COMMENTARY: The EU’s sanctions wall will hold until 2027: patience versus Putin’s chaos

Maxime Marquette

2026-06-29 14:15:56

Increasingly Targeted Sanctions

The 21st round of European sanctions against Russia stands out from previous ones due to its increasing precision. After twenty rounds, the most obvious targets have already been identified. The focus is now on the gaps: entities serving as fronts to circumvent existing sanctions, intermediaries in third countries, and innovative financial mechanisms developed to access international payment systems despite SWIFT exclusions.

This intricate legal and financial work is less spectacular than the high-profile announcements of the initial packages, but it may be more effective in the long run. Each new package tightens the net a little more, making circumvention more costly and riskier for economic actors who might be tempted to help Russia access Western markets and technologies. Compliance is never perfect, but it improves with each iteration.

Expansion into Trade, Banking, Energy, and Cryptocurrency

EU sanctions now cover an extraordinarily broad spectrum of the Russian economy. In the trade sector, hundreds of products and technologies are subject to strict export restrictions. In the banking sector, several major Russian banks have been cut off from the international financial system. In the energy sector, Russian oil is subject to a price cap and transport restrictions. In the cryptocurrency sector, tracking and freezing mechanisms have been put in place to prevent Russia from using digital assets to circumvent financial sanctions.

The inclusion of cryptocurrencies within the scope of the sanctions is particularly significant. Russia had explored digital assets as an alternative to traditional financial systems from which it is partially excluded. The EU, in collaboration with the United States and the United Kingdom, has gradually closed this loophole. This is an example of the West’s ability to adapt its regulatory arsenal faster than its adversaries can innovate to evade it.

Crypto sanctions are a good example of something I want to emphasize: the West is learning. Slowly, at times, but it is learning. Every Russian attempt to circumvent sanctions becomes a lesson, and every lesson becomes a new rule. It’s less glamorous than bombing an oil refinery, but it’s also a form of warfare—financial warfare, waged with patience and precision.

The Baltic States' Oil Embargo: Pushing the EU Forward

The Baltic States: Driving a Greater Ambition

The Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—have been urging the European Union for months to accelerate and expand the oil embargo against Russia. These three countries have a history that makes them averse to any half-measures when dealing with Moscow: they have experienced Soviet occupation, they live on the border with a Russia that regularly tests their defenses, and they know better than anyone what an “aggressive Russian neighbor” means in practice.

Their demands are not merely symbolic. When the sanctions were renewed on June 19, 2026, the EU extended the existing sanctions for a full year rather than the usual six months. This is a sign of commitment and seriousness. But the Baltic states want more: a total and permanent embargo on Russian oil, including by sea, and an acceleration of the transition to renewable energy to permanently end Europe’s dependence on Russian hydrocarbons.

European Divisions Over Pace and Ambition

The Baltic states’ ambitions are meeting resistance from certain EU countries that are more energy-dependent or more concerned about the economic impact of sanctions on their own economies. Hungary remains the most widely publicized case of internal resistance, but it is not alone in tempering certain ambitions. As of late June 2026, two EU countries were still opposed to a travel ban on Russian nationals, revealing deep differences over the philosophy behind the sanctions.

These divisions are not catastrophic for the coherence of the sanctions regime: the requirement for unanimous voting on sanctions has been partially circumvented through creative legal arrangements, and consensus exists on the essentials. But they reveal the limits of a policy that must balance twenty-seven different national interests while maintaining coordinated pressure on a single, centralized adversary. This is structurally more difficult for the EU than for its adversaries.

Orbán’s Hungary is a thorn in the EU’s side when it comes to sanctions; this is well known. But I want to avoid reducing the entire complexity of the European situation to Orbán. There are legitimate debates about the pace, the economic impact on the most vulnerable European countries, and the capacity for energy substitution. These debates are not a betrayal; they are the reality of a union of twenty-seven democracies with partially divergent interests.

Russia's Deficit and the 80 Billion: What It Really Means

Breaking Down the Russian Budget Figures

Russia’s budget deficit of over $80 billion is a significant figure, but it must be put into context to be understood. Russia has a National Wealth Fund that allows it to absorb deficits for a limited time. This fund, built up from oil surpluses during boom years, has already been partially used to finance the war. Its gradual decline is real and well-documented.

What is more revealing than the raw deficit figure is its trajectory. Russia is spending more and more on the war—the additional 4 to 5 trillion rubles announced for 2026 represent a significant acceleration—while seeing its revenues squeezed by sanctions on oil exports, the plummeting value of the ruble, and restrictions on access to international financial markets. This budgetary squeeze is gradually tightening.

Inflation, Interest Rates, and Everyday Hardship

Behind the big macroeconomic numbers lies the daily reality of ordinary Russians. Inflation in Russia remains high. Interest rates hover around 15% on Russian government bonds, which means that Russian companies are borrowing at even higher rates. Credit is tightening. Productive investment is plummeting as military spending takes precedence. Russian regions, as documented by the Ukrainian government in Donetsk, are accumulating debt at alarming levels.

This difficult economic reality has not yet sparked a popular uprising in Russia—Putin’s repressive regime ensures that. But it is creating underlying social tensions that the Kremlin must manage. The spread of information about Russia’s economic reality, despite censorship, is a strategic issue: the more Russians understand the true cost of this war, the more passive support for the regime may erode over time.

I do not take pleasure in the suffering of ordinary Russians. I am glad that the sanctions are working—imperfectly, slowly, but they are working. If they make continuing the war costly enough that voices within the Russian system begin to question whether it is worth it, then they will have achieved their primary objective. Economic pressure as a lever for political change: that is the theory. The numbers are starting to prove him right.

The Structural Exhaustion of the Russian Economy: The Kiel Institute Report

What “structural exhaustion” means

The Kiel Institute for the World Economy is one of the most rigorous academic institutions tracking Russia’s war economy. Its diagnosis of “structural exhaustion”—distinct from an immediate collapse—describes an economy that is sacrificing its future capabilities to sustain its current war effort. This is an important distinction that simplistic analyses (“sanctions are working / sanctions aren’t working”) fail to capture.

In concrete terms, structural exhaustion manifests itself in: productive investment in free fall, with resources diverted to military spending; a skilled workforce depleted by military casualties and the emigration of top talent fleeing mobilization and repression; an industrial base that is aging due to a lack of modernization; and skyrocketing regional debt resulting from the transfer of war costs to regional budgets. These trends cannot be reversed quickly, even after hostilities have ended.

A Comparison with the Soviet Economy of the Late 1980s

Several economists compare the current situation to the Soviet economy of 1985–1991: an economy that functions on the surface, propped up by political repression and oil revenues, but which is eroding from within. The comparison has its limitations—the Russia of 2026 differs from the USSR of 1985 in many respects—but it captures something real about the long-term dynamics.

What precipitated the Soviet collapse was not a sudden crisis but the accumulation of structural tensions that reform could no longer contain. Putin’s Russia resists the comparison because it has learned certain lessons: it has built up foreign exchange reserves and has partially diversified its economy. But the war effort of 2022–2026 is depleting these reserves at a rate few had anticipated. The Kiel Institute foresees a trajectory that, if the war drags on, will lead to severe fiscal constraints in the next two to three years.

I will not predict Russia’s collapse. The prophets of Russia’s imminent collapse have been proven wrong too often for me to recklessly join their ranks. But structural exhaustion, an aging industrial base, brain drain, and explosive regional debt—all of this is real, documented, and measurable. This isn’t optimism; it’s analysis.

Russian government bonds are plummeting: a market that tells the truth

Market Signals the Kremlin Cannot Censor

The bond market is one of the few economic indicators that the Kremlin cannot fully control. When yields on Russian government bonds reach nearly 15%, it means that investors—even Russian investors who have no choice but to operate in this market—are factoring a high level of risk into their valuations. A 15% bond yield is the market’s way of saying, “I’m not sure you’ll be able to repay me under current conditions.”

The plunge in Russian government bonds follows the Kremlin’s announcement of plans to massively increase war spending in 2026. The markets quickly did the math: more spending means an even wider deficit and even greater uncertainty about Russia’s fiscal trajectory. This market reaction has been documented by the independent Russian financial press, notably The Moscow Times, which operates from abroad and continues to provide rigorous coverage of the Russian economy despite the risks.

Access to International Financial Markets: A Door That Remains Closed

Russia can no longer access international financial markets to refinance its debt or raise fresh capital. Its exclusion from SWIFT, sanctions on foreign currency transactions, and the freeze on the Russian central bank’s assets abroad—all of this means that Moscow must finance its war and its economy solely from domestic resources. This constraint is fundamental and underestimated in many analyses.

In the short term, Russia can absorb this constraint thanks to its accumulated reserves and revenues from hydrocarbon exports to Asia. In the medium term, if the war drags on and Ukrainian strikes continue to reduce its refining and export capacity, the lack of access to external capital will become an increasingly tight constraint. This is one of the long-term effects of the sanctions that short-sighted analysts overlook.

I find it intellectually honest to cite the Kiel Institute and The Economist to point out that the Russian economy will not collapse overnight. This is not defeatism; it is accuracy. But accuracy does not mean inaction. What these institutions are also saying is that sanctions and Ukrainian strikes are creating real, cumulative pressure. Keep going. Intensify the effort. But be patient.

The 21st Package and the Battle Over the Bypass

Russia and Its Sanctions-Circumvention Networks

Since 2022, Russia has developed sophisticated networks to circumvent sanctions. Shell companies in third countries purchase regulated goods to re-export them to Russia. Banks in non-sanctioned jurisdictions act as financial intermediaries. Fleets of “ghost” oil tankers—old vessels often lacking insurance that meets international standards—transport Russian oil to Asian buyers outside the price-cap mechanisms.

The EU and its allies have gradually tightened the noose around these networks. Secondary sanctions—which threaten third-country entities facilitating circumvention—have been a particularly effective tool for disciplining certain intermediaries who risk losing access to the U.S. or European markets. The results are mixed but tangible: some circumvention routes have closed or have become significantly more expensive than before.

The Challenge of the Ghost Fleet and Maritime Oil

The Russian ghost fleet—hundreds of old oil tankers operating without compliant international insurance—has become one of the most complex challenges to the effectiveness of oil sanctions. These vessels transport Russian oil to Asia, primarily to China and India, under opaque conditions that make traceability difficult. The environmental and maritime safety risks posed by this fleet are real and well-documented.

Responses to this challenge combine several approaches: denying port access to non-compliant vessels, pressuring insurance and flag states to enforce standards, and imposing targeted sanctions on identified owners and operators. These measures cannot completely eliminate the ghost fleet, but they increase its operating costs and create legal and financial risks that deter those most exposed to Western regulations.

The ghost fleet is Putin using rusty, uninsured ships to circumvent sanctions by selling oil at rock-bottom prices to China. If it were to sink in the Mediterranean or the Bosphorus, it would be an environmental disaster. This is a risk that the West should document and denounce even more forcefully—not only for the sake of sanctions, but also for environmental accountability.

The EU, Russia, and the Long Term: An Economic War of Attrition

Patience as a Strategy

The European Union’s strategy toward Russia is, fundamentally, a strategy of patience. It is banking on the cumulative costs of sanctions, combined with military support for Ukraine, gradually eroding Russia’s ability to sustain its war effort, to the point where a settlement becomes preferable to continuing the conflict for Moscow. It is a strategy of economic attrition that takes time—perhaps years—to produce decisive results.

This patience is being tested politically. Elections in various European countries have brought to power political forces that are more skeptical of sanctions or of support for Ukraine. The European coalition in favor of sanctions is solid but not set in stone. The extension of the sanctions regime through 2027 is good news, but this will not be the last opportunity to maintain it or let it erode.

What Russia Thinks of the Sanctions

The Kremlin officially promotes a narrative that the sanctions are “an act of Western economic aggression that has backfired on the West”—citing the energy shocks of 2022–2023 and European inflation as evidence. This narrative is partially true: Europe has paid a real price to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, and that price has fueled painful inflation. But that price has been absorbed, dependence has been reduced, and the Russian economy is paying the far heavier cumulative consequences in the long term.

What the Kremlin cannot publicly admit is the real impact of the sanctions on Russia’s military industrial capabilities—the inability to access certain microprocessors, certain precision equipment, and certain high-tech weapons components. These shortcomings are evident on the battlefield: captured Russian equipment containing consumer electronics components salvaged from household appliances, for lack of anything better. This is not the image of a thriving arms industry.

When Russian tanks contain chips taken from dishwashers, it’s not an urban legend—it’s documented military intelligence. And it’s the direct result of sanctions on electronic components. The impact may be less visible than a refinery in flames, but it’s just as real—and likely more lasting.

Russian Regions Drowning in Debt: The Backwater of Disaster

The Geography of Russian Debt

Russian regions are bearing a disproportionate burden of the war’s costs. The federal government in Moscow is shifting financial obligations to the regions—including support for soldiers’ families, social assistance related to mobilization, and investments in military infrastructure—while simultaneously reducing federal transfers to these regions to directly fund the war effort. This double-edged mechanism is causing regional debt to skyrocket.

The regions of “deep Russia”—those that supply the most soldiers to the front because economic alternatives there are the most limited—find themselves in a vicious cycle: their young men are dying in the war, families receive compensation that the regions struggle to fund, and local economies are being depleted. This picture is documented by Ukrainian sources and independent Russian media in exile, and it reveals the true human and economic cost of the war for the Russians themselves.

Siberia, the Urals, and Minority Peoples: The Hidden Human Cost

The available statistics—despite the Russian regime’s lack of transparency regarding military casualties—suggest that non-Russian peoples in Russia—Buryats, Yakuts, Tuva, Dagestanis, and residents of the Urals and Siberia—are overrepresented among soldiers killed in action. This is no coincidence: these are economically less integrated populations, with fewer resources to buy their way out of military service and fewer connections in the corridors of power that would allow them to be stationed far from the front lines.

This phenomenon creates underlying ethnic tensions that the Kremlin monitors with anxiety. Some regions have seen protests against mobilization, which were quickly suppressed. Stories of families left in the dark about the deaths of their loved ones, of bodies not returned, of compensation not paid—all of this builds up a reservoir of resentment that propaganda alone cannot contain indefinitely.

There is a tragic irony in the fact that the peoples Russia has historically colonized—the Buryats, the Tuva, and the peoples of the Caucasus—are the ones dying on the front lines for Moscow’s imperial ambitions. Putin’s Russia is still an empire, even if it rejects that term. And empires, as always, pay for their conquests with the blood of their outlying regions.

The one-year extension of sanctions: a strategic signal

Six Months vs. One Year: Why It Matters

Technically, the renewal of EU sanctions against Russia takes place every six months, which requires a unanimous vote. The June 19, 2026, decision to extend the sanctions for a full year rather than six months marks a significant change in practice. It reduces the frequency of high-stakes votes—occasions when a blocking minority could demand concessions in exchange for its support—and sends a signal of stability and durability to Russia, Ukraine, and the markets.

This change was driven by the most determined states within the EU—the Baltic states, Poland, and the Scandinavian countries—which convinced a majority that the predictability of the sanctions framework was in itself a tool for exerting pressure: if Russia knows it faces at least a year of guaranteed sanctions, its strategic calculations must factor this in differently than if it could hope for a crack in the sanctions regime within the next six months.

The two countries opposing the entry ban on Russians

One of the points of contention that emerged in late June 2026 is the opposition of two EU member states to a travel ban on Russian nationals. This opposition reveals differing views on sanctions policy within the Union: some countries see it as a tool to pressure the Russian regime; others fear alienating Russians who do not support the war or who are fleeing repression. Both positions have their own logic.

The middle ground that seems to be prevailing is that of targeted measures: strict restrictions on officials and those close to the regime, but maintaining entry channels for political refugees, opposition figures, journalists, and dissidents. This pragmatism is reasonable, even if it is more complex to implement than a blanket ban and creates opportunities for potential abuse.

A blanket entry ban on all Russians poses a problem of principle for me. There are hundreds of thousands of Russians who have fled Putin’s regime, who oppose the war, and who risk their freedom or their lives by speaking out. Treating them as enemies would be a moral and strategic mistake. Putin would love for the West to make this mistake: it would allow him to claim that the West hates Russia, not just his regime.

The Ukrainian Economy Under Attack: The Less-Discussed Side of the Story

The Economic Cost of the War to Ukraine

In the discussion about sanctions and the Russian economy, there is less talk about what the war is costing Ukraine itself. The destruction of infrastructure is colossal: power plants, distribution networks, roads, bridges, homes, and factories. Ukraine’s GDP has been severely affected since 2022. Millions of people have fled the country. The reconstruction effort will be one of the largest in modern European history.

This reality makes it all the more justified to maintain the sanctions against Russia: if Ukraine is to rebuild, Russia—the aggressor—must pay. Russian assets frozen abroad—estimated at over $300 billion in central bank reserves alone—represent a potential source of funding for Ukraine’s reconstruction. This mechanism, gradually implemented by the G7, is perhaps one of the most significant economic decisions in the West’s entire handling of the conflict.

Western Aid to Ukraine: Investment or Charity?

It is important to reframe Western aid to Ukraine not as charity or unilateral generosity, but as a strategic investment. Every euro and every dollar spent to help Ukraine resist is money that won’t have to be spent defending NATO if Russia were to win and once again pose a threat along other borders. The cost of a Ukrainian defeat—in terms of Europe’s remilitarization, regional instability, and setting a precedent for other potential aggressors—would be infinitely higher than the cost of current support.

Western leaders should hammer home this economic and strategic argument more forcefully to convince their populations that aid to Ukraine is not “wasted” money but an investment in Europe’s collective security. This is a message that Euroskeptic and isolationist parties seek to challenge. The clarity of the West’s political response on this point is a major electoral and strategic issue.

When a politician says that aid to Ukraine is too costly for our taxpayers, I want to ask them: How much does a war in Europe cost? How much do millions of additional refugees cost? How much will it cost to rebuild the defense spending that the West has slashed over the past thirty years because “perpetual peace” was supposedly bought and paid for? Aid to Ukraine is the best security insurance Europe has ever purchased.

The Political Sustainability of the Sanctions Wall: Risks and Opportunities

The European Elections and the Temptation of Accommodating Realism

The main threat to maintaining the sanctions regime is not external—it is not Russia that will break the sanctions through economic means—but internal. These are the internal political dynamics within EU member states, the rise of nationalist, Euroskeptic parties, and electoral pressures on governments weakened by inflation and economic stagnation. These dynamics exist and cannot be ignored.

The response to these political risks is not technical but political: pro-sanctions governments must better explain why these measures are in their countries’ national interest, not just in Ukraine’s interest. Communication about the actual effects of the sanctions—defective Russian military components, difficulties in resupplying the Russian army, and the Russian budget deficit—must be more proactive and concrete.

The Opportunities of European Unity

Paradoxically, Russia’s aggression has produced a result that Putin did not anticipate: it has strengthened the European Union. Countries such as Finland and Sweden have joined NATO. The European defense budget has skyrocketed. A common strategic culture is developing within the EU, which increasingly recognizes itself as a full-fledged geopolitical actor, not just a free-trade zone.

This transformation is historic. Before 2022, talk of European strategic autonomy was considered by many to be wishful thinking. Today, it is a necessity that is in the process of being realized. The wall of sanctions is a key component of this transformation: it demonstrates the EU’s ability to use its economic clout as an instrument of geopolitical power. This is a capability that will serve well beyond the war in Ukraine.

The European Union is often mocked for its slow decision-making, its unsatisfactory compromises, and its inability to speak with one voice. These criticisms are often deserved. But on sanctions against Russia, the EU has performed better than anyone could have hoped. Twenty-one packages. A one-year extension. A wall that holds. Sometimes, the Brussels bureaucracy shows its teeth.

Divergent Allies: When European Solidarity Wavers

The Hungarian Case: A Member State Sabotaging from Within

Viktor Orbán’s Hungary represents the best-documented case of systematic obstruction within the European sanctions mechanism. Budapest has regularly delayed, weakened, or made its approval of sanctions packages contingent on concessions on other issues—European funds, migration policy, and judicial independence. This bargaining tactic is legal within the European institutional framework, but it erodes the effectiveness of sanctions by creating delays and exemptions that benefit Moscow. In June 2026, extending the sanctions through 2027 once again required arduous negotiations with Budapest.

The situation in Hungary reveals a structural vulnerability in European foreign policy: the principle of unanimity in the EU Council on foreign policy issues allows a single member state to block or water down essential collective decisions. This mechanism, designed to protect the national sovereignty of small states, can be exploited by governments that share ideological affinities with the adversary Europe is seeking to sanction. Reforming this mechanism—moving toward qualified majority voting on certain sanctions issues—is an urgent internal European debate that the war in Ukraine has made impossible to avoid.

The Issue of Unanimity: An Unavoidable Internal Reform

Beyond the Hungarian case, the issue of sanctions governance reveals a deeper problem in the EU’s institutional architecture. The unanimity required for foreign policy decisions makes sense in a world of absolute sovereignties—it ensures that no one can be dragged into a policy contrary to their vital interests. But in the context of a war of direct aggression waged by Russia against a country seeking EU membership, maintaining a rule that grants each member state a veto would amount to allowing the government most accommodating toward Moscow to dictate policy for the entire bloc.

Several member states—notably the Baltic states, Poland, Sweden, and Finland—have pushed for the EU to explore mechanisms allowing a qualified majority to adopt sanctions even in the absence of unanimity in cases of clear aggression. These proposals face resistance from states that value the principle of unanimity as the ultimate guarantee of their sovereignty. Finding the right balance between collective effectiveness and respect for national sovereignty is one of the most complex institutional challenges Europe must resolve to remain a credible geopolitical actor.

Orbán’s Hungary is Putin’s Trojan horse in the European Union—and everyone knows it. The real question is not to point the finger at Budapest, but to ask why the EU has not yet created institutional mechanisms to prevent a single state from paralyzing the collective response to a war of aggression. This shortcoming is no accident—it is the result of decades of turning a blind eye to the vulnerability created by governments that are ideologically aligned with our adversaries.

Lessons for Future Sanctions: What 2026 Teaches Us

Speed as a Strategic Factor

A key lesson from the experience of sanctions against Russia since 2022 is the importance of speed of implementation. The initial response following the invasion on February 24, 2022, was remarkably swift by typically cautious European standards—the first package of sanctions was adopted within hours, not weeks. But subsequent packages took increasingly longer to negotiate, and certain sectors—notably Russian liquefied natural gas—took years to come under the scope of the restrictions, giving Moscow time to redirect its exports.

For future sanctions—against Russia or other potential actors—this lesson in speed is fundamental. Modern economies adapt. Every month of delay allows the targeted regime to find workarounds, create alternative structures, and redirect its trade flows to less cooperative countries. China, India, and the Gulf states have all absorbed Russian trade flows that should have been halted sooner. The next time sanctions are necessary—and there will be a next time—Europe should have faster activation mechanisms in place, ones that are pre-negotiated rather than cobbled together in a rush.

Political sustainability: maintaining pressure as public opinion wanes

The most difficult long-term challenge is not economic—it is political. Maintaining sanctions over several years requires public conviction that the costs borne by European economies are worth it. In 2022–2023, the moral mobilization around the Russian aggression provided that conviction. By 2026, after four years of war, fatigue is setting in in some countries. Pro-Russian or anti-sanctions parties are gaining ground in several European elections. The temptation is strong for some governments to seek an honorable exit toward economic normalization with Moscow.

Resisting this temptation requires constant political effort—tirelessly reminding the public why the sanctions exist, what their actual effects are on the Russian economy, and what the strategic cost of lifting them prematurely would be. European leaders who have grasped this reality—Ursula von der Leyen, the presidents of the Baltic states, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk—repeat this message consistently and clearly. Those who remain silent or ambiguous on this issue unwittingly contribute to the erosion of the consensus that Russia needs to survive its economic isolation politically.

The sustainability of sanctions is as much a matter of political will as it is of economics. The Russian economy has shown greater resilience than forecast for 2022. But this resilience comes at a cost: forced militarization, regional debt, capital flight and brain drain, and growing dependence on China, which is extracting increasingly favorable terms in exchange for its support. Putin is holding on. But he is holding on with increasing difficulty. And that is precisely why we must not let our guard down.

Conclusion: The EU's patience is the only real response to the chaos in Russia

What Two Years of Patience Have Achieved

Two years after the first major waves of sanctions hit Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, the outcome is complex but encouraging: Russia has not collapsed, but it is structurally weakened. Its deficit exceeds $80 billion. Its bonds are plummeting, yielding 15%. Its refineries are being struck by Ukrainian drones, and it cannot repair them fast enough. Its regions are going into debt to finance a war that their populations are supporting less and less openly.

Faced with Putin’s chaos—a deliberate, systematic, criminal war of aggression—the European Union has chosen a response of organized patience: consistent, renewed, and strengthened sanctions, accompanied by unwavering military and financial support for Ukraine. This patience is not passivity. It is the most demanding form of political action: holding firm over the long term when the temptation to give in is strong.

The 2027 Gamble: Hold On Longer to Win in the End

By extending its sanctions regime through 2027, the EU is betting that the war will be over by then or that conditions will have changed sufficiently to reopen discussions on the terms of the sanctions regime. It is a reasonable bet. It is not a guaranteed bet. Its success depends on the will of Ukraine—and that will is there—of its allies—and they are there—and on the ability of European democracies to resist internal and external pressures to abandon this strategy before it bears fruit.

What I do know is that Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian people have been holding out for more than two years under conditions that many Western leaders would not have endured. The least Europe can do is maintain its sanctions wall for as long as Ukraine holds its trenches. That’s not asking for much.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist