ANALYSIS: The SABER Act and Euroclear’s 193 billion — when Russian money funds Ukraine’s defense

A Political Signal Beyond the Legislative Text

Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States, responded publicly to the announcement of the SABER Act. Her message: the legislation opens up new opportunities regarding Russian assets and reignites the discussion on practical mechanisms for utilizing funds from the aggressor state. For Kyiv, the significance is not merely financial—it is political. Every dollar confiscated from Moscow and returned to the Ukrainian forces underscores that Putin’s war is self-financing. This is a logic of retributive justice that goes beyond mere accounting.

Zero cost to U.S. taxpayers

In a polarized Congress, redirecting frozen Russian assets represents a less politically painful solution than voting for new appropriations. Chuck Grassley, a Republican senator from Iowa, put it bluntly: this support comes at no cost to taxpayers. The math is clear: forcing Putin to finance the Ukrainian resistance is a selling point that resonates on both sides of the aisle in the U.S. Senate. This logic is not new, but the SABER Act formalizes it in a way that sets a lasting legislative precedent: Putin’s war must be paid for with Putin’s own funds.

There is something profoundly just—not only legally, but morally—about the idea that the reserves of a central bank financing an invasion are used to stop that very invasion. That is the very definition of a meaningful sanction.

The Central Securities Depository at the Heart of a Global Legal Dispute

Euroclear, a Belgian financial infrastructure based in Brussels, has unwittingly become the epicenter of the conflict over frozen Russian assets. Following the large-scale invasion in February 2022 and the subsequent Western sanctions, Euroclear found itself holding 193 billion euros in assets belonging to the Central Bank of Russia and other Russian sovereign entities—representing the largest share of the approximately 260 billion euros in Russian assets frozen by Western countries in total. Euroclear enforced the European Union’s sanctions, as required by EU law.

Moscow’s Legal Counteroffensive

In December 2025, the Russian Central Bank filed a claim with the Moscow Arbitration Court. In May 2026, the court ruled in its favor and ordered Euroclear to pay approximately 220 billion euros in damages for freezing the assets. The request for immediate enforcement was granted a few days later. Euroclear described the proceedings as unfair and sham—since the hearings were held behind closed doors—and categorically contested the jurisdiction of Russian courts over a Belgian legal entity operating in accordance with European Union rules.

A Russian court convicting a Belgian institution for complying with European laws—this is the logical outcome of a system that has abandoned any pretense of the rule of law. Moscow is no longer trying to persuade; it is trying to intimidate.

A preliminary hearing on June 25, 2026

On June 25, 2026, an initial preliminary hearing was held before the Brussels Commercial Court. Euroclear had officially filed its complaint to block the enforcement of the Russian decision. The central argument is strong: Euroclear is an entity governed by Belgian law; only Belgian courts have jurisdiction over the matter; and EU law explicitly protects it for having complied with the sanctions. Further proceedings are expected before the Brussels court in the coming months.

The Risk in Non-European Jurisdictions

A Reuters analysis dated June 30, 2026, highlighted the residual risk that Moscow might seek to enforce its ruling outside the European Union—in China, the United Arab Emirates, and Kazakhstan. In these jurisdictions, the protection that EU law affords Euroclear does not apply. Analysts describe this risk as more symbolic than practical in the short term, but it signals Russia’s strategy: to exploit gaps in Western jurisdictional coverage to gain ground in non-aligned countries. The Bank of Russia has stated that it is preparing a defense strategy, confirming that it is closely monitoring the proceedings in Brussels.

The risk in China or the United Arab Emirates is not negligible, and this is precisely why the West must accelerate the final resolution of the issue of Russian assets rather than allowing uncertainty to linger—uncertainty that Moscow knows how to exploit.

Fedorov Calls on London to Release Funds on June 30

On June 30, 2026, Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov met with Rachel Reeves, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer. The purpose: to accelerate the ERA (Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration) program, the G7 mechanism that uses revenue generated from frozen Russian assets as collateral for long-term loans to Ukraine. Fedorov requested that the funds be released as soon as possible, with three priorities: air defense, long-range munitions, and Ukrainian drones.

Kyiv’s Three Priorities: Air Defense, Ammunition, and Drones

Each of these three needs has a documented cost and a measurable sense of urgency. Ukraine’s air defense faces daily pressure from Russian ballistic missiles and guided aerial bombs. Long-range munitions are needed to strike Russian supply lines and logistics depots. Ukrainian drones have proven their operational effectiveness in both attack and reconnaissance roles and require a continuous supply stream. For Kyiv, the British ERA program is a source of funding that Ukraine considers legitimate and available; what is lacking is a political decision in London.

Fedorov is one of the Ukrainian ministers who is most forthright in his requests to the West. He does not negotiate behind the scenes; he states the needs publicly. This approach forces partners to take a stand.

The Scale of the International Financial Challenge

To understand what is at stake, we need to look at the overall figures. Western countries have frozen a total of approximately 300 billion euros in Russian sovereign assets since February 2022. About two-thirds of this amount is held in Europe, with the majority at Euroclear in Brussels. The United States holds a smaller share. Since 2024, the interest generated—about 3 billion euros per year—has been channeled to Ukraine via the ERA mechanism. This is the approach that the G7 has collectively endorsed. It has produced concrete results since its implementation.

From the REPO Act to ERA interest: the evolution of mechanisms

What the SABER Act proposes is to go much further: no longer just interest, but the confiscated principal as well. This represents a major qualitative leap. The proposal by Senators Kaine and Cornyn simply extends the scope permitted by the REPO Act to direct arming. Moscow’s argument under international law—that the seizure of assets constitutes a violation of customary law—clashes with the Western position: obligations under jus cogens and UN resolutions on aggression authorize proportionate retaliatory measures against a documented aggressor.

Three hundred billion euros are frozen, and we’re still debating the details. There’s something absurd about watching a house burn down while we discuss the terms of the insurance policy.

Statements that draw a clear moral line

John Cornyn, a Republican from Texas, articulated the issue with remarkable political clarity: the current arms export approval process is too lengthy and is causing delays in deliveries that are critical for Ukrainian forces. His amendment has two objectives: to free up Russian assets to finance arms purchases, and to reduce the bureaucracy that slows down arms transfers via NATO allies. Tim Kaine, a Democrat from Virginia, emphasized Ukrainian resilience on the battlefield and the increased efficiency that the new mechanism would enable.

Cornyn, Wicker, Whitehouse: Republican and Democratic Voices

Roger Wicker, a Republican from Mississippi, summarized the bill’s ambition: hundreds of billions of dollars in frozen Russian funds should be put to good use to repel the Russian invaders and support Ukrainians fighting for freedom. Sheldon Whitehouse, a Democrat from Rhode Island, drew a direct causal link: seizing Russian sovereign wealth funds via the REPO Act was the first step; the SABER Act would go further to force Putin to finance the very weapons that are defeating him. These statements confirm that the U.S. debate on Ukraine now transcends partisan lines.

When Cornyn and Kaine join forces on a pro-Ukraine bill, it’s a sign that Capitol Hill hasn’t completely abandoned the issue. It’s not enough yet, but it’s a real step forward.

An additional 70 billion on the table in July

The SABER Act comes at a pivotal moment for Western military support for Ukraine. The NATO summit is scheduled for July 7 and 8, 2026, in Ankara. Discussions are focused on additional military aid estimated at 70 billion euros, with a stated intention to maintain a similar level of funding in 2027. Support for Ukraine is expected to be among the key points in the final declaration. In this context, the initiative by U.S. senators takes on strong symbolic significance: it signals that the U.S. Congress, at least in part, remains committed.

The Convergence of U.S., European, and British Approaches

For the European allies present in Ankara, the SABER/ERA/Euroclear framework represents a convergence of different approaches toward a common goal. The EU has approved the use of interest from frozen assets to arm Ukraine starting in 2024. The European Commission has proposed loans against the principal. The United States is considering the direct purchase of weapons. The United Kingdom is pushing for the ERA program. This informal coordination is unprecedented in its scope. What is still lacking is the speed of execution in the face of a war that will not wait.

The Ankara summit will be a test—not to determine whether the allies support Ukraine in principle—they do—but to see if they are capable of turning good intentions into concrete actions in the coming weeks, not quarters.

Russia’s Decision: More Symbolic Than Practical in the EU

Financial analysts quoted by Reuters on June 30, 2026, agree: the Moscow arbitration court’s ruling ordering Euroclear to pay 220 billion euros has more symbolic than practical significance in the European Union. EU law explicitly protects Euroclear, and no Belgian or European court will recognize the jurisdiction of a Russian court over a Belgian-incorporated entity operating in compliance with EU sanctions. Euroclear’s response in the Belgian courts forces Moscow to demonstrate, before an independent court, the legal basis for its claims.

Russia’s Global Legal Intimidation Strategy

Moscow knows that its decision will not be enforced in Europe. The strategy lies elsewhere: to create uncertainty for financial institutions that cooperate with the sanctions regime, to fuel a narrative of victimization among BRICS countries, and to chip away at positions in non-aligned countries. The Bank of Russia has stated that it is preparing a defense strategy against the Brussels proceedings—a defensive posture that speaks volumes about the true fragility of its position. The West’s objective must be to bring the case to a legal close before this uncertainty begins to affect third-party financial markets.

Moscow is playing for time and capitalizing on uncertainty. This is its approach in all areas—military, economic, and legal. The West must learn to act more quickly, not more cautiously.

A bill that is still in the draft stage

The limitations of the SABER Act must be clearly stated. As of July 1, 2026, the bill is still a draft bill, not a law. It must pass through Senate committees, a Senate vote, the House of Representatives, and then be signed by the president. In a polarized Congress, where the SAVE Act—a similar initiative—had already failed to secure the 60 votes needed in the Senate, the road ahead remains long. Senator Thune, the Senate Majority Leader, stated that the SAVE Act did not have enough support. The SABER Act has stronger bipartisan support, but a majority is not guaranteed.

The geographic distribution of assets limits the direct U.S. impact

Furthermore, Russian assets under strict U.S. jurisdiction represent only a fraction of the total $300 billion in frozen assets. The vast majority remains in Europe, primarily with Euroclear. The SABER Act therefore has no direct leverage over these European funds—it can only act on what is under U.S. control. To mobilize the European assets, the European Parliament, the Council, and the EU member states must take action. The U.S. initiative sends a strong political signal, but its direct financial impact is limited by the geographic distribution of the frozen assets.

Good ideas are not laws. The path through the U.S. Senate is fraught with obstacles, and Ukraine does not have the luxury of waiting for the next legislative session. This is the urgency that is not being emphasized enough.

The Gap Between the Legal Framework and Actual Implementation

There is a cruel paradox in this matter: the frozen Russian assets do exist. The 300 billion euros are tied up, identified, and located. The mechanisms for using them are being developed or are already partially in place. And yet, every week of delay results in concrete shortfalls in the Ukrainian armed forces’ equipment. The gap between the legal framework and actual implementation is not technical—it is political. Western decision-makers have not yet decided to move as quickly as the war demands.

The 70 billion from the NATO summit in response to the Ukrainian crisis

The NATO summit in Ankara is discussing an additional 70 billion euros in aid. This is a significant sum. But frozen Russian assets amount to four times that figure and cost allied taxpayers nothing. The political challenge, therefore, is to understand why Western democracies prefer to mobilize their own resources rather than seize those of the aggressor. The answer is partly legal—the mechanisms are not yet fully in place—and partly political: fear of setting an international precedent and of economic retaliation from Moscow in other areas is holding back the boldest decisions.

The Defense-Funding-Time Equation

On the Ukrainian side, coordination is evident. Fedorov spoke in London about the ERA program on June 30. Stefanishyna praised the SABER Act in Washington. In Brussels, legal proceedings against the Russian Central Bank are moving forward. This is no coincidence: Ukraine is waging a coordinated diplomatic and financial offensive to maximize access to frozen Russian assets before the issue is politically resolved. Ukrainian forces need massive quantities of artillery ammunition, air defense systems, and drones. Frozen Russian assets theoretically represent the means to finance these without overburdening Western defense budgets.

Ukrainian coordination between Washington, Brussels, and London

Every week of delay in releasing the funds results in unfunded military capabilities. The time pressure is real. The NATO summit in Ankara in July 2026 will be followed by an implementation period. If the SABER Act is not passed by the end of 2026, the political window may close. If ERA funds are not released quickly by the United Kingdom, deliveries of air defense systems will be delayed. Ultimately, the issue is not just whether Russian money will finance Ukrainian weapons—it is how quickly.

The war is being fought in weeks, sometimes even days. Financial and legal arrangements, however, take months or even years. This mismatch in timing is perhaps the greatest structural threat to Western support for Ukraine.

A Legal Innovation Developed Under the Pressure of War

The issue of using the assets of a belligerent state even before the end of a conflict has no recent precedent that is perfectly comparable. War reparations imposed by treaty—Versailles in 1919, the postwar agreements in 1945—occurred after the aggressor’s defeat. What is happening with the frozen Russian assets is different: mobilizing resources during the conflict, without waiting for a hypothetical peace, to enable the victim to defend itself. This is a major legal and political innovation that the West is devising on the fly, under the pressure of an actual war.

The Budapest Memorandum and the West’s Debt

The strongest moral argument remains the 1994 Budapest Memorandum: Ukraine renounced the Soviet nuclear arsenal it had inherited on its territory in exchange for security guarantees signed by Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Moscow violated these guarantees in 2014 and again in 2022. Using frozen Russian assets to finance the Ukrainian resistance is not a dangerous precedent for the international system—it is proof that sanctions have real consequences. Legal experts concerned about setting a precedent should first be concerned about the precedent set by a full-scale invasion in Europe that has gone unpunished with no lasting financial consequences for the documented aggressor.

Those who worry about the precedent should first worry about the precedent set by a large-scale invasion in Europe that has had no lasting financial consequences for the aggressor. The two risks are not symmetrical.

The Political Window That Is Gradually Closing

The week of June 18–30, 2026, marked a rare convergence of signals: a bipartisan bill in the U.S. Senate, legal action by Euroclear in Brussels, and a direct request from Fedorov in London. These three parallel events convey a consistent message: the Western world has decided that Russian funds will be used to defend Ukraine, but the mechanisms are still incomplete, the procedures are slow, and the votes are uncertain. The SABER Act needs 60 votes in the Senate; the ERA program needs a swift political decision in London; Euroclear needs the EU’s diplomatic support to defend its legal position.

What history will remember about this pivotal moment

In five years, historians will look back on this moment and judge whether the West acted quickly enough. 193 billion euros at Euroclear. 300 billion in total. Entire arsenals could be financed by money from the very person who started the war. The question is no longer whether this is legally possible—the legal framework is taking shape—nor even whether it is politically desirable—the Western consensus exists. The question is whether democratic institutions, slow by nature, can move fast enough so that there is still something left to defend. Ukraine cannot wait for the next legislative session. It is waiting for ammunition.

Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, the West is learning at the speed of war that power is not just military. It is also financial, legal, and industrial. And on all three of these fronts simultaneously, the delay is being paid for with Ukrainian lives.

The Budapest Memorandum was not a scrap of paper—it was a contract. Moscow tore it up. Using its frozen assets to defend Ukraine is not a punishment: it is the enforced repayment of a debt incurred in 1994.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist