FEATURE: Ankara 2026 — NATO 3.0 and Europe Taking the Reins

Ankara, Host of the Summit—A Symbolically Significant Choice

The choice of Ankara as the host city for the NATO summit in July 2026 is not insignificant. Turkey is a member of the Alliance with a strategic geographic location—it controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits and shares borders with Russia and several Middle Eastern countries. It has also had a complicated relationship with Moscow in recent years, particularly regarding the purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, which led to its exclusion from the F-35 program.

Hosting the NATO summit in Ankara sends a strong signal to Turkey: you are a pillar of the Alliance, your commitment is valued, and your role in European and Middle Eastern security is recognized. Turkey has also served as an important mediator between Ukraine and Russia—particularly during the negotiations on Ukrainian grain in 2022. This bridging role could prove invaluable at a time when peace negotiations remain deadlocked.

Turkish Statements Ahead of the Summit

In the days leading up to the summit, Ankara stated that NATO is “adjusting to the new security landscape” and that the United States is not withdrawing from Europe. This phrasing is cautious: it acknowledges the change while presenting it as an adjustment rather than an abandonment. For the Alliance’s most anxious members—the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania—this phrasing strikes a delicate balance between reassurance and realism.

Secretary General Rutte had emphasized in his pre-summit statements that the decision made at the 2025 Hague summit to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP was a decision about delivery and implementation. Ankara must be the summit where these commitments begin to materialize—not just another summit where goals are reaffirmed without robust implementation mechanisms.

Turkey’s role in NATO remains a complex equation. It is strategically indispensable. It is politically unpredictable. And hosting the summit in Ankara means acknowledging this indispensability while hoping that institutional proximity will anchor Erdoğan—or his successor—more firmly within the Western camp. This gamble has its logic. It also carries its risks.

Security Guarantees for Ukraine: The Unresolved Issue

For Ukraine, the Ankara summit raises a fundamental question: what security guarantees will it receive? No formal NATO membership in the short term—the political obstacles remain considerable. But bilateral security agreements with the most committed members—the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States—can serve as an alternative security framework until formal membership is achieved.

These bilateral agreements, which have multiplied since the 2023 Vilnius summit, commit the signatories to supporting Ukraine militarily, financially, and in terms of intelligence. They are not Article 5—but they are a form of commitment that, if all members honor their commitments, offers substantial security to Ukraine. The Ankara summit is expected to consolidate and deepen these commitments.

NATO 3.0 and Ukraine’s Place in the European Security Architecture

Within the framework of NATO 3.0, Ukraine occupies a unique position: it is both the primary reason why this transformation is necessary and a leading military actor whose capabilities could enrich the Alliance if its integration progresses. Ukraine’s long-range drones, its military’s combat experience, and its electronic warfare doctrine—all of these represent added value for collective security that the most forward-thinking member countries are beginning to recognize.

Estonian MEP Riho Terras, quoted in the pre-summit analysis, stated that Europe must become “strategically mature”—which implies, among other things, recognizing Ukraine as a security partner, not merely as a recipient of aid. This vision—of Ukraine as a contributor to European security rather than a burden—should guide the discussions in Ankara.

I have observed a shift in perception over the past few months in European strategic circles: Ukraine is no longer seen merely as a country to be defended—it is seen as an army to be integrated. This development is healthy and long overdue. The Ankara summit should further formalize it.

Verifiable and Binding Commitments on Defense Spending

For the Ankara summit to be more than just a diplomatic event, it must produce concrete and verifiable commitments on defense spending. The goal of 5% of GDP by 2035 is ambitious—but without robust monitoring mechanisms and consequences for states that fail to meet their commitments, it risks resembling NATO’s previous 2% pledges, which were long ignored by most European members.

Alliance members that share a border with Russia—Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, Norway, and Romania—are already spending at high levels. It is the major economies of Western Europe—Germany, France, Italy, and Spain—that will have to make the greatest efforts. And it is precisely there that internal political resistance is strongest, in societies that have enjoyed several decades of the peace dividend.

A Clear Message to Moscow—and to Beijing

The Ankara summit must send a clear message to Moscow: NATO is not fracturing, aid to Ukraine remains in place, and the transition to NATO 3.0 strengthens—not weakens—the continent’s defensive capability. This message is particularly important at a time when Russia is hoping that divisions among allies over defense spending will create opportunities for further advances.

It must also send a signal to Beijing: China, which is closely watching how the Ukraine crisis is being managed to draw lessons for Taiwan, must understand that the West is capable of supporting an invaded ally and strengthening its own defenses simultaneously. If NATO demonstrates its solidarity in Ankara, the entire Western deterrent posture against China will benefit.

I am watching the Ankara summit with the cautious hope that democracies will finally realize that defense is an investment, not an expense. But I have also seen too many fine-sounding press releases followed by little actual action. What will matter is not what is said in Ankara on July 8. It is what will be spent and deployed on January 8, 2027.

Terras Says No to a European Army — Taylor Says Yes to NATO’s European Pillar

Riho Terras was unequivocal in her pre-summit remarks: “A European army is a bad idea.” ” Her argument: Europe doesn’t need a new structure—it has NATO, which works. What it needs to do is fulfill its obligations within this existing structure. Political scientist Kai Kamp shares this view: “We don’t need a new structure for European decision-making—we have one, and that’s NATO.”

This debate is not merely academic. The issue of European strategic autonomy—championed by France in particular for years—is resurfacing with renewed force in the context of NATO 3.0. The idea is not to replace NATO with a European army, but to ensure that Europe can act defensively even if the United States is slow to respond—or if a future U.S. administration decides to disengage even further than Trump did.

The Political Flexibility of the NATO Framework as an Asset

The NATO framework offers a decisive political advantage over any other European defense structure: it includes the United States, which is irreplaceable for nuclear deterrence and strategic capabilities that Europe cannot yet afford. It also includes Turkey, Norway, and the United Kingdom—players that would not necessarily be part of an EU army. This inclusivity is a strength in a security environment where cohesion and interoperability are more important than formal autonomy.

NATO 3.0 is therefore less a formal restructuring than an informal redistribution of responsibilities within the existing framework. Europe takes charge of conventional defense. The United States retains nuclear capabilities. Both remain bound by Article 5 and by decades of interoperability. It is a pragmatic arrangement for a pragmatic era—and this is likely what the Ankara communiqué will formalize, using the appropriate diplomatic language.

I prefer NATO 3.0 to a European army for pragmatic reasons. The next two decades will be too dangerous for institutional experiments. But let’s be honest: NATO 3.0 only works if every European member meets its spending commitments. Without that, it’s just a nice-sounding phrase to cover up a real strategic void.

Moscow is assessing what the summit reveals about the Alliance’s cohesion

Russia is watching the Ankara summit with particular attention. Every sign of disunity among Alliance members—on funding, on red lines regarding Ukraine, on the pace of NATO 3.0—is strategic information that Moscow will use in its military calculations. Putin has always bet on Western fragmentation. If Ankara issues an ambitious but vague communiqué, lacking concrete implementation mechanisms, the Kremlin will draw its own conclusions about the coalition’s strength.

Russia also maintains its partnerships with Iran and North Korea, which continue to supply ammunition and equipment. For these countries, a West that debates the distribution of responsibilities instead of actually increasing its capabilities is good news. The Ankara summit must therefore not only reaffirm the Alliance’s commitments but also demonstrate that members are upholding them. The credibility of deterrence depends on consistency between words and actions.

Iran, North Korea, and the Support Network for Russia

North Korea has delivered millions of artillery shells to Russia since 2023. Iran has supplied Shahed drones that continue to be launched at Ukrainian cities. China is supplying technological components that fuel the Russian defense industry despite Western sanctions. This coalition supporting Russia—informal but effective—is one of the factors explaining why the war has lasted for more than four years despite the sanctions.

Responding to this coalition requires coordination within the Alliance that goes beyond a purely military response: diplomatic pressure on Pyongyang, Tehran, and Beijing; stricter enforcement of secondary sanctions on Chinese exports; and coordination among intelligence agencies to document transfers of prohibited arms. The Ankara summit is an opportunity to strengthen this coordination—if members have the political will to do so.

Russia, Iran, North Korea, and, to a certain extent, China, form an axis of common interest against the liberal international order. This is not a formal alliance with a centralized command—it is a convergence of interests that produces concrete results on the ground. NATO must have a coordinated response to this axis. Ankara must begin to formulate it.

NATO’s Forward Defense: From an Enhanced Presence to Actual Defense

Since the 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO has transformed its multinational battlegroups on the eastern flank from a symbolic presence into a genuine combat force. The brigades deployed in Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania have been reinforced. Permanent infrastructure has been built. Large-scale exercises have been conducted regularly.

But military experts in the Baltic states are clear: to truly deter a Russian attack, sufficient forces are needed to hold the line without waiting for reinforcements. The Cold War doctrine—withholding the initial attack and then counterattacking with reinforcements from the West—is no longer credible in the Ukrainian context, where Russia has demonstrated that it can seize territory rapidly before reinforcements arrive. NATO 3.0 must therefore equip itself with the means for a robust forward defense from the very first day of any potential conflict.

The Suwalki Corridor and the Kaliningrad Threat

The Suwalki Corridor—that narrow strip of land between Poland and Lithuania, wedged between Kaliningrad to the west and Belarus to the east—is the most vulnerable point on NATO’s eastern flank. Russia could theoretically cut off this corridor to isolate the Baltic states from the rest of the Alliance, trapping them in an enclave that is difficult to reinforce. NATO military planners have been working on this scenario for years.

NATO 3.0 must provide a credible response to this risk. It must demonstrate that the Suwalki Corridor is defensible, that the forces pre-positioned in the Baltic states are sufficient to hold their ground, and that reinforcements can arrive quickly if necessary. These issues will be at the center of military discussions in Ankara—even if public statements will likely mention them only obliquely.

I am thinking of the residents of Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius, who are watching the Ankara summit with a sense of anxiety that the French or Belgians do not feel in the same way. For them, NATO is not a geopolitical abstraction—it is the difference between freedom and occupation. These countries deserve concrete guarantees, not diplomatic platitudes. Ankara must deliver.

A Summit Set to Make History

The Ankara summit on July 7 and 8, 2026, carries the weight of a pivotal moment in the history of European security. The war in Ukraine continues. Defense spending is rising. Ambitions are growing. But concrete capabilities have yet to be built. This summit will be judged not by its declarations—which everyone will applaud—but by the concrete implementation mechanisms it produces: timelines, objectives, responsibilities, and consequences for noncompliance.

What I take away as a witness to this era

I bear witness to this era with the conviction that Europe is taking its defense seriously—for the first time since 1945. This is no easy transformation. It will cost hundreds of billions of euros, require difficult political choices, and take place against the backdrop of an active war on the continent’s doorstep. But it is necessary. And if the Ankara summit yields the commitments that the situation demands, it will go down in history as the moment when Europe decided to stand up—and to stand by its allies.

I was not in Ankara. I will not be in the room where leaders make their decisions. What I do know is that these decisions will have consequences for the lives of millions of Ukrainians and Europeans, and for the security of the democratic world for decades to come. That is why I observe, analyze, and comment on them—with all the seriousness that this responsibility demands.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist