INVESTIGATION: 1,500 billion for the war, zero dollars for Ukraine — where is U.S. money going?

The Name Change That Says It All

On June 16, 2026, the U.S. Department of War announced that U.S. Indo-Pacific Command would officially revert to U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). Just a name change, one might say. Except that in the language of strategic signaling, words matter a great deal. In 2018, the creation of the Indo-Pacific Command was intended to signal to India its centrality in U.S. strategy and to unify the Indian and Pacific Oceans into a single theater of operations. The return to the original name reverses that message and abruptly refocuses attention on the Pacific theater, on Taiwan, on the South China Sea, on the strait, and on the chain of islands off the Chinese coast.

For Admiral Samuel J. Paparo Jr., commander of USPACOM, the situation is extremely serious. In a 221-page report to Congress, he requested at least $122 billion to strengthen the U.S. military presence in the region. His request includes $67.4 billion for new missiles, $18 billion to counter Chinese military command systems, $15 billion for a space-based missile warning system, and $909 million for Guam’s defense system against Chinese ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles. The admiral described this request as “the minimum required to maintain a credible deterrent.”

The PLA Ready for Taiwan by 2027

Admiral Paparo reiterated in his report a warning that other U.S. military officials have already issued: China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been ordered to prepare for military operations against Taiwan by 2027. It’s a ticking military clock. And this clock largely explains why Washington has decided to refocus its resources on the Pacific rather than maintain a direct financial commitment in Ukraine. Following this logic, Europe is being called upon to finance the defense of its eastern flank on its own, while the United States mobilizes its arsenals for the scenario it fears most: a war against China over Taiwan.

This paradigm shift is described by the Pentagon itself as a “monumental shift in resource allocation.” The wording is soberly bureaucratic. The reality it describes is far less so: this is nothing less than the greatest U.S. strategic repositioning since the end of the Cold War. And this repositioning comes at a direct cost to Ukraine.

I don’t know if you realize what Admiral Paparo means when he says that 122 billion is the “minimum.” That’s years’ worth of military budgets for entire countries, allocated to a single theater of operations. China has changed the global geopolitical calculus, and Ukraine is footing part of the bill.

Drones and Autonomy as Strategic Pillars

While Ukraine does not appear in the U.S. budget, other spending items are highlighted in bold. First and foremost: autonomous systems and drones. The Defensive Autonomy Working Group (DAWG) has been allocated a staggering $53.6 billion in reconciliation funding alone. The objective is clearly defined: to establish U.S. supremacy in autonomous warfare, with naval, aerial, land-based, and underwater drones capable of operating on a large scale in the Pacific against a military power with robust air defenses. This is not about preparing to support Ukraine—it is about a high-intensity conflict against a near-peer power.

Added to this are massive allocations for precision munitions. The 2027 budget allocates $52 billion to high-priority munitions, a fivefold increase over the previous fiscal year. The entire arsenal is diversifying: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM), Joint Advanced Tactical Missiles (JATM), and long-range missile systems. At the same time, an additional $100 billion is earmarked to develop the defense industrial base—that is, to build the factories that will produce these weapons on the scale required for a large-scale conflict.

Arms Procurements and Force Modernization

Arms acquisitions are jumping from 223 to 413 billion dollars, an 85% increase. Research and development is climbing from 210 to 344 billion. The Space Force alone is requesting 12 billion in additional funding for its Air Moving Target Indicator program and the development of the Space Data Network. The U.S. Air Force is requesting $2.3 billion for 14 new F-35s, in addition to $2.9 billion for precision-guided munitions. These investments are designed to maintain air superiority against a China that has already surpassed the U.S. fighter force in numbers and aims to surpass the entire U.S. military by 2030.

In this context, border security also receives a substantial budget allocation, in line with the Trump administration’s domestic priorities. Billions are also allocated for drones and counter-drone systems at military bases and along land borders. The logic is clear: the Pentagon is preparing for two simultaneous fronts—the Pacific against China, and the southern border against immigration. Ukraine, thousands of kilometers away, is not part of either of these two priority fronts.

When I read these figures—53 billion for drones, 52 billion for ammunition, 100 billion for arms factories—I think of the Ukrainian soldiers who lack Patriot interceptors. America is building the arsenal for the next war. Ukraine is fighting in this one. The disconnect is cruel.

A diplomatic innovation that masks a financial withdrawal

In response to the direct withdrawal of budgetary support for Ukraine, the Trump administration has promoted the PURL mechanism—the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List. Launched jointly by Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on July 14, 2025, this program operates according to a simple model: Ukraine draws up a prioritized list of its military needs, European and Canadian allies finance the purchase of this equipment from U.S. manufacturers, and the United States handles delivery and logistics. America supplies the weapons—but Europe pays for them.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth presented this mechanism as a “step forward” at the NATO defense ministers’ summit in Brussels on June 18, 2026. “Through President Trump’s PURL initiative, the allies have taken the lead in funding support for Ukraine’s defense,” he said. For Hegseth, this is validation of the Trump approach—allies pay, the United States delivers. At a Ramstein-format meeting on June 18, 2026, the partners announced more than $1 billion for the PURL, the largest amount ever announced at a single meeting of the contact group.

The Limits of the PURL: Italy Says No, Patriots Remain Insufficient

But the PURL has its limits. Italy has officially announced that it will refuse to fund this mechanism. “We said no from the start, and it’s still no,” said Defense Minister Guido Crosetto during an address to the Italian parliament. Rome prefers to reallocate existing budget lines to meet its defense spending targets rather than actually increase its military investments. Its spending level remains below 1.5% of GDP, well short of the 3.5% target set by NATO. Meanwhile, the program is operating thanks to Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, and others, which have collectively committed nearly $6 billion.

The concrete problem is evident on the ground in Ukraine: the lack of Patriot interceptors. Following a devastating Russian strike in June 2026 that killed 22 people, Zelensky pleaded with his European partners to speed up deliveries, emphasizing that “the situation is no longer a matter of funding.” Supplies are simply insufficient. Ukraine has even considered “borrowing” Patriot munitions from Germany, with a promise to repay them. This is not a country receiving aid: it is a country struggling to survive on the scraps of Western logistics.

There is something deeply unsettling about the idea that Ukraine is “borrowing” missiles to defend itself. This is not a metaphor—it is a fact. And it says everything about what the direct U.S. budgetary abandonment actually means.

Funds Approved but Not Disbursed

During a speech in the U.S. Senate on June 17, 2026, a senator raised an embarrassing issue: it is “high time for the Pentagon to spend the $400 million in aid to Ukraine authorized by Congress and signed into law by the president,” as well as the $200 million for security in the Baltic states. These funds have been legally allocated, but their disbursement has been delayed. The senator had repeatedly asked Secretaries Hegseth and Rubio about the status of the process; he was told that the funds would be transferred soon. But “soon” has dragged on.

This detail reveals a deep institutional tension within the U.S. government itself. On the one hand, Congress continues to approve aid funds for Ukraine, albeit in small increments. On the other, the executive branch is holding back, delaying, and imposing conditions. The bipartisan vote in the House of Representatives in favor of additional aid to Ukraine and tougher sanctions against Russia remains stalled in the Senate. The legislative intent is there. The executive branch’s resolve is wavering. And in the meantime, Ukrainian soldiers are waiting for equipment that isn’t arriving.

The REPO Act: Frozen Russian Assets as an Alternative Solution

Faced with the U.S. budget shortfall, senators from both parties—Tim Kaine, John Cornyn, Chris Coons, Roger Wicker, Chuck Grassley, and Sheldon Whitehouse—introduced a bill in June 2026 aimed at allowing Ukraine to use frozen Russian assets to purchase weapons. The idea is to circumvent the political deadlock: if Washington does not provide fresh funds, Ukraine should at least use the $5 to $7 billion in Russian sovereign wealth funds frozen in U.S. financial institutions. As Senators Grassley and Whitehouse pointed out, “This funding for Ukraine’s military needs will not require any expenditure from the U.S. budget or U.S. taxpayer money.”

It’s an ingenious solution. But it remains only a bill. And it underscores just how much U.S. support for Ukraine is now forced to seek unconventional paths rather than taking the high road of a rapidly expanding defense budget.

The idea of using frozen Russian assets to buy Ukrainian weapons has a certain poetic justice to it. Putin would be financing his own defeat. But the legal niceties of the U.S. Congress turn what should be a moral no-brainer into a long legislative road fraught with pitfalls.

The Nuance Between Authorization and Appropriation

In its version of the NDAA 2027, the Senate Armed Services Committee approved $780 million in authorization for Ukraine through 2029. This provision also prohibits any reduction in U.S. military forces in Europe. For those unfamiliar with the intricacies of the U.S. budget process, the distinction between authorization and appropriation is crucial: an authorization permits the expenditure of a certain amount, but it does not in itself release the funds. A separate appropriations bill is then required for the money to actually become available.

This parliamentary subtlety is precisely what the Trump administration is skillfully exploiting. It is possible to authorize spending for Ukraine in the NDAA while ensuring that the corresponding appropriations bills never see the light of day—or are delayed indefinitely. The net result for Ukraine is the same: political promises do not translate into actual military equipment.

Europe on the Financial Front Line

In the wake of this U.S. vacuum, the European Union has decided to step in on an unprecedented scale. In June 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law amending Ukraine’s 2026 state budget to increase security and defense spending by 1.56 trillion hryvnias, funded primarily by the European Union’s Ukraine Support Loan. This loan, part of a comprehensive 45-billion-euro package from the EU, covers two-thirds of Ukraine’s financial needs through 2027, according to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated that Ukraine’s defense spending would reach a record high of 4.4 trillion hryvnias in 2026.

This unprecedented European mobilization is remarkable. But it contains a paradox: Europe is paying for American weapons for Ukraine through the PURL, while the United States is propping up its own defense industry thanks to these European purchases. It’s a clever arrangement for Washington—allies are financing American rearmament while convincing themselves that they are supporting Ukraine.

This is where I start to find the situation downright absurd: Europe is paying for American weapons to defend Ukraine, while America is using that money to build weapons factories intended for the war in the Pacific. Who is really helping whom?

A Hero Navigating Through Setbacks

Amid a landscape of shifting budget allocations and diverging strategic priorities, Volodymyr Zelensky embodies a tenacity that commands respect. Attending the G7 summit in France on June 16 and 17, 2026, he negotiated tooth and nail with leaders, some of whom might have been tempted to abandon the Ukrainian cause. He emerged with concrete commitments: additional missiles for air defense, licenses to produce anti-ballistic systems in Ukraine itself, and a support package for the winter. He hailed these results as “strong assurances” while maintaining constant pressure on his allies.

At the Ramstein meeting on June 18–19, 2026, Zelensky listed three key outcomes: more than one billion for the PURL, more than 500 million for long-range munitions, and approximately one billion for the production of Ukrainian drones and missiles. He thanked the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Norway. The United States was not included in his acknowledgments for funding—only for the supply of equipment purchased by others. This telling silence speaks volumes about Washington’s new role in financing the war.

Ukraine as an Arms Producer: A Strategy for Survival

Realizing that dependence on foreign funding is an existential vulnerability, Ukraine is rapidly developing its own defense industry. The budget law signed by Zelensky allocates 2.3 trillion hryvnias for the purchase of weapons and military equipment, and more than 1.45 trillion for military salaries. Funds from a special budget derived from the “military personal income tax” are being directed toward the development of the defense industrial complex. License agreements for the production of U.S. missile systems will be concluded on Ukrainian soil.

This strategy of vertical integration of military production is both a necessity and an ambition. It is a necessity because foreign aid fluctuates according to the domestic policies of each supporting country. It is an ambition because Ukraine is building a war industry capable of enduring, regardless of the vagaries of U.S. budgetary policy. This is the lesson that Putin’s invasion has etched into the institutional DNA of the Ukrainian state: never again to depend entirely on others for its survival.

There is something deeply moving about this Ukraine that is building weapons factories while the rug is being pulled out from under its feet. Zelenskyy does not beg. He builds. This may be the most powerful form of resistance there is.

A Joint Statement Wrenched From Them

On June 16 and 17, 2026, the G7 summit in Évian, France, produced a joint statement on Ukraine. Emmanuel Macron said he had secured “U.S. alignment” on a “shared commitment” to Ukraine. This hard-won declaration commits the G7 countries to increasing military aid to Kyiv and intensifying economic pressure on Moscow. Trump even raised the possibility of allowing Ukraine to manufacture U.S. anti-ballistic missiles under license on its territory—a significant concession that could strengthen Ukraine’s defensive capabilities in the long term.

But the context in which Trump signed this document speaks volumes about the nature of this commitment. A few days earlier, at the same summit, he had declared that the United States had “nothing to do” with a war “thousands of kilometers away.” The joint statement was wrested from him by the Europeans, particularly by Macron, who understands that without formal U.S. backing, support for Ukraine risks eroding politically in several NATO member countries. Trump signed—but his strategic vision of direct U.S. disengagement from Ukraine remains intact.

Diplomatic Pressure on Putin

The G7 also agreed on new sanctions targeting Russia. Britain, moreover, carried out a spectacular show of force: the seizure of a Russian oil tanker linked to the “ghost fleet” in the English Channel. This demonstration of European naval power sends a signal to Moscow: the economic stranglehold on Russia continues, regardless of U.S. budgetary delays. Vladimir Putin, who has sent hundreds of thousands of soldiers to their deaths in futile offensives, must now contend with an increasingly determined European coalition, even as Washington refocuses on the Pacific.

Trump himself stated at the G7 that he believes Putin is “now genuinely considering” peace. That may be true. It may also be diplomatic wishful thinking. What is certain is that Russia has not won this war, despite four years of attempts, catastrophic human losses, and growing economic isolation. And Zelensky, for his part, “is holding the line against sustained Russian assaults,” as Hegseth himself acknowledged.

Putin is “thinking about peace,” according to Trump. I wouldn’t say I’m convinced of that. A man who bombs Ukrainian civilians with missiles every day isn’t drafting a peace letter. He’s testing the defense lines to see which one gives way first.

40,000 billion dollars and an explosive trajectory

Behind the debates over the amounts allocated to Ukraine or China looms an economic reality that neither fiscal hawks nor warmongers can ignore indefinitely: the U.S. national debt is nearing $40,000 billion. Democratic Representative Adam Smith, a senior member of the Armed Services Committee, put it bluntly: this debt constitutes “the greatest threat to national security” in the United States. His analysis is shared by a growing number of economists and strategic analysts.

The problem with the reconciliation process for the additional $350 billion is that it adds directly to this debt without any effort to offset the increase with additional revenue. The previous $150 billion infusion via the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” was financed through cuts to Medicaid and SNAP food assistance—that is, at the expense of the most vulnerable Americans. The current trajectory of the U.S. military budget is sustainable only if the United States maintains its ability to borrow at reasonable rates. This is not guaranteed in the long term.

The War in Iran: An Unforeseen Cost

The budget calculation has been further complicated by the war in Iran, whose costs amount to approximately $29 billion according to the Pentagon’s acting deputy comptroller, Jules Hurst III—not including repairs to military bases damaged by Iranian attacks in the Middle East. These unplanned costs have absorbed part of the budgetary leeway initially set aside for other priorities. The $1,500 billion budget even includes a request for $200 billion that was initially intended as a supplemental appropriation for the conflict in Iran but was ultimately incorporated into the annual budget. The war is escalating, costs are mounting, and Ukraine remains at the bottom of U.S. financial priorities.

This constrained budgetary context partly explains why the Trump administration has been so aggressive in shifting the financial burden of Ukraine onto the Europeans. It is not merely a matter of ideology or disinterest in Europe: it is also a matter of simple arithmetic. The United States has costly military commitments in the Pacific, in Iran, and along its borders, and it cannot finance everything simultaneously. The problem is that it is always Ukraine that bears the brunt of U.S. budget cuts.

With a debt of 40,000 billion and a military budget heading toward 1,500 billion, at some point the contradiction will become untenable. The history of empires in fiscal disarray is a history of misplaced priorities. I hope the United States will read this chapter before contributing to it.

A Crucial Vote to Determine the Real Priorities

On June 24, 2026—the day after this report is published—the House Appropriations Committee is scheduled to vote on the full defense appropriations bill, with a proposed spending level of $1,070 billion. This bill is separate from the NDAA and represents the concrete translation of authorizations into actual disbursements. Democrats have already announced their opposition, with Representative Betty McCollum voting against the subcommittee version during the closed-door markup.

The stakes are high: the June 24 vote will determine not only the level of military spending for fiscal year 2027, but also which geographic and programmatic priorities will actually be funded. If funding for Ukraine is not included in this appropriations bill—and there is no reason to believe it will be—then the $780 million authorized by the NDAA will remain a dead letter. The gap between what Congress authorizes and what it actually funds is the real budget story of 2026.

The National Security and Foreign Affairs Act: Cuts to Global Aid

Meanwhile, H.R. 8595, the National Security, State Department, and Related Programs Act, also considered by committee on June 23, 2026, allocates $49.8 billion for diplomacy and foreign aid—a significant reduction from previous levels. Of this amount, $3.3 billion goes to military aid for Israel and $1.8 billion to the Indo-Pacific strategy. The top priority is clear. Humanitarian aid and reconstruction programs in conflict zones such as Ukraine receive only residual funding.

Democrats on the committee have called this a “unprecedented” 22% cut from previous levels. But in a Republican-majority House, the final figures are likely to resemble what the Trump administration requested. Ukraine must rely on Europe, not on the U.S. Congress, in 2026.

I am watching the June 24 vote with real anxiety. Not because I expect a favorable surprise—I don’t expect any. But because every day of budget debate in Washington is one less day for Kyiv in a brutal war of attrition.

The New Burden-Sharing Arrangement

At the NATO defense ministers’ summit in Brussels on June 17–18, 2026, the new framework for supporting Ukraine was formalized. The objective is now clear: Europe will take the lead in providing financial support to Ukraine, while the United States will supply the military capabilities that only Washington can provide—notably Patriot interceptors and other air defense systems—but at the price set by the PURL. Secretary General Rutte described the arrangement with rare candor: “When it comes to the large sums of money needed for Ukraine, it is Europe and Canada that are footing the bill.”

This division of roles represents a structural shift within the Alliance. Since 1949, the United States has been the financial and military guarantor of European security. This model is crumbling before our eyes. NATO has set a new defense spending target of 5% of GDP—including 3.5% for core military capabilities. Most members are not meeting this target. But the most committed ones, led by Germany, have already begun to significantly increase their military budgets. Germany will contribute to the PURL for the fourth time in 2026. Canada, the Netherlands, and Sweden are following suit.

The PURL: 90% of Ukraine’s Anti-Aircraft Missiles

The PURL’s figures are impressive: according to NATO, the mechanism funds 70% of the missiles for Ukraine’s Patriot systems and 90% of the munitions used in various U.S. air defense platforms deployed in Ukraine. Since its launch in July 2025, the program has committed nearly $6 billion from more than 27 partner nations. At the Ramstein meeting on June 18–19, 2026, the $1 billion pledged in a single session set an all-time record. These figures illustrate both Ukraine’s dependence on U.S. systems and Europe’s ability to fill the void left by Washington.

The question that no one is asking openly but that everyone is asking behind the scenes is: What will happen if the United States one day decides to stop selling through the PURL? For now, this is a hypothetical question—the Pentagon states that “100% of PURL equipment comes from the United States.” But against a backdrop of rising tensions with China and the diversion of U.S. military resources to the Pacific, the issue of stock availability is far from trivial.

Europe is financing the purchase of U.S. weapons for Ukraine through institutions and budgets built on decades of peace. I don’t know if the European public understands the full scope of what their governments are doing. But they would do well to start paying attention.

A Coordinated Triangle of Destabilization

Admiral Paparo put it in black and white in his report to Congress: “China’s aggressive military modernization, its territorial expansion, and its deepening relations with Russia and North Korea present major challenges in an increasingly complex security environment. ” This triangle—Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang—is the true structure of the global threat in the 21st century. Iran is included in U.S. analyses, forming an axis of four revisionist powers determined to challenge the Western liberal order.

China is the driving force behind this axis. Its military has been ordered to be ready for Taiwan by 2027. It has already surpassed the United States in the number of fighter jets. It has developed hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missile capabilities that challenge U.S. defense systems. It has built the world’s largest navy in terms of the number of ships. And it is discreetly funding the rebuilding of Russia’s industrial capabilities and North Korea’s military. This is not an abstract threat: it is a threat that is taking shape.

Russia: Weakened but Still Dangerous

Putin is waging a war of attrition in Ukraine while weathering economic sanctions thanks to oil revenues and Chinese aid. He is bombing Ukrainian cities, massacring civilians, and maintaining constant military pressure on the front lines. But the human and material costs for Russia are astronomical. Russian losses are reaching levels that Western military analysts would not have thought possible. The Russian economy has been reoriented toward the war but is running at full capacity with profound distortions. North Korea has sent troops and ammunition to support the Russian effort—a sign that even Moscow can no longer rely solely on its own resources.

But a weakened Russia remains dangerous. And a Russia that perceives the U.S. budgetary abandonment of Ukraine as a sign of Western weakness is even more dangerous. This is the paradox of Trump’s policy: by withdrawing direct financial support, Washington hopes to force a negotiated peace. The risk is sending Putin a message that he will interpret as an incentive to hold out a little longer, until the Europeans, too, grow weary.

I am not a military expert, and I do not have access to classified intelligence. But I read the signals. And the signal that Moscow and Beijing see in this U.S. budget is not “America is growing stronger.” It is “America is turning its back on Europe.” There is a world of difference between the two.

The Budget as a Political Act

A budget is never just a table of numbers. It is a statement of values, a political act, a definition of what matters and what does not. The U.S. defense budget for fiscal year 2027—$1,500 billion for the largest military arsenal in human history—says something very specific about the Trump administration’s priorities: China, drones, missiles, the border. Not Ukraine. Ukraine is relegated to a third-party financial mechanism, the PURL, funded by European partners who are paying for U.S. weapons that they themselves do not have enough of. It is a sleight of hand that is remarkably effective politically—and morally indifferent.

Ukraine has been fighting for more than four years against an illegal, brutal, and deadly invasion. Zelensky is holding his ground, as Hegseth himself acknowledges. Ukrainian soldiers are dying for values that the West claims to defend—sovereignty, democracy, and international law. And the country with the largest military budget in human history has found a way to allocate not a single direct budget line item to them. This is a fact. Brutal, documented, indisputable.

The Strategic Shift and Its Consequences

The geopolitical logic behind the U.S. pivot to the Pacific is understandable. China is a real threat. Taiwan is a potential crisis of historic magnitude. Admiral Paparo is right to sound the alarm. But understanding a logic does not mean absolving it of its consequences. And the consequence of U.S. financial disengagement from Ukraine is that Kyiv must now rely on a European coalition whose solidarity—despite remarkable efforts—remains uneven, politically fragile, and susceptible to erosion. The West cannot claim to support Ukraine while simultaneously emptying its coffers. Either we choose to defend the international order against aggression—and pay the price—or we delegate and hope that others will do enough. The U.S. budget of 1,500 billion has made its choice: it’s the second option.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist