ANALYSIS: Duma Elections in the Occupied Territories — The Legitimacy Putin Can’t Buy

The FSB and the Rosgvardia are calling for a postponement

One of the most telling developments surrounding the Duma elections is the pressure being exerted by the security services themselves to cancel or postpone them. According to sources close to the presidential administration cited by independent Russian media, the FSB (Federal Security Service) and the head of the Rosgvardia (National Guard), Viktor Zolotov, reportedly pressured Putin to postpone the vote. This internal pressure from the security agencies—the very ones on which the regime’s survival depends—is an alarming sign for the Kremlin.

The logic behind this pressure is evident from the context: in a country where political freedom is severely restricted, the security services are best informed about the population’s actual discontent. Signs of fragility are mounting: a slowdown in economic growth, fuel shortages in dozens of regions, repeated internet outages, and increasingly frequent long-range Ukrainian strikes deep into Russian territory. Independent analysts consulted by the Kyiv Independent believe that the erosion of the stability long promised by the Kremlin could complicate efforts to mobilize voter support for United Russia.

Support for United Russia—Figures That Worry Moscow

Sources cited by the independent Russian media outlet Meduza indicated that support for United Russia had fallen to around 35% in some polls. These figures—if accurate—are historically low for the ruling party of an authoritarian regime that is usually capable of securing landslide victories. They reflect growing war fatigue, economic frustration stemming from fuel shortages and inflation, and a gradual disillusionment with promises of a quick victory that have failed to materialize since 2022.

In this context, the decision to hold the elections despite security pressures to cancel them is likely a calculated move: Putin needs the formal legitimacy that elections provide, even if they are rigged. A cancellation would be an all-too-visible admission of vulnerability and would provide ammunition to domestic and international critics. But elections that fail to produce the expected result—a large majority for United Russia—would be politically disastrous. Hence the pressure from the security services to avoid the risk by canceling the elections, and Putin’s resistance, as he prefers to control the outcome rather than avoid the vote altogether.

The Russian security services want to cancel the elections. Putin prefers to hold them—and control the outcome. This internal debate within the Kremlin is fascinating. It suggests that even within Putin’s immediate inner circle, there is no longer certainty that a sufficiently decisive result for United Russia can be guaranteed. It is a vulnerability that democratic societies find difficult to comprehend from the outside.

The Illegal Annexation of 2022 and Its Implications for Electoral Legitimacy

The extension of Duma elections to the occupied Ukrainian territories—the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts—raises fundamental questions of legitimacy. These territories were illegally annexed by Russia in September 2022 through referendums that the international community—including the UN, the EU, the United States, and the vast majority of the world’s nations—refused to recognize. These annexations directly violate the United Nations Charter, the principle of territorial integrity, and international law.

Holding parliamentary elections in these territories is an attempt to solidify the annexation through formal electoral means—to create Duma representatives from these regions in order to normalize their status as part of the Russian Federation. But this maneuver cannot create the international legitimacy it seeks. No government that recognizes Ukrainian sovereignty over these territories—that is, virtually the entire international community—will recognize these representatives. These are elected officials whose mandate is based on an illegal occupation and an unrecognized annexation.

The Conditions for a Free Vote in a Territory at War

Beyond questions of international legitimacy, the practical conditions for a free vote in the occupied territories do not exist. These regions are under Russian military administration. The Ukrainian civilian population that has not fled—and millions have fled—lives under military occupation, with restricted movement, monitored communications, and a permanent physical presence of Russian armed forces. Freedom of political expression, freedom of association, and freedom of the press—all the minimum conditions for a democratic vote—are absent.

Furthermore, a significant portion of the territories officially annexed by Russia is not under its effective control. Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in certain parts of the Kherson Oblast on the right bank of the Dnieper and in parts of the Donetsk Oblast. Holding elections in a partially controlled territory, under military occupation, with a population that is partly displaced—is to stage an electoral farce that makes sense only in Russian domestic rhetoric.

Elections in occupied territories where people vote under the supervision of the occupying army. Calling this “elections” is a misnomer that should shock any democratic conscience. This is not democracy—it is a regime of conquest disguised as democracy. And the world must call it what it is, clearly and without diplomatic euphemisms.

The Russian Economy in 2026 — Cause for Concern

The economic context in which these elections will take place is marked by mounting tensions that complicate the Kremlin’s political agenda. The slowdown in economic growth has been documented by independent economists monitoring the Russian economy from Moscow, Helsinki, and Kyiv. Fuel shortages in more than twenty Russian regions—directly linked to Ukrainian strikes on refineries—are affecting the daily lives of ordinary citizens. Inflation on basic necessities remains high. Interest rates, kept at exceptionally high levels by the Russian Central Bank to curb inflation, are hampering access to credit for businesses and households.

Repeated internet outages—deliberate measures to control information in the context of war—are causing practical frustration among Russians who rely on digital services for their professional and personal activities. Ukrainian long-range strikes deep into Russian territory—on Moscow, Yaroslavl, Volgograd, and Bashkortostan—are creating security anxiety among populations that have not experienced war on their soil since World War II. These economic and security tensions are mounting among an electorate set to vote in less than three months.

Disillusionment Among Pro-War Conservative Circles

One of the least-discussed political vulnerabilities of Putin’s regime is the growing disillusionment within its own base. Russian militarist and nationalist circles—those who had enthusiastically supported the 2022 invasion, believing in a quick victory—are now facing the reality of a long, costly war with no decisive victory in sight. Military casualties—more than 1.4 million Russian casualties since February 24, 2022, according to the Ukrainian General Staff—are affecting families in every region of Russia. These losses are creating private grievances that cannot be expressed publicly but are manifesting themselves in voting behavior.

Putin’s decision to maintain the military course without offering his people a clear way out of the crisis is generating silent frustration that the security services are observing and reporting. This is not a revolution—repression remains effective enough to stifle any organized movement. But it is a gradual erosion of social consensus that complicates electoral mobilization. The Kremlin needs an election result that unequivocally demonstrates its dominance—and current conditions make that harder to achieve than in previous elections.

The silent disillusionment among Putin’s pro-war base. This is the phenomenon most difficult to measure from the outside—and potentially the most significant. When nationalists who believed in a quick victory begin to count their dead, their frustration is not directed at Ukraine. It is directed at the regime that promised them a victory that has not materialized.

Elections as a Ritual of Internal Legitimacy

Elections in Putin’s Russia have never been open political contests. They have been rituals of legitimization—staged displays of popular consent producing predetermined results that allow the regime to claim a democratic mandate. In this context, the September 2026 election is no different in nature from previous ones. Genuine opposition parties are banned or marginalized. Independent candidates are screened out by controlled election commissions. Independent media outlets, almost all of which have been shut down or forced into exile, are unable to provide critical coverage.

What is different this time is the context of fragility in which this electoral charade must take place. In 2021, during the last Duma elections, Russia was nominally at peace, the economy was functioning properly despite the 2014 sanctions, and the most visible opposition—represented by Alexei Navalny, who was then in prison but alive—had not yet been physically eliminated. In 2026, everything has changed: all-out war, massive sanctions, fuel shortages, drones flying over Moscow, and the regime’s traditional electoral bases under pressure.

Mechanisms for Controlling Election Results—Institutionalized Fraud

Control over election results in Russia relies on a well-documented combination of institutional mechanisms. The Central Election Commission is directly under the Kremlin’s control. Ballot box stuffing and vote-counting manipulation have been documented in every Russian election by independent observers. Electronic voting, which is being phased in, offers even less transparency than paper ballots. Independent election monitoring NGOs have been shut down or forced into exile. Civil society, which could have monitored the process, has been systematically dismantled since 2022.

In this context, the main question is not whether the results will be rigged—they will be; that is the norm—but to what extent the rigging will be credible. A result of 70% for United Russia, when polls show 35% support, would create a credibility gap visible even by usual standards. The security services calling for the election to be canceled are anticipating precisely this problem: that even large-scale fraud will not produce a result convincing enough for the regime’s international and domestic supporters.

Rigging elections when you have 70% support is easy. Rigging elections when you have 35% support is much riskier—the gap between the reality and the reported results becomes too obvious. Putin finds himself in this situation for the first time in a long while. And his own security services are telling him that it’s better to cancel the election than to risk being exposed.

United Russia as an Administrative Apparatus for the Russian Elite

United Russia is not a political party in the conventional sense. It is an administrative apparatus of the Russian elite—a structure for organizing loyalty to Putin, distributing state resources to loyalists, and nominating candidates for elected office at all levels of government. It has no coherent ideology beyond loyalty to Putin and the Russian state. It has no distinctive platform beyond continuity. It is the ruling party by default, occupying the political space that the state allocates to parties in a pseudo-competitive system.

The decline in support for United Russia is therefore less an ideological signal—Russians are not voting for an alternative platform—than a sign of general support for the regime. When support for United Russia declines, it is support for Putin and the conduct of the war that declines. And that is why this decline is perceived as an existential threat by the security services, which see the elections as a risk of exposing a vulnerability that the regime would prefer to keep hidden.

Satellite parties—the controlled opposition

The Russian electoral system maintains the illusion of a multiparty system with satellite parties that offer a false alternative without threatening the regime. The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR, founded by the late Vladimir Zhirinovsky) has always served as a outlet for nationalism, allowing frustrated voters to “vote against” United Russia without actually voting for an alternative. The Communist Party of Russia serves the same purpose for those nostalgic for the Soviet era. These parties are never allowed to come anywhere near real power—their function is to channel discontent into harmless outlets.

In 2026, the question is whether the satellite parties will capture more votes than expected—not because they represent a genuine alternative, but because voting for a satellite party is the only form of electoral protest available within this system. A Duma with a smaller majority for United Russia—even if the satellite parties remain within acceptable limits—would be perceived as a sign of the regime’s weakness by domestic and international observers.

Russian satellite parties. These fake opposition parties exist to create the illusion of competition. Under normal circumstances, they serve as a safety valve for discontent. But when discontent is widespread enough, even a “protest” vote for the LDPR or the Communists becomes a real political signal that the regime must take seriously.

Diesel Shortages and Duma Votes — The Causal Chain

The connection between fuel shortages and voting intentions in the Duma is a verifiable causal chain. In regions where fuel restrictions are most severe—the agricultural regions of Western Siberia, the Urals, and the Volga—the concrete economic effects on ordinary citizens are most visible. A farmer who cannot obtain the diesel needed for planting or harvesting is not a voter satisfied with the regime that promised him prosperity and security. A driver who waits in line for hours at a gas station in an oil city like Tyumen or Omsk is not going to vote enthusiastically for the ruling party.

These effects are the direct electoral consequence of Ukraine’s campaign of strikes on Russian refineries. Ukraine is not merely seeking to reduce Russia’s military capacity—it is seeking to create internal political pressure that complicates the position of Putin and United Russia. Viewed in this light, the strikes on refineries are not just military operations—they are political operations that affect the conditions under which the elections will be held. This is a sophisticated indirect strategy that deserves to be recognized as such.

The Long-Term Impact of Sanctions on Electoral Behavior

Western economic sanctions—the 17 EU packages, as well as U.S., British, and Canadian sanctions—have a diffuse but real impact on the Russian economy. This impact is not always immediately apparent to ordinary citizens—but it gradually manifests itself in the unavailability of certain goods, a decline in the quality of imported products, and difficulties accessing banking services and international trade. Over several years, these cumulative effects erode the standard of living and create an economic climate that is hard to ignore during an election.

Independent economic analysts—notably those at the KSE Institute and Western institutions such as CREA—estimate that sanctions and Ukrainian strikes have significantly increased the costs of the war for Russia compared to initial projections. These costs ultimately reverberate throughout Russian society. And in the context of the September 2026 election, they form a backdrop of discontent that the Kremlin cannot fully control through propaganda alone.

Ukraine is striking refineries. Russians are lining up at gas stations. Security services want to cancel the elections. This direct causal chain—from Ukraine’s economic warfare to Russia’s internal political fragility—is one of the clearest demonstrations that Ukraine’s strategy of economic pressure is producing documented political effects.

The Predictable International Condemnation and Its Limits

The Duma elections, which include the occupied Ukrainian territories, will be condemned by the international community with a certain degree of predictability. EU member states, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the vast majority of UN member states will refuse to recognize them as legitimate. Diplomatic statements condemning the elections in the occupied territories will be issued. These condemnations will be legally and morally sound—but their practical effect on Russia’s behavior will be limited.

Russia has shown since 2014—with the elections held in annexed Crimea—that it can ignore international condemnations of elections in occupied territories without immediate consequences. What changes in 2026 is that combined military and economic pressure—sanctions, strikes on refineries, massive military losses—creates a context in which these elections cannot play their usual role of legitimizing the regime. International condemnation carries even greater weight given that the regime is already weakened internally.

Ukraine and Its Allies Facing Russian Elections—Strategy and Communication

For Ukraine and its allies, the September 2026 Duma elections represent a strategic communications opportunity. Documenting and denouncing the elections in the occupied territories reinforces the Ukrainian narrative regarding the illegitimate nature of the Russian occupation. Highlighting internal pressure within the Kremlin to cancel the elections—a sign of fragility—helps erode the perception of an invincible Russia. Emphasizing the repressive context in which the vote is taking place—shortages, censorship, surveillance—shows that the regime does not enjoy genuine popular support.

The 40-day campaign approved by Zelensky on June 25, 2026, is particularly well-timed in this context. By maintaining or intensifying strikes on Russian infrastructure in the weeks leading up to the September elections, Ukraine is adding direct economic and security pressure on the conditions under which the vote will take place. Fuel shortages, refinery fires, drones flying over Russian cities—all of this makes it harder for the Kremlin to present the image of normalcy that the elections are supposed to project.

Ukrainian strikes in the weeks leading up to the Russian elections. It is likely no coincidence that the 40-day campaign kicks off in June and continues through August—just before September. Zelensky is playing multiple cards simultaneously: military, economic, and political. This is first-rate integrated strategy.

What the Request to Cancel the Elections Really Means

The FSB’s request to cancel the State Duma elections is an extraordinary signal regarding the state of Russia’s internal security. The FSB is not an institution that calls for the cancellation of elections lightly—it is the institution whose primary mission is to ensure the stability of the regime. If the FSB believes that holding elections poses a risk to stability, it means that its internal analyses indicate a sufficiently high level of discontent for the election results to be potentially problematic—even with large-scale fraud.

This call for cancellation also reveals a deep-seated debate within Russian security circles regarding the regime’s political sustainability under current conditions. It suggests that some senior security officials believe the foundations of popular support for Putin—the promise of stability, security, and relative prosperity—have eroded enough that the usual electoral mechanisms no longer function in a predictable manner. This is an admission of institutional concern that deserves to be taken seriously.

Putin’s Resistance to Cancellation—The Logic of the Need for Legitimacy

Putin’s resistance to his own security services’ call for cancellation reveals his conviction that elections—even risky ones—are necessary to maintain the appearance of legitimacy that allows Russia to function on the international stage and manage its relations with certain partners such as China and India. Canceling the elections would amount to a public admission of an internal political crisis—which Russia’s diplomatic adversaries would exploit to undermine its alliances and international standing.

The decision to hold the elections despite the risks is therefore a calculation aimed at managing public perception: the risk of an unsatisfactory election result is deemed less serious than the risk of an explicit cancellation, which would project the image of a regime in crisis. This is a calculation that may prove right or wrong depending on the extent of possible fraud and the credibility it generates. But it is fundamentally the calculation of a regime that cannot afford to admit its vulnerability.

Putin chooses to hold risky elections rather than admit that he does not dare to hold them. This choice between two vulnerabilities—the outcome or the cancellation—is the very definition of a political trap. He has set this trap for himself by promising a swift victory in Ukraine that he cannot deliver. And now he must deal with the political consequences of that broken promise.

The rhetoric of the external enemy to mobilize the domestic front

Putin’s rhetoric at the United Russia congress—that the West is trying to destabilize Russia politically after failing militarily—is a classic mobilization of the external threat theory to consolidate domestic support. This rhetoric worked effectively in 2014 and 2022—each escalation produced an initial rallying behind the flag. But its effectiveness erodes over time and as a reality that contradicts the official narrative accumulates.

In 2026, Russians waiting in line at gas stations are not convinced that their hardships are caused by Western destabilization—they know that their refineries have been struck by Ukrainian drones, a fact that even state media eventually report, at least in part. Families who have lost loved ones in the war did not lose them because of Western manipulation—they lost them in a war chosen by their government. The rhetoric of the external enemy is becoming less and less effective as the effects of the war are felt on Russian soil itself.

The Lack of a Postwar Vision—A Gaping Political Void

A striking feature of Putin’s rhetoric at the United Russia congress is the absence of any articulated plan for ending the war. He did not offer United Russia candidates a vision of the post-conflict future that could mobilize a weary electorate. He did not announce clear conditions for ending hostilities. He did not provide a timeline. He simply reaffirmed the mission of the war and blamed the difficulties on the Western enemy—a formula that works as a rallying cry at the start of a conflict but loses its effectiveness as the war drags on with no end in sight.

This lack of a postwar vision is politically dangerous. People will tolerate extraordinary sacrifices if they see an end in sight. But a war without a clearly defined horizon—a war whose objectives have been shifting and expanding since 2022 without ever being achieved—creates deep political fatigue. United Russia finds itself having to defend this endless war during an election campaign—a politically very uncomfortable position.

Putin at the United Russia congress. No plan for ending the war. No vision for the future. Just rhetoric about the external enemy. It’s the politics of a besieged fortress—but the citizens of that fortress are hungry, have no diesel, and their sons aren’t coming home. At some point, the fortress begins to crack from within.

Scenario 1 — Large-scale fraud and a rigged victory

The most likely scenario is the one the Kremlin is preparing: large-scale electoral fraud that produces an “acceptable” result of 50–55% for United Russia—enough to maintain an absolute majority in the Duma, and plausible enough not to trigger an overly blatant international credibility crisis. This scenario would allow the regime to claim a renewed democratic mandate while continuing the war. Its implementation would require even more intensive electoral manipulation than in previous elections—which carries its own risks of revelations and scandals.

This scenario is the most likely because the Kremlin controls all the institutional levers—the electoral commission, the courts, the security forces, and the media—that make it possible to organize and validate large-scale fraud. There is no opposition capable of challenging the result in an organized manner. Independent observers have been expelled or imprisoned. Popular resistance to a rigged result would be immediately suppressed. This scenario maintains the authoritarian status quo—with the difference that its legitimacy will be even more hollow than before.

Scenario 2 — The situation is too deteriorated to produce a credible result

A less likely but not negligible scenario would be one in which internal pressure is so strong that even large-scale fraud produces a result that no one—including Russia’s partners and allies—can publicly defend. A United Russia result below 40% despite manipulation, or reports from regional broadcasters of particularly blatant fraud, or unusual protests in medium-sized Russian cities—any of these would constitute an internal political crisis that the regime would struggle to manage without making matters worse.

This scenario is unlikely in the short term because the regime has the tools necessary to prevent it from becoming public. But it is possible if economic pressure—particularly fuel shortages linked to Ukrainian strikes—continues to worsen in the months leading up to the vote. Zelensky’s 40-day campaign, which continues through the summer of 2026, could directly contribute to creating the conditions for this scenario.

Which scenario are we in? Probably the first—controlled fraud, a rigged result, the status quo maintained. But the likelihood of the second is increasing as refineries burn and Russians line up at gas stations. War has this characteristic: it accelerates everything, including the internal political deterioration of the regimes that prolong it.

A regime that needs legitimacy but cannot generate it authentically

The September 2026 election reveals a fundamental contradiction in Putin’s regime. It needs the trappings of democracy—elections, political parties, and votes—to present itself as a normal state in the eyes of its international partners, notably China, India, Turkey, and other countries that maintain trade relations with Russia. But it cannot accept the substance of democracy—genuine competition, the uncertainty of results, the possibility of a change in leadership—without jeopardizing its political survival.

This contradiction—the need for the forms without the substance—is ultimately unsolvable. The more the regime engages in massive fraud, the more its elections lose their value as a signal of legitimacy for sophisticated observers. And as the war imposes increasing costs on Russian society—human losses, economic shortages, security anxieties—the pressure on this fragile system grows. The September 2026 elections will serve as a barometer—imperfect, manipulated, but real—of the intensity of this pressure.

Implications for Ukrainian and Western Strategy

The internal political fragility revealed by the tensions surrounding the Duma elections reinforces the relevance of Ukraine’s strategy of economic pressure. Every strike on a refinery, every region placed under fuel restrictions, every rise in the cost of living due to sanctions—all of this contributes to the erosion of domestic support for the regime, which will manifest itself in voting behavior in September. For Ukraine’s Western partners, supporting this pressure campaign in the months leading up to the elections is a strategy that demonstrates a rare coherence among military, economic, and political instruments.

Russia can rig its elections. It can maintain its regime through fraud and repression for years to come. But every manipulated election cycle further erodes Putin’s legitimacy in the eyes of his own people, his partners, and his own elites. A facade of democracy requires constant maintenance—and the resources needed for that maintenance are being absorbed by an endless war. This is a strategy of attrition that Ukraine and its allies have every interest in supporting consistently.

The Russian elections in September 2026 will not topple Putin. They will not change the course of the war. But they will produce a record—imperfect, manipulated, but readable—of the state of Russian society at war. And that record will reveal something important about the limits of what even an authoritarian regime can demand of its people indefinitely.

The September 2026 Elections as a Barometer of the War

The September 2026 State Duma elections will be one of the most revealing tests of the Putin regime’s domestic political resilience since the start of the full-scale war. They will be held amid growing economic hardship, massive military losses, domestic security pressures not seen in decades, and in occupied Ukrainian territories where the vote will be a farce of democracy not recognized by the international community. The results will be rigged—but even large-scale manipulation can provide insights into the true state of Russian society.

What the Next Steps Require

For Ukraine and its allies, the months between this analysis and the September elections represent a strategic window of opportunity. Maintaining and intensifying economic pressure—strikes on refineries, energy sanctions, and targeting the ghost fleet—in the weeks leading up to the vote is a strategy that complicates Putin’s domestic political landscape while advancing military objectives. This is a coherent set of measures serving a single objective: to force Russia into serious negotiations from a position of growing weakness. The legitimacy that Putin cannot buy at the ballot box, Ukraine can help strip away at the refineries.

The legitimacy that Putin cannot buy. This is perhaps the most accurate way to describe what is at stake in these elections. He can buy the results—and he will. But he cannot buy the genuine support of citizens who are standing in line for diesel, who are mourning their dead, who hear drones flying over their cities. No amount of electoral fraud can produce that kind of legitimacy.

The Paradox of the Election That Exposes Fragility

The ultimate irony of the September 2026 Duma elections is that Putin himself created them as a problem. By invading Ukraine and promising a quick victory, he created the economic and military conditions that make these elections dangerous for his regime. By annexing Ukrainian territories and planning to include them in the vote, he has created an insoluble problem of international legitimacy. By proceeding with the elections despite warnings from his security services, he is prioritizing the appearance of legitimacy over prudent risk management. This choice reveals a regime trapped by its own decisions.

What This Analysis Implies for the Future

Putin’s Russia will survive the September 2026 elections—the regime has sufficient control mechanisms to ensure its continuity in the short term. But each cycle of rigged elections amid a crisis further erodes the foundations of legitimacy. And this erosion—slow, difficult to measure from the outside, yet real and verifiable—is one of the most significant long-term effects of the war Putin has chosen to wage. It is a war that can end in only two ways: with a total Russian victory—which is becoming increasingly unlikely—or through serious negotiations that the combined pressure—military, economic, and political—will eventually make inevitable.

Russian elections in occupied territory. Putin at the United Russia congress, delivering defensive rhetoric. Security services seeking to cancel the vote. Widespread fuel shortages. And Ukraine striking 700 kilometers deep into Russian territory. All of this is happening simultaneously in June 2026. History is written quickly when it’s written in flames. And for now, it’s the Russian refineries that are burning.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist