PROFILE: Witkoff and Kushner, the Envoys Returning to Moscow After the Islamabad Agreement

Fourteen Points for Peace in Iran

The Islamabad Memorandum, digitally signed on June 14, 2026, and confirmed by the presidents on June 17, is a 14-point agreement negotiated under Pakistani mediation with the support of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. It calls, in particular, for an end to hostilities, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the lifting of the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports, immediate exemptions on Iranian oil exports, and a reconstruction fund of at least $300 billion.

As for the negotiations on Ukraine, this memorandum has an indirect but immediate effect: it frees Witkoff and Kushner from their primary commitment in Tehran and allows them to turn their attention to Moscow. Putin stated this explicitly during a televised interview on June 28: “We expect that once the events are over, once the active phase of the Iranian track has passed, we will see representatives of the U.S. administration arrive—the same ones we have already met with repeatedly in Moscow.”

The Iran Deal and Russia’s Economic Relief

The resolution of the Iranian crisis has significant economic implications for Russia—and not all of them are positive. According to an analysis by the Carnegie Endowment, the war between the United States and Iran had caused oil prices to rise, which represented a financial windfall for Moscow. In May 2026 alone, Russia collected an additional 175 billion rubles ($2.3 billion) in oil and gas revenues thanks to this increase.

With the signing of the memorandum and the gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, oil prices immediately fell—a severe blow to the Kremlin’s finances. The price drop comes at the worst possible time: Russia’s military budget is under pressure, and the deficits created by the war in Ukraine require high oil revenues to be covered. In this context, Putin has an objective interest in negotiating quickly on Ukraine—not out of a desire for peace, but to ease budgetary pressure.

Here’s a paradox I’d have a hard time making up: resolving the conflict between Washington and Tehran weakens Moscow economically. Putin took advantage of the Iranian distraction to catch his breath on the Ukrainian front—and now that this distraction is fading, he’ll face the dual problem of a budget deficit and available American negotiators. This may be the strongest argument for a swift negotiation. But “negotiation” does not mean “Ukrainian capitulation.”

The preliminary meetings that laid the groundwork

The discussions between Witkoff-Kushner and the Kremlin have a history. The first meeting in Moscow in December 2025 lasted five hours without resulting in an agreement. A 28-point U.S. proposal—parts of which had been leaked—had caused consternation among European leaders, who felt it made too many concessions to Moscow’s demands—particularly regarding NATO and Russian control over roughly one-fifth of Ukrainian territory.

On June 28, Putin referred to the Anchorage discussions with Trump himself, indicating that the resumption of talks in Moscow would build on what had been discussed during that direct meeting between the two presidents. This framing by Putin reveals his strategy: to use the Trump channel to bypass Ukrainian and European intermediaries and to anchor future negotiations in the concessions already on the table.

Zelensky and the “Positive” Conversation with U.S. Envoys

On June 8, 2026, before the signing of the Islamabad Memorandum, Zelensky described his conversation with Witkoff and Kushner as “positive” and highlighted their “willingness to engage.” He noted that the two men had “assessed Ukraine’s position positively”—an ambiguous phrasing that suggests the U.S. envoys recognized the strength of Ukraine’s position without necessarily committing to fully supporting it.

Zelensky had also raised the possibility of discussions during the G7 summit in France—discussions that did indeed take place in that context, with Trump stating on June 28 that Russia should “make a deal with Ukraine” and that Zelensky was holding his own “pretty well” on the front lines. This shift in Trump’s vocabulary—from “Zelensky doesn’t have the cards to win” to “he’s holding his own pretty well”—is a subtle but real indicator of a shift in American perception.

Trump now says that Zelensky is “holding his own pretty well.” A few months ago, he said Zelensky didn’t have what it takes. This change in tone is not insignificant—it reflects either a sincere shift in the U.S. assessment of the military situation in Ukraine or a rhetorical adjustment to the realities on the ground. In either case, it’s better news for Kyiv than the alternative.

Peskov and the Art of Making Promises Without Committing

Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s statement on June 24, 2026—that talks will resume when Witkoff and Kushner “are available”—is a classic example of the Kremlin’s diplomatic communication: asserting openness without setting any specific conditions, timeline, or substance. This superficial openness is calculated to signal goodwill to Washington while conceding nothing on the substance.

It is in the Kremlin’s best interest to maintain the illusion of a willingness to negotiate as long as the military conditions on the ground do not work against it. Russian advances—modest but steady—in areas such as Kupyansk, Kostyantynivka, and Huliaipole allow Putin to enter negotiations from a position of relative territorial advantage. Negotiating now might mean locking in gains that new Ukrainian counterattacks could erode.

The Oil Price Factor in the Diplomatic Equation

The Carnegie Endowment’s analysis clearly identifies Moscow’s real interests: the “muddy status quo” between war and peace with Iran was ideal for Russia—high oil prices, global attention diverted from Ukraine, and Western arms flows to Kyiv disrupted. With the signing of the memorandum and the prospect of a resumption of Iranian oil exports, this windfall is fading.

By May 2026, Russian agricultural exports to Iran had increased by 81% via the Caspian Sea, and traffic at Russian Caspian ports had doubled in some cases. This trade dynamic between Moscow and Tehran, born out of the war in Iran, is likely to diminish as relations normalize. Russia therefore has an objective interest in offsetting these commercial and financial losses through a swift diplomatic resolution of the Ukraine crisis—but on its own terms.

What Carnegie rigorously demonstrates is that Putin is not an irrational strategist—he is a rational opportunist. He took advantage of Iran’s distraction to gain economic breathing room and curb Western support for Ukraine. Now that this window is closing, he will recalibrate. And for him, recalibrating does not mean giving in—it means seeking a new position of advantage.

Zelensky: Between Suspicion and Pragmatism

Zelensky has navigated this period of diplomatic paralysis caused by the Iranian crisis with remarkable skill. He has maintained European support, strengthened bilateral partnerships with the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Nordic countries, and used the window of relative American inattention to push forward his own offensives—notably the deep strikes on Russian military infrastructure that characterized June 2026.

With the likely resumption of the Witkoff-Kushner-Moscow talks, Ukraine’s position is stronger than it was in December 2025: the strikes on the Kapotnya refinery in Moscow, the attacks on air defenses in Crimea, and the saturation campaign documented by Meduza have demonstrated that Ukraine can strike far and inflict significant damage. This is no small matter at the negotiating table.

Ukraine’s Red Lines and Kyiv’s Resilience

Ukraine’s red lines are well-known and well-documented: no territorial concessions without a referendum, no exclusion from NATO membership, and binding security guarantees for any agreement. These positions have not changed despite U.S. pressure and the Witkoff-Kushner proposals, which, according to leaks, would have accommodated certain Russian demands.

Today’s Trump—who says that Russia must “make a deal” and that Zelensky is holding his own—is potentially more helpful to Ukraine than the Trump of December 2025. If this shift in stance is genuine and not merely cosmetic, it could alter the parameters of future discussions in Moscow. Ukraine has always known how to navigate the volatility of Trump’s moods—it’s a diplomatic art in itself.

I cannot afford to blindly believe in Trump’s change of tone. This man has said so many contradictory things about Ukraine in just a few months that every favorable statement must be weighed against the memory of his previous ones. But I also refuse to be completely cynical: if Trump is truly using his influence to push Moscow toward a fair deal, that’s a game-changer. Ukraine needs that to be true.

What can we expect from a third visit?

Witkoff and Kushner’s third visit to Moscow—if it takes place in the weeks following the Islamabad memorandum—will occur against a military and diplomatic backdrop substantially different from that of December 2025. Ukraine is now striking at average depths of several dozen kilometers behind Russian lines; Crimea is under increasing logistical pressure; and ISW reports confirm that Ukraine has degraded numerous Russian air defenses.

In this context, U.S. envoys will have to choose: present Putin with the same package of accommodating proposals that shocked the Europeans in December, or come with a revised mandate that takes into account the shifting balance of power. The first scenario benefits Moscow; the second could lay the groundwork for an agreement that Ukraine could accept without committing political suicide.

The Role of the Europeans in This Equation

Europe is fundamentally ill-positioned in this process: absent from direct discussions between Washington and Moscow, yet indispensable to any credible post-conflict security guarantee. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany have each expressed concerns about an agreement that would bypass European and Ukrainian interests.

Zelenskyy’s upcoming visit to Bratislava, the bilateral intergovernmental consultations between Ukraine and Slovakia in Lviv, and the Ukraine-United Kingdom strategic dialogue in June 2026 are all part of this strategy: Kyiv is strengthening its European diplomatic ties to ensure that no one can negotiate over its head. This is preventive diplomacy—and it is essential.

Europe faces a structural problem in this matter: it is providing substantial funding for Ukraine’s war effort and will be responsible for reconstruction, yet it is not at the table when Trump and Putin talk. This asymmetry between financial responsibility and diplomatic power is an anomaly that no solemn declaration can correct. As long as Europe does not carry enough military clout to assert its presence, it will remain on the sidelines.

The Trump Doctrine of “Deals” in Succession

The Trump administration’s foreign policy during its second term was structured around a series of successive “deals”: first resolving the Iran issue, then turning to Ukraine. This serial approach reflects both the constraints of the president’s attention span and a negotiating philosophy that favors bilateral agreements over complex multilateral frameworks.

The Islamabad Memorandum cost Washington significant concessions: $300 billion in reconstruction funds, the unfreezing of Iranian assets, and immediate oil exemptions. If Trump applies the same logic to Ukraine—finding a deal acceptable to both parties—the concessions from Ukraine could be considerable. This is the scenario that terrifies Kyiv and Brussels.

The Iranian Precedent as a Warning for Ukraine

The Islamabad Memorandum is not a peace treaty—it is an armistice framework that leaves the most difficult issues (Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and network of proxies) for future negotiations. The analogy with a future agreement on Ukraine is troubling: a “freeze of positions” ceasefire that would postpone the fundamental issues of territorial sovereignty and security guarantees.

For Ukraine, this scenario would amount to freezing a partial defeat while maintaining the illusion of negotiation. It is precisely for this reason that Zelensky rejects any formula that is not accompanied by binding security guarantees, comparable to NATO’s Article 5. The lesson from Iran, as seen from Kyiv, is that framework agreements can become traps—if the details are never finalized.

Iran accepted an imperfect agreement because it had no choice after massive strikes on its infrastructure. Ukraine is not in that position: it is resisting, striking back, and holding its ground. Zelensky would be wrong to accept an agreement that resembles the Islamabad MoU for Ukraine—vague on essential points, filled with non-binding good intentions. Dignity comes at a price, and that price is being negotiated now.

The June 28 Statements and Their Dual Interpretations

Putin’s remarks on June 28, 2026, warrant careful analysis. “We are ready to continue negotiations and discuss all the details and terms—if not the agreements themselves, then at least the issues discussed in Anchorage.” This phrasing is revealing: it signals that Putin views the Anchorage talks as the starting point for future negotiations—rather than the Ukrainian or European positions.

By referring to Anchorage rather than to previous rounds of talks with envoys, Putin seeks to anchor future negotiations within the framework most favorable to Russia—that of a direct dialogue between the two major powers, without influential Ukrainian or European intermediaries. This is a classic diplomatic maneuver by the Kremlin: asserting the primacy of the bilateral Russia-U.S. channel over any other format.

Moscow’s Silence on Substantive Conditions

Neither Putin nor Peskov has publicly mentioned specific conditions for resuming formal talks on Ukraine. There has been no demand for a prior ceasefire, no explicit territorial conditions set forth, and no demand for a Ukrainian withdrawal from areas of conflict. This calculated silence maintains a useful ambiguity: it allows Moscow to keep all options open while committing to nothing.

For observers of Russian diplomacy, this silence is itself a signal: Putin is open to discussion but feels no urgent pressure to reach a conclusion. Territorial losses, budgetary pressure caused by falling oil prices, and the prospect of increased Western support for Ukraine could accelerate the timeline. But for now, the Kremlin is playing for time.

Putin masters the art of strategic silence better than anyone. When he says nothing about the substantive terms, it is not out of ignorance—it is calculated restraint. Every week that passes without negotiations is a week in which his troops can advance a few hundred meters on the ground. The clock and the map are his two best allies.

A Narrow Window of Opportunity

The signing of the Islamabad memorandum creates a diplomatic window that some analysts describe as an opportunity to revive talks on Ukraine. Witkoff and Kushner have their attention focused on the issue; falling oil prices are putting economic pressure on Moscow; and Trump seems willing to push for a deal. These three converging factors could theoretically accelerate serious discussions.

But this window is narrow and fragile. The Iran memorandum itself is a framework agreement fraught with uncertainties—the possibility of renewed hostilities between Washington and Tehran remains. If the Iranian crisis flares up again, U.S. envoys will return to Saudi Arabia or Qatar, and Ukraine will slip back in line. Kyiv must therefore act quickly to solidify its diplomatic gains while U.S. attention is momentarily available.

The Threat of an Imposed Agreement

The scenario most feared in Kyiv remains that of an imposed agreement—in which Washington and Moscow agree on a framework that forces Ukraine to accept conditions it would have refused to endorse of its own free will. Leaks regarding the U.S. proposals from December 2025 had triggered legitimate alarm among European allies, who viewed these 28 points as a dangerous accommodation of Russian demands.

Ukraine’s ability to resist such a scenario depends on two factors: its military performance on the ground, which maintains a balance of power that is not unfavorable to it, and the strength of its European support, which can counterbalance excessive U.S. pressure. Both are in better shape today than they were six months ago—which is good news for Kyiv.

The imposed agreement is Ukraine’s nightmare—and it is a possibility. Trump has shown that he can make quick decisions and present his allies with a fait accompli. If Witkoff and Kushner return from Moscow with a deal that Zelensky is expected to sign within 72 hours, Ukraine will have to fight politically just as it is fighting militarily. This is not a foregone conclusion—but it is a real danger.

Caspian Trade and Its Implications

The war between the United States and Iran had an unexpected effect: it forced Iran to step up its trade with Russia via the Caspian Sea. Two million metric tons of Russian wheat—usually shipped via the Black Sea—were rerouted to Iran via the Caspian Sea. Russian agricultural exports to Iran increased by 81% in 2026. Traffic at Russian ports on the Caspian Sea doubled.

With the end of the Iranian crisis, some of these trade flows could shift. Iran will regain access to its Gulf ports and its usual trade routes. Russia will lose part of its trade monopoly with Tehran. This is a side effect of the Islamabad Memorandum that few analyses mention: regional normalization reduces Iran’s dependence on Russia, which weakens the Moscow-Tehran axis in the medium term.

The Moscow-Tehran Axis After Islamabad

Russia supplied drone components to Iran, notably for the Geran-2 drones developed from the Iranian Shahed-136. These shipments were routed via the Caspian Sea. Iran was attempting to turn the Caspian Sea into a “lifeline” for its food and military imports. This military-commercial symbiosis—with Russia supplying technology and Iran supplying drone models—is one of the cornerstones of Russian-Iranian military cooperation that has fueled the war in Ukraine.

Resolving the Iranian crisis could reduce the urgency of this cooperation for Tehran—but it is unlikely to eliminate it in the short term. Ongoing contracts, established dependencies, and shared strategic interests between Moscow and Tehran run too deep to be erased by a 60-day framework agreement. For Ukraine, this means that the Iranian drones used by the Russian military will not disappear overnight.

The depth of the Moscow-Tehran axis in this conflict is systematically underestimated. It is not merely an alliance of convenience—it is a commercial, technological, and military infrastructure that has been built up over the years. A ceasefire agreement between Washington and Tehran will not dismantle this infrastructure. It would take a much more sustained diplomatic effort to sever this connection. And no one seems willing to do so.

Negotiators with Radically Different Styles

The contrast between the two pairs of negotiators is striking. On one side are Witkoff and Kushner—two businessmen with direct styles, accustomed to negotiations without formalities and quick deals. On the other, Dmitry Peskov and presidential aide Yuri Ushakov—Kremlin bureaucrats forged by decades of Soviet and post-Soviet diplomacy, masters of the art of saying a lot without committing to anything.

This asymmetry in style is in itself a diplomatic factor. The Americans seek a quick resolution; the Russians play the long game. The Americans are willing to compromise on details to secure the principle; the Russians negotiate the details with the same ferocity as the principles, knowing that the devil is in the fine print. For Ukraine, hoping that Witkoff and Kushner will secure the best possible deal against such seasoned negotiators may be overly optimistic.

The Ukrainian Team and Its Position in the Process

Ukraine’s position in this three-way process is structurally delicate: it is directly affected but is not at the Washington-Moscow negotiating table. Zelensky maintains direct contact with the American envoys, but his ability to influence what Witkoff and Kushner will say to Putin is limited to what Trump is willing to take into account.

This is why Ukraine’s strategy is to multiply its points of leverage: consolidated European support, mobilized Western public opinion, military gains on the ground, and multilateral diplomatic advances such as access to the EU Cybersecurity Reserve or Ukrainian sanctions against the Russian military-industrial complex. Each additional point of leverage makes it a little harder to reach an agreement that would marginalize Kyiv.

Zelensky finds himself in the most thankless position in international diplomacy: he is the primary focus of the negotiations but not the decision-maker. He must convince his allies to maintain their support, monitor what U.S. envoys propose to Moscow, and at the same time win the war on the ground. It is a balancing act whose difficulty is often underestimated.

The Conditions for an Acceptable Agreement for Ukraine

An agreement on Ukraine that would be acceptable to Kyiv should include, at a minimum: a ceasefire along the current lines, legally binding security guarantees for Ukraine involving nuclear-armed countries, a credible path to NATO membership or an equivalent mechanism, and the issue of reparations—linked to frozen Russian assets that the EU has begun to mobilize through the International Claims Commission mechanism.

None of these elements appear in the leaked U.S. proposals from December 2025. This does not mean they cannot be included in a future version—but it does mean that Zelensky will have to exert maximum pressure on Trump before Witkoff and Kushner fly to Moscow. Diplomacy happens before the departure, not during the meeting.

What Russia Can Concede—and What It Will Not Concede

Putin may accept a freeze on current positions if it allows him to maintain control over the occupied territories and secure guarantees of Ukraine’s neutrality. He will not budge on Ukraine’s NATO membership—that has been his absolute red line since 2022. He will not budge on Crimea, which he considers permanently Russian since its illegal annexation in 2014. These two points define the parameters within which any negotiation must take place.

What remains within the realm of possible negotiation: the precise borders of the four oblasts annexed in 2022 (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson)—which Russian forces do not fully control—the terms of Ukraine’s neutral status, the partial or total lifting of sanctions, and the issue of prisoners of war. It is in these areas that negotiations could actually yield results—if the parties involved are willing.

I will only believe in a serious agreement when I see a U.S. proposal that truly protects Ukraine rather than merely appeasing it. Witkoff and Kushner were able to conclude the Islamabad MoU—that’s a real achievement and no small feat. But Ukraine is not Iran. And Zelenskyy is not Pezeshkian—he has democratic legitimacy and a people behind him who deserve better than a token agreement.

Zelensky’s Minimum Conditions — A Red Line That Holds

While Witkoff and Kushner continue their diplomatic shuttle diplomacy, Zelensky’s position on the conditions for a settlement remains well-documented and consistent. Ukraine demands the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from the occupied territories, legally binding security guarantees—not mere declarations—preferably including NATO membership, and accountability for the perpetrators of war crimes. These conditions are non-negotiable in substance, even if their sequencing and implementation might be open to discussion.

This Ukrainian red line creates a fundamental tension with the Trump administration’s mediation ambitions, which seem to favor a rapid ceasefire along the current lines over a full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. The gap between the two positions is immense—and both Witkoff and Kushner know it. That is why their missions to Moscow and Islamabad appear aimed at building a gradual architecture of trust, in the hope that successive small steps will create an irreversible momentum toward a more comprehensive settlement.

The Architecture of Guarantees—What History Teaches

The most painful precedent for Ukraine regarding security guarantees is the 1994 Budapest Memorandum: in exchange for giving up the Soviet nuclear arsenal on its territory, Ukraine received guarantees of sovereignty and territorial integrity from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. These guarantees proved to be of no practical value when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and then launched a full-scale invasion in 2022.

Any security guarantee framework in a potential settlement must therefore be radically different from the Budapest Memorandum—featuring automatic trigger mechanisms, pre-positioned forces, and concrete military commitments rather than mere political declarations. Ukraine, having learned from the betrayal of 1994, insists on this point with absolute clarity. And this insistence is entirely justified.

Budapest 1994. This memorandum haunts every diplomatic conversation about Ukraine. Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for a piece of paper. It learned this lesson at a terrible cost. Anyone negotiating a peace agreement with Ukraine must understand why empty guarantees are unacceptable—and propose something substantially different.

A Turning Point in the Diplomatic War

The signing of the Islamabad Memorandum and Putin’s statements on June 28, 2026, mark a pivotal moment: the conditions for resuming Washington-Moscow talks on Ukraine are in place for the first time in months. Witkoff and Kushner will soon be in Moscow. Putin is waiting for them. Trump is pushing for a deal. The window of opportunity is open.

But an open window is no guarantee of a favorable outcome. Ukraine must use the coming weeks to consolidate its military positions, strengthen its European diplomatic ties, and ensure that the U.S. mandate truly serves its interests. Zelenskyy understands this—which is why he is stepping up his visits, bilateral agreements, and demonstrations of military capability.

The ultimate stakes: a just peace or a fragile armistice

The world hopes for peace. Ukraine wants a just peace. The difference between the two is immense—and it is within this space that Witkoff, Kushner, Putin, and Zelensky will negotiate the next chapters of this war. Radkivka has fallen. Soldiers are dying every day. History cannot wait for a perfect deal—but neither should it accept a deal that paves the way for the next war.

Ukraine has held out. It is still holding out. The American envoys are returning to Moscow. This is neither a victory nor a defeat—it is the beginning of the next chapter. And in this next chapter, Zelensky deserves allies who negotiate with his strength, not in spite of it.

Diplomacy is resuming. Envoys are shuttling back and forth. Memorandums are being signed in Islamabad. And meanwhile, soldiers are dying in Kupyansk, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka. Peace will not come simply because Witkoff and Kushner want a media success story. It will come when Putin realizes that the cost of the war has definitively outweighed its benefits. We must work to hasten that moment—not to rush into a peace that would resemble a Ukrainian capitulation.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist