ANALYSIS: Sanctions Extended for One Year: The EU Finally Changes Its Approach Toward Moscow

The Most Effective Sanctions — and Why

Among the most effective measures of the current regime, experts cite, first and foremost, restrictions on technology exports—semiconductors, precision manufacturing equipment, and advanced navigation systems. These restrictions have forced the Russian defense industry to replace Western components with Chinese or locally manufactured ones, which are often less effective. Russian tanks recovered from the Ukrainian battlefield contain components dating back to the 1990s—due to a lack of access to modern technology.

Exclusion from SWIFT has also had a significant impact on Russian financial transactions. While Russia has developed alternative systems—the domestic SPFS and transactions in non-dollar currencies—these systems have much more limited capabilities and cannot handle the volume of transactions that Russia processed prior to 2022. Transaction costs have risen, processing times have lengthened, and many counterparties in the Global South remain reluctant to use Russia’s alternative channels for fear of secondary sanctions.

The Least Effective Sanctions—and Why

Restrictions on energy exports had a limited short-term impact because Russia redirected its exports to China and India with massive discounts. The G7 countries capped the price of Russian oil at $60 per barrel—a level that has been partially circumvented by the “ghost fleet.” The embargo on Russian natural gas has hurt Europe as much as it has Russia, forcing the EU to import U.S. LNG at higher prices and to drastically accelerate its energy transition.

Travel restrictions on the Russian elite are symbolically significant but have limited practical impact: oligarchs who wanted to travel moved their families to Dubai, Turkey, or Central Asia long ago. The restrictions have affected ordinary Russian citizens more than those close to the regime. This represents a real ethical tension in sanctions policy—and it partly explains why, according to Pravda.com.ua on June 25, 2026, two EU countries were still resisting additional entry bans.

There is no such thing as a perfect sanctions regime. Some sanctions hit the wrong people. Others are circumvented. But taken together—21 packages, a full arsenal—they create real cumulative pressure. And it is the cumulative pressure that ultimately matters, not each measure taken in isolation.

The Orbán Problem—Once Again

No analysis of European sanctions can ignore Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Budapest has systematically sought exemptions—particularly regarding Russian oil deliveries via pipeline, on which Hungary remains dependent through the Druzhba network. Orbán has negotiated exceptions that allow Hungary to continue receiving Russian oil at a reduced price, thereby circumventing the spirit of the maritime embargo.

This situation is unsatisfactory both morally—Hungary indirectly benefits from the Russian war by purchasing cheap oil—and practically—it weakens the consistency of the message sent to Moscow. The unanimity rule required for European sanctions is what allows Orbán to use his cooperation as leverage. Reforms to the voting rules that would allow for qualified majority decisions on sanctions would make this type of obstruction more difficult—but they themselves require a consensus that is hard to achieve.

Slovakia and the Nuances of the East

Prime Minister Robert Fico’s Slovakia represents a different nuance. Unlike Orbán, who appears to share an ideological affinity with Russian authoritarian nationalism, Fico adopts a stance of critical neutrality—presented as pragmatic and grounded in Slovak economic interests, particularly energy dependence. The practical result is not very different: reluctance to approve the toughest measures, and calls for “de-escalation” that sound like demands for concessions from Kyiv.

These minority positions within the EU are irritating, but they are not enough to block the sanctions regime as a whole—which is generally maintained and strengthened. What they do create is a marginal erosion of coherence and a political cost of coordination that must continue to be paid with each new package and each renewal. Peer pressure, infringement procedures, and the gradual political isolation of these governments within the EU are the tools available to manage these exceptions.

Having Orbán and Fico in the EU is like having two cracks in an otherwise solid wall. We can live with cracks. But we must monitor them, patch them up, and never let them widen. The European Union has this discipline—imperfectly, but genuinely.

Why the Baltic States Want a Total Embargo

The three Baltic states have a clear and radical vision: all Russian oil, regardless of the route of transport, must be banned in the European Union. This position includes deliveries via the Druzhba pipeline, which still supplies refineries in Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Poland. This is an ambitious demand—the countries involved have all made substantial investments in their refineries to process Russian oil.

The Kyiv Post reported on June 27, 2026, that the Baltic states are exerting increasing pressure on their European partners to accelerate this comprehensive embargo. Their argument is simple: as long as Russian oil enters the EU by any means, Russia continues to finance its war machine with European revenue. The distinction between seaborne oil and pipeline oil is morally untenable.

The practical constraints of a rapid transition

Countries that depend on the Druzhba pipeline have practical concerns: their refineries were designed for Russian oil, and converting these facilities takes time and is costly. Poland has already largely resolved this problem by increasing its imports of North Sea oil and LNG. Hungary and Slovakia are making less effort and are more inclined to cite economic constraints—constraints that are real but not insurmountable with the right political will.

The fundamental challenge is coordinating a transition that imposes painful economic adjustments on certain member states without providing them with the financial tools to absorb them. A European transition fund, focused on converting energy infrastructure dependent on Russian oil, would be a powerful tool—if it existed. This is one of the blind spots in the current sanctions policy.

The Baltic states are right in substance. The constraint is real in form. And in between, years are passing during which Russian oil continues to finance the bombs falling on Kyiv. This tension revolts me, even though I understand its political motivations.

The Kremlin’s Interpretation of the European Vote

How does Putin interpret the one-year extension of sanctions? The Kremlin has two possible interpretations, and it can choose one depending on its communication needs. Interpretation #1—promoted in Russian state media—is that the sanctions have “failed,” that the Russian economy is “holding up,” and that the EU is forced to maintain its measures because it has failed to achieve its objectives. Interpretation #2—less publicly acknowledged but likely closer to reality within the Kremlin—is that the EU has demonstrated a level of cohesion and persistence that was not anticipated, and that the pressure will last longer than expected.

It is Interpretation #2 that matters strategically. If Putin must plan on the basis that the sanctions regime will remain in place through 2027 and beyond, his war calculations change. Forecasts for economic recovery, industrial investment plans, and supply timelines for its defense industry—all of this must be revised in light of pressure that will not ease anytime soon.

The 2027 Horizon: What’s Changing for Russia

The 2027 horizon coincides with several significant developments. It comes after the upcoming elections in several EU countries—including elections in Germany, France, and other nations that could affect the composition of parliaments and governments. It also comes after the potential end of Trump’s presidential term in the United States. It is a period during which the Western political landscape could change significantly.

Putin is waiting. This has been his fundamental strategy since 2022: to hold out, wear down, and wait for the West to fragment. The one-year extension of sanctions tells him that this wait will be longer and more costly than he had hoped. It is not a defeat for him. But it is a forced recalibration. And recalibrations, in a regime built on an image of invincibility, come at a political cost.

Putin is waiting for the West to split apart. And the West, by extending its sanctions for another year, is saying: wait some more. For a long time. It is a test of patience that the EU, for the first time since 2022, seems determined to win.

Pressure on third countries that circumvent

One of the major challenges of the sanctions regime against Russia is to convince—or compel—third countries that facilitate circumvention. Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Georgia—these countries have seen their re-exports to Russia skyrocket since 2022. Electronic components, industrial equipment, and luxury goods are transiting through these countries to reach the Russian market despite official sanctions.

U.S. secondary sanctions—which threaten to sanction any company or financial institution that helps Russia circumvent primary sanctions—have begun to take effect. Banks in the UAE and Turkey have suspended certain transactions with Russian entities for fear of losing access to the U.S. financial system. It’s not perfect, but it demonstrates that secondary sanctions can change the behavior of third parties.

The EU’s Role in Pressuring Third Countries

The European Union has developed its own policy to pressure third countries that facilitate circumvention. High-level diplomatic missions to the capitals in question, warnings about the trade consequences of proven complicity, and “anti-circumvention” clauses in new trade agreements—these are all tools aimed at closing the backdoors in the sanctions regime.

The 21st sanctions package, proposed on June 27, 2026, specifically includes mechanisms for designating entities in third countries if they facilitate sanctions evasion. This is a significant development—it gives the EU the legal tools to act beyond its borders in the fight against sanctions circumvention, thereby creating a broader deterrent effect on intermediaries worldwide.

Consistency between the U.S. and European approaches to secondary sanctions is crucial. If the United States pressures a third country while the EU maintains normal economic relations with that same country, the message becomes muddled and the deterrent effect diminishes. Transatlantic coordination on secondary sanctions is one of the most important challenges of the coming years—and likely one of the topics to be discussed at the Ankara summit.

Secondary sanctions are the tool that transforms a sanctions regime limited to G7 members into pressure that affects the entire world. If you assist Russia, you risk losing access to U.S. and European markets. For most global economic actors, this calculation serves as a powerful deterrent.

How Sanctions Support the Ukrainian Military Front

Economic sanctions against Russia are not merely a moral punishment or an expression of political disapproval. They serve a direct military purpose: to reduce Russia’s ability to finance, equip, and maintain its armed forces. Every dollar of oil revenue lost due to price caps or sanctions evasion is a dollar that does not go toward funding a missile launched at Ukrainian cities. This direct link is sometimes overlooked in abstract discussions about the effectiveness of sanctions.

Technological restrictions on semiconductors have a measurable impact on the quality of Russian weapons. T-72 tanks recovered from the Ukrainian battlefield reveal primitive electronic components—sometimes Soviet-era cameras repurposed to guide missiles—because modern precision systems are no longer accessible to the Russian defense industry. This is not a complete victory, but it is a real degradation of Russia’s military capability.

The EU and the G7 continue to freeze approximately $300 billion in Russian sovereign assets—primarily reserves from the Russian Central Bank deposited in Western financial institutions prior to 2022. The interest generated by these assets—about $3 billion per year—has been used since 2024 to fund aid to Ukraine.

Frozen Dividends: A Financial Weapon for Reconstruction

The question of fully unfreezing these assets—using the $300 billion itself to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction—remains a subject of legal debate. Some EU countries are concerned about the implications for international law and the protection of foreign sovereign assets held in Europe. Others—notably the Baltic states and Poland—are pushing for a more direct use of these funds. The debate will continue until a legal solution is found or a peace agreement renders it moot.

In the meantime, interest on the frozen assets continues to fund arms deliveries to Ukraine. It is a poetic form of justice: the reserves that Putin had accumulated to finance his geopolitical ambitions are now being used to arm those resisting his aggression. In this sense, the sanctions regime serves both as economic pressure and as a source of funding for Ukraine’s defense.

300 billion euros frozen. The interest on those funds is financing the weapons that defend Kyiv. There is a magnificent irony in the fact that Putin is unwittingly financing his own defeat. Sanctions are decidedly more than just punishment. They are a resource.

Strategic Maturity Finally on Display

The decision of June 19, 2026, is more than just a technical decision regarding the duration of sanctions. It represents a strategic maturity on the part of the European Union that was by no means a given. The EU has long been perceived—and rightly so—as a reactive institution, incapable of long-term strategic planning and dominated by short-term compromises and national election cycles. The one-year extension breaks with this model.

It signals that the EU has chosen a strategy of patience—aware that economic pressure on Russia will not produce immediate results, but confident that the cumulative effects justify the duration of the commitment. It is a less appealing stance than quick victories—but it reflects the reality of a protracted war, a resilient enemy economy, and a liberal democracy that must act without losing its internal cohesion.

The Next Battle: The 2027 Elections

The 2027 election will be the next test. In a year’s time, the European political landscape may have changed. Pro-Russian populist parties may have gained ground in some countries. The state of the war in Ukraine will shape the political momentum. Advocates of sanctions must begin preparing for this election now: consolidating their arguments, documenting the effects, and strengthening the institutional mechanisms that make it harder for a single country to block action.

The European sanctions regime against Russia is solid today. It will come under pressure in 2027. The EU changed its pace in June 2026—it must now maintain this pace until peace becomes possible under conditions that respect Ukrainian sovereignty and the principles of international law. This is not a certainty. But it is a goal that Europe’s liberal democracies have the means to pursue, if they have the will to do so.

The EU has shifted its pace. One year instead of six months. This signals that a strategy of patience has been chosen, embraced, and institutionalized. Putin is waiting for the West to split. The West tells him: wait a little longer. And the sanctions are holding.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist