COMMENTARY: Nuclear Inspections: Why the Conflicting Accounts from Vance and Tehran Smell Like a Scam

Maxime Marquette

2026-06-29 14:39:46

The Vice President as the Spokesperson for “Victory”

Vice President JD Vance has distinguished himself as one of the Trump administration’s most active communicators on the Iran roadmap. His position on nuclear inspections—that Iran had reportedly agreed to substantial access—was one of the central points of the U.S. narrative in the hours following the announcement. Vance was also particularly forthright on the issue of the Strait of Hormuz, stating through Secretary of State Rubio that there can be no “tolls” in the strait—a clear and principled red line.

But Vance’s statement raises a question: had he actually read the same text as the Iranian negotiators, or was he selling a spin-doctored version of the agreement to a domestic U.S. audience? The answer may be both. In complex negotiations, it is common for parties to sign a deliberately ambiguous text that allows each side to present itself as the winner at home. This is the diplomacy of constructive ambiguity—constructive for the signing, potentially destructive for implementation. Vance is selling an agreement to America. Tehran is selling the same agreement, in a different version, to its own Revolutionary Guards.

Vance’s Credibility on the Iran Issue

Vance is not the most seasoned expert on the Iran issue within the administration. His political reputation is built more on domestic U.S. issues—the economy, immigration, and culture. The Iranian nuclear issue requires in-depth technical familiarity—enrichment levels, inspection protocols, verification mechanisms—which his public statements do not always demonstrate. This is not a personal criticism—it is an observation about the division of labor within the administration.

The risk is that statements made by Vance to satisfy the American political audience will be taken at face value by allies—notably Israel—as firm commitments on technical points that they do not actually establish. If the final agreement is less restrictive on inspections than Vance’s statements suggest, the allies’ disappointment could be all the more acute and potentially dangerous. In nuclear negotiations, precision in wording is not a stylistic luxury—it is a matter of global security.

I’ll be honest: I don’t know exactly what Vance said or in what context. I am relying on reports from the Washington Times and Al Jazeera. It is possible that his statements were nuanced in a way that these reports do not fully capture. But the very fact that conflicting accounts are circulating publicly within the first 48 hours is in itself indicative of a diplomatic communication problem—regardless of who said what exactly.

The Iranian narrative: challenging the status quo to avoid appearing to have given in

Iranian Domestic Politics and the Need to Challenge

The Iranian narrative that immediately challenges U.S. claims regarding inspections is not merely a negotiating position—it is a domestic political necessity. The Iranian regime cannot be seen to have conceded on issues of national sovereignty and military security. The Revolutionary Guards and hardline factions scrutinize every official statement to identify signs of weakness. A statement confirming that Iran has agreed to unconditional inspections of its military sites would be a red flag for these factions—potentially enough to trigger internal sabotage of the negotiations.

The classic Iranian strategy is therefore to sign a text that is ambiguous enough to allow it to claim a favorable interpretation domestically, while maintaining a stance of non-concession on sensitive issues. This is domestic politics disguised as international diplomacy. The international negotiating community knows this—and often tolerates it because the alternative is the total collapse of the negotiations. But this tolerance of ambiguity comes at a cost: it guarantees disputes over interpretation immediately after the signing. What we are seeing in these first 48 hours is no accident—it is the expected pattern.

The Supreme Leader’s Role in Final Approval

A crucial element in understanding the Iranian narrative is that negotiators from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot speak on behalf of the entire Iranian power structure. Supreme Leader Khamenei is the sole authority who can approve a strategic agreement of this magnitude—and his approval is not guaranteed even if his diplomatic delegation has signed a roadmap. There are precedents: agreements negotiated by Iranian diplomats that did not receive the Supreme Leader’s final approval, forcing renegotiations or abandonment.

If Khamenei rejects or substantially alters what the negotiators have signed, Tehran’s contradictory narrative regarding inspections could be explained by an anticipation of this resistance at the highest level. Iranian diplomats know what Khamenei will accept—and they sign accordingly, even if it means contradicting what their American counterparts thought they had secured. Negotiating with Iran is like negotiating with a black box whose true decision-maker remains invisible.

The question of Khamenei is fundamental yet rarely discussed. When I read optimistic analyses of Iran’s roadmap, I always look for this: have they said anything about Khamenei’s approval? Almost never. Yet that is where everything hinges. An agreement that Zarif or his successor signs in Switzerland only becomes real if Khamenei says yes. And Khamenei—at 85 years old, in uncertain health, surrounded by hardline factions who view the agreement as a capitulation—is precisely the unknown factor that no one can accurately predict.

The Technical Challenge of Inspections: What the IAEA Can and Cannot Do

The Additional Protocol: The Minimum Standard That Is Not Enough

At the heart of the debate over inspections lies a specific technical question: Which verification protocol will the IAEA apply? There are different levels of safeguards agreements between states and the IAEA. The Additional Protocol—which Iran signed and then suspended—grants the IAEA broader inspection powers, including short-notice visits and access to additional information. It is a significant improvement over basic safeguards agreements, but it still does not allow for unannounced inspections of undeclared military sites.

What the United States is demanding—and what Iran refuses—goes beyond the standard Additional Protocol. It involves access to “suspicious” military sites—places like the former Parchin base, where the IAEA detected traces of research into nuclear weapon detonators—without preconditions and without prior notice. This type of access is entirely exceptional in international safeguards practice and would constitute an unprecedented intrusion into national military sovereignty. Iran portrays it as an unreasonable demand. The United States portrays it as a minimum condition for credibility. Someone has to give in—and no one wants to.

Known Gaps in Iran’s Verification

The IAEA has documented several gaps in the verification of Iran’s nuclear program over the years. Traces of polonium-210 at Parchin—consistent with research on nuclear weapon initiators. Metallic uranium found at undeclared sites. Documents from the “AMad Program”—Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program—suggest that weapons research continued after the date Iran claims to have halted it. These gaps are not resolved by the roadmap—they remain entirely unaddressed.

If a final agreement does not resolve these verifiable gaps—if the IAEA does not obtain answers to the specific questions it has raised about these anomalies—then the agreement is built on an intellectually dishonest foundation. We are signing a nonproliferation agreement while knowing that past activities remain unexplained and that the nuclear state maintains a veil of secrecy over the true extent of its past activities. Nonproliferation requires retrospective transparency as much as it does prospective safeguards.

The verification gaps documented by the IAEA regarding Iran’s program—Parchin, metallic uranium, the AMad Program—are established facts that I am not making up. They are in the Agency’s public reports. What strikes me is how often these facts disappear from optimistic analyses of the negotiations, as if one could build a nonproliferation architecture while ignoring the unanswered questions of the past. One cannot. The nuclear ghosts of Parchin are in the negotiating room, even if no one mentions them.

Why Divergent Narratives Serve Both Sides

The Political Utility of Ambiguity

It would be naïve to conclude from the divergent narratives that the agreement is simply “stillborn.” In the complex world of diplomacy, deliberate ambiguity on sensitive issues can serve as a functional mechanism that allows both parties to sign and move toward a more substantial agreement at a later date. The logic is as follows: if one insists on resolving every point of contention before signing, nothing will ever be signed. By deliberately leaving certain points vague, one creates momentum that can then be used to resolve difficult issues at a later stage.

This logic holds true in certain contexts. But in nuclear negotiations, it is particularly dangerous. The ambiguities regarding inspections are not administrative details—they determine whether the agreement is real or fictitious. If Vance announces that Iran has agreed to robust inspections and Tehran disputes this claim within 48 hours, both delegations will return to their capitals with conflicting political mandates for the rest of the negotiations. Resolving a contradiction in the weeks ahead is infinitely more difficult than avoiding creating one in the first place.

The Potential Scam: Two Exploitation Scenarios

Two scenarios for exploiting these divergent narratives deserve to be clearly identified. The first—the Iranian scam—involves Tehran strategically maintaining contradictory narratives to buy time and secure economic concessions (partial unfreezing of assets) without ever granting the substantial inspections demanded. Iran “negotiates” indefinitely, reaps the economic benefits of the negotiating atmosphere, and keeps its nuclear program moving forward. This is precisely what hardline Iranian factions would like to see.

The second scenario—the American scam—is more subtle but just as problematic. The Trump administration signs a deliberately ambiguous agreement on inspections so it can present it as a political “victory” to its domestic audience, while knowing full well that the verification mechanisms are insufficient. The agreement is politically marketable in the short term but structurally flawed in the long term. In this scenario, it is not Tehran that is swindling Washington—it is Washington that is swindling itself for domestic political reasons. These two dynamics can coexist within the same agreement—and that is precisely what is scandalous.

I’ll take this line of thought to its logical conclusion: if the 60-day agreement produces a text in which both parties claim contradictory interpretations regarding nuclear inspections, it is no agreement at all. To call it an agreement and sell it as a diplomatic success would be a deception—toward allies, toward the public, and toward the very goal of nonproliferation. I’d rather be told, “The negotiations failed on this fundamental point,” than be presented with a contractual ambiguity as a historic triumph.

The Implications for the Credibility of the Nonproliferation Regime

If Iran secures a deal without genuine nuclear transparency

If the roadmap leads to an agreement that normalizes Iran economically without addressing verification shortfalls—if Tehran secures the lifting of sanctions and the 300 billion without granting genuine inspections of its military sites—the implications for the global nuclear nonproliferation regime will be catastrophic. Every power aspiring to nuclear capabilities will look at this agreement and conclude: if we hold out long enough, if we negotiate ambiguously enough, if we stand firm on inspections, we can achieve economic normalization without losing our nuclear capabilities.

This is exactly the wrong signal to send. North Korea is watching. Saudi Arabia, which is discussing its own enrichment program, is watching. States that are considering their own security in a post-American world are watching. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is already weakened by decades of compromise. A U.S.-Iran agreement that fails to deliver on its promises regarding verification could potentially deal a fatal blow to the treaty’s credibility. International regimes do not die from direct attacks—they die when an exception becomes a precedent, which in turn becomes the rule.

The IAEA Caught in the Crossfire

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) finds itself in an institutionally delicate position. On the one hand, it is the verification body that has documented Iran’s shortcomings and is demanding answers. On the other hand, if a political agreement between the United States and Iran is reached with insufficient inspection mandates, the IAEA will be the body tasked with “validating” an agreement that it knows full well does not give it the tools for effective verification.

This situation would put the IAEA Director General in an impossible position: to publicly endorse an agreement that does not meet minimum verification standards, or to publicly oppose it and trigger a diplomatic crisis. The history of international agencies suggests that they often lean toward the first option, out of institutional pragmatism and to avoid derailing diplomatic momentum. But a credible nonproliferation regime requires that it be given the tools to be credible—and a verification agency that validates an agreement it cannot verify loses its raison d’être.

I struggle with this question: Do I prefer an imperfect agreement on inspections to no agreement at all, if the alternative to the agreement is an Iran approaching the military nuclear threshold? My honest answer is: It depends on the degree of imperfection. An agreement that slows the program by a few years, even without perfect inspections, can have temporary value if it is used to build a more robust verification architecture. An agreement that normalizes Iran without any real limitations is worse than no agreement at all. The line between the two is difficult to draw from the outside—but crucial to draw.

What We've Learned from Previous Cases

North Korea: The Nightmare Scenario

To understand where the conflicting narratives on nuclear agreements are leading, one need only look at the case of North Korea. Decades of negotiations—the 1994 Agreed Framework, the Six-Party Talks of the 2000s, the Trump-Kim summits of 2018–2019—have produced agreements, announcements, “historic breakthroughs,” and immediate conflicting narratives. The result: North Korea is now a nuclear power with intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States, and it continues to build up its arsenal despite all the negotiations.

It’s not that diplomacy with North Korea has been useless—it may have slowed the pace. But the divergent narratives, deliberate ambiguities, and the failure to insist on rigorous verification mechanisms have contributed to a catastrophic outcome for nonproliferation. If Iran follows the same path—using negotiations to buy time and secure economic resources while maintaining its nuclear program—in 10 years, analysts will compare the 2026 roadmap to the 2006 talks on North Korea. History does not repeat itself exactly—but it does have recurring patterns that attentive observers recognize.

Libya: The Counterexample We Tend to Forget

The Libyan case is the opposite example—and it deserves to be recalled to balance the picture. In 2003, Colonel Gaddafi agreed to dismantle his program of weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, and the beginnings of a nuclear program—in exchange for normalized relations with the West. The agreement was effective because it included genuine verification and the verifiable physical dismantling of the equipment. It was not an agreement that left room for ambiguity regarding inspections—it was an agreement that required the weapons to be disclosed and destroyed.

This positive precedent shows that nuclear agreements can work when the parties are sufficiently motivated and when verification is genuine. The difference with Iran is that Gaddafi had not yet invested heavily in his program, and the cost of dismantlement was lower. Iran in 2026, with its advanced enrichment capabilities and a program that has spanned decades, faces much higher costs of abandonment. Positive precedents exist, but they do not automatically apply—they are applicable only under the same basic conditions that made them possible.

No one ever mentions Libya in discussions about nuclear precedents, and that is a mistake. The fact that Gaddafi did indeed dismantle his program—and that verification confirmed this—proves that this type of agreement can work. What destroyed Libya’s incentive for good behavior was the 2011 intervention that overthrew Gaddafi despite his compliance with the agreements. That lesson—that states that renounce weapons of mass destruction can subsequently be overthrown by the West—is precisely what Iran has taken to heart. And that lesson makes today’s negotiations structurally more difficult.

What Washington Needs to Do Now

Insist on public clarification of the terms

Washington must publicly resolve the contradiction regarding inspections before moving forward with other aspects of the agreement. Allowing this contradiction to take root and become normalized—with both sides maintaining divergent narratives as the status quo in negotiations—sets a dangerous precedent for the future. If the United States accepts Iran’s divergence on inspections as an “issue to be resolved later,” it signals that it can live with ambiguity on the most crucial point.

The correct approach is to ask the question publicly and precisely: Does Iran accept or not accept IAEA access to suspected military sites, without prior notice and without preconditions? If the answer is no—and all indications suggest that this is Tehran’s actual response—then the agreement purports to resolve the nuclear issue without addressing its core. Clarifying this now is painful. Discovering the scam after the signing is catastrophic.

Mobilizing Allies as a Lever for Pressure

To secure genuine concessions from Iran on inspections, the U.S. administration must rally its allies—Israel, Europe, and the Gulf allies—around a common position on the minimum acceptable standard for verification. If Israel and Saudi Arabia publicly state that they cannot accept an agreement without unconditional inspections of military sites, the pressure on Tehran will be greatly increased. If Europe makes its participation in the $300 billion reconstruction package contingent on robust verification guarantees, the economic leverage of the agreement will depend on the nuclear integrity of its terms.

This effort is not easy—it requires intensive diplomatic coordination and the political will to prolong the negotiations rather than rush into signing a mediocre agreement. But it is the only path leading to a lasting agreement. A hasty and flawed agreement is worse than a long and demanding negotiation. Patience is sometimes the most essential form of courage in diplomacy.

My conclusion on this matter is uncomfortable but necessary: if, within 60 days, Washington and Tehran cannot agree on precise and unambiguous language regarding inspections of military sites, it is better to acknowledge this honestly and suspend the negotiations rather than sign an ambiguous document and call it an agreement. Ambiguous nuclear agreements are not neutral—they provide diplomatic cover for proliferation while stripping the international community of the tools to respond. Diplomatic courage, at times, means saying no.

What Tehran Is Calculating—and Why This Calculation Is Dangerous

Time-Buying as an Iranian Strategic Objective

I will put forward an analytical hypothesis: the Iranian regime—or a significant portion of it—views the current negotiations not as a path toward a permanent agreement, but as a mechanism for buying time and conserving resources. By entering the 60-day roadmap, Iran gains: a diplomatic atmosphere that reduces pressure for preemptive strikes (by Israel or the U.S.), the prospect of a partial unfreezing of frozen assets that marginally improves its economic situation, and increased international legitimacy that complicates future sanctions coalitions.

If that is the objective, the conflicting accounts regarding the inspections are not a flaw—they are a feature. They allow Iran to participate in negotiations without actually committing to the one issue that matters. This nuclear stalling strategy—practiced by North Korea since 1994—is extraordinarily effective in the short term. In the long term, it produces an undeclared military nuclear state that defies the global nonproliferation order. Iran’s calculation is rational in the short term and catastrophic in the long term for regional stability.

What Iran Would Lose in a Genuinely Binding Agreement

If Iran were to truly accept robust IAEA inspections of its military sites, it would lose its capacity for nuclear “hedging”—that ability to approach the military threshold without ever formally crossing it, thereby maintaining strategic ambiguity between civilian and potential military capabilities. This ambiguity is invaluable in Iran’s regional security calculations: it deters a preemptive strike by Israel (which prefers clear targets), it increases the perceived cost of a U.S. confrontation, and it gives Tehran a nuclear option as a last resort.

Agreeing to genuine inspections means accepting the loss of this strategic ambiguity. This is a huge cost for the regime—far greater than any economic benefit the agreement might offer. And that is why I remain skeptical that Tehran will ever truly accept the level of inspections the United States is demanding. The divergence in narratives during the first 48 hours is not a misunderstanding—it is the revelation of a fundamental incompatibility of objectives. The conflicting narratives from Vance and Tehran do not signal a communication problem—they reveal a problem of intent.

Here is where I stand after this analysis: I do not believe that the divergent accounts regarding the inspections can be resolved within 60 days, because the divergence reflects an incompatibility of actual objectives. Washington wants a verifiable agreement. Tehran wants economic normalization without giving up its nuclear ambiguity. These two objectives are irreconcilable. Unless one of the two fundamentally changes its position—and nothing in the first 48 hours suggests that this is happening.

The IAEA's Credibility in the Face of Conflicting Accounts from Washington and Tehran

The IAEA as a Neutral Arbiter—and Its Institutional Limitations

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the body tasked with resolving the conflicting accounts from Washington and Tehran regarding inspections. But the IAEA itself operates under institutional constraints that limit its ability to fulfill this role with full authority. Its director general is dependent on the consensus of its member states—including China and Russia, which tend to shield Iran from the most restrictive resolutions. Its inspection teams, however professional they may be, can only access facilities that Iran agrees to open. And its findings, even when clearly negative, can be politically sidelined by member states that do not wish to acknowledge their implications.

The history of the IAEA’s nuclear inspections in Iran is a story of partial and selective cooperation. The agency has repeatedly documented evidence of undeclared nuclear activities—notably the discovery of 60% enriched uranium at undeclared facilities. These findings have been systematically downplayed or contested by Tehran, which cites “civilian research activities” or accuses the IAEA of political manipulation in the service of American and Israeli interests. When every finding by an international agency becomes a matter of dispute, verification loses its raison d’être.

The proposal for “enhanced” inspections: what does “enhanced” mean?

The Islamabad memorandum mentions “enhanced inspections”—but this term remains deliberately vague. In nuclear jargon, “enhanced” can mean several things: the implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol, which allows for short-notice inspections at declared facilities; even more intrusive “early detection” measures for underground sites; or simply an increase in the frequency of routine inspections. The difference between these levels is immense—and it is precisely on this issue that Vance’s and Tehran’s accounts diverge the most.

Washington presents the agreement as including inspections that are “more robust than the JCPOA.” Tehran speaks of “enhanced cooperation within the framework of existing obligations”—which essentially means the status quo with improved rhetoric. If this discrepancy is not resolved within the 60 days following finalization, the agreement will end up with two incompatible interpretations of its central provision—and the first confirmed violation will cause this contradiction to erupt in a potentially catastrophic manner. Calculated ambiguity is useful in diplomacy—it is fatal in verification.

The IAEA’s role in this matter reminds me of a soccer referee whose decisions are systematically contested by both teams. No matter how competent and neutral the referee may be, if the teams refuse to recognize his authority, the game cannot be played. This is exactly the situation the IAEA faces with Iran: serious inspectors producing rigorous reports, pitted against a regime that challenges the findings, restricts access, and uses its allies on the Security Council to block any consequences. Truly strengthening inspections requires strengthening the IAEA’s political authority—not just its procedures.

The North Korean Precedent: What Iran Has Learned from Pyongyang

The Strategy of Endless Negotiations as a Tool for Nuclear Development

North Korea offers Iran the most instructive strategic precedent regarding nuclear programs in the face of international pressure. Pyongyang has used two decades of negotiations, partial agreements, and deliberate violations to develop, behind the scenes of diplomacy, an operational nuclear arsenal. The pattern is repetitive: solemn commitments followed by violations, a return to the negotiating table under pressure, new commitments, and new violations. With each cycle, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities advanced—until it was sufficiently advanced to make any denuclearization politically and technically impractical.

Iranian planners have studied this precedent. Nuclear negotiations with Tehran since 2003 bear troubling similarities to the North Korean pattern: diplomatic advances followed by breaches of commitments, escalating demands parallel to the development of capabilities, and the use of diplomacy to buy time while making technical progress. The difference is that Iran, unlike North Korea, has not yet taken the step of declaring a nuclear bomb—which still leaves room for an agreement that halts further progress. But that window is closing with every additional enrichment.

The differences between Iran and North Korea that could make an agreement possible

The analogy with North Korea has significant limitations. Iran, unlike Pyongyang, remains integrated into the global economy—or aspires to be. Economic sanctions have taken a real toll, creating popular pressures that the North Korean regime has never had to manage to the same extent. Iran has an active civil society, an educated middle class, and a diversified economy whose stakeholders have a stake in economic normalization. These factors create internal pressure toward compromise that North Korea, hermetically sealed off, does not experience.

There is also the question of dynastic calculations: Kim Jong-un’s regime considers its survival impossible without nuclear weapons—it is an existential red line. In Iran, the internal debate over the value of a full-scale nuclear program versus the economic benefits of a deal is more nuanced. Factions within the Iranian regime prefer economic pragmatism to nuclear adventurism. This is what the Trump administration gambled on by entering into negotiations—and the Islamabad memorandum suggests that this gamble is not entirely irrational. The difference between Iran and North Korea is that Iran still has something to lose economically—and it knows it.

The North Korean precedent haunts me in this analysis. I have seen how the international community has repeatedly allowed itself to be convinced that negotiations with Pyongyang would yield results—and each time, North Korea has emerged with a more advanced nuclear program. I don’t want to be the analyst who repeats the same errors in judgment. But I also recognize that Iran is not North Korea—its society is different, its relationship with the world is different, and economic levers work differently. Perhaps this time is different. That’s the gamble. It’s always the gamble.

The Impact of the Agreement on Ukraine and the Ongoing War

The Indirect Links Between Iranian Diplomacy and Russian Support for Moscow

There is a direct strategic connection between the Iranian nuclear issue and the war in Ukraine that diplomatic analyses often overlook. Iran has become one of Russia’s main arms suppliers since 2022—particularly the Shahed-136 drones, which have become Moscow’s weapon of terror against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. These drones have killed Ukrainian civilians, destroyed power plants, and spread terror in millions of homes. Every Shahed drone strike is an Iranian contribution to Russian war crimes in Ukraine.

The question that therefore arises with particular urgency is this: Does the Washington–Tehran agreement include an Iranian commitment to stop supplying drones to Russia? The available information on the Islamabad memorandum does not explicitly mention this condition. If Iran can sign a nuclear agreement with the United States while continuing to fuel Putin’s war machine, the agreement would send the disastrous signal that authoritarian regimes’ arms programs and alliances can be compartmentalized at will. Peace with Tehran while it funds the war against Kyiv is a two-tiered peace—and Kyiv would foot the bill for the Iranian-American détente.

What Kyiv Thinks of the Deal—and Why It Matters

Kyiv is watching the Washington–Tehran negotiations with understandable anxiety. If the agreement improves Iran’s economic conditions, it could reduce Tehran’s willingness to sell its drones at low prices to a Russia that is seeking suppliers at any cost. That is the optimistic argument. The pessimistic view is that Iran will continue to supply drones to Russia regardless of its commitments to Washington, using the same covert channels that circumvent current sanctions.

For Kyiv, the top priority remains Western military support—weapons, ammunition, and air defenses—which has no direct connection to the status of the Iran-U.S. agreement. But if the agreement were to effectively reduce the flow of Shahed drones to Russia, that would be a concrete and welcome benefit. Any diplomacy that reduces Putin’s ability to kill Ukrainians is good diplomacy—even if it does not align with the diplomatic principles we would have preferred to apply.

The connection between the Iran-U.S. agreement and the war in Ukraine is the one that matters most to me. Ukrainians are dying from Iranian drones every week. If the Washington agreement includes a serious commitment to halt this flow of weapons, then it has concrete value that goes beyond nuclear nonproliferation—it saves Ukrainian lives. If that is not the case, then the agreement is built on a moral compartmentalization that I find difficult to defend. Diplomacy does not take place in the ethical vacuum of each issue considered in isolation.

The Role of Russia and China in the Agreement: Interested Observers

Moscow Balances Satisfaction and Concern Over a Normalized Iran

Russia is observing the Washington–Tehran negotiations with calculated strategic ambivalence. On the one hand, an Iran reintegrated into the international financial system is less dependent on Russia—which reduces Moscow’s leverage over Tehran. A prosperous, normalized Iran is one that has less need for Russia as a substitute market, as an alternative technology partner, and as a source of diplomatic support in multilateral organizations. Iranian-American normalization is therefore, paradoxically, a slight strategic loss for Putin.

On the other hand, an Iran with increased economic resources maintains its military capabilities and support for proxies—which remains useful to Russia’s strategy of regional destabilization. And an Iran-U.S. agreement that absorbs Washington’s attention and diplomatic resources for months is an opportunity for Moscow to consolidate its positions in Ukraine with less international scrutiny. Putin excels at capitalizing on the West’s diplomatic distractions—and a complex nuclear negotiation is an excellent one.

China: Trade First, Geopolitics Second

China has a clear interest in a Washington–Tehran agreement: it has been the main buyer of Iranian oil since the U.S. sanctions were imposed, paying preferential prices in exchange for implicitly defying the Western sanctions regime. A normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations could reduce this economic advantage for China—Iran would no longer need to sell its oil at a discount to Beijing if international markets were reopened to it.

But Beijing also calculates that lifting sanctions on Iran would create new investment opportunities in Iranian infrastructure—exactly the type of projects the “Belt and Road” initiative seeks to develop. The 25-year Sino-Iranian strategic agreement signed in 2021, which provided for massive Chinese investments in exchange for preferential Iranian oil, could be revisited in the context of a normalized Iran. For Beijing, Iran is first and foremost a market and a route to resources—diplomacy is always in the service of trade.

The way Russia and China view the Iran-U.S. agreement reveals something important about their worldview: neither has a fundamental interest in Middle Eastern stability—they have an interest in controlled instability that benefits them economically and strategically. A normalized Iran that reduces their respective leverage bothers them somewhat. But they also calculate the benefits of an America distracted by complex negotiations in the Middle East while they consolidate their positions elsewhere. This is the constant game of revisionist powers: never to confront head-on, but always to seek to profit from disorder.

The implications for long-term global nuclear safety

What the Agreement Says—or Doesn’t Say—About Nonproliferation

The Washington–Tehran agreement, whatever its final form, sends a message to the world about the value of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If the agreement imposes real and verifiable constraints, it reinforces the idea that the NPT can be enforced with significant consequences for those who violate it. If, on the other hand, it grants Iran major concessions without robust, verifiable reciprocity, it sends the opposite signal: that the clandestine development of a nuclear program ultimately results in the lifting of sanctions and the implicit recognition of special status.

This signal is being closely watched by countries such as Saudi Arabia, which has stated its intention to develop its own nuclear capability if Iran crosses the threshold to a nuclear bomb. It is also being watched by Japan and South Korea, which view proliferation in Northeast Asia as an existential threat. And by dozens of countries that are weighing whether a nuclear program remains the best guarantee of security in the face of revisionist regimes. Nonproliferation is not an abstract treaty—it is a norm whose value for everyone changes with every agreement or violation.

Long-term scenarios depending on the outcome of the 60 days

In the best-case scenario, the 60 days result in an agreement with robust verification mechanisms, a phased lifting of sanctions tied to measurable milestones, and a credible Iranian commitment not to cross the threshold into military nuclear capabilities. This scenario strengthens the nonproliferation regime, sets a positive example for other nuclear negotiations, and reduces the risk of a regional war triggered by fears of a nuclear Iran.

In the worst-case scenario, negotiations drag on beyond the 60 days, key issues remain unresolved, and Iran continues to enrich uranium while diplomats debate the wording. In this case, the Islamabad Memorandum will have primarily served to buy Tehran time and allow Washington to claim a diplomatic success without any real substance. The history of the Iranian nuclear negotiations since 2003 unfortunately offers numerous examples of this second scenario. Vigilance over the details is the only thing that distinguishes a historic agreement from an elaborate deception.

I conclude this analysis with a firm conviction: the true test of this agreement will not lie in the press releases issued by both parties on the day of the signing. It will lie in the IAEA’s reports six months later, in Iran’s regional behavior eighteen months later, and in Tehran’s response to the first real tension with Washington in two years. If, at these three milestones, Iran honors its commitments, then Islamabad will have marked a historic turning point. Otherwise, it will have been just another episode in the long history of Iranian nuclear agreements that have failed to deliver on their promises.

Conclusion: Call the scam by name to foil it

The Uncomfortable Truth That Must Be Told

The contradiction between Vance’s and Tehran’s accounts of the nuclear inspections is not a technical issue of translation or diplomatic misunderstandings. It reveals a fundamental problem: either one of the parties is lying about what was agreed upon, or both parties deliberately signed an ambiguous text that allows each to present itself as the winner at home. In either case, the agreement is not what it claims to be. And an agreement that is not what it claims to be on the most crucial issue—nuclear verification—is not a nonproliferation agreement. It is a diplomatic fiction with real security implications.

Calling out this potential scam is not pessimism—it is a necessary condition of realism to force negotiators on both sides to produce an honest and precise text on the sticking point. Pressure from an informed public, demanding allies, and journalists who ask the right questions is sometimes the only thing that prevents diplomats from signing compromises that solve nothing. The role of the commentator is not to rubber-stamp the agreements that are reached—it is to ask: what does this really say?

What the Next Steps Must Show

In the coming weeks, resolving the contradiction over inspections will be the litmus test for the roadmap. If both sides publicly clarify their positions and arrive at a precise and unambiguous text, it’s a sign that the 60 days can produce something tangible. If the disagreement persists—if it is treated as a “issue to be resolved” while the agreement moves forward on other aspects—it’s a sign that the scam is underway. The entire world has a stake in ensuring that this distinction is made clearly, quickly, and honestly. The truth about Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program deserves better than contradictory narratives disguised as a historic agreement.

Identifying the potential scam without closing the door on real hope—that is the difficult balance this column seeks to strike. I cannot afford the pure cynicism that rejects any agreement out of hand, because the alternative—a nuclear Iran in a few years—is even more dangerous. And I cannot afford the naivety that accepts the statements of both sides without demanding the verification mechanisms that make them credible. Between these two pitfalls lies a narrow space of vigilant pragmatism. That is where serious diplomacy must operate.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist