ANALYSIS: The long-range drone war has changed the strategic landscape in Europe

A Drone Designed for Depth

The Lyutyi, also spelled Liutyi, has become the iconic weapon of this campaign. This single-use attack drone, classified as an OWA-UAV in NATO terminology, is 4.4 meters long and carries a significant payload over distances exceeding 1,000 kilometers. According to analyses by specialist H.I. Sutton, the Lyutyi even exceeded its stated range to reach the Perm refinery, more than 1,400 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. When a drone designed for 1,000 kilometers travels 1,400, that’s no longer engineering—it’s determination.

The Lyutyi’s design incorporates low-radar-signature composite materials, GPS navigation coupled with backup inertial systems, and an optically guided final approach. Its unit cost is estimated at between $20,000 and $50,000—a fraction of the price of a Russian Kalibr cruise missile, which costs between $1 million and $3 million. This cost-effectiveness ratio is central to Ukraine’s strategy.

First Strategic Targets Hit

In January 2024, a Ukrainian drone struck the Yaroslavl refinery, located about 900 kilometers from Ukraine, signaling a new capability. Starting in the early months of 2024, strikes multiplied against targets previously considered out of range. The Engels Air Base, the Bryansk oil depots, and the Ust-Luga petrochemical plant were struck. According to the Atlantic Council, this campaign explicitly targeted Putin’s war machine by striking at his energy logistics.

The Lyutyi was identified at several strike sites, notably in Saratov and the Moscow region in June 2025. Available footage shows drones maneuvering to evade Russian air defenses over the capital itself. The Kremlin believed its air defenses were impenetrable; Ukrainian drones turned that certainty into fiction.

A Systematic Campaign Against Oil

Ukraine has systematically targeted the heart of the Russian economy: the oil sector. The refineries in Ilsky, Afipsky, Slaviansk-ECO, Kirichi, and Novochakhtinsk have all sustained damage. The strikes were planned to maximize economic impact while disrupting Russia’s military supply chain. Exports of refined petroleum products are a major source of foreign currency for Moscow’s budget. Attacking Russian oil is like striking at the lifeblood of the war with a surgical precision that Western sanctions have never achieved.

Oil terminals in the Krasnodar and Rostov regions were struck multiple times between 2024 and 2025. Drones also targeted strategic storage depots, causing local shortages of aviation fuel at some Russian air bases. Ukrainian intelligence services released satellite images confirming the damage, forcing Moscow to acknowledge some of the strikes.

The Impact on Refining Capacity

Analysts estimate that Russia’s refining capacity has been reduced by 10 to 15 percent as a result of the Ukrainian drone strikes. This reduction has had a ripple effect on export revenues and on the availability of fuel for the Russian armed forces. Russia, which produced approximately 5.5 million barrels per day of refined products before the conflict, has had to restrict certain exports to meet domestic demand.

And yet, the Russian government continued to deny the extent of the damage, claiming that repairs were proceeding quickly and that production was returning to normal. Trade data indicated otherwise. Russian propaganda may deny the strikes, but it cannot deny the decline in oil revenues evident in customs statistics. Russia was forced to import gasoline for the first time in decades, a fact that reveals the vulnerability of its energy infrastructure.

One Million Drones in One Year

Ukraine produced more than one million drones in 2024, a staggering number for a country at war. This production spanned the entire spectrum: FPV drones for the front lines, reconnaissance drones, and long-range drones such as the Lyutyi and the Bohdan. The Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, had set this goal as a national priority. The factories, often decentralized to reduce the risk of airstrikes, operated around the clock.

Funding came from a mix of the state budget, international donations via United24, and private investments. Ukrainian companies developed modular assembly lines capable of switching between models in a matter of days. One million drones produced by a country under daily bombardment: this was the industrial miracle that no one had anticipated. According to Ukrainian military intelligence, drones carried out 69 percent of strikes against Russian military targets and 75 percent of strikes against infrastructure in 2024.

The Goal of 2,000 Long-Range Strike Drones

In 2025, Ukraine planned to more than quadruple its production rate of deep-strike drones, with a target exceeding 2,000 units per year. This figure, reported by several international media outlets, represented a dramatic increase compared to 2023 capabilities. Investments in production automation and component standardization made this goal achievable.

The volume of strikes confirms this ramp-up. According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Ukraine launched approximately 1,000 drones toward Russia in August 2024, then 3,000 in July 2025, and up to 7,000 in March 2025, exceeding for the first time the number of drones launched by Russia toward Ukraine. And yet, these figures represent only a fraction of total production, with a large portion reserved for the front lines.

The Hornet System and Autonomous Navigation

The BBC has revealed the existence of the Hornet system, an AI-powered drone platform developed by the Ukrainians to strike Russian supply lines deep within enemy territory. This system uses machine learning algorithms to identify and track moving targets without direct human intervention. The Hornet represents a qualitative leap forward compared to remotely piloted drones, as it can operate in environments with intense GPS jamming.

The integration of artificial intelligence allows the drones to correct their trajectory in real time, bypass air defense zones detected by their sensors, and select the best final approach to the target. When a drone learns to evade a surface-to-air missile, warfare enters an era where machines think faster than human operators. Ukrainian engineers have trained their models on thousands of hours of flight data and sensor feedback.

Russian Countermeasure Networks Overwhelmed

Russian air defense systems, notably the S-300, S-400, and Pantsir, were designed to intercept aircraft and cruise missiles. Ukrainian drones, flying at low altitude and low speed, have a very different radar signature. The cost of interception is disproportionate: an S-400 missile costs about $1 million, while a Lyutyi drone costs less than $50,000.

Russia has deployed anti-drone nets, electronic jamming systems, and aerial patrols, but saturation made these measures partially ineffective. And yet, Moscow has continued to portray its air defenses as virtually invulnerable in its official communications—a growing disconnect between rhetoric and the reality on the ground.

The Expansion of Air Defense Lines

Russia must now protect a vast territory. From arms factories in the Urals to refineries on the Volga, including air bases in Murmansk and logistics depots in Kursk, potential targets span thousands of kilometers. The Russian Ministry of Defense has been forced to deploy its S-400 systems across a considerably wider area, creating gaps that Ukrainian drones have been able to exploit.

Analyses by the Institute for the Study of War have shown that the distribution of Russian air defenses between the front lines and the rear created an unsolvable dilemma. Strengthening the protection of Moscow and critical infrastructure meant weakening coverage at the front, and vice versa. Putin must choose between protecting his capital and protecting his army at the front: this is the impossible choice that Ukrainian drones force upon him every day.

The Exorbitant Cost of Interception

The economic ratio between the cost of an attacking drone and the cost of intercepting it is overwhelmingly in Ukraine’s favor. Launching a $1 million interceptor missile against a $20,000 drone is unsustainable in the long term. Russia has attempted to develop less expensive countermeasures, including automated anti-aircraft guns and interceptor drones, but these solutions remain in the limited deployment phase.

Russia’s defense budget reached $137 billion in 2025, or about 5.1 percent of gross domestic product. A growing share of this budget is being absorbed by air defense and infrastructure protection, at the expense of combat forces deployed in Ukraine. The conflict has turned into an economic war of attrition in which drone production capacity plays a decisive role.

Losses in Oil Revenues

The strikes on refineries have directly impacted Russia’s export revenues. The oil industry accounts for about 30 percent of the Russian federal budget. Reductions in refining capacity have forced Moscow to sell more crude and fewer refined products, thereby reducing profit margins. Western sanctions were already limiting market access, and the drone strikes have added further domestic pressure.

Global markets have reacted to the growing uncertainty. Insurance premiums for ships carrying Russian oil have risen, and some Asian buyers have begun demanding price cuts. Yet Putin has stayed the course, refusing any negotiations that would involve a withdrawal from Ukrainian territories, preferring to drain his economy rather than admit strategic failure.

A Military Budget Under Pressure

Russia’s $137 billion military budget for 2025 is the highest in the country’s modern history. This amount covers operations in Ukraine, the modernization of nuclear forces, the strengthening of air defenses, and the reconstruction of infrastructure damaged by drones. Social spending, education, and healthcare have been sacrificed to fund this war effort.

When a country spends more than five percent of its national wealth on war while under attack on its own soil, it is not winning—it is merely surviving. Russia has had to draw on its sovereign wealth fund reserves, which have declined significantly since 2022. Sustaining this effort over the long term raises questions about the economic viability of the conflict for Moscow.

Military Spending Hits Record High

The SIPRI Observatory reported that military spending in Europe reached $864 billion in 2025, up 14 percent from the previous year. This increase is the sharpest ever recorded on the continent since the end of the Cold War. European countries have come to realize that the war in Ukraine is not a peripheral conflict but a direct threat to their security.

The European Union’s defense spending rose from 1.6 percent of gross domestic product in 2023 to 1.9 percent in 2024, with an estimated 2.1 percent for 2025. According to the European Council, the 27 member states have collectively increased their budgets by 381 billion euros. These figures reflect a paradigm shift: Europe can no longer rely solely on the U.S. security umbrella.

National drone programs are on the rise

Inspired by Ukraine’s successes, many European countries have launched their own long-range drone programs. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Scandinavian countries have announced massive investments in combat and reconnaissance drone capabilities. Poland, whose defense budget reached 3 percent of its gross domestic product as early as 2023, is among the most ambitious.

Ukrainian drones have achieved what forty years of NATO conferences failed to do: convince Europe that it must produce its own weapons. Industrial partnerships between European companies and Ukrainian manufacturers have multiplied. Technology transfer agreements have been signed, allowing Europe to benefit directly from combat experience.

The 5 percent target of gross domestic product

NATO leaders meeting in the Netherlands agreed to increase defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product by 2035. This target, once unthinkable, reflects the realization that the Russian threat is structural and enduring. The NATO Secretary General emphasized that Ukrainian drones had demonstrated the need for deep-strike capabilities even for countries that do not possess traditional projection forces.

European allies and Canada increased their defense spending by 20 percent between 2024 and 2025, according to the Atlantic Council’s tracking. This acceleration is directly linked to lessons learned on the Ukrainian battlefield. Drones have proven that a medium-sized country can project considerable strike power at a lower cost.

Exercises Incorporating Drone Swarms

NATO has begun incorporating drone swarm scenarios into its major exercises. The Steadfast Defender exercises in 2024 and 2025 included simulations of defending against massive drone attacks and the offensive deployment of long-range drones. Tactical doctrines are being rewritten to incorporate these new capabilities.

NATO training centers in Estonia and Latvia have developed specific training programs for drone operations. Ukrainian instructors have been invited to share their operational experience. Ukraine is becoming NATO’s war college—a role no one would have assigned to it three years ago.

Rethinking Operational Depth

Western militaries have long considered operational depth to be the preserve of major powers with conventional air forces. Ukrainian drones have proven that a medium-sized country can strike targets 1,000 kilometers away and beyond using relatively affordable means. This lesson has direct implications for countries such as the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania, which could develop drone-based deterrence capabilities.

The Bruegel study estimated that Europe might need 300,000 additional soldiers and an annual increase in defense spending of at least 250 billion euros in the short term to deter Russia. Long-range drones could supplement these forces by providing a strike capability that does not depend on the deployment of ground troops.

Industrial Alliances with Ukraine

Contracts between European companies and Ukrainian drone manufacturers multiplied in 2024 and 2025. Consortia including companies from France, Germany, and Poland signed joint production agreements. The goal is to create a European supply chain for combat drones, reducing dependence on non-European suppliers of electronic components.

NATO’s Center of Excellence for Drones has published recommendations based on Ukrainian lessons learned. These recommendations cover the design, production, deployment, and doctrine for the use of long-range drones. The most promising alliance for European defense is not being forged in treaty rooms, but on drone assembly lines in Kyiv and Warsaw.

Losses and Interception Rates

Not all drones launched reach their targets. Russian air defenses, despite their limitations, manage to intercept a significant proportion of Ukrainian drones. Interception rates vary considerably depending on the mission, distance, weather conditions, and jamming measures in place. In some drone waves, more than half of the drones were shot down before reaching their targets.

The human factor remains crucial. Ukrainian operators must plan complex flight paths, taking into account defense zones, terrain, weather conditions, and windows of opportunity. Drone losses represent a cost, even if that cost is infinitely lower than that of human casualties or conventional aviation.

Dependence on Electronic Components

Ukrainian drone production relies on imported electronic components, including chips, sensors, and communication systems. Although Ukraine has developed local alternatives for certain components, dependence on international supply chains remains a vulnerability. Restrictions on dual-use technology exports could theoretically affect production.

Ukrainian authorities have worked to diversify their supply sources and develop local alternatives. Microelectronics programs have been launched to reduce this dependence. Yet the pace of production still depends in part on the ability to import critical components, making Ukraine’s supply chain both remarkable and fragile.

A Conflict That Is No Longer Unilateral

One of the most significant changes brought about by the drone war is the end of the conflict’s initial asymmetry. In 2022, Russia struck Ukraine without Ukraine being able to mount a substantial counterattack. By 2025, the situation had reversed. Ukrainian strikes are reaching Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Urals, and Western Siberia. Putin has lost his monopoly on military force within Russian territory.

Three years ago, Putin promised to take Kyiv in three days. Today, Ukrainian drones are flying over Moscow. This symbolic reversal has profound geopolitical consequences. Russia’s allies, notably China and India, are closely observing the vulnerability of the Russian military apparatus. The prestige of the Russian army, already tarnished by setbacks on the front lines, has suffered yet another blow.

The Message Sent to Moscow’s Allies

The successes of Ukrainian drones have not gone unnoticed in Beijing. China, which maintains a strategic partnership with Russia, is closely examining the implications for its own defense capabilities. If Ukraine, with limited resources, can penetrate Russian defenses, what might a determined technological alliance be capable of?

The countries of Central Asia, formerly within the Soviet sphere of influence, are also watching the situation with growing interest. The vulnerability of Russia’s energy infrastructure could encourage them to diversify their own security alliances. The drone war thus has repercussions that extend far beyond the scope of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

The End of Conventional Firepower’s Supremacy

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that conventional weapons, however powerful they may be, are no longer sufficient to guarantee a territory’s security. Long-range drones have introduced a new dimension to the art of war: that of low-cost, long-range precision strikes. European militaries must rethink their doctrines, investments, and structures to incorporate this reality.

The defense budgets of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are beginning to reflect this shift. Combat drone programs—long considered secondary to fighter jets—are now receiving priority funding. The question is no longer whether drones will replace conventional aviation, but at what pace and under what conditions.

The War of Tomorrow Begins Today

The lessons from the Ukrainian drone war extend far beyond Europe’s borders. In Taiwan, the Middle East, and Africa, the conflicts of tomorrow will be shaped by innovations born out of the Ukrainian conflict. The United States, China, Israel, and Turkey are investing heavily in similar technologies, but Ukraine was the first country to deploy these systems on the scale of a high-intensity conflict.

Europe is at a tipping point. Ukrainian drones have proven that creativity, determination, and technological innovation can offset the imbalance of conventional forces. The challenge for the coming years is to transform this lesson into a permanent capability. The future of European defense is no longer decided solely in Brussels or Washington; it is being shaped in drone factories and command centers where the wars of tomorrow are being prepared.

The long-range drone war has reshaped the strategic landscape of the European continent. In three years, Ukraine has transformed a position of apparent military weakness into a strike capability capable of reaching the heart of the Russian Federation. The 7,000 drones launched in a single month of 2025, the refineries struck from Yaroslavl to Perm, and the $864 billion in European military spending: these figures tell a story of a strategic shift.

Putin launched a war he believed would be quick and one-sided. Ukrainian drones reminded him that 21st-century wars are no longer won solely with tanks and aircraft. Europe, abruptly jolted from its strategic slumber, has learned its lesson. Budgets are skyrocketing, factories are running at full capacity, and military doctrines are shifting. And at the heart of this transformation, a small country that refuses to fade into obscurity continues to shape the future of warfare.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist