INVESTIGATION: The Diplomacy of Deception: An Investigation into the Kremlin’s Tactics for Simulating Peace While Striking

What do the “Anchorage terms” mean?

Putin also mentioned the “Anchorage terms” in his negotiating conditions—a reference to the discussions that took place during U.S.-Russian diplomatic meetings in Anchorage, Alaska. This terminology, which is obscure to most outside observers, is deliberately chosen to create an impression of diplomatic sophistication and to suggest that serious discussions have already taken place, from which Russia would now like to draw conclusions.

What analysts following these issues point out is that the “Anchorage terms” do not constitute a binding agreement or even a consensus-based framework: they are exploratory discussions from which Russia selectively extracts the elements that suit it to construct a narrative according to which the West has “promised” certain things to Russia. This is the classic technique of rewriting diplomatic history to create artificially legitimized expectations.

The Mechanics of Historical Rewriting in Russian Diplomacy

Russia has become a master of the art of diplomatic historical rewriting. Unwritten promises regarding NATO’s non-expansion allegedly made after 1991—a claim that is disputed and not corroborated by credible diplomatic documents—have become a standard element of Russia’s repertoire to justify its aggression in Ukraine. The Istanbul agreements, which were never finalized or signed, are presented as Ukrainian commitments that were subsequently betrayed. The “Anchorage terms” follow this same logic of retroactively fabricating a diplomatic framework that never existed.

This technique is effective because it is difficult to refute without delving into tedious technical details. The claim “we were negotiating in good faith and Ukraine broke off the talks” is easier to remember than a documented demonstration of its falsity. It is a communication asymmetry that Russia systematically exploits and to which the West responds inadequately.

Russian diplomacy has a relationship with the truth that resembles that of a defense attorney professionally tasked with securing an acquittal for a guilty client. Every statement is calculated for impact, not for accuracy. Every piece of “evidence” is selected, taken out of context, and rephrased. Refuting this requires a much greater cognitive effort than simply asserting it. This is the liar’s advantage over the truth-teller.

What “realities on the ground” Mean in Putin’s Vocabulary

The phrase “realities on the ground” is one of the most loaded euphemisms in Russian diplomatic vocabulary. When Putin uses it, he means: Russia controls certain Ukrainian territories, and peace negotiations must start from this reality. What is left unsaid in this phrasing is that these “realities” were created by an illegal war of aggression, in flagrant violation of international law, the United Nations Charter, and agreements signed by Russia itself.

To enshrine the “realities on the ground” in a peace agreement is to reward aggression and set a catastrophic precedent: any state can now seize its neighbor’s territory by force and, once positions have stabilized, demand that the “reality” be recognized. This precedent would be particularly dangerous in a context where other revisionist powers—notably China with regard to Taiwan—are closely watching how the international community deals with military faits accomplis.

The Four Illegally Annexed Regions: A Constitutional Impossibility for Ukraine

Under its constitution, Ukraine cannot legally cede territory. This is not a negotiating position—it is a legal reality. Successive Ukrainian presidents, including Zelensky, cannot sign an agreement recognizing the loss of territory without a constitutional amendment, which would require a national referendum conducted under conditions of free and secure voting. Russian diplomats are well aware of this constitutional constraint—and that is precisely why the demand for recognition of the “realities on the ground” is a politically impossible demand, designed to ensure that negotiations fail so that Russia can blame Ukraine.

This is a deliberate tactic: setting conditions that the adversary is structurally unable to accept, so that Russia can later claim, “We wanted to negotiate, but they refused.” This tactic has been used in virtually every conflict Russia has waged in the post-Soviet era. Recognizing it should not be difficult for experienced Western diplomats. And yet, it continues to work because media and political pressure in favor of a “chance for peace” is stronger than analytical rigor.

Putin’s “realities on the ground.” That’s a concept that sums it all up. If a burglar breaks into your home, the “realities on the ground” are that he’s there. Do you still consider yourself the owner, or do you accept these realities? The question is not rhetorical. It is literally what Putin is asking Ukraine to accept. And some Western leaders seem to find this reasonable. It’s frightening.

The 76th Exchange: 160 for 160, Mediated by the UAE

On June 26, 2026, a prisoner-of-war exchange took place—the 76th exchange since the start of the war. 160 Ukrainians were released from Russian captivity in exchange for 160 Russian soldiers, with the United Arab Emirates acting as mediator. This is one of the most tangible and humanly significant aspects of all the diplomacy surrounding this conflict: real men and women returning home, reuniting with their families, and perhaps rebuilding their lives.

As of 2026, 1,596 Ukrainians have been returned from Russian captivity since the start of the year. Since 2022, more than 9,500 prisoners have been exchanged. These figures, reported by the Kyiv Independent and confirmed by Interfax-Ukraine, represent lives saved by the only diplomacy that truly works in this conflict: not grand rhetoric about peace, but the patient and discreet mechanics of prisoner exchanges, made possible by mediators such as the United Arab Emirates, which maintain channels of communication with both sides.

Prisoner Exchanges as a Barometer of Russia’s True Intentions

The history of these exchanges is revealing. While Russia proclaims a desire for peace but sets impossible conditions in diplomatic talks, it agrees—often after lengthy negotiations—to exchange prisoners of war. This willingness is an indicator of pragmatism within Russian military and security circles, even as political circles maintain a rhetoric of total war.

It also reveals something about Russia’s motivations in these exchanges: the recovery of its own captured soldiers is a genuine priority for domestic reasons—the families of soldiers in captivity exert informal but real pressure on the regime. This pragmatism regarding prisoners, where Russia has a direct interest, contrasts dramatically with its intransigence on political issues, where only Ukraine would have to make concessions. This is a perfect illustration of Russia’s negotiating logic: concessions where it costs me little, intransigence where it yields everything.

Every prisoner exchange is a tiny victory for humanity in a dehumanizing war. These are real lives, real families, and real traumas overcome. I commend the work of the mediators from the United Arab Emirates and all those who make these exchanges possible. In the desert of false diplomacy, these exchanges are true oases of reality.

Why Abu Dhabi?

The fact that the United Arab Emirates is mediating prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine is indicative of new global diplomatic dynamics. The UAE maintains cordial relations with Moscow—it has not joined Western sanctions against Russia—while also having close economic and security ties with the United States and Western countries. This balanced position allows it to act as a channel of communication in a conflict where the parties no longer have direct diplomatic contacts.

This pragmatic mediation by the UAE illustrates a broader phenomenon: in the multipolar world emerging from the conflict in Ukraine, actors that maintain relations with both sides hold particular diplomatic value. They are not necessarily the West’s closest allies or champions of democratic values—it is sometimes precisely their calculated neutrality that makes them viable mediators where others fail.

The Limits of Mediation in an Existential Conflict

The ability of the UAE—or any other mediator—to translate successful prisoner exchanges into broader diplomatic progress on political issues is severely limited. Prisoner exchanges work because both sides have a clear and immediate interest in them. Political negotiations fail because the positions of both sides are fundamentally incompatible: Ukraine wants the restoration of its territorial integrity and real security guarantees; Russia wants Ukraine’s capitulation and the elimination of any prospect of Ukraine’s integration into NATO or the EU.

No mediator, however talented and well-intentioned, can bridge this gap unless both sides have decided for themselves that the cost of war outweighs the expected benefit of victory. The role of mediators in this context is to keep channels of communication open for when that calculation changes—not to bring about the change themselves. This clarity regarding the limits of mediation is necessary to avoid overestimating what diplomatic talks can achieve.

I have confidence in the teams negotiating prisoner exchanges. They do essential, difficult work that requires patience, discretion, and courage. What I do not trust are the grand narratives of global mediation—the Chinese peace plan, the African peace plan, Trump’s peace plan—which miss the fundamental reality: Putin does not want peace. He wants victory. And victory on his terms is unacceptable to Ukraine and the West.

How the Kremlin Uses Peace Rhetoric Domestically

Putin’s peace rhetoric serves two distinct functions depending on his audience. For the international public, it aims to divide the coalition supporting Ukraine by suggesting that an opportunity for peace exists that Ukraine and its supporters would refuse. For the Russian domestic audience, it serves to position Putin as a reasonable leader facing a “Nazi” Ukraine backed by belligerent Western powers. In both cases, the objective is rhetorical and political, not diplomatic.

This dual function is evident in the timing of Russia’s peace declarations: they consistently occur at times when Russia is suffering military setbacks or facing increased international diplomatic pressure, or when debates in Western capitals over continued support for Ukraine are intensifying. They are countermeasures in the information war, not sincere diplomatic overtures.

The Minsk Ceasefire as a Manually Applicable Precedent

The Minsk I and II agreements of 2014–2015 are the clearest and most well-documented example of the mechanics of Russian diplomatic simulation. They brought an end to an active phase of fighting by providing for a ceasefire, a withdrawal of heavy weapons, prisoner exchanges, and a political process. They were never fully implemented by Russia. Ceasefire violations began almost immediately. The political process was deliberately blocked.

What former German Chancellor Angela Merkel said in her memoirs—that the Minsk agreements served primarily to give Ukraine time to prepare—suggests that some Western leaders knew these agreements would not be honored by Russia. If this is true, it is an implicit acknowledgment of “diplomacy of pretense”: agreements signed not to be implemented but to create a temporarily more favorable environment for Ukraine. In this case, both sides were going through the motions.

Minsk was a consensual diplomatic fiction, in which each side used the agreements for its own purposes without believing in their actual implementation. That is not good diplomacy. It is short-term crisis management that bought time but did not resolve the fundamental problem. Today, it is 2026, and we are in the midst of all-out war. The lesson of Minsk should haunt anyone who proposes a quick ceasefire as a magic solution.

Zelensky’s Position on the Negotiations

Volodymyr Zelensky has maintained a consistent position on negotiations: Ukraine is ready to negotiate, but only on the basis of international law, respect for its territorial integrity, and credible security guarantees. This stance is not irrational intransigence: it is the only coherent position for a leader representing a country that is the victim of an act of aggression and that cannot legally cede any territory.

Zelensky also developed the ten-point Ukrainian Peace Formula, presented in November 2022, which covers the restoration of territorial integrity, nuclear security, freedom of navigation, food security, the withdrawal of Russian forces, justice for war crimes, environmental protection, the prevention of escalation, and the safety of prisoners. It is a serious document, based on international law, which Russia has never seriously engaged with in any diplomatic forum.

Turkey’s Mediation Effort: Balancing National Interests and International Duty

Turkey has repeatedly attempted to play a mediating role in the conflict, including by organizing meetings between delegations and serving as an intermediary for certain partial agreements, such as the Black Sea grain corridor. These efforts have had mixed results: the grain corridor, which enabled Ukrainian exports for several months, was ultimately derailed by Russia when it determined that the benefits no longer outweighed the political drawbacks.

This experience illustrates the limits of any mediation in this conflict: when Russia deems an agreement to be in its immediate interest, it partially complies with it. When its interests change, it abandons it without hesitation or explanation. A mediator, however influential, cannot replace a party’s willingness to honor its commitments. And until proven otherwise, that willingness is absent on the Russian side.

The Black Sea grain corridor. It made it possible to export millions of metric tons of Ukrainian grain to countries in need. It temporarily reduced the risk of famine. Russia torpedoed it because its short-term political gains no longer outweighed the benefits. This is the portrait of Russian diplomacy: instrumental, calculated, and lacking loyalty to the agreements it signs.

Trump and the Impatience for the “Great Deal”

Since taking office, the Trump administration has shown an eagerness to “resolve” the war in Ukraine quickly. The rhetoric of the “big deal”—reaching an agreement that ends the fighting, even at the cost of Ukrainian territorial concessions—is prevalent in pro-Trump circles. This approach treats the conflict as a business deal in which each side gives something up to reach an agreement, without dwelling on the legitimacy or fairness of the terms.

This approach is dangerous for several reasons. It ignores the legal reality that Ukraine cannot cede territory. It underestimates Russia’s ability to use a ceasefire as a pause to regroup and prepare for the next offensive. And it sends a very dangerous message to other revisionist powers like China: the West is willing to reward aggression if it is persistent enough. Such a precedent could be potentially catastrophic for global stability.

European Allies’ Resistance to a Hasty Peace

NATO’s European allies—particularly the countries on the eastern flank, which have the most to lose from a bad peace—are actively resisting any temptation toward a hasty peace on Russia’s terms. Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have all, to varying degrees, maintained clear positions on the need for a peace that respects international law and guarantees Ukraine’s security.

This European resistance is one of the most important factors in the coherence of the Western response. If European allies maintain their unity on the need for a just and lasting peace—and they have demonstrated an ability to do so despite pressure—then Trumpian temptations toward a quick deal will be counterbalanced by the collective weight of the European allies.

Trump as a peace mediator in Ukraine. The idea would be appealing if it weren’t so risky. Trump thinks in terms of deals, appearances, and quick media successes. Peace in Ukraine is not measured in magazine covers but in security guarantees that last for decades. These two approaches are incompatible. And it is Ukraine that would pay the price for this incompatibility.

China’s Peace Plan: Goodwill or Calculation?

China has presented its own twelve-point “peace plan” for the conflict in Ukraine. This document, which has been met with cautious enthusiasm in some capitals, calls for a ceasefire, negotiations, and respect for state sovereignty—but makes no mention of a Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territories or any responsibility for the aggression. It is a document designed to make China appear as a responsible peacemaker without costing its Russian partner anything.

Beijing’s professed neutrality in this conflict is a carefully maintained fiction. China has been Russia’s leading trading partner since 2022 and supplies it with dual-use goods that have military applications. It has supported Russia diplomatically, particularly in the UN Security Council. Its “peace plan” is therefore less a serious diplomatic initiative than a communication tool allowing Beijing to present itself as a constructive actor without taking a position that would harm its economic interests with Moscow.

The Kremlin exploits the “Global South” to legitimize its false diplomacy

Beyond China, Russia has instrumentalized several countries in the “Global South”—notably South Africa, Brazil, and India at certain times—to give its diplomatic initiatives the appearance of international legitimacy. Mediation proposals from non-aligned countries are met with media goodwill that Russia would never have obtained had it presented the same proposals directly.

These countries have their own interests in this conflict—access to Russian oil at reduced prices, arms markets, and the geopolitical balance among the major powers—and their offers of mediation reflect these interests as much as a sincere desire for peace. Russia skillfully exploits this situation to lend its diplomatic demands an international legitimacy that they do not deserve on the merits.

The Chinese peace plan is the most carefully ambiguous document in contemporary diplomacy. Every sentence can be read as favoring Ukraine or Russia, depending on the interpretation chosen. That is precisely the point. Beijing wants to appear to be seeking peace without taking any risks or staking out any positions. This is opportunistic diplomacy, not principled diplomacy.

The Conditions for Serious Negotiations

Genuine peace diplomacy between Russia and Ukraine requires several conditions that are not currently in place. First, Russia must abandon its veiled demands for surrender and agree to negotiate on the basis of international law. Second, the costs of the war for Russia must reach a high enough level that its leaders consider a negotiated peace preferable to continuing the conflict. Finally, credible security guarantees must be available to Ukraine—guarantees that would make any future Russian aggression costly enough to serve as a deterrent.

None of these conditions are met in June 2026. Russia’s demands remain maximalist. The cost of the war to Russia is rising but has not yet reached a decisive level. And security guarantees for Ukraine depend on resolutions regarding NATO membership that have not yet achieved consensus within the Alliance. In this context, Russia’s pretense of diplomacy is convenient: it costs little and yields much.

The Role of International Justice in Any Future Peace

A lasting peace cannot be achieved without justice for the war crimes committed since 2022. Proceedings before the International Criminal Court, accountability mechanisms for documented crimes, and official acknowledgment of responsibility—all of this is essential for peace to be lasting and not merely a pause before the next act of aggression. Russia, of course, opposes this. But peace without justice would not be peace: it would be a capitulation disguised as reconciliation.

Ukraine has meticulously documented Russian war crimes since the first day of the invasion. Thousands of cases have been referred to ICC prosecutors. This documentation effort is an investment in future justice, even if immediate prosecutions remain limited by political realities. The machinery of international justice is slow, but it is real. And the diplomacy of pretense cannot substitute an amnesty for it.

Justice before peace—or justice as a condition for peace. I know this sounds unrealistic when you hear the bombs falling. But without accountability, a peace agreement with Russia isn’t worth the paper it’s written on. Putin has been indicted by the ICC. That’s a start. It isn’t justice yet. But it’s the direction any peace agreement must take to be legitimate.

Signs of a Sincere Offer vs. a Propaganda Stunt

Following this investigation, it is useful to establish some criteria for distinguishing a genuine peace offer from a diplomatic charade intended for propaganda purposes. A genuine peace offer proposes specific, measurable, and verifiable terms; it does not make its acceptance contingent on demands that the opposing party is structurally unable to accept; it is accompanied by a reduction in hostilities rather than a continuation of fighting; and it accepts an independent international verification mechanism.

The Russian proposals in 2026 meet none of these criteria. They are vague where the terms should be precise. They impose impossible conditions. They are made while the bombings continue. And they systematically reject any international verification mechanism. This is the perfect portrait of “fake diplomacy,” recognizable by these markers as clearly as a forged painting is by its clumsy brushstrokes.

What the West Must Do with This Analysis

The practical implication of this analysis is simple: the West must resist the temptation to treat Russian peace declarations as serious diplomatic offers requiring a conciliatory response. To respond to a sham diplomatic maneuver with a genuine concession is to be taken in. The correct response to Russia’s current offers is to maintain support for Ukraine, increase economic pressure on Russia, and be explicit about the conditions for a genuine peace that the West would be willing to support.

This clarification is important: the West must not appear to be against peace. It must appear to be for peace—true peace, based on international law, security guarantees, and justice. This framing is both morally right and politically useful for countering the Russian narrative that it is Ukraine and the West who are refusing peace.

If Putin truly wanted peace, all he would have to do is withdraw his troops from Ukraine. That would be the simplest and most indisputable proof of his good faith. He has not done so. That is all there is to know about his “peace offers.” The rest is just diplomatic rhetoric designed to lull the naive into complacency.

The Covert Channels Between Kyiv and Moscow

Behind the Kremlin’s public diplomacy—designed for the cameras—there are discreet channels of communication between the two warring parties, used primarily for prisoner exchanges, coordination on certain humanitarian corridors, and the management of emergencies such as the nuclear risk in Zaporizhzhia. These channels are real and functional, even during periods of the most bellicose rhetoric. They serve as a reminder that states at war always maintain a minimum level of practical communication, regardless of public statements.

The question is whether these channels could one day be used for genuine peace negotiations, or whether they will remain confined to their limited operational use. The answer depends largely on how the military situation on the ground evolves. Moscow will only negotiate seriously under sufficient military and economic pressure to make continuing the war more costly than peace. Kyiv will only negotiate on the basis of credible security guarantees that make further Russian aggression impossible in ten years. Neither of these conditions has yet been met as of June 2026, which explains why the discreet channels are not yielding substantial results.

The Behind-the-Scenes Role of Certain Arab and Central Asian Countries

Beyond the United Arab Emirates and Turkey, several countries have attempted to play a mediating or facilitating role. Qatar has been involved in prisoner exchanges. Saudi Arabia has hosted indirect talks. Some Central Asian countries—notably Kazakhstan—have kept channels open with both sides while resisting Russian pressure to participate in the war. These actors are motivated by their own interests—regional security, stability in oil markets, and maintaining good relations with both the West and Russia—but their contribution to a potential peace should not be underestimated.

This network of parallel mediation efforts is characteristic of modern conflicts in which major powers do not speak directly to one another. It has its advantages—the multiplicity of channels increases the chances that a message will get through—and its disadvantages—fragmentation can lead to contradictions and misunderstandings. For these channels to yield results, they must eventually converge into a unified process with a lead mediator recognized by both sides. Such unification of the mediation process is not yet in sight for the Ukrainian conflict.

Behind-the-scenes diplomacy fascinates journalists and analysts because it suggests that solutions exist if only the right intermediaries could find the right words. I’d like to believe that. But the history of Russian-Ukrainian diplomacy since 2014 teaches a harsh lesson: Russia uses negotiations to buy time, not to make peace. Every diplomatic lull has been used to rearm, reorganize, and prepare for the next offensive. Peace will not come from words. It will come from the battlefield.

The Ukrainian Peace Plan: Ten Non-Negotiable Points

President Zelensky has outlined a ten-point peace plan that defines what Ukraine considers to be the minimum conditions for a lasting peace. These points include nuclear safety (the return of Zaporizhzhia), food security, the release of prisoners and deportees, Russia’s withdrawal from all internationally recognized Ukrainian territories, a special tribunal for war crimes, reparations funded by frozen Russian assets, and binding security guarantees for the future. This framework serves as Ukraine’s official reference point for any negotiations.

Russia categorically rejects most of these points—particularly the complete withdrawal from occupied territories, the war crimes tribunal, and reparations. The United States under the Trump administration has at times appeared to want to push Ukraine toward territorial concessions to hasten a peace agreement. This tension between Ukraine’s position and U.S. pressure is one of the most significant fault lines within the coalition supporting Ukraine. Zelensky must navigate the balance between upholding his principles and not alienating his primary financial backer and arms supplier.

Security guarantees: the fundamental issue that diplomacy avoids

The issue of security guarantees for Ukraine is likely the most difficult challenge in any future negotiations. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum—under which Ukraine gave up its Soviet nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom—has been flagrantly violated. No reasonable Ukrainian government will again accept a peace agreement that is not backed by binding and enforceable security guarantees—not diplomatic assurances, but concrete military commitments.

The only security guarantee that Ukraine considers credible is NATO membership. Any intermediate solution—bilateral guarantees from the U.S. or Europe, or multilateral guarantees without NATO—will be viewed as insufficient by Kyiv, given the experience with the Budapest Memorandum. Zelenskyy has made this clear and unequivocal. The issue of NATO membership—either before the end of the war in territories under Ukrainian control or with a credible timeline—is therefore at the heart of any viable roadmap to peace. And this is precisely the point on which some NATO members are still hesitating.

Zelensky’s red lines are often portrayed in the Western media as obstacles to peace—as if it were Ukraine that were being intransigent rather than Russia, which is invading and occupying. This reversal of responsibility infuriates me. Ukraine is defending its internationally recognized sovereign territory. Its security demands are exactly what any reasonable democracy would make after suffering an aggression of this magnitude. To call that intransigence is to mislabel things—it is dignity.

The Fundamental Equation: Costs vs. Benefits for the Kremlin

Deceptive diplomacy will work until the cost of the war exceeds—for Putin or his potential successors—the expected benefit of victory. Until that point, Russian calls for peace will remain propaganda tools, not diplomatic overtures. The West cannot force Putin to negotiate in good faith through words alone. It can only make the continuation of the war costly enough to change his calculus.

This cold reality is the compass for sound Western policy: supporting Ukraine militarily and economically, maintaining sanctions, increasing NATO defense spending, and not being lulled by Russian peace offers whose sole purpose is to delay and divide. It is a strategy that demands patience. It is the only one that stands a chance of bringing about real peace.

The 76 Prisoner Exchanges: Real Diplomacy That Saves Lives

While the Kremlin’s grand speeches about peace yield nothing concrete, the 76 prisoner exchanges since the start of the war have brought more than 9,500 Ukrainians home. This quiet, unassuming figure says more about the state of diplomacy in this conflict than all the Kremlin’s press releases combined. True diplomacy is measured in lives saved, not in statements. By that measure, the discreet negotiators behind the prisoner exchanges are worth a thousand times more than the spokespeople for Russian diplomatic lies.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist