ANALYSIS: Two Years Since the Moscow-Pyongyang Treaty: The Axis of Authoritarian Leaders

Maxime Marquette

2026-06-29 14:20:52

Soldiers, ammunition, legitimacy

From Russia’s perspective, the results of two years of the treaty are tangible and well-documented. In terms of manpower, Russia has received between 10,000 and 15,000 North Korean soldiers—a force that has partially offset the Russian army’s considerable losses in Ukraine and made it possible to maintain troop levels on multiple fronts. These soldiers are not a substitute army: they are support forces that have taken over certain positions while freeing up Russian units for other missions.

In terms of ammunition, North Korea has supplied millions of 152-mm artillery shells and other calibers compatible with the Soviet-era systems inherited by the Russian military. This supply has been significant at times when Russian ammunition supply lines were showing signs of strain. Western sanctions on ammunition exports to Russia have made these North Korean alternatives strategically valuable.

Reversed International Legitimacy

Less visible but just as real: the treaty offered Putin a form of reverse international legitimacy. Faced with Russia’s growing isolation in Western forums, Moscow’s ability to build and maintain alliances with other states—even pariah states—demonstrates that Russia is not alone. It is not recognition from democracies that Putin seeks. It is proof that an alternative bloc exists—one that is functional and capable of taking action. The alliance with Pyongyang, with Tehran (which supplies drones), and with Beijing (which maintains its trade exports)—all these relationships form a network that Moscow can present as its own system of alliances.

For Russian domestic propaganda, this network is essential. It allows Putin to portray the war in Ukraine not as an isolated adventure by a pariah state, but as the resistance of a great nation against Western hegemony, supported by other “great nations” that also refuse to bow down. North Korea plays this rhetorical role with enthusiasm.

Putin needs North Korea as much for propaganda as for ammunition. An isolated dictator is a weakened dictator—not militarily, but politically. Having Kim Jong-un by his side is a way of telling his compatriots: “See, the world isn’t entirely against us. Alternative great powers support us.” That’s the narrative. And in autocracies, the narrative is half the power.

What North Korea Has Achieved

Military Technologies and Combat Experience

North Korea’s track record over the two years of the treaty is, in many respects, even more substantial than Russia’s. North Korea has obtained what it had been seeking for years but was prevented from acquiring by sanctions. First and foremost, space and missile technologies—Russian assistance has enabled North Korea’s spy satellite programs to make spectacular progress. Pyongyang has launched at least one military reconnaissance satellite into operational orbit, giving it an independent surveillance capability that democracies can no longer ignore.

The combat experience gained by North Korean soldiers deployed in Ukraine is the second major gain. As mentioned in the previous article, North Korean officers who have observed how drones, modern counter-battery systems, anti-drone defenses, and precision-guidance systems operate—all of this represents a technological and doctrinal upgrade for the KPA that is worth far more than any equipment purchase.

Fuel, Food, and Critical Resources

Economically, North Korea has received energy resources—Russian fuel and coal—in exchange for its soldiers and ammunition, which have partially alleviated the constraints imposed by sanctions. These resources do not replace a normal economy, but they allow the regime to maintain its military priorities without completely sacrificing the basic needs of its population—which could be potentially destabilizing.

The treaty has also opened channels for parallel economic exchanges—Russian grain to North Korea, North Korean minerals to Russia—that bypass official sanctions channels. These exchanges take place through networks of intermediaries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, using ships that change flags and transactions conducted in cryptocurrencies or local currencies rather than in dollars or euros.

What North Korea has gained from this treaty is alarming when viewed objectively: spy satellites, experience in modern warfare, fuel, and Russian diplomatic protection at the UN Security Council. Kim Jong-un has struck a very good deal. Democracies allowed this transaction to take place without a proportionate response. It is one of those strategic errors whose cost is only fully realized years later.

The Authoritarian Axis: Beyond the Bilateral Treaty

The Geometry of the Anti-Western Alliance

The Moscow-Pyongyang treaty does not exist in a vacuum. It is part of a broader network of mutually reinforcing relationships among authoritarian regimes. China continues to provide economic support to Russia while offering diplomatic protection to North Korea. Iran has supplied drones that have killed Ukrainians while negotiating with the United States. Pyongyang provides ammunition and soldiers. This coordination is not formalized in a multilateral treaty—that would be too visible and too easily targeted by sanctions. It operates bilaterally but complementarily, with each pair of partners meeting specific mutual needs.

This network forms an architecture of mutual support that allows each member to withstand Western pressure longer than it could on its own. Russia, without North Korean ammunition and Iranian drones, would be in a more difficult military situation. North Korea, without Russian support and Chinese diplomatic cover, would be even more economically strangled. Iran, without Russian and North Korean buyers for its drones, would lose a market that financed its development program. This interdependence is the strength of the authoritarian axis.

What the West Still Does Not Fully Understand

One of the West’s major analytical errors since 2022 has been to treat the various authoritarian threats as separate challenges, to be managed by distinct teams and policies. The Russian issue in one department, the Chinese issue in another, North Korea in one office, Iran in another. Meanwhile, these regimes themselves coordinate—not perfectly, not without internal tensions, but they coordinate nonetheless.

Western foreign policy needs an integrated approach that recognizes that these threats reinforce one another and must be addressed together. Weakening Russia in Ukraine reduces the resources available to fund North Korea’s ballistic missile program. Effectively sanctioning Iranian arms exports reduces the capacity of drones to strike Ukrainian cities. Limiting Chinese technology transfers to North Korea slows down the spy satellite program that enhances the KPA’s targeting capabilities. Everything is connected.

The authoritarian axis is the geopolitical equivalent of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis of 1940—but less formalized and more adaptable. In 1940, democracies were slow to realize that these partnerships had a dangerous cumulative logic. I hope that 2026 will not be a repeat of that slow realization. The signs are there. The data is there. The only question is whether policymakers in democracies see them and act accordingly.

Two Years of Sanctions and Their Limits

What Sanctions Have — and Have Not — Achieved

International sanctions against North Korea—adopted by the UN Security Council during previous nuclear crises—have been largely circumvented since Russia began blocking their strengthening through its veto power. China, which had partially enforced these sanctions in the past, now enforces them even less rigorously, as Sino-Russian relations have strengthened diplomatic protection for Pyongyang.

This erosion of the sanctions regime has real consequences: North Korea continues to export coal and labor through intermediary countries, continues to receive fuel, and continues to find markets for its products. Sanctions create friction and additional costs, but they do not strangle the regime as they did at their peak between 2017 and 2019.

Autonomous Sanctions as an Alternative

Faced with the UN deadlock, the United States, the EU, Japan, and South Korea can step up autonomous sanctions—national or bilateral measures that do not require Security Council approval. These sanctions can target entities that facilitate Russian-North Korean transfers: banks in Southeast Asia, shell companies in Hong Kong, and oil intermediaries. They are less comprehensive than a UN regime, but they can be implemented more quickly and are less likely to be vetoed.

The U.S. expansion of sanctions lists against facilitating entities—an approach the administration has used to target Iranian arms exports to Russia—can be applied with the same logic to the Russian-North Korean support network. The key is precise mapping of the networks—financial, logistical, and technological—and the application of sanctions without exception once these networks are identified.

Autonomous sanctions are imperfect, but they are what we have when the UN is paralyzed by vetoes. I cannot believe that we are powerless in the face of this treaty. The financial networks that facilitate trade between Russia and North Korea pass through banks, cryptocurrency platforms, and ship registries—all checkpoints where democracies have real influence if they choose to exercise it. Political will, not capacity, is what is lacking.

The Economic Dimension of the Moscow-Pyongyang Alliance

Cooperation That Circumvents Sanctions

Russian-North Korean economic cooperation is not limited to the most visible military exchanges. It includes a network of economic transactions that circumvent international sanctions. North Korean ships transport coal to Russia in exchange for petroleum products. North Korean workers—officially “students” or “trainees”—work in Russian industries in exchange for foreign currency that feeds into Pyongyang’s state budget. These flows, documented by sanctions experts, represent significant resources for both regimes.

The mutual defense treaty of June 2024 formalized and deepened these exchanges. Russia provides diplomatic protection for North Korea at the UN Security Council, preventing any tightening of sanctions. In exchange, Pyongyang supplies ammunition, soldiers, and political support. It is a symbiotic relationship that the second anniversary, celebrated on June 22, 2026, confirms as enduring.

Cryptocurrencies and the Financing of the Nuclear Program

North Korea finances a significant portion of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs through massive cybertheft operations. Hacker groups linked to the North Korean state—notably the Lazarus Group—have stolen billions of dollars in cryptocurrencies from exchanges and decentralized finance projects. These funds, discreetly converted into national currencies via intermediaries in Southeast Asia, directly contribute to financing programs that sanctions are specifically designed to cut off.

This mechanism of financing through cybercrime illustrates the North Korean regime’s ability to adapt. Every time sanctions closed off a traditional funding channel, Pyongyang opened a new one. This pattern of adaptation is crucial to understand: sanctions are not useless, but they must be accompanied by an equally consistent effort to shut down the alternative channels that the regime inevitably develops.

Cryptocurrencies as a tool for financing North Korea’s nuclear program—that is an irony that the proponents of decentralized finance likely did not anticipate. The technology that was supposed to free individuals from dependence on governments is being used by one of the world’s most repressive regimes to finance its weapons. This is not an argument against the technology. It is an argument for international regulation of crypto exchanges that is as rigorous as that of traditional banks.

Regional Outlook: Japan and South Korea Confront the Axis

Tokyo Faces a Coordinated Threat

Japan is the democracy most directly exposed to the consequences of the Russia-North Korea axis. Pyongyang’s intermediate-range ballistic missiles cover the entire Japanese archipelago. Regular tests—missiles that fly over Japanese territory or crash into the sea off the coast—maintain constant psychological and strategic pressure on Tokyo. And the strengthening of the KPA’s capabilities through Russian technology transfers, documented since 2024, exacerbates this situation.

Japan’s response takes two complementary forms. On the defensive front, it involves strengthening Aegis systems and missile defense capabilities. On the offensive front—a historic doctrinal shift—it involves developing a counterattack strike capability against enemy launch sites. This doctrinal shift, which required a revision of the constitutional principles rooted in postwar pacifism, illustrates the extent to which the North Korean threat—reinforced by Russia—is transforming the strategic postures of even the most cautious democracies.

South Korean Resilience as a Model

South Korea offers a model of resilience in the face of the North Korean threat that is worth studying. A cutting-edge economy, world-class military technology, a solid alliance with the United States, and the ability to maintain a degree of diplomatic openness with the North while upholding a firm defensive posture—this is a difficult balance that Seoul has maintained for decades, under the constant threat of artillery within 50 kilometers.

Seoul’s decision to take in North Korean prisoners held in Ukraine—as reported by Caliber.az on June 23, 2026—is part of this strategy of applying pressure through every available means. South Korea uses military, diplomatic, economic, and now informational tools to keep pressure on a regime that has not fundamentally changed in seventy years. This multi-domain approach is the model that other democracies facing persistent authoritarian threats should study.

South Korea inspires me. To live under the constant threat of a nuclear-armed neighbor and still maintain a dynamic economy, a vibrant democracy, and a culture that shines on the world stage—that is a remarkable achievement. And now, seizing the opportunity presented by the North Korean prisoners in Ukraine to open a new breach in Pyongyang’s information wall—that is smart long-term strategy. This country deserves our full support.

Lessons for the West: How to Respond to the Authoritarian Axis

An Integrated Approach Against a Coordinated Adversary

The Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang-Tehran axis is not formalized in a multilateral treaty, but it operates in a coordinated manner on key issues. Moscow receives soldiers and ammunition from Pyongyang, drones from Tehran, and economic support from Beijing. Pyongyang receives technology and diplomatic protection from Moscow, as well as commercial cover from Beijing. Tehran sells its drones and benefits from Russian and Chinese support in the Security Council. This network of mutual support strengthens each actor individually and the group as a whole.

The Western response must be equally integrated. Weakening Russia in Ukraine reduces the resources available to support Pyongyang. Sanctioning Iranian arms exports reduces attacks on Ukrainian civilians and signals to Tehran that there is a price to pay for its complicity. Restricting Chinese technology transfers to Pyongyang slows down North Korea’s ballistic missile program. Everything is interconnected, and a strategy that addresses these threats separately leaves blind spots that adversaries will exploit.

Investing in the Resilience of Allied Democracies

In the face of the authoritarian axis, the most sustainable investment is in the resilience of allied democracies—South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Baltic states, and Ukraine. These countries are on the front lines. Their ability to resist, to thrive despite pressure, and to uphold their democratic values in hostile environments—this is the best demonstration that the democratic model can confront authoritarian threats without becoming what it fights against.

Concrete solidarity with these allies takes many forms: explicit security guarantees, military aid, intelligence sharing, economic support, and diplomatic presence. The second anniversary of the Moscow-Pyongyang treaty should serve as a reminder to Western governments that their own alliances—NATO, the Indo-Pacific partnerships—are their primary strategic asset in the face of this axis. An asset that requires constant maintenance and regular investment to remain credible and deterrent.

Two years of the Moscow-Pyongyang treaty. Two years of lessons the West has failed to learn about the need for an integrated approach. I am not without hope—democracies always react belatedly but often end up doing the right thing. But this delay comes at a cost in human lives, in capital diverted to war rather than development, and in freedoms eroded by regimes that interpret every hesitation as an invitation to go further. This cost must be identified, quantified, and clearly attributed to those whose hesitation causes it.

Conclusion: The authoritarian axis must be taken seriously

Two Years That Cannot Be Ignored

The second anniversary of the Moscow-Pyongyang Treaty of June 22, 2026, deserves to be treated not as a routine diplomatic event but as a serious strategic milestone. Two years of this treaty have resulted in: North Korean soldiers fighting in Europe, military technologies that enhance the KPA’s capabilities, a network of economic cooperation that circumvents sanctions, and an announcement by Kim of a destructive posture that fits within this context of renewed strength.

Democracies must respond to this axis with a level of coherence they have not yet fully demonstrated. This requires treating the threats from North Korea, Russia, Iran, and China as an integrated system, not as separate issues. It requires more aggressive sanctions targeting their mutual support networks. And it requires solidarity with South Korea and Japan that is commensurate with the actual level of threat—not that of five years ago, but that of today.

The Choice the West Must Make

The anniversary of the Moscow-Pyongyang Treaty poses a fundamental question for the West: Is it prepared to treat the authoritarian axis as the coordinated system that it is, or will it continue to manage each threat separately, allowing authoritarian regimes to exploit the blind spots created by this fragmentation? The answer to this question will determine, more than any other factor, the course of global security in the coming years. The past two years have shown what this axis can accomplish when it acts in concert. The next two years will show whether the West can respond with equivalent coherence.

This work of assessment, deterrence, and preparation—it is the very definition of what democracies do best when they act like democracies: anticipating threats, naming them, and responding with action before the crisis imposes its own logic. It’s never perfect, often too slow, and sometimes contradictory. But it’s incomparably better than the complacent silence that all too often preceded the great catastrophes of the past century.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist