From Ukraine’s needs to U.S. delivery—the complete cycle
Ukraine draws up its list of priorities. SACEUR approves the packages. Allies provide funding. The United States delivers from its stockpiles. This cycle, which may seem simple on paper, actually represents a radical break from previous military aid practices. Before PURL, each country had to individually negotiate equipment transfers with Washington, navigate a maze of arms export regulations, and coordinate incompatible delivery schedules. The result was chaotic, slow, and suboptimal for a war where every week counts. PURL centralizes, accelerates, and aligns aid with actual operational needs on the battlefield.
PURL packages are structured at $500 million each. According to the official website of the Ukrainian presidency, the first four packages were funded respectively by the Netherlands ($578 million), Denmark, Norway, and Sweden jointly ($495 million), Germany ($500 million), and Canada (500 million). Deliveries of the first two packages had already begun as early as mid-September 2025. This is an industrial war-support effort—methodical, traceable, and now irreversible in its momentum.
JUMPSTART, PURL’s turbo-charged cousin
Beyond PURL itself, NATO has developed a complementary mechanism called JUMPSTART, specifically designed to accelerate the supply of PAC-3 missiles for the Patriot systems—the rarest and most sought-after interceptors of the conflict. At the NATO defense ministers’ meeting on June 18, 2026, in Brussels, Germany announced an additional $200 million earmarked for the purchase of PAC-3 missiles via JUMPSTART. The United Kingdom, for its part, was providing $650 million for 100 critical Patriot missiles through this same mechanism.
The purpose of JUMPSTART is simple but vital: PAC-3 missiles are the only systems capable of effectively intercepting Russian ballistic missiles, particularly the formidable Oreshnik missiles. Zelenskyy put it in black and white in his May 26, 2026, letter to Trump and the U.S. Congress, made public the following day: “Ballistic missiles are Putin’s last major advantage on the battlefield.” Eliminating this advantage is the goal. JUMPSTART is the lever.
What strikes me about this financial architecture is its perverse elegance. Trump, who ostensibly refuses to “pay for Ukraine,” has nevertheless signed off on PURL and is allowing U.S. military stockpiles to be sold off—in exchange for European payment. It’s a business deal disguised as a mechanism of Atlantic solidarity. As always with Trump, everything boils down to a transaction. But if this transaction saves Ukrainian lives, I’m all for it.
U.S. Withdrawal: Reality or Strategic Fiction?
Trump: The Absent Figure Who Remains Present
Since Donald Trump took office, direct U.S. military aid to Ukraine has shrunk dramatically. The billions that flowed under Biden have been frozen, congressional debates have been stifled, and U.S. policy toward Ukraine has been redefined around a single obsession: that Europeans pay their share. PURL is precisely the institutional response to this U.S. withdrawal—a mechanism that allows Washington to maintain a strategic presence (its weapons, its defense industry) without directly tapping the U.S. federal budget to support Kyiv.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, upon his arrival in Brussels on June 18, 2026, described PURL as “President Trump’s initiative” and celebrated its “progress.” According to him, “through President Trump’s PURL initiative, the allies have taken the lead in funding support for Ukraine’s defense.” ” He added: “This is a validation of President Trump’s approach, an approach that will set the stage for peace.” Translation from “Hegseth-speak”: The Europeans pay, Trump takes the credit, Ukraine survives. Everyone is supposed to be happy.
A Dependency That Shapes the Balance of Power
What Hegseth doesn’t say—but what every serious analyst understands—is the structural fragility of this model. Ukraine depends on U.S. stockpiles for its most critical systems. According to an IFRI study published on June 4, 2026, PURL supplies 75% of the missiles for Ukraine’s Patriot systems and 90% of the missiles used by other air defense systems. This represents a massive dependence on U.S. industrial capacity and on the goodwill of the Trump administration. If Trump were to decide tomorrow to cut off the supply—even for domestic political reasons, even for just a few weeks—the consequences for Ukraine’s air defense capabilities could be catastrophic.
Zelensky himself acknowledged this in his joint letter to Trump and Congress, seen by Bloomberg and cited on May 27, 2026: “The current pace of deliveries through the PURL program is no longer in line with the reality of the threat we face.” ” A statement that speaks volumes about the limitations of a mechanism that, however ingenious it may be, cannot make up for everything.
Trump is the necessary evil in this equation. I say this without pleasure, but with clarity: without his signature on the PURL agreement in July 2025, Ukraine would not have these Patriot missiles. Realpolitik, at times, takes root in the most uncomfortable places. What I refuse to do, however, is let Trump take credit for a Ukrainian victory that his administration nearly jeopardized on several occasions.
Europe Takes the Reins: From Words to Concrete Action
The June 18 Brussels Summit—An Operational Turning Point
The June 18, 2026, meeting of the Contact Group on Defense Support for Ukraine in Brussels—the so-called “Ramstein” format—marked a new stage in the implementation of the European relay effort. In total, the allies pledged more than $4 billion in military support to Ukraine on that single day, according to Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. The composition of the package illustrates the diversification of contributions: air defense missiles, drones, and long-range artillery ammunition. The days of large symbolic checks are over: the time has come for concrete and traceable deliveries.
Of the $4 billion announced that day, nearly $1 billion will be channeled through PURL to provide Ukraine with interceptor missiles for its Patriot systems, according to Fedorov. Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden make up the leading quartet. A total of nine countries have confirmed their participation in this new PURL round. Sweden, which is allocating an additional $108 million, is making its fourth contribution to the mechanism, bringing its cumulative total to $543 million through PURL alone since the program’s launch.
The United Kingdom and Frozen Russian Assets as Fuel for War
One of the most significant innovations in this funding cycle is the UK’s mechanism for mobilizing frozen Russian assets. On June 18, London announced a package worth 752 million pounds (approximately one billion dollars), including 150,000 Ukrainian-made drones, more than 350 air defense missiles, and radar systems—funded by the sale of Russian assets seized under the ERA (European Rearmament Asset) program. It is a form of justice that is both poetic and strategic: Putin himself, through his frozen assets, is financing the weapons that destroy his missiles.
According to data from the Kyiv Independent on June 19, 2026, the allies also pledged more than one billion dollars in drones during this meeting. The Netherlands announced an additional package of 500 million euros (573 million dollars), half of which is allocated to strengthening Ukraine’s drone capabilities. Norway is contributing to the purchase of naval drones. On June 19, Australia confirmed an additional 100 million Australian dollars (70 million dollars) through PURL over the next twelve months.
That frozen Russian assets are being used directly to finance weapons against Russia—that’s a twist Putin likely didn’t anticipate in his initial calculations. He thought the West would grow weary, become divided, and capitulate. Instead, his own billions are being hurled back at him like projectiles. There is an irony here that I deeply appreciate, even though I know the war continues to claim lives every day.
NATO's 80 Billion: Anatomy of a Mind-Boggling Figure
Where does this figure of 80 billion come from?
The figure has been circulating since early June 2026: NATO is reportedly discussing a support package for Ukraine in the range of 70 to 80 billion euros, which could be announced at the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026. Politico revealed the existence of these discussions, citing several NATO diplomats. The proposed structure is as follows: 30 billion would come from the EU’s 90-billion-euro loan program, which was already approved on April 23, 2026; 40 billion would consist of new bilateral commitments from NATO member states. In total, this amounts to approximately 80 billion dollars at the current exchange rate.
This figure has not yet been finalized. Turkey, the host country of the Ankara summit, stated on June 8, 2026, that it had “no information” regarding the existence of such an initiative on the summit’s agenda. Negotiations are ongoing. But the trend is clear: at the June 18 meeting in Brussels, the allies were already spending at a rate consistent with this goal. At the same time, Germany proposed a transparency mechanism to track and coordinate these contributions, in order to avoid double-counting between bilateral pledges and EU funds. This is a technical issue, but one that is crucial for the credibility of the figures.
Geographic distribution: Who is shouldering the burden?
European NATO member states allocated approximately two billion euros per month to Ukraine during the first four months of 2026, according to data compiled by the Eastern Herald—an annualized rate of 24 billion euros, which is insufficient to reach the 80 billion target. The goal of the Ankara summit is therefore to institutionalize and accelerate this pace. According to Secretary General Rutte, in his remarks ahead of the June 18, 2026, Brussels summit, Europe and Canada spent more than $90 billion additional in 2025 compared to 2024—an increase of nearly 20% in one year.
Germany bears the lion’s share of the European burden: approximately 11 billion euros in bilateral aid planned for 2026. Johann Wadephul, the German foreign minister, proposed at the NATO foreign ministers’ summit that European NATO countries provide between 30 and 40 billion euros to Ukraine annually for 2026 and 2027. It is an ambitious proposal—far from a done deal—but one that outlines a sustainable and structured European commitment that no longer depends on the whims of Washington.
These figures make my head spin—in a good way. When you think that in 2022, Europe was debating whether it could even supply helmets to Ukraine… Today, we’re talking about coordinated tens of billions, transparency mechanisms, and contributions from Japan and Australia. History is accelerating. I wouldn’t have bet on this three years ago. Perhaps Putin wouldn’t have either.
Weapons Delivered: From the Patriot to Ukrainian Drones
The Backbone of Air Defense
What is keeping Ukraine alive in the face of massive Russian strikes are, first and foremost, the interceptor missiles for the Patriot systems. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has confirmed that Ukraine currently receives more than 90% of all its anti-ballistic capabilities through the PURL mechanism, including missiles for Patriot and HIMARS. This dependence speaks volumes about the vital importance of the mechanism. During a massive Russian strike on Kyiv in May 2026, Ukraine had to contend with 30 ballistic missiles simultaneously—a scenario that requires a high consumption of PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors.
Zelensky put this reality into the most apt words in his June 18 statement in Brussels, according to the Kyiv Independent: “Sometimes, these deliveries make a difference literally day after day. When you know that Russia is preparing a massive strike against Ukraine, and you’re able to receive Patriot missiles the day before that attack, it saves lives. ” It’s as simple, as brutal, and as human as that.
Drones: Ukraine’s Capability Revolution
Beyond U.S. systems, allies are investing heavily in Ukrainian-made drones. This shift is strategic: Ukraine has developed unparalleled expertise in drone warfare, to the point that at the Brussels summit, Rutte stated that “when it comes to drones in particular, it is Ukraine that is teaching others. ” The United Kingdom has committed to supplying 150,000 Ukrainian-made drones. The Netherlands is allocating 250 million euros to strengthen Ukraine’s drone capabilities. Over the course of the June 18 meeting, more than one billion dollars was pledged specifically for drones.
This focus on Ukrainian drones is doubly beneficial: it supports the Ukrainian defense industry, reducing dependence on imports, and it capitalizes on Kyiv’s comparative advantage. The funds allocated by countries such as Norway for naval drones also signal a shift toward asymmetric capabilities that have proven effective in the Black Sea. The request for funding for one million Ukrainian drones, presented by the United Kingdom to the Contact Group, illustrates the scale of this ambition.
There is something moving about seeing Ukraine—a country at war—become a global laboratory for military innovation. They had no choice. But from that lack of choice, remarkable ingenuity has emerged. This may be the only positive legacy this war will leave behind: a Ukrainian doctrine of military asymmetry that will transform 21st-century warfare.
NSATU Wiesbaden: The Logistical Hub of Western Support
An Unprecedented Coordination Infrastructure
Behind PURL lies an operational infrastructure that few people know about: the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) Command, based in Wiesbaden, Germany. With some 700 personnel from allied and partner nations, NSATU serves as the logistical backbone of Western support for Ukraine. This is where equipment deliveries are coordinated, training for Ukrainian forces is organized, and shipments from U.S. stockpiles to the front lines are scheduled. According to NATO, NSATU currently coordinates more than 80% of all military support to Ukraine, as per the IFRI study from June 2026.
The internationalization of NSATU is itself a strong political signal. On May 29, 2026, Japan officially announced the deployment of four Self-Defense Forces officers to Wiesbaden—a first in Japanese history. These four soldiers illustrate a profound truth: the war in Ukraine is no longer a European affair; it is a global security issue. Tokyo is not joining PURL and NSATU out of emotional solidarity—Koizumi and his strategists understand that what is at stake in Kharkiv also shapes what will be at stake tomorrow in the Taiwan Strait.
The Chain of Command and Logistical Hubs
NSATU operates from its headquarters in Wiesbaden, with three logistics hubs in the eastern part of the Alliance, as close as possible to Ukrainian territory. This structure minimizes transit times, a critical factor when Kyiv needs interceptors “on the eve of a massive strike.” Deliveries of the first two PURL packages began as early as mid-September 2025, less than two months after the agreement was signed—a historically short timeframe for international arms procurement procedures. This proves that logistical organization can be just as decisive as the weapons themselves.
The Joint Initiative on Large-Caliber Ammunition led by the Czech Republic—a program parallel to PURL for artillery shells—reflects the same logic of coordination. Although this program has lost half of its contributors (from 18 countries to 9) since Andrej Babiš took office in December 2025, it has nonetheless delivered approximately 500,000 shells since early 2026, with contracts for a total of one million rounds over the course of the year. Germany added an additional 300 million euros to this initiative on June 9, 2026, securing approximately 50,000 additional long-range shells.
Allow me a personal remark about Wiesbaden: this German city, once a symbol of the post-1945 Allied occupation, has become the central hub of Europe’s largest collective defense effort since the end of the Cold War. History has its magnificent ironies. Germany, which took so long to overcome its historical reservations, is now at the heart of the logistics operation that is saving Ukraine. It took the horror of Bucha to trigger this sudden shift.
Zelensky Faces a Shortfall: The Request for an Additional 20 Billion
A leader who isn’t content with the status quo
Zelensky never lets his allies rest on their laurels. His strategy is consistent: to push, to demand, to remind them that what has been promised is insufficient, that the war doesn’t stop just because summits are taking place. On June 17, 2026, the day before the Brussels summit, Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced at a joint press conference with his Dutch counterpart that Ukraine is requesting an additional $20 billion on top of the $40 billion already pledged for 2026. In total, of the $40 billion, $24 billion has already been factored into the delivery schedule—which means that approximately $16 billion still needs to be secured.
Fedorov summed up the issue with surgical precision: “We are working with our partners to improve the quality of support so that it aligns with Kyiv’s priorities.” ” He laid out the priorities without mincing words: long-range artillery, drones, the PURL initiative, and air defense systems. This isn’t a wish list—it’s a framework for understanding the ongoing battle. Where the Russians are making gains is where these capabilities are lacking.
The Cycle of Constant Demand as a Survival Strategy
The dynamics of Ukraine’s requests are a strategy in and of themselves. By constantly making requests that exceed what allies can immediately provide, Zelensky maintains political pressure, prevents support from becoming normalized at an insufficient level, and creates the psychological conditions for a gradual escalation of support. This is the diplomacy of survival, practiced by someone who knows that his country pays in human lives for every gap between demand and delivery.
Proof of this strategy’s effectiveness: at the Hague summit in June 2025, NATO formalized a commitment to provide at least 40 billion euros in funding for Ukraine over the following year. Rutte then declared at the Ramstein meeting in April 2026 that NATO member states would provide $60 billion in military support to Ukraine in 2026, not counting the EU’s $90 billion loan program. The $80 billion target for the Ankara summit is merely the next step in this upward spiral.
Zelensky is a hero—I say this without irony or naivety. Not because he is perfect, not because his government is beyond reproach. But because in 2022, when virtually all Western military experts predicted that Kyiv would fall within 72 hours, he refused the evacuation offered by Washington and said, “I need ammunition, not a taxi.” That choice changed history. That choice may have saved Europe.
Finland, Sweden, Norway: The Northern Flank Mobilizes
New Members That Are Shifting the Balance
NATO’s recent expansion—Finland in 2023, Sweden in 2024—has structurally transformed the Alliance’s ability to support Ukraine. These two countries not only make their own financial contributions to the PURL mechanism but also bring valuable expertise in defense doctrine against Russia. Sweden, in particular, has increased its cumulative contribution through PURL to $543 million, becoming one of the mechanism’s most consistent contributors. At the Brussels summit on June 18, 2026, Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson emphasized that “thanks to PURL, Ukraine can quickly access essential U.S. defense equipment, including modern air defense systems.”
Norway announced an additional contribution of more than $300 million to the PURL mechanism, in addition to its participation in the $540 million purchase of long-range artillery ammunition at the Brussels summit, jointly with Denmark, Spain, Lithuania, and Luxembourg. Oslo, which has massive oil revenues and a tradition of supporting international security, is one of the most consistent financial backers of Western support for Ukraine.
The Baltic States: The Most Determined, the Most Vulnerable
While the countries on the northern flank are providing massive funding, the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are the ones that best understand what is at stake. They are not mere spectators of the war in Ukraine: they are potential candidates for the next one. At the June 18 summit in Brussels, Lithuania and Luxembourg confirmed their participation in funding artillery ammunition. These countries are already spending a percentage of their GDP on aid to Ukraine far greater than their economic weight would suggest, because they know that a victorious Putin in Ukraine would be an existential catastrophe for them.
The decision at the 2025 Hague summit—that direct contributions to Ukraine’s defense and its defense industrial base would count toward the new 5% of GDP threshold for defense spending—created a structural financial incentive to support Kyiv. It’s institutional genius: by aligning NATO’s budget rules with support for Ukraine, Rutte has transformed aid to Zelensky into a national defense policy for each of the 32 member states.
I often think of the Baltic states when I read these figures. For them, the war in Ukraine is not a matter of principle or abstract values—it is a matter of national survival. Their determination should not put us, the more comfortable Westerners, to shame. It should remind us why we are fighting, and for whom.
EU Support: 90 Billion and the Historic Loan
NATO-EU Complementarity in the Funding Architecture
PURL and NATO mechanisms are only part of the Western support framework for Ukraine. At the same time, the European Union has launched its own massive funding program. On April 23, 2026, European leaders approved an additional loan of $104 billion to cover Ukraine’s needs for 2026–2027: nearly 70 billion for military aid, and more than 34 billion for budgetary support. Since 2022, the EU and its member states have provided $82.9 billion in military support to Ukraine, according to data from the EU Delegation to the United States updated as of June 16, 2026.
Coordination between NATO mechanisms (PURL, NSATU, the Czech Ammunition Initiative) and EU financial instruments (European Peace Facility, sovereign loans, ERA) is one of the most complex technical challenges of this support. The German proposal for a transparency mechanism—to avoid double-counting and ensure that the 80 billion announced in Ankara truly represents new funding—directly addresses this challenge. Without transparency, figures can easily be inflated by reusing the same funds across multiple accounting frameworks.
The European Peace Facility: A Tool That Has Become Essential
Among European instruments, the European Peace Facility deserves special mention. It has provided $6.6 billion in contributions since the start of the war—an amount that represents a radical break from the European tradition of excluding military spending from EU instruments. The EU has also launched a Joint Defense Center in Warsaw to capture lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, and a joint NATO-Ukraine defense innovation program to support Ukrainian weapons production.
This joint center in Warsaw embodies something fundamental: Ukraine is teaching NATO how to wage modern war. The doctrine of defense in depth against an adversary with ballistic capabilities, the massive use of FPV drones, decentralized electronic warfare—Ukraine has developed all of this under actual enemy fire. This is not just aid flowing from the West to Ukraine: it is also a reverse transfer of know-how that is transforming European armies.
The image that comes to mind is that of a wounded soldier who, from his hospital bed, teaches his doctors surgical techniques they didn’t know before. That is what Ukraine is doing with NATO. It is paying a terrible price, but it is bequeathing a doctrine of warfare that could prove decisive for Europe’s defense in the decades to come. It is a terrible yet necessary exchange.
Internal Resistance to NATO: Divisions Within the Coalition
The Issue of Burden-Sharing
The facade of unanimity that characterizes NATO’s press releases should not obscure the real divisions within the coalition. The main source of tension centers on the sharing of the financial burden. Some allies feel they are contributing disproportionately more than others. It is precisely to address this criticism that the 80-billion mechanism proposed for the Ankara summit includes a system for transparency and monitoring of contributions. The Eastern Herald noted on June 8, 2026, that “the cost of supporting Ukraine is perceived as unevenly distributed within the alliance.”
Orbán’s Hungary continues to act as a brake on European decisions, using its veto power within the EU to slow down or impose conditions on certain tranches of aid. Turkey, the host country of the Ankara summit, has complex relations with Russia that complicate its position within the alliance. And even among the most committed members, resistance to the idea of a mandatory contribution of 0.25% of GDP specifically for Ukraine—a proposal put forward by Zelensky—remains strong. Rutte himself has admitted that he does not believe this approach would be acceptable.
The Czech Initiative’s Withdrawal: A Wake-up Call
The Czech Ammunition Initiative’s decline serves as a concrete illustration of these tensions. Since Andrej Babiš returned to power in December 2025, the number of contributing countries has fallen from 18 to 9—and the new Czech government has ceased to contribute financially directly, now limiting itself to a coordinating role. The volume contracted for 2026 has fallen to approximately one million shells, compared to 1.8 million delivered in 2025. This represents a 44% reduction in volume, in a war where every artillery shell counts.
This decline serves as a serious warning: mechanisms for supporting Ukraine are vulnerable to internal political changes in member countries. What was taken for granted under one government may be called into question by the next. This is precisely why institutionalizing support through mechanisms like PURL—anchored in treaties and coordinated by an international organization—is so crucial: it creates institutional inertia that is better able to withstand national political shifts.
The Czech withdrawal concerns me. Not because Babiš is an unknown figure—he is a pro-Russian populist who has long been playing into Putin’s hands behind the scenes in Europe. But because he reminds us of a truth we’d rather forget: democracy can vote for its own gravediggers. Ukraine needs not only generous allies today, but also institutional frameworks that survive political turnover.
Trump's Role: Constraint, Accomplice, Catalyst
A president who signs off on measures he would not fund
Trump’s stance toward Ukraine remains one of the most troubling ambiguities in current geopolitics. On the one hand, his administration has cut off direct U.S. aid to Kyiv and exerted constant pressure on the Europeans to “pay their share.” On the other hand, Trump personally signed the PURL agreement with Rutte in July 2025, allowing European allies to purchase U.S. weapons for Ukraine. Pete Hegseth, his Secretary of Defense, describes PURL as “an initiative of President Trump” and celebrates its results.
This dual stance is consistent with Trumpist logic: America supplies weapons (and makes money), Europe pays (which Trump has been demanding for years), and Trump can claim to have “set the stage for peace” without having directly opposed Putin. It is a clever narrative construct, even if it is morally shaky. For Ukraine, the concrete result—Patriot missiles delivered on a regular basis—is what matters. Whether it’s labeled a “Trump initiative” or “Atlantic solidarity,” Kyiv doesn’t care: what matters is that the missiles arrive.
The Limitation of the Trumpist Equation
But this dependence on Trump’s goodwill carries a major risk. If the U.S. administration were to decide, for reasons of diplomacy with Moscow or domestic politics, to slow down deliveries on its end, PURL would collapse. Ukraine itself has warned that the mechanism “is no longer in step with the reality of the threat”—a sign that deliveries, though continuous, are insufficient in volume. The race between the pace of U.S. production and exports and Ukraine’s consumption of interceptors remains tight. According to Rutte on June 3, 2026, “the risk of an impact on stockpiles” from intense military operations “exists, but has no immediate impact on PURL at this time.”
This is why Zelensky’s proposal—the licensed production of Patriot systems in Ukraine or Europe, under U.S. technological ownership—is so strategically important. It would aim to structurally reduce dependence on U.S. stockpiles by creating local production capacity. The G7 has indicated it is “ready to consider licenses for the production of interceptors directly in Ukraine.” ” This prospect, if it materializes, would fundamentally change the balance of power.
Trump is fascinating in his pragmatic cynicism. He has found a way to support Ukraine without “supporting Ukraine”—by making the Europeans pay for American weapons. It’s almost elegant in its commercial logic. I condemn him for his methodical destruction of American democratic institutions. But on this specific point, his deal with Rutte may have saved more Ukrainian lives than any humanistic speech ever could. The moral ambiguity of our times, in a nutshell.
The Ankara Summit in July: What's at Stake for Ukraine
What Kyiv Expects from July 7–8, 2026
Mark Rutte has described the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, as “entirely focused on implementation.” For Ukraine, the expectations are clear and numerous. First and foremost, formal confirmation of a long-term financial commitment—ideally the 80 billion envisaged—that goes beyond scattered bilateral promises and creates a predictable and robust support framework. Zelensky also hopes for a collective reaffirmation of Ukraine’s irreversible path toward NATO, even if immediate membership remains politically out of reach.
According to the Ukrainian ambassador to Turkey, Nariman Dzhelialov, Kyiv is also counting on the summit to discuss a specific contribution mechanism for Ukraine—with each member contributing a fraction of its national budget—and to finalize agreements on drones, particularly with Turkey. This last point is particularly sensitive: Ankara maintains complex economic and diplomatic relations with Moscow while also being a NATO member and a supplier of Bayraktar drones to Ukraine.
Remaining Obstacles for Ankara
The path to an ambitious agreement in Ankara remains fraught with obstacles. Turkey has stated that it has “no information” on the $80 billion package, which is not necessarily a veto but reveals the state of negotiations as of early June. The United States has not yet clarified its position on potential co-financing or its role in the 80-billion mechanism. The issue of equitable burden-sharing among allies remains politically sensitive, particularly for countries facing domestic budget constraints.
Nevertheless, the momentum is positive. The June 18 meeting in Brussels demonstrated that, when the political will is there, the allies are capable of mobilizing billions within a matter of hours. The acceleration of financial commitments since early 2026—driven by the evident Russian threat and the logical pressure resulting from the U.S. withdrawal—has created momentum that will be difficult to halt in Ankara. The Secretary General set the framework: “Deliver. Deliver on spending, deliver on industry, deliver on support for Ukraine.”
I will be keeping a close eye on the final communiqué from Ankara. It will be the litmus test for everything the Europeans have promised since February 2022. If the 80 billion is formalized, accompanied by a transparency mechanism and a binding delivery schedule, then Europe will have demonstrated that it can take its destiny into its own hands. If it’s nothing more than empty words, Zelensky will have realized it well before the end of the press conference.
Conclusion: A historic turning point—fragile but irreversible
Europe Is Learning to Defend Itself
What has been unfolding since the launch of PURL in July 2025 is a historic paradigm shift. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, Europe is no longer content to be protected by the American security umbrella: it is building its own mechanisms for financing collective defense, investing in its own defense industry, and developing its own logistical coordination capabilities. NSATU in Wiesbaden, PURL, the Czech Initiative, and the EU’s lending mechanisms—these are the pillars of a European security architecture that, for the first time, could function without Washington as a direct financial contributor.
This pivot is not flawless; it is not complete; it is not guaranteed. It is fragile, fraught with internal political tensions, and vulnerable to electoral shifts in member capitals. But it is real. And it is driven by urgency: every Patriot missile that intercepts a Russian Oreshnik over Kyiv is one more argument for continuing to fund this mechanism. The reality of war is forcing policymakers to make choices they would not have made in peacetime.
Ukraine as a Test of the Western Spirit
History will judge this period harshly or generously depending on what Western democracies choose to do. For now, the results are mixed but heading in the right direction. Billions are pouring in, weapons are arriving, and the mechanisms are becoming more professional. Zelenskyy remains steadfast—a daily strategist, a tireless negotiator, and a symbol of resistance for millions of people. Putin, for his part, is counting on Western exhaustion, on internal divisions within NATO, and on the electoral cycles of democracies. He is partly wrong: the institutionalization of support through PURL and large financial packages creates commitments that are difficult to undo.
But vigilance remains essential. The 80 billion promised to Ankara is only worth as much as 80 billion actually delivered. And if the history of this conflict teaches us one thing, it is that the gap between promise and reality can cost Ukrainian lives. The PURL is a remarkable mechanism—innovative, effective, and bold in its diplomatic architecture. But it is not a magic solution. It is a tool. An extraordinarily valuable tool that must be defended, funded, developed, and protected from the political vagaries that constantly seek to undermine it.
Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist
Sources
Primary sources
NATO — Joint Rutte-Zelensky press conference (PURL, 6 billion pledged) — June 3, 2026
Ukrainska Pravda — Pete Hegseth highlights PURL’s “progress” and the path to peace — June 18, 2026
Secondary Sources
Kyiv Independent — Australia Announces $70 Million Through the PURL Mechanism — June 19, 2026
Ukrainska Pravda — Japan joins PURL to fund non-lethal equipment for Ukraine — May 30, 2026
NATO — NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (PURL mechanism, NSATU) — June 11, 2026
Euromaidan Press — Japan Joins NATO’s PURL Funding Mechanism — May 30, 2026
IFRI — Study on NSATU and PURL: NATO’s Strategic Shift for Ukraine — June 4, 2026
This content was created with the help of AI.