ANALYSIS: Two Years Since the Moscow-Pyongyang Treaty: The Axis of Authoritarian Regimes Fueling the War in Europe

Maxime Marquette

2026-06-29 14:39:17

What the Russia-North Korea Agreement Actually Says

The treaty signed on June 19, 2024, in Pyongyang is officially titled the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.” But behind this diplomatic language lies a stark reality: a clause providing for automatic mutual assistance in the event of armed aggression against either party, explicitly modeled on the mechanisms of NATO’s Article 5. This is a direct message to Washington and Brussels: the authoritarian axis is building its own collective alliance structures.

The agreement also covers the economic, technological, and space sectors. Russia has shared ballistic technologies with North Korea that have significantly enhanced Pyongyang’s capabilities. In return, Kim Jong-un has supplied Moscow with millions of 152-mm artillery shells and KN-23 ballistic missiles, which have since struck Ukrainian cities. This is not a trivial commercial exchange: it is a direct contribution to the destruction of Ukraine.

Two Years of Arms Deliveries: A Damning Record

Since the treaty was signed, North Korean arms deliveries to Russia have been massive and well-documented. Estimates vary by source, but the consensus among Western intelligence agencies points to more than three million shells delivered, in addition to missiles, launchers, and various other military equipment. This ammunition has enabled the Russian military to maintain a rate of fire that its own arms factories could not have sustained on their own.

In exchange, North Korea has received not only military technology, but also fuel, raw materials, and valuable diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council. Moscow systematically blocks any resolution condemning Pyongyang. It is a bad deal for humanity, but a perfectly rational one for two regimes that have no regard for international norms.

Let me be clear: this comes as no surprise. Experts who monitor North Korea have known for years that Pyongyang was ready to monetize its surplus weapons. What is surprising is the speed with which this partnership has become institutionalized, the depth of the cooperation, and the total absence of any cost imposed by the West on Russia for this monstrous alliance.

North Korean Soldiers in Ukraine: The Truth Behind the Denials

The confirmation no one wanted to hear

For months, Russian authorities denied it. For months, Pyongyang remained silent. And yet, the reality has become clear: North Korean soldiers are fighting in Ukraine, mainly in the Kursk region, as part of Russian army units. U.S., British, South Korean, and Ukrainian intelligence agencies have all reached the same conclusion. The bodies, the prisoners, and the intercepted communications have dispelled any remaining doubt.

This deployment represents a qualitative shift in the war. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, soldiers from a third country are fighting directly alongside Russia in a conflict in Europe. The international dimension of this Russian war of aggression is no longer a figment of the imagination: it is concrete, quantified, and documented. Estimates suggest several thousand soldiers have been deployed, with regular rotations.

Seoul Opens Pandora’s Box on North Korean Prisoners

Seoul’s decision to open the door to the processing of North Korean prisoners of war captured in Ukraine is of considerable significance. These prisoners find themselves in an extraordinary situation: they have seen the world outside North Korea, they have fought in a war that their families are likely unaware even exists, and they know that returning home means, at best, a life of intense surveillance, and at worst, disappearance into a camp.

Ukraine, with mediation from South Korea and the West, must treat these prisoners like any other prisoners of war, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. But their case raises unprecedented humanitarian and political questions: Can they seek asylum? Do they have the right not to return to North Korea? There are no simple answers to these questions under existing international law, and Pyongyang is watching these developments with understandable anxiety.

These young North Korean soldiers—and they are often very young men, indoctrinated from birth in the cult of Kim—deserve genuine humanitarian attention. They did not choose this war. They likely had no choice at all. The way Ukraine and South Korea treat them will speak volumes about the difference between our values and those of the authoritarian axis.

Kim Jong-un, the Third Man in the War in Ukraine

A “destructive” stance: the words that say it all

On June 25, 2026, Kim Jong-un called on his armed forces to adopt a military stance that he himself described as “destructive” toward South Korea. This carefully chosen vocabulary is not insignificant: it is part of a rhetoric of deliberate escalation, intended both to mobilize his domestic base, to intimidate Seoul, and to signal to Moscow that Pyongyang remains a reliable and combative partner.

This “destructive” posture comes amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, exacerbated precisely by North Korea’s deployment in Ukraine. Washington and Seoul have intensified their joint military exercises, prompting formal protests from Russia—which declares, with remarkable aplomb, that it is “concerned” about U.S.-South Korean military activities, as if Moscow itself were not sending Korean soldiers to die in Europe.

North Korea as a Full-Scale Test Bed for Its Own Weapons

There is a profound strategic dimension to North Korea’s involvement in Ukraine: this conflict serves as a full-scale testing ground for Pyongyang’s weapons and tactics. North Korean military engineers are observing how their shells perform in combat, how their missiles hit their targets, and what technical adjustments are needed. This is extraordinarily valuable feedback for an arms program that, until now, could only test its equipment in controlled trials.

This aspect is often underestimated in Western analysis. Kim Jong-un is not merely a passive arms supplier: he is an active investor in a conflict that allows him to refine his military capabilities without direct risk to his regime. Every shell fired at a Ukrainian city is also, cynically, a performance test for the North Korean arms industry.

That is why I reject the idea that North Korea is a secondary player in this war. Kim Jong-un has made a cold, rational calculation: allying with Putin brings him technology, fuel, diplomatic protection, and a military testing ground. It’s diabolically logical. And we continue to treat the Korean issue as if it were separate from the Ukrainian issue. A monumental strategic error.

Russia and North Korea: A Distorted Mirror of Two Ideological Failures

Two Regimes That See Themselves Reflected in Each Other

What deeply binds Moscow and Pyongyang is not merely short-term military interests. It is a shared ideological destiny: two authoritarian regimes that have chosen confrontation with the West as the guiding principle of their foreign policy, two systems that keep their populations in a state of fear and ignorance, two states that have placed the military-industrial complex at the center of their economies at the expense of their own people.

Putin’s Russia has been “North Koreanizing” at an accelerated pace since 2022: the shutdown of independent media, the criminalization of all dissent, a full-scale war economy, and a cult of personality surrounding the leader. Conversely, Kim’s North Korea has found in this partnership an international legitimacy it had not enjoyed for decades. They feed off each other’s radicalism.

What this reveals about the reshaping of the international system

The Moscow-Pyongyang axis cannot be understood in isolation. It is part of a broader geopolitical realignment that includes Tehran and Beijing in different but complementary roles. These four powers—Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China—share a common hostility toward the Western liberal international order, even if their interests diverge on other issues.

What this axis reveals is that the international system, as it was constructed after 1945 and then reinforced after 1991, is under existential pressure. The UN, nonproliferation mechanisms, international trade rules, humanitarian conventions—all of these are being actively circumvented, undermined, and ridiculed by regimes that have decided these rules do not apply to them. And they are right, insofar as the costs imposed remain insufficient.

I am not a doomsayer. I do not believe that the end of the liberal world order is inevitable. But I do believe that this order will survive only if its defenders finally resolve to defend it with the same energy and resolve that its enemies are using to destroy it. And frankly, we’re not there yet.

Ukraine Caught in a Vise: Between the Russian Front and North Korean Logistics

The Tangible Impact of North Korean Munitions on the Front Lines

From a purely military standpoint, North Korea’s contribution has had tangible and well-documented effects on the war in Ukraine. The artillery shells supplied by Pyongyang partially offset the shortages that the Russian arms industry could no longer cover on its own. For months in 2024 and 2025, Ukrainian units reported an intensification of Russian artillery fire, which analysts linked to the North Korean shipments.

North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles struck Ukrainian cities, causing civilian casualties and destruction. These missiles, with their distinctive trajectory, posed new challenges for Ukrainian air defense systems. They are not the most accurate weapons, but they are effective enough to terrorize populations and destroy civilian infrastructure. This is their primary purpose for the Russian military: systematic terror.

The Challenges Posed by North Korean Soldiers on the Ground

The integration of North Korean soldiers into Russian units has posed considerable logistical and operational challenges for Moscow. Language barriers, differences in military doctrine, and tactical interoperability issues have made their deployment less effective than hoped for, according to several analyses. Nevertheless, their presence has allowed Russia to partially offset its considerable human losses.

For Ukraine, facing North Korean soldiers introduces a new psychological and operational dimension. These soldiers possess a tolerance for suffering and blind obedience shaped by a totalitarian regime that has conditioned them since childhood. They do not give up easily. They do not possess the same survival instincts as soldiers raised in a society where human life is valued. This is a chilling reality that Ukrainian commanders must incorporate into their tactical doctrine.

Every North Korean soldier killed in Ukraine is a young man whom Kim’s regime has sacrificed on the altar of its ambitions and its partnership with Putin. These deaths are not officially recorded anywhere; their families will not be notified, and their sacrifice will never be acknowledged by Pyongyang. This is one of the silent horrors of this war.

The West's response: too little, too late, too divided

Sanctions Insufficient to Counter the Depth of the Alliance

The West has responded to the Russian-North Korean alliance by tightening sanctions against Pyongyang. But North Korea has already been subject to one of the strictest sanctions regimes on the planet for decades. Additional sanctions on an already hyper-isolated economy have only a marginal effect. The real question is: How can we impose significant costs on Russia for its reliance on partners like North Korea?

The honest answer is that the measures taken so far remain insufficient. The United States and the European Union have imposed additional sanctions, designated entities involved in arms transfers, and shared intelligence with their Asian allies. All of this is helpful but does not fundamentally change the equation. Moscow continues to receive North Korean ammunition without paying a truly deterrent strategic price.

Transatlantic Coordination Put to the Test

Managing the North Korean dimension of the war in Ukraine requires coordination between NATO allies and Asian partners such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia. Such coordination exists, but it remains largely informal and insufficiently structured. The Ankara summit on July 7–8, 2026, will provide an opportunity to further formalize this transatlantic-transpacific cooperation.

But this coordination is complicated by the uncertainties the Trump administration has cast over U.S. commitments. If Washington reduces its support for Ukraine while wavering on its obligations in the Asia-Pacific region, the coherence of the Western response will be seriously undermined. Kim Jong-un and Putin are banking precisely on this vulnerability.

Trump is the unpredictable element in the equation. On the one hand, his administration has maintained firm positions on certain issues; on the other, the contradictory signals coming from Washington leave our Asian allies perplexed and our adversaries optimistic. This is not foreign policy; it is a series of improvisations with real geopolitical consequences.

The Treaty's Anniversary: Messages Sent to the International Community

A Calculated Display of Authoritarian Solidarity

The celebrations marking the treaty’s second anniversary were not insignificant. They were orchestrated to send several messages simultaneously. To Seoul and Washington: we stand together, united and determined. To Beijing: we exist, we have our own momentum, you cannot ignore us. To Ukraine and the West: you will not succeed by isolating Russia, because it has friends.

This demonstration is accompanied by concrete promises from Pyongyang: “deeper ties” with Moscow across all fields. We can reasonably anticipate new arms deliveries, deeper technological cooperation, and perhaps new troop deployments. The anniversary was not a look back—it was a roadmap for the future.

Implications for Regional Stability in Northeast Asia

The strengthening of the Russia-North Korea axis has direct implications for stability in Northeast Asia. Seoul finds itself in an uncomfortable position: it supports Ukraine diplomatically and materially, but hesitates to supply lethal weapons directly, fearing an escalation with Pyongyang. This cautious approach is understandable, but it has its limits.

Japan is watching with growing anxiety as North Korea’s military technology advances, fueled by Russian cooperation. Every improvement in North Korea’s ballistic capabilities poses a direct threat to Japanese territory. Tokyo has drawn practical conclusions by significantly increasing its defense budget, but the fundamental question remains: how can one deter a regime that values the survival of its leader above all else, including the well-being of its own people?

The Korean Peninsula and Ukraine are geographically distant but strategically connected. What Putin gets from Kim directly affects what is happening in the trenches of the Donbas. What the West does—or fails to do—in Ukraine sends a direct signal to Kim about what he can hope for or fear. It’s all connected. It’s all one and the same challenge.

China: The Silent Arbiter of the Authoritarian Axis

Beijing: Between Profits and Strategic Unease

China is watching the evolution of the Russian-North Korean alliance with a mixture of interest and unease. On the one hand, anything that weakens the West and divides U.S. attention between Europe and Asia serves Beijing’s tactical interests. On the other hand, a militarily strengthened Kim Jong-un who is less dependent on China complicates Beijing’s policy on the Korean Peninsula.

China has traditionally been the only actor with real influence over Pyongyang. However, the alliance with Moscow gives North Korea a strategic alternative that automatically reduces North Korea’s dependence on Beijing. This is an outcome that China did not anticipate and must now manage, without being able or willing to publicly oppose this dynamic.

The Four-Nation Axis: When Interests Diverge but Hostilities Converge

The Russia-North Korea-Iran-China axis is not a formal or cohesive alliance. These four powers often have divergent interests, internal rivalries, and shared histories that are at times fraught with tension. What unites them is not a shared positive worldview, but rather their shared hostility toward the Western-led international order and their desire to undermine it—each in its own way and for its own reasons.

This nuance is important for Western policy. We must not treat this axis as a monolithic bloc, as that would overestimate its cohesion and deprive us of opportunities to drive a wedge between its members. But neither should we underestimate it or hope that internal contradictions alone will be enough to cause it to implode on its own. Vigilance and action remain necessary.

Beijing is playing a dangerous game. It is tacitly supporting a war that destabilizes the world order from which it has itself benefited greatly for the past forty years. The contradictions inherent in this position are not yet apparent, but they will become so. The question is: at what cost to the rest of the world in the meantime?

What International Law Says—and Cannot Do

A Legal Framework Under Severe Strain

North Korea’s involvement in Ukraine raises complex legal questions. The deployment of North Korean soldiers constitutes a form of direct participation by a third state in an international armed conflict, which is, in principle, contrary to the norms of international law. North Korea cannot “lease” its soldiers to an aggressor without bearing legal responsibility for doing so.

But international law is meaningless unless its enforcement mechanisms function. Yet Russia holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, while North Korea, though subject to sanctions, can rely on the Russian and Chinese vetoes to block any additional binding measures. Law without effective sanctions is a call to resistance for regimes that fear only force.

Accountability Before the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants against Vladimir Putin for war crimes in Ukraine. These warrants are symbolically powerful but practically limited in their immediate enforcement. There is currently no international mechanism to hold North Korean leaders accountable for their role in these crimes.

Yet documenting accountability is essential for the future. The crimes committed today—including those facilitated by North Korean ammunition and soldiers—must be recorded, investigated, and attributed. Judgment may come later. History has repeatedly shown that the guilty sometimes end up being held accountable for their actions, even decades later. Rigorous documentation today is tomorrow’s justice.

I believe in international law—not naively, but as a necessary normative framework. Without it, it is the law of the strongest, pure and simple. And in a world where authoritarian regimes arm one another, the law of the strongest always favors unscrupulous regimes. The West must strengthen these mechanisms, not circumvent them.

Global Public Opinion in the Face of the Authoritarian Axis

What People in the Global South Think

Perceptions of the Russian-North Korean alliance in the “Global South” are complex and often differ from the Western perspective. In many countries in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia, the war in Ukraine is viewed through the lens of other conflicts, other colonial histories, and other mistrusts toward the West. Russia skillfully exploits these alternative narratives to downplay the diplomatic isolation its aggression should be causing.

North Korea, for its part, has little impact on global public opinion beyond its immediate region. But its role as a supplier of weapons for a war in Europe sets dangerous precedents: if Pyongyang can supply ammunition to Russia without significant consequences, other regional actors might be tempted to fuel future conflicts using the same model.

The Information War on the North Korean Front

Russia and North Korea have waged an active information war to deny, downplay, or normalize their military partnership. Official denials were systematic until the accumulated evidence made denial impossible. Even then, the rhetoric shifted toward justification: if the West can supply weapons to Ukraine, why couldn’t Russia accept arms shipments from its partners?

This equivalence is fallacious—Ukraine is the victim of aggression, not the aggressor—but it resonates with certain segments of global public opinion. Combating this disinformation requires not only factual counterarguments but also coherent strategic communication, which the West has not always been able to deploy effectively.

The information war is as real as trench warfare. And on that front, I must admit that our adversaries have at times been more agile, more creative, and quicker. Not because their lies are more convincing, but because we have been slow to take the power of storytelling seriously in the contemporary world.

Outlook for the Future: Scenarios for the Next Two Years

The Scenario of Controlled Escalation

The most likely scenario for the next two years remains that of controlled escalation: a gradual strengthening of the Russian-North Korean alliance, new arms deliveries, and possibly new troop deployments—but without crossing thresholds that would provoke a qualitatively different Western response. Putin and Kim are two players who move their pieces but generally avoid the board where they cannot win.

In this scenario, Ukraine continues to face increased pressure on the front lines, supported by North Korean ammunition, while the West seeks to ramp up its own arms production to compensate. This is a de facto arms race, one in which Europe is catching up but which will take several more years to fully take effect.

The Strategic Breakdown Scenario

An alternative scenario—less likely but not to be ruled out—would be a strategic rift in the Russia-North Korea alliance. If the war in Ukraine were to end on terms unfavorable to Russia, or if the costs of the partnership became too high for Pyongyang in terms of tensions with China or the risk of Western retaliation, North Korea might recalibrate its position. Kim Jong-un is, above all, a pragmatist: he will not sacrifice himself on the altar of Russo-North Korean friendship if it were to genuinely threaten his regime.

But this scenario depends largely on the decisions the West makes now. If we impose sufficiently high costs on Russia for its reliance on Pyongyang, if we demonstrate a resilience that makes a Russian victory impossible, then Kim Jong-un’s calculations could change. The history of authoritarian alliances is marked by pragmatic reversals when interests dictated it.

I’m not betting everything on the optimistic scenario. But I also reject fatalism. The outcome of this war and this alliance depends largely on what we decide to do, here and now, with the tools at our disposal. Passivity is also a strategic choice—and often the worst one.

What this requires of the West: clear-eyed realism without complacency

Moving Beyond Rhetoric to Action

Faced with the Russia-North Korea axis, the West needs fewer statements and more action. Summits, communiqués, and “expressions of deep concern” serve a ceremonial purpose, but they do nothing to slow down Pyongyang’s arms shipments to Moscow. What could slow them down: additional economic costs imposed on Russia, increased military aid to Ukraine that makes the cost of the war unbearable for Moscow, and resolute support for Seoul and Tokyo in addressing their own security challenges.

The NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, is an opportunity. Not the last, not the only one, but an opportunity. The decision to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, if actually implemented, will shift the balance of power in the medium term. But summit decisions must be followed by actual budgets, signed contracts, and delivered equipment. The history of NATO’s commitments on defense spending is a constant reminder that promises are only as good as their implementation.

Thinking Long-Term in a World of Short Cycles

One of the West’s structural disadvantages when facing authoritarian regimes is the short electoral cycle that shapes our policies. Putin, Kim Jong-un, and Xi Jinping think in terms of decades. Our leaders think in terms of four- to five-year terms, with an eye on the next quarter’s polls. This temporal misalignment is a real advantage for authoritarians.

Meeting this challenge requires institutional mechanisms that shield long-term commitments from short-term political shifts: formal treaties rather than informal commitments, defense budgets enshrined in multi-year legislation, and aid programs for Ukraine structured over several years. These mechanisms exist—the European Union has made progress in this direction—but they must be strengthened and expanded.

What I ask of Western leaders is simply political courage. The courage to tell their voters that security comes at a price, that this price is lower than the cost of a war in Europe, and that today’s sacrifices are tomorrow’s dividends of peace. This is not an easy message to sell. But it is the only honest message.

North Korea and NATO: Bridging the Strategic Blind Spot

Why North Korea Must Be Factored Into Western Security Calculations

NATO was designed to defend the North Atlantic. Its geographic and doctrinal mandate does not formally cover Northeast Asia. However, the events of 2024–2026 have rendered this distinction artificial: North Korean soldiers killed on Ukrainian soil, North Korean munitions striking Ukrainian cities, and the strategic partnership treaty signed between Pyongyang and Moscow in June 2024 make North Korea an active participant in the European conflict. Denying this reality by maintaining geographical divisions from a bygone era would be a strategic mistake.

The operational response requires enhanced coordination between NATO and its Indo-Pacific allies—South Korea, Japan, and Australia—who themselves have a vital interest in preventing North Korea from exploiting the Ukrainian conflict to bolster its ballistic capabilities and war chest. The joint RIMPAC and Valiant Shield exercises are a start, but a genuine response framework to North Korean proliferation tailored to the European context has yet to be established. This will be the focus of diplomatic and military efforts in the coming months.

North Korean Prisoners of War: An Unprecedented Diplomatic Opportunity

In June 2026, reports confirmed by media outlets such as Caliber.az indicated that Seoul had opened the door to the interrogation of North Korean prisoners of war captured by Ukraine. This information is remarkable for several reasons. First, it irrefutably confirms that North Korean soldiers fought alongside Russian forces—a fact that Moscow and Pyongyang have long denied. Second, it creates a rare opportunity: to obtain firsthand information on the structure, training, and capabilities of the North Korean special forces involved in the conflict.

These prisoners also represent a potential source of diplomatic pressure on Kim Jong-un. The public revelation of North Korean involvement through firsthand accounts undermines Pyongyang’s official stance, which denies any military involvement on Russia’s behalf. For Western and South Korean intelligence agencies, every North Korean soldier captured alive is an invaluable source of information on command structures, the true state of Kim’s army, and the precise terms of the secret agreement with Moscow.

The appearance of North Korean soldiers in Ukrainian trenches is one of the most troubling developments in this conflict—not because it changes the military balance overnight, but because it normalizes the idea that a pariah state can send its fighters into a war of aggression against a sovereign democracy without any real consequences. If we allow this precedent to take hold, we will have opened a door that will take decades to close.

Conclusion: The authoritarian axis will only be stopped if we erect a wall against it

Two Years of the Treaty, Two Years of Lessons Not Learned

Two years after the signing of the Russia-North Korea treaty, the outcome is clear: this alliance has delivered on its promises to the signatories. North Korea has delivered what it promised—ammunition, soldiers, and diplomatic support. Russia has provided technology, protection at the Security Council, and international legitimacy. The alliance works because the interests of both parties are genuinely aligned in the short term.

What has not worked is the Western response. Not because we did nothing—we did a great deal—but because we did not do enough, quickly enough, or with sufficient consistency and resolve. Putin is betting that Western fatigue will set in before the costs of his war become unbearable. It is a rational bet from Moscow’s perspective. Our collective mission is to thwart this calculation.

Zelensky, Ukraine, and Us

Volodymyr Zelensky is holding on. His country is holding on. Against a Russia armed by North Korea, against missiles falling on its cities, against the exhaustion of two years of total war, against the international temptation toward appeasement, Ukraine is resisting. This resistance comes at a cost: it is costing Ukrainian lives, infrastructure, and an entire generation scarred by war. This resistance deserves better than our ambivalence. It deserves our full, clear, lasting support—without any condition of surrender.

The second anniversary of the Moscow-Pyongyang treaty is also, in its own way, a call to action for democracies. The authoritarian axis has charted its course. It is up to us to chart our own—and to follow it through to the end.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist