, institutionally speaking, the most destructive. It does not simply state that immigration policy has changed—it asserts that the process itself is a sham. That the analyses serve not to inform the decision, but to legitimize it after the fact. That career officials are not advisors—they are actors in a play whose outcome has already been written. And when career officials refuse to play that role—as they did on May 29, 2025, by issuing an honest recommendation—they are overruled by a verbal directive.
Kristi Noem: Twelve Countries, Zero Extensions
Judge Ana Reyes noted in her February 2, 2026, decision: under Secretary Kristi Noem, DHS had terminated every TPS designation submitted to her office—twelve countries, zero extensions. This perfect record is not the result of an analytical coincidence. It reveals a systematic policy, independent of the actual conditions in each country. Judge Reyes also cited a social media post by Noem—in which she referred to Haiti as a “cursed” country—as additional context for understanding the lens through which decisions were made. This is not a legal judgment on her personal motivations. It is one piece of the bigger picture that internal documents help to complete.
The Trump administration argued before the Supreme Court that the Secretary of Homeland Security’s discretionary decisions regarding TPS cannot be reviewed or challenged by the courts. This is a constitutionally questionable position—and the courts have largely rejected it. But this position says something about the executive branch’s conception of power that this administration defends: absolute discretionary power, removed from judicial oversight, exercised through undocumented verbal directives. This is the model that career civil servants have been tasked with tempering for decades.
Twelve countries, zero extensions. I’m not accusing anyone of being racist based on this statistic alone—I’m saying that this figure, when viewed alongside internal documents revealing manipulated analyses and falsified consultations, raises a legitimate and urgent institutional question. Regardless of whether one is on the left or the right on immigration.
Case Before the Supreme Court: A Decisive Moment for U.S. Institutions
The June 2026 Motion: New Evidence, a Request for Remand
On June 16, 2026, attorneys representing Haitian and Syrian TPS holders filed a motion with the U.S. Supreme Court, requesting a remand of the case Miot v. Trump on the grounds of new evidence. This evidence—internal DHS documents disclosed in the NTPSA v. Noem case—demonstrates, according to the attorneys, that the Court does not have a complete factual record to rule on the merits. The motion emphasizes that the documents confirm that the July 1, 2025, termination notice was based on “a deliberately false statement ” and on “an unprecedented basis,” and that it had been issued only after a political appointee issued “an unusual last-minute verbal directive” ordering career officials to abandon their recommendation for an extension.
This motion was filed as a Supreme Court decision was expected before the end of June 2026. The context is particularly sensitive: in May 2025, the Supreme Court had already granted a stay—a suspension—of the injunction protecting Venezuelans under TPS, in an unreasoned decision issued on the shadow docket. Attorneys for the Haitian TPS holders argue that the Court cannot decide the case fairly without the complete record—and that the record has been deliberately obscured by false statements from DHS itself.
The Shadow Docket and the Risk of a Decision Without the Full Record
One of the most troubling aspects of this case is the way it was brought before the Supreme Court: not through the ordinary route of an appeal on the merits, but via emergency stays on the shadow docket—rapid, unmotivated decisions made outside the usual process of full and thorough argument. This mechanism, designed for exceptional emergencies, has been used repeatedly by the Trump administration to circumvent lower court rulings that blocked its immigration policies.
The June 2026 motion raises precisely this issue: the Supreme Court is ruling on a case in which the basic facts have been falsified by one of the parties. The lawyers cite the argument that “until discovery is concluded, the Court lacks a solid factual basis to assess the validity of the allegations.” This is not a delaying tactic: it is a fundamental demand that institutions function as they are supposed to—with facts that are verified and presented transparently.
The shadow docket as a tool of immigration policy—this is a symptom of a deeper institutional crisis. A healthy democracy should not have to fight, case by case, to compel its own government not to lie in its official documents.
Institutional Costs: When Career Expertise Becomes Obsolete
The Value of Institutional Memory in Federal Agencies
The career civil servants at DHS—the ones who drafted the May 29, 2025, memo—are not anonymous, interchangeable bureaucrats. They are specialists who have devoted years, sometimes decades, to mastering a specific field: TPS law, conditions in designated countries, interagency procedures, and relevant case law. Their May 29, 2025, memo was not the result of improvisation: it was the product of accumulated expertise, a precise understanding of legal requirements, and a keen awareness of the consequences of an ill-founded decision.
This institutional memory holds a value that political appointees, by definition, do not possess—not because they are less intelligent, but because they have not had the time to acquire it. This is precisely why democratic systems have developed safeguards for the career civil service: to preserve this expertise in the face of pressure from electoral cycles. When this expertise is systematically undermined—through verbal directives, document manipulation, or sham consultations—it is not merely detrimental to a specific policy. It is an irreversible loss of institutional capacity.
Silent Demotivation: What the Documents Don’t Say
The documents revealed in this case allow us to piece together part of the story. But there is one dimension these documents do not show: how career civil servants feel after seeing their work thrown in the trash within twenty-four hours. We must not invent testimonies that do not exist—but it is possible to reason about the structural consequences. When a federal agency repeatedly signals that the professional recommendations of its career civil servants can be overturned by a verbal directive with no follow-through, it sends a message to everyone who works there: your expertise is optional. Your analysis is an obstacle to be circumvented. Your role is to rubber-stamp, not to advise.
This message produces two predictable effects. Either the most competent career officials—those who have other options—leave the agencies. Or they stay, but learn to anticipate the desired conclusion and produce analyses designed to justify it. In both cases, the agency’s ability to produce rigorous and independent analyses deteriorates. This is what economists call a problem of adverse selection. And in the long run, it is the most profound institutional cost of politicization.
I do not claim to know what these anonymous civil servants are feeling. But I do know what an organization that punishes professional honesty produces, structurally. It eventually ends up with none.
Haiti: A Country in Crisis—A Fact That Even Internal Documents Do Not Deny
The Reality That DHS Acknowledges but Ignores
One of the most revealing aspects of the Haiti TPS case is that DHS’s internal documents do not claim that the situation in Haiti had improved. They explicitly acknowledge that conditions remained “of concern.” The November 2025 termination notice, published in the Federal Register, makes no such claim of improvement either: it cites U.S. “national interest” as the grounds for termination, while implicitly acknowledging that conditions in Haiti remain dangerous. This is a logically and morally troubling position: deporting people to a country that you yourself acknowledge is dangerous—not because it is no longer dangerous, but because their presence in the United States is deemed contrary to an undefined national interest.
Conditions in Haiti in 2025–2026 are documented by numerous independent sources. Gangs control a significant portion of Port-au-Prince. There are over one million internally displaced persons. The healthcare system is in shambles. The state, as understood in the West, is largely absent. These are the conditions that USCIS country condition experts had assessed when they recommended the automatic extension on May 29, 2025. Their analysis was not an ideological stance—it was a description of reality.
The security argument: a post hoc construct
To justify the termination in November 2025, the Trump administration put forward a new argument: the deteriorating conditions in Haiti—particularly gang violence—were creating a flawed screening and vetting environment that posed risks to U.S. national security. In other words, the Haitian crisis itself was exploited as an argument to terminate TPS—not because Haiti was getting better, but because Haiti was in such dire straits that security screenings of TPS applicants could not be conducted effectively. This is a circular argument: the more Haiti is in crisis, the less Haitians deserve temporary protection.
Judge Ana Reyes, in her February 2, 2026, ruling, had dismantled this rationale point by point. She noted that Noem’s reasoning focused on Haitians outside the United States or present in the country illegally, while deliberately ignoring the fact that TPS holders—those targeted by the termination—were living legally in the United States. This is the fundamental paradox of this policy: the people the administration sought to deport were precisely those who had followed all the rules, who had registered, who had obtained legal work authorizations, and who had built a life within the law.
Using the Haitian crisis as an argument to terminate Haitian TPS—that is turning humanitarian logic on its head. The more catastrophic the situation, the less protection refugees deserve. This is morally untenable, and several judges have said so.
The Legal Battle: The Courts as the Last Line of Defense
An Unprecedented Series of Judicial Setbacks
Between February 2025 and June 2026, court rulings regarding Haitian TPS came in rapid succession. On July 1, 2025, Judge Brian Cogan blocked the early termination, concluding that DHS had acted unlawfully by disregarding the legal protections ensuring sufficient notice to TPS holders. On September 5, 2025, Judge Edward Chen invalidated the terminations of Haitian and Venezuelan TPS, concluding that Noem had acted outside her statutory authority and in an arbitrary and capricious manner. On January 28, 2026, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld these findings. On February 2, 2026, Judge Ana Reyes of the Washington, D.C., court blocked the latest termination, conducting an 83-page analysis of the legal and factual basis for Noem’s decision.
This judicial track record—stay after stay, court after court, appellate court after appellate court—is unprecedented in the history of the TPS program. It illustrates that the courts have repeatedly had to compensate for the absence of properly followed institutional procedures. But the courts are not a sustainable substitute for functioning administrative institutions. Each judicial stay imposes real costs: uncertainty for TPS holders, legal costs for applicants, the strain on judicial resources, and delays in any final decision.
The Supreme Court and the Risk of Upholding the Precedent
The ultimate issue in the Miot v. Trump case before the Supreme Court is whether the Court will uphold or overturn the logic of predetermination and document manipulation revealed by internal DHS documents. If the Court—with a conservative majority—upholds the government’s position that the Secretary of Homeland Security’s discretionary decisions regarding TPS are not subject to judicial review, it will set a precedent that would extend far beyond Haitian TPS. It would signal that political appointees can bypass career civil servants, issue undocumented verbal directives, and publish factually false statements in official records—and that all of this is beyond judicial scrutiny.
The June 2026 motion requesting that the case be remanded is specifically intended to avoid this outcome: to allow the Court to rule on the basis of a complete record, including evidence of forgery, rather than on the basis of a record that reflects the government’s representations—which have now been refuted by the evidence. This is, at its core, a question about the very nature of the rule of law: Can a case be brought before the country’s highest court when its key pieces of evidence are falsified documents, without this being a problem?
I can understand that a conservative administration would want to reform the GST—that is a legitimate political position. What is not legitimate is falsifying official documents to achieve that goal. That line cannot be crossed without consequences for the entire system.
What This Case Reveals About American Democracy
The West Confronted with Its Own Institutional Contradictions
The TPS Haiti case unfolds within a broader geopolitical context in which the West claims to embody—in contrast to its authoritarian adversaries—a model of governance based on the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the integrity of institutions. This is a claim I endorse—the West is, on the whole, that model. But this claim entails obligations. It entails the obligation to uphold, within its own borders, the standards it demands of others. When official U.S. documents are falsified to justify predetermined political decisions, it is a breach of that claim. Not fatal—but real.
Putin’s Russia, Xi Jinping’s China, the mullahs’ Iran—these regimes build their domestic legitimacy, in part, on the idea that Western democracies are not really any more virtuous: that they, too, lie, manipulate, and protect their interests at the expense of the principles they proclaim. Every time official U.S. documents are falsified, every time career civil servants are overruled by verbal directives, every time legally required consultation is replaced by a false assertion—these regimes gather ammunition for their rhetoric. This is not an argument for paralysis: it is an argument for rigor.
Trump as a Necessary Evil: The Necessary Nuance
It would be intellectually dishonest not to acknowledge what is true about the Trump administration’s stance on immigration: TPS had, in some cases, become a form of de facto semi-permanence—used by successive administrations as a substitute for legislative reform that Congress was unable to produce. The concern to bring order to this program is not illegitimate in itself. It is possible—I admit—that U.S. immigration policy needs to be reformed, including TPS.
But this reform should have followed legitimate channels: legislation, transparent regulations, and respected consultative processes. That is not what happened. What happened was that political appointees sidelined career civil servants, falsified official documents, and presented to the courts a version of events that their own internal emails contradicted. Trump may be a necessary evil for the West in certain respects—his tough stance toward China, his rejection of strategic passivity. But a necessary evil remains an evil, and this evil carries a specific, well-documented institutional cost that future generations will have to pay.
I can hold both ideas at the same time: Trump may be useful to the West on certain geopolitical fronts, and simultaneously destructive to the American institutions that constitute the West’s strength in the long term. This is not a contradiction—it is an honest assessment of a complex reality.
Conclusion: Career civil servants deserve better than to be overlooked
Bringing to Light What Has Been Deliberately Concealed
This post aimed to do one simple thing: bring to light what political decisions tend to hide. The career civil servants at DHS who drafted the May 29, 2025, memo will never be named in the headlines. They don’t hold press conferences. They don’t post threads on social media. They do their work behind the scenes at federal agencies, guided by a belief in the value of professional expertise and procedural rigor. That work was overturned in twenty-four hours by a verbal directive. They deserve, at the very least, to be recognized for what they did: their job, honestly, in a hostile environment.
Documents revealed in June 2026—as part of the cases NTPSA v. Noem and Miot v. Trump—offer a rare inside look at a federal agency under extreme political pressure. This portrait is disturbing: emails showing officials forced to include “claims without empirical support” in official documents, memos overturned by undocumented verbal instructions, and legally required consultations replaced by false statements. This isn’t politics—it’s institutional falsification.
What American democracy chooses to do with these documents
The real question at hand, as we approach the end of June 2026, is not merely legal—it is political and moral. The documents exist. They have been submitted to the Supreme Court. They have been reviewed by judges in several districts. They confirm a precise sequence of events: a professional recommendation on May 29, a verbal directive on May 30, a falsified document on July 1, and a false statement in the Federal Register. American democracy now faces a choice: to validate this sequence as acceptable, or to reject it as incompatible with the institutional standards it claims to uphold.
This choice does not concern only the 350,000 Haitians who have been living in uncertainty for over a year. It concerns all career U.S. civil servants who wonder, every morning, whether their expertise still matters. It concerns all citizens who trust the official documents published in the Federal Register. Ultimately, it concerns the question of whether the United States is still capable of governing itself according to the rules it has itself established. The answer to this question will define—far beyond the TPS issue—the quality of American institutions for decades to come.
By Maxime Marquette, columnist
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This content was created with the help of AI.