EDITORIAL: The Strait of Hormuz Reopens: Why the West Must Not Let Its Guard Down

What Tehran Accepts and What It Rejects

The issue of nuclear inspections is the Gordian knot of any negotiations with Iran. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demands regular, unannounced access to all Iranian nuclear facilities—including military sites where nuclear activities have been suspected. Tehran has systematically restricted such access, expelled inspectors, and delayed visits until all traces of prohibited activities could be erased.

In the current talks reported by Al Jazeera and the Washington Times in June 2026, Iran is proposing inspections “under a mutually agreed framework”—a phrasing that U.S. negotiators and the IAEA interpret as a mechanism for Iran to control its own verification process. The United States demands unannounced inspections covering all sites, including military facilities. Tehran refuses. This is where the 60-day deadline may not be enough.

Enrichment Level: The Nuclear Red Line

Iran has enriched uranium to 60%—well above the 3.67% authorized by the 2015 agreement (JCPOA), and close to the 90% threshold required to manufacture a nuclear weapon. According to some analysts, Iran already has the know-how and perhaps enough materials to assemble a weapon within a few weeks if the political decision were made. This narrow “breakout window” makes any negotiations extremely urgent—and concessions dangerous.

An agreement that would allow Iran to maintain its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium while benefiting from the lifting of sanctions would be an agreement that rewards transgression. The international community—and especially Israel, which is monitoring this issue with existential anxiety—cannot accept this outcome. The parameters for an acceptable agreement are narrow. The parameters Iran is willing to accept seem just as narrow, but in the opposite direction.

An Iran with 60% enrichment that negotiates a pause is not an Iran that is disarming. It is an Iran taking a strategic pause. The difference is fundamental, and it concerns me more than any optimistic statement from the mediators.

What the Memorandum Promises

The document, dubbed the “Islamabad MoU,” as reported by Ground News on June 23, 2026, comprises 14 points covering a wide range of areas: the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz as a free passage, the lifting of the blockade, a $300 billion reconstruction program for Iran, and mediation mechanisms involving Pakistan and Qatar. It is an ambitious document—perhaps too ambitious. Its implementation depends on political will on both sides, which has not yet been demonstrated on key issues.

The $300 billion reconstruction program is a promise that requires the commitment of international private investors. These investors will not go to Iran until the main sanctions are lifted. These sanctions will not be lifted until the nuclear program is verifiably brought under control. And that program will not be brought under control as long as inspections remain a point of contention. The circular logic of these negotiations is a warning sign.

The Role of Qatar and Pakistan: Fragile Mediators

Qatar has served as a mediator in numerous regional conflicts—between Hamas and Israel, between the United States and Iran, and in crises in the Sahel. Its relationship with Tehran is functional but not without tensions. Pakistan, for its part, shares a long border with Iran and has direct economic interests in normalizing the situation. Both mediators enjoy a certain degree of legitimacy in the region, but their ability to exert pressure on Iran is limited.

Mediators cannot substitute for Iran’s willingness to make real concessions on the nuclear issue. If Tehran uses the 60 days to buy time—to enrich more uranium, consolidate its regional positions through Hezbollah and the Houthis, and wait to see how the U.S. midterm elections unfold—then the mediation will have served Iranian interests without producing a lasting agreement.

I respect Qatar and Pakistan for their mediation efforts. But a mediator is only as strong as the parties’ willingness to reach a genuine agreement. And I do not yet clearly see that willingness on the Iranian side.

The Temptation of a Trump-Style Grand Bargain

Donald Trump has a particular fondness for grand, spectacular deals—the kind that make headlines, redefine relationships, and allow him to claim a diplomatic victory that his predecessors failed to achieve. His withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 during his first term, his policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran, and now this resumption of negotiations in 2026 all point to an approach rooted in transactional intensity rather than strategic coherence.

The risk of an overly accommodating agreement is real. If Trump sees an opportunity to present a “historic deal” with Iran ahead of a major U.S. political deadline, the temptation to make concessions on inspections or on the permitted level of enrichment could override technical rigor. This is precisely what European partners and Israel fear most.

What the West Must Demand

The West’s position in these negotiations must be based on non-negotiable demands: unannounced inspections of all sites, reduction of enriched uranium stockpiles to near-zero levels, dismantling of advanced IR-6 and IR-8 generation centrifuges, and verification mechanisms that are triggered automatically—without the possibility of an Iranian veto. These conditions are not unreasonable maximalist demands. They are the minimum conditions for an agreement to have any real value.

If these conditions are not met, an agreement would be worse than no agreement at all: it would create the illusion of a resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue, allow for the lifting of sanctions, and give Tehran the resources to continue its program. This scenario has already played out in part with the 2015 JCPOA. The West must not repeat it.

Trump wants a deal. Iran wants sanctions lifted. And somewhere between these two desires, Iran’s nuclear program continues to expand. That is the reality of the ongoing negotiations. Vigilance is essential.

The Russian Lesson, Applied to the Iranian Case

In 2022, Europe learned the hard way the cost of energy dependence on a hostile state. Dependence on Russian gas forced entire nations to make impossible choices—supporting Ukraine while seeking to maintain their energy supplies. The lesson was learned, painfully, and Europe has massively accelerated its energy diversification.

Security in the Strait of Hormuz is the next lesson. If a crisis in the Persian Gulf—whether triggered by Iran, an escalation between Iran and Israel, or an incident involving the Houthis—were to disrupt oil transit, Europe would once again be vulnerable. Investments in renewable energy, in U.S. LNG, and in electricity interconnections—all of these reduce dependence, but do not eliminate it.

The red line the West must draw

The West—the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Australia—must be united in sending an unambiguous message to Tehran: any obstruction of transit through the Strait of Hormuz, even partial, will be considered a major economic aggression and will trigger a collective response—diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military. This message must not be left to American rhetoric alone. It must be conveyed collectively by all nations that depend on free navigation through this strait.

The fact that an agreement is currently being negotiated does not suspend the need for this clarity. On the contrary: it is precisely when an agreement seems possible that red lines must be drawn most clearly. Firmness in negotiations does not mean a lack of willingness to compromise. It is the guarantee that any compromise is based on reality, not on hope.

The fact that the Strait of Hormuz is open today does not mean it will be secure tomorrow. The difference between the two is precisely what negotiators tend to forget in the euphoria of reaching an agreement. Do not forget. Never let your guard down.

Israel’s Red Line

Israel is the player watching the U.S.-Iran negotiations with the greatest existential anxiety. For Tel Aviv, a nuclear Iran is not a geopolitical abstraction—it is a declared threat to its national survival. Iranian leaders have in the past made statements about the destruction of Israel that leave no ambiguity regarding their intentions. This is why every compromise in the nuclear negotiations is scrutinized with particular intensity by Israeli intelligence agencies.

Israel has in the past carried out covert operations to slow down Iran’s nuclear program—including sabotage of centrifuges and the assassination of scientists. These operations served to delay the program but did not halt it. Today, with Iran enriching uranium to 60% and potentially just weeks away from weapons-grade capability, the pressure on U.S. negotiators to take a firm stance on inspections is all the more intense. Tel Aviv will not hesitate to take military action if it believes the negotiations are opening a window of opportunity for Tehran.

Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran’s Regional Posture

In parallel with the nuclear negotiations, Iran is maintaining and strengthening its networks of regional proxies. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria—all of these forces serve Iran’s strategy of “resistance” and power projection without direct engagement. These networks have not been put on hold during the nuclear negotiations. They continue to operate, arm themselves, and exert constant pressure on U.S. and Israeli interests in the region.

This duality—negotiating on nuclear issues while keeping proxies active—is characteristic of Iranian strategy. It allows Tehran to advance simultaneously on multiple fronts while maintaining a facade of good faith in official negotiations. The West must insist that the nuclear negotiations include discussions on Iran’s regional behavior—not just on centrifuges.

Israel views the U.S.-Iran negotiations through the eyes of a nation whose very survival is at stake. This perspective is not paranoid—it is realistic. And the West would be making a mistake not to factor it into its diplomatic calculations.

Iranian Drones in the Russian War

The delivery of Iranian Shahed drones to Russia for use in Ukraine is one of the most concrete examples of the strategic convergence between Tehran and Moscow. These drones—which are inexpensive and mass-produced—have been used by Russia to carry out saturation strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. They illustrate how Iranian-Russian military cooperation directly results in the loss of Ukrainian lives.

This military cooperation creates a relationship of mutual dependence. Russia provides Iran with advanced military technology, diplomatic protection at the Security Council, and a market for its exports. Iran provides Russia with affordable ammunition and a model for circumventing sanctions that Moscow seeks to replicate in other areas. Any nuclear negotiations that ignore this military dimension would be incomplete.

What a Nuclear Agreement Will Not Resolve

Even if the 60 days of negotiations resulted in a solid agreement on the nuclear program, the Iranian threat would not disappear. Tehran would continue to fund its proxies. The Revolutionary Guards would continue to operate regionally. Military cooperation with Russia would continue. A nuclear agreement reduces a specific aspect of the Iranian threat—one that is existential for Israel and potentially for the Persian Gulf. It does not resolve Iran’s regional policy, which is a constant source of destabilization.

The West must be honest with itself about this limitation. A nuclear deal, even a good one, does not transform Iran into a responsible partner. It reduces a specific threat. The other threats—proxies, the Strait of Hormuz, military cooperation with Russia, ballistic missiles—remain. And they require a separate regional policy, one that is more complex and takes longer to build than any agreement reached in 60 days.

A nuclear deal is not peace with Iran. It is a step toward reducing a specific risk. Confusing the two is dangerous. The West has this tendency—to sign a deal and declare that the problem is solved. With Iran, nothing is ever solved. Everything is managed.

The Paradox of the Iran Nuclear Negotiations

The question the West has been asking itself since 2003—since the start of the Iran nuclear negotiations—remains unanswered: Is an imperfect agreement better than no agreement at all? The honest answer is: It depends on the degree of imperfection. An agreement that freezes Iran’s program at a verifiable level of enrichment and allows for robust inspections—even without total dismantlement—is progress. An agreement that gives Iran resources and respectability without real verification is a step backward disguised as progress.

The 60 days ahead represent a window of opportunity—uncertain, but real. If negotiators stand firm on inspections, if the international community remains united, and if Trump resists the temptation to pursue a spectacular “big deal” rather than a sound agreement, then something viable may emerge. If any of these conditions fail, the result will be an illusion of stability more dangerous than open confrontation.

Why We Must Not Let Our Guard Down

I’ll conclude with this advice—addressed to Western leaders as much as to the public: don’t let your guard down. Negotiations with Iran have a history of broken promises, incomplete agreements, and periods of détente followed by renewed tensions. This isn’t cynicism—it’s memory. The Strait of Hormuz may remain open. Negotiations may move forward. But vigilance can never be put on hold.

The West has learned enough in recent years about the cost of strategic naivety—in dealing with Russia, with China, and with energy dependencies. Applying this vigilance to the Iran negotiations is not intransigence. It is wisdom acquired at a high price.

The reopening of Hormuz is good news. An imperfect nuclear deal would be bad news disguised as a victory. Vigilance is not cynicism. It is memory. And when it comes to Iran, memory is the most important of all diplomatic weapons.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist