COLUMN: The 11th Sino-Russian Patrol — Nuclear Bombers and Tensions in the Sea of Japan

Simulated Launch Near the Japanese Coast

According to reports from Chinese and Russian media, as well as data from the Japanese Joint Staff, Russian Tu-95s conducted simulated launches of Kh-101 missiles near the Japanese archipelago. The Kh-101 is a long-range cruise missile with a maximum range of 3,500 km, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Simulating its launch from a position near Japan is a calculated move: it demonstrates that Russian bombers can reach targets throughout the region without ever entering sovereign airspace.

That 3,500-km range means that from the Tu-95s’ position during this patrol, the missiles could theoretically reach targets in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and parts of the Pacific where the United States maintains military bases. This isn’t rhetoric—it’s the geography of the threat.

What This Means for Regional Defense

For military planners in Seoul and Tokyo, this simulated long-range strike demonstration reinforces the relevance of the missile defense systems deployed in the region: THAAD, Patriot, and Aegis-class naval systems. It also highlights the limitations of these systems when faced with diverse, coordinated strike vectors operating in formation from multiple directions.

South Korea has recently struggled to conduct its own joint air exercises with the United States. A South Korean military source quoted by the Chosun Daily noted this contrast in no uncertain terms: “South Korea has recently struggled to conduct joint air exercises with the United States, which stands in contrast to the progress observed in Sino-Russian cooperation.” ” This contrast is a signal that allies must heed.

Cruise missiles with a range of 3,500 km, simulated from aircraft flying without prior notice into the air defense identification zones of U.S. allies. If this patrol had taken place against a backdrop of heightened tension—a crisis in Taiwan, a North Korean provocation—it would not have been an exercise. It would have been a prelude. And that is exactly why we must take it seriously.

Eleven patrols, one flight path

The first joint China-Russia strategic air patrol dates back to 2019. Since then, each iteration has grown in complexity: more aircraft, a wider variety of types, a larger geographic area, and greater interoperability. This progression is no accident. It reflects a deliberate investment by both countries in military cooperation that goes beyond the level of political communication.

In 2026, Russia is engaging its strategic air force in joint exercises with China while waging a war of attrition in Ukraine. This speaks volumes about Russia’s ability to maintain a strategic posture across multiple theaters simultaneously—but also about Moscow’s growing dependence on Beijing. China is Russia’s leading trading partner despite sanctions. It is also, gradually, becoming its most active military partner. This dual dependence represents a major geopolitical shift that the West cannot ignore.

What China Gains from This Alliance

For China, these patrols serve multiple purposes. They allow China to accelerate the training of its crews in complex combined operations. They offer China an opportunity to closely observe Russian procedures—including the weaknesses that the war in Ukraine has exposed. They also allow China to send a diplomatic message to the United States: we have a strategic partner; we can operate together; and your air dominance in the Pacific is being challenged.

But China also gains something more concrete: confirmation that its strategic air force can operate under real-world conditions involving complex training scenarios—with early-warning aircraft, refueling aircraft, and escort fighters—over distances reaching the western Pacific. Each patrol is a real operational training exercise, free from the constraints of a purely simulated drill.

China and Russia are not allies out of mutual affection. They are allies by calculation. Russia needs China to survive economically under sanctions. China needs Russia to maintain pressure on the United States in the Northern Hemisphere while it pursues its own ambitions in the Pacific. It is an alliance of convenience—but alliances of convenience can be just as dangerous as ideological alliances when their interests converge.

F-15K and F-35A: The Immediate Defense

In response to the incursion into the KADIZ, South Korea dispatched F-15Ks to intercept the intruder. Japan scrambled F-35As. These responses are immediate, well-documented, and constitute the first line of military communication in the face of provocation. They signal: we saw it, we reacted, and we will not back down.

But beyond the immediate response, these repeated incidents raise a structural question for both democracies. How long can they continue to respond with the same aircraft and the same procedures without adapting their posture to the growing sophistication of Sino-Russian patrols? Each new iteration adds new capabilities: this time, cross-air refueling. Next time, perhaps actual strike weapons in the bombers’ bomb bays. Defense cannot simply play catch-up with what the offense is preparing.

Japan’s Serious Concern

Japan has conveyed “serious concern” to both countries through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This diplomatic phrasing reflects something deeper: Japan, whose adjacent airspace is being used as a nuclear strike simulation zone, cannot remain in a state of purely verbal protest indefinitely. The pressure on Tokyo to increase its defense capabilities—and its defense budget, which has already risen significantly since 2022—only grows with every patrol.

For NATO allies watching these developments from across the Atlantic, there is a clear lesson: the challenge posed by the China-Russia axis is not geographically limited to Ukraine or the Black Sea. It extends to the Western Pacific, the East China Sea, and Northeast Asia. The threat is multipolar and coordinated. The response must be as well.

Japan has expressed “serious concern.” South Korea has scrambled fighter jets. The United States is taking note. And meanwhile, China and Russia are conducting their eleventh patrol, adding cross-refueling to their repertoire, and returning home having demonstrated that their military cooperation is more advanced than it was during their tenth patrol. The momentum is on their side. That’s no reason to panic—but it is a reason to act.

A Signal Aimed at Both Fronts

It would be naive to view this patrol in isolation from the Ukrainian context. Russia is waging a war of attrition in Ukraine, under economic and military pressure. At the same time, it is deploying its strategic air force in a show of force with China over the Pacific. This dual signal is intentional: we are not isolated, we have a partner, and our strategic air power remains intact.

For Ukraine and its allies, this signal must be read carefully. It confirms what analyses from Kyiv and Washington have concluded for several months: China and Russia form an axis of resistance to the Western liberal order that is operating across multiple theaters simultaneously. Supporting Ukraine in Europe without maintaining a strong presence in the Pacific would leave an exposed flank that Beijing could exploit.

The Coordination the West Must Build

Faced with a China-Russia axis conducting its eleventh joint patrol, the West needs transatlantic and trans-Pacific coordination that is commensurate with the threat. This means NATO exercises that incorporate multi-vector threat scenarios, deeper intelligence-sharing between European and Indo-Pacific allies, and investments in missile defense tailored to the long-range strike capabilities that China and Russia are jointly training for.

The NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, is taking place against this backdrop. Thirty-two member nations are gathering less than two weeks after the 11th Sino-Russian patrol. The collective defense agenda cannot be limited to Ukraine—it must incorporate the reality of a Sino-Russian military partnership that is now operating with visible operational maturity.

NATO is meeting in Ankara in a few days. I hope that someone in that conference room has looked at the data from the 11th patrol—the cross-refueling, the simulated Kh-101s, the scrambled Japanese F-35As. Because the threat NATO must address is not only in Europe. It is in the Pacific. It is eleven times more advanced than it was in 2019. And it won’t stop during the summit.

A Steady Pace

The 11th China-Russia Joint Strategic Air Patrol on June 27, 2026, is not an anomaly—it is a step in a deliberate progression. Each patrol has been more complex than the last. Each iteration has demonstrated deeper interoperability. The 12th will be planned, likely with new elements—more types of aircraft, an even broader geographic area, and perhaps new weapons systems tested in a joint framework.

The response this progression demands is not panic—it is adaptation. Strengthened missile defenses. Joint exercises with Indo-Pacific allies. A doctrine for rapid response to air identification zone incursions that matches the sophistication of the patrols. And above all, a clear understanding of what the China-Russia axis is building—before the 12th patrol adds yet another layer to what the 11th demonstrated.

What June 27 Proved

On June 27, 2026, China and Russia proved three things. First, that their joint strategic air force can operate for six hours in high-pressure zones with multiple types of aircraft flying in coordinated formation. Second, that their in-flight refueling systems are sufficiently interoperable to allow—potentially—cross-refueling. Third, that their long-range strike assets can simulate nuclear attacks on strategic areas without ever formally violating any country’s sovereign airspace.

Taken together, these three pieces of evidence paint a picture of a joint military force that did not exist five years ago. It is not yet comparable to NATO in terms of standardization and integration. But it is advancing much faster than the analysts who kept insisting that the China-Russia axis was fundamentally fragile. Until it turns out they are right, the allies would do well to prepare for the possibility that they are wrong.

Eleven patrols. An alliance in the making. Democratic alliances struggling to agree on joint exercises. I’m not a defeatist—I’m an observer who’s counting. And what I’m counting tells me that the window to adapt our defenses is here, right now, while the China-Russia axis is still in its first few dozen exercises. The twentieth patrol will be much harder to challenge than the eleventh.

The Sea of Japan as a Barometer

In just a few years, the Sea of Japan has become one of the most reliable barometers of the rise in Sino-Russian military power. This is no mere geographical coincidence—it is because this area is strategically central to the ambitions of both countries: for Russia, it provides access to Pacific sea lanes and allows it to project a threat against U.S. allies; for China, it serves as a corridor to the Pacific Ocean that bypasses potential chokepoints in Japan and South Korea.

Every patrol in this space is an implicit territorial claim, a declaration of interests, and a test of the resilience of democratic alliances. What the F-15Ks and F-35As scrambled on June 27 demonstrated—correctly—is that these alliances hold firm. But holding firm is not enough. We must also anticipate. And anticipating, in 2026, means taking the 12th patrol seriously before it even takes place.

I’ll conclude on a personal note: I’ve never been particularly concerned about the Sea of Japan. For a long time, it was a region where tensions were manageable, where Sino-Russian patrols were merely rhetorical. The 11th patrol, with its cross-ship refueling, changed my mind. Not because it heralds war. But because it signals that the tools of war are there, ready, and well-trained. And that deserves to be stated clearly.

What Seoul, Tokyo, and NATO Need to Take Away

Eleven patrols. Six hours. Simulated missiles at 3,500 km. A cross-air refueling operation demonstrating unprecedented interoperability. Japanese F-35As and South Korean F-15Ks on intercept missions. A “serious diplomatic concern” from Tokyo. This is the summary of events on June 27, 2026. It is objective, documented, and indisputable.

What Seoul, Tokyo, and NATO must take away from this is that the threat in the Western Pacific and Northeast Asia is evolving at a pace that current defense structures are not fully prepared to handle. The answer is not panic—it is investment. In missile defense capabilities, in joint exercises, and in common doctrine. The time to prepare for the 12th patrol is now.

I’m covering this patrol against the backdrop of a war in Ukraine that is monopolizing attention. But these two theaters are linked. Russia waging a war of attrition in Europe and a show of force in the Pacific at the same time—that’s exactly what Putin wants us to believe the West cannot sustain. We must prove him wrong on both fronts at once.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist