ANALYSIS: Ankara, July 7–8: What NATO Must Absolutely Achieve in the Face of Putin

Maxime Marquette

2026-06-29 14:39:06

How 5% Became the Key Figure

The 2% of GDP threshold for defense spending—long the official NATO standard that most members failed to meet—is now a floor, not a target. Mark Rutte is pushing for 5%, a target that reflects pessimistic assessments of the Russian threat and the need to rearm Europe at a pace not seen since the 1980s. This figure is staggering for economies that have been accustomed to peace for decades.

For France, reaching 5% of GDP would mean more than doubling its defense budget. For Germany, which has already been making significant efforts since the Russian invasion of 2022, this would represent a further doubling. For Italy or Spain, it is a leap of such magnitude that their economies and fiscal policies make it difficult to absorb in the short term. And yet, the Gdańsk Declaration of June 25, 2026, reaffirmed the commitment to this goal.

Resistance and European Budgetary Realities

Not all European capitals perceive the Russian threat with the same intensity. The countries on the eastern flank—Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland—already spend more than 3% of their GDP and are pushing toward 5%, driven by a conviction that their geographic location makes understandable. But the countries of Western and Southern Europe face budgetary constraints, significant public debt, and populations less directly exposed to the Russian threat.

The Ankara summit will need to find a formula that allows the alliance to demonstrate a collective commitment toward 5% while allowing for differentiated trajectories based on national capabilities. This is the art of multilateral diplomacy: building a facade of unity on top of divergent realities—and hoping that the facade holds long enough for those realities to converge.

5% of GDP for defense: that’s a figure that would have been met with laughter in European chancelleries in 2019. Today, it’s the survival threshold that Rutte is defending with all the conviction of a man who has looked Putin in the eye. I prefer this sense of urgency to the complacency that prevailed before 2022.

The Ukraine issue at the heart of the summit

Support for Ukraine: How Far, and for How Long?

NATO’s support for Ukraine is on Ankara’s agenda from several angles: arms deliveries, funding for reconstruction, long-term security guarantees, and the question of Ukraine’s potential accession to the alliance—a topic still too sensitive to be resolved at this summit. What the allies can do in Ankara is reaffirm their continued support and announce new arms deliveries.

Zelensky’s “40-day operation”—which is unfolding just as preparations for the summit are picking up speed—strengthens Ukraine’s position. Every strike on a Russian refinery is an argument in favor of continued support: Ukraine is using its resources effectively, striking where it hurts, and needs its allies to continue standing by it.

Security guarantees: the big missing piece?

What Ukraine really wants—and what the Ankara summit may not yet be able to provide—are legally binding security guarantees. A formal invitation to join NATO, or failing that, an equivalent collective security mechanism, remains a long-term goal. Trump’s United States is reluctant. Some European allies are hesitant. And Putin is making threats.

The summit could announce “strengthened” bilateral or multilateral security “commitments” that stop just short of NATO’s Article 5. That would be more than what exists today, but less than what Zelensky is asking for. And in a conflict where security guarantees have already been violated once—the 1994 Budapest Memorandum—toothless guarantees are worth very little.

The Budapest Memorandum: Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees. We know how that ended. I understand that Zelensky wants something solid from Ankara—and I also understand why he doubts that the allies will actually give him what he’s asking for.

U.S. Pressure: Hegseth and the Threat of Withdrawal

Hegseth’s 6-Month Review: A Sword of Damocles

Pete Hegseth, U.S. Secretary of Defense, announced a 6-month review of the U.S. presence and contributions in Europe. This review, revealed by The Guardian on June 27, 2026, poses a fundamental threat to the Ankara summit: the United States could reduce its contributions if European allies do not increase their spending quickly enough. This is the stick being brandished while the carrot of “tens of billions” in defense contracts is dangled.

The Trump/Hegseth strategy is consistent: use the threat of U.S. disengagement to force Europeans to spend more. This pressure has worked—European defense spending has increased significantly since 2022. But the approach breeds mistrust and erodes the alliance’s political cohesion. Allies on the eastern flank, in particular, need certainty, not conditional threats.

Trump: A Necessary Evil or a Systemic Risk to NATO?

The relationship between the Trump administration and NATO is structurally ambivalent. On the one hand, U.S. pressure has pushed the Europeans to spend more—which is objectively necessary. On the other hand, Trump’s unpredictability, his sudden geopolitical gambits, and Hegseth’s rhetoric on withdrawal create instability that benefits Putin.

The Guardian reported on June 27, 2026, that several NATO leaders fear they will no longer be able to count on U.S. assistance if Russia attacks. This fear is the real issue at the Ankara summit—not defense contracts, not GDP figures, but the fundamental question: Who will protect Europe if the United States withdraws?

Trump is a necessary evil—I’ve used that phrase before, and I stand by it. His pressure on defense spending has had concrete positive effects. But an ally who makes you doubt his word isn’t quite an ally. And this uncertainty is the poisoned gift that the U.S. administration is offering Ankara.

The eastern flank: the real dividing line

The Baltic States and Poland: Between High Alert and Legitimate Demands

The countries on NATO’s eastern flank—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—are approaching the Ankara summit with a sense of urgency that Western European countries struggle to fully share. For them, the Russian threat is not hypothetical: it is daily, concrete, and well-documented. Latvia warned as early as June 22, 2026 (according to Fox News) that Russia was preparing hybrid attacks on the eastern flank. The Guardian reported on June 26 that there were fears of a possible Russian “provocation” in the Baltic states or Poland.

These warnings are not paranoia. Russia is conducting strike exercises from Kaliningrad using Su-24M bombers and Su-30SM2 fighters—as documented on June 21, 2026, by Army Recognition. It is testing NATO’s responses, mapping response times, and looking for vulnerabilities. The Ankara summit must respond to these provocations by strengthening the alliance’s forward presence on its eastern flank.

Quadrupling shell production: an industrial priority

General Stringer, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, stated that he wants the Ankara summit to push for an acceleration of defense spending, particularly to quadruple the production of 155mm artillery shells. This figure illustrates the scale of the need: artillery consumption in the war in Ukraine has exceeded all projections, revealing the inadequacy of NATO’s stockpiles.

For the eastern flank, the question is not just who pays, but who produces and how quickly. European defense industries need massive investments to increase their production capacity. The “tens of billions” in contracts announced by Rutte are partly intended to finance this industrial ramp-up.

Quadrupling the production of 155mm shells: that’s the kind of statement you don’t hear in typical political speeches, and that’s why it strikes me. We are rearming Europe at a wartime pace. And if NATO has to do this now, it’s because it didn’t do it soon enough before 2022.

Industrial Challenges: Ankara as a Defense Trade Show

Tens of Billions in Contracts: Who Benefits?

Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that the Ankara summit would see the announcement of “tens of billions” in new defense contracts. These contracts represent a windfall for European and American defense industries: air defense systems, ammunition, armored vehicles, and command-and-control systems. The war in Ukraine has transformed defense into a priority economic sector—and the companies operating in it into strategic players.

This transformation has geopolitical implications: countries whose defense industries receive the most contracts have an economic interest in maintaining high levels of military spending. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing—in fact, it’s desirable for the West to build robust defense industrial capabilities. But it also creates dynamics of interest that are worth acknowledging.

Turkey as a Host: The Ankara Paradox

Turkey is a NATO member whose relations with the alliance are complex. It has maintained economic and diplomatic ties with Russia while remaining a member of the alliance. It sold Bayraktar drones to Ukraine—a decisive contribution in the early stages of the war. And it is now hosting the alliance’s most important summit in years.

The choice of Ankara as the summit venue is itself laden with significance: it acknowledges Turkey’s geopolitical centrality and seeks to further align Erdoğan with the common cause. It is a diplomatic gamble—Turkey as a bridge between NATO and Russia may be useful in certain scenarios, but this ambiguous position can also weaken the alliance’s cohesion.

Turkey hosting the NATO summit: Erdoğan knows exactly what he’s doing. He’s at the center of the game, indispensable to everyone, and beholden to no one. It’s political genius—even if I don’t agree with all of his positions. In the chaos of today’s geopolitics, Turkey may be the only country playing all its cards at once.

Ukraine at the Summit: What Zelensky Expects from Ankara

The Structural Dimension of the Issue

Beyond the immediate decisions of the Ankara summit, there is a structural dimension to the current challenge that military analysts regularly highlight: Western collective security rests on a combination of political will, actual military capabilities, and strategic coherence. These three elements are currently under simultaneous strain—making this a more critical moment than usual.

The decisions made in Ankara in July 2026 will take place in a context where every signal sent to Moscow, Beijing, and the allies carries double the weight. The alliance’s credibility is a public good that is built over time and destroyed quickly. The responsibility of those gathering at Beştepe is therefore considerable.

The Key Players Shaping the Decisions

The outcome of the Ankara summit will depend on a few key players: Rutte, to maintain the coherence of the alliance’s agenda; the leaders of the eastern flank, to emphasize the urgency of their concerns; and the Trump administration, to determine how far it will push its demands without undermining what it claims to want to strengthen. Each has distinct interests—and the negotiation between these interests will define the outcome.

Ukraine isn’t directly at the table—but it’s present in every conversation. Its 40 days of strikes, its enemy refineries in flames, its soldiers holding the front lines: all of this forms the invisible backdrop to every decision that will be made in Ankara.

Zelensky arrives in Ankara with drones that are setting refineries ablaze in Moscow and the Urals. That is his strongest diplomatic argument. And if NATO does not respond to that with concrete commitments, I don’t know what else needs to be done.

The Global Threats Surrounding the Ankara Summit

External pressure driving decisions

Beyond the alliance’s internal dynamics, the Ankara summit is taking place against a global geopolitical backdrop that extends beyond the European theater alone. China is watching NATO and calibrating its own behavior toward Taiwan based on what it observes. Iran is negotiating with the United States while maintaining its partnerships with Moscow. North Korea is supplying ammunition to Russia and developing its military capabilities.

This multi-threat context precisely justifies the 5% of GDP target: NATO is not facing a single localized threat, but an arc of instability stretching from Moscow to Pyongyang via Tehran. The alliance must therefore prepare for a more dangerous world on multiple fronts simultaneously—which makes the budgetary shortfall all the more serious.

The Long-Term Consequences of Ankara’s Decisions

Future historians will view the Ankara summit as a defining moment. In one scenario, the alliance decided to seriously rearm, to support Ukraine until a just peace is achieved, and to build a robust deterrent against the multiple threats that are mounting. In another scenario, it issued statements and postponed difficult decisions.

These two scenarios have very different consequences for European security in the decades to come. The first builds peace through strength. The second invites predators to test the limits. And the choice between them will be made in Ankara, in July 2026, by politicians who bear a historic responsibility.

While we gather in Ankara to discuss European defense, Xi is watching Taiwan, Kim is arming Russia, and Iran is negotiating its nuclear program. The multi-threat world is here. And NATO must respond to it with unity, not division.

Conclusion: Ankara must provide clarity, not press releases

The Conditions for a Successful Summit

A successful Ankara summit must produce several concrete results: a commitment to 5% of GDP with credible national roadmaps; defense contracts that finance industrial buildup; strengthened commitments to support Ukraine; and a firm response to Russian provocations on the eastern flank. If the summit produces nothing but communiqués and vague diplomatic rhetoric, it will be perceived as a sign of weakness—and Putin will know how to exploit it.

Since 2022, NATO has proven that it can respond to a military crisis with remarkable cohesion. What is more difficult is maintaining that cohesion over the long term, in the face of internal pressures—U.S. hesitations, European budget constraints—and a Russian threat that combines conventional warfare, hybrid warfare, and sustained psychological pressure.

What History Will Remember About Ankara

In ten or twenty years, historians will look back on the Ankara summit and seek to understand its significance. Either it will be remembered as the summit where NATO decided to seriously rearm and stand firm against Russia—and it will be celebrated as a turning point. Or it will be remembered as a summit of lofty declarations that came to nothing—and it will be analyzed as a missed opportunity.

The difference between these two outcomes will not be determined by the speeches in Ankara, but by what happens in the months that follow: the budgets approved, the contracts actually signed, the troops deployed to the eastern flank, and the weapons delivered to Ukraine. Summits are only as valuable as the actions they trigger. And Ankara cannot afford to fail.

Ankara has all the elements to be the summit that changes the course of Western defense. The question is whether the leaders gathering there will have the courage to make that decision. I hope so. I demand it, in fact.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist