OP-ED: Ukraine Strikes from 3,000 km Away — Zelensky Changes the Rules of Long-Range Warfare

Bashneft and Rosneft in the Crosshairs

On June 25, 2026, Ukrainian drones—some of which resembled the Liutyi drone, a Ukrainian AI-powered drone with a range of approximately 2,000 kilometers and capable of carrying a 50- to 75-kilogram warhead—struck two of the three plants at the Bashneft refinery complex in Ufa: Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim and, likely, Bashneft-UNPZ. These facilities are controlled by Rosneft, the Russian state-owned oil giant.

The head of the Bashkortostan region, Radiy Khabirov, claimed that the attack had been “repelled” and that only debris from downed drones had caused damage. This official Russian account should be taken with a grain of salt: satellite imagery and independent reports have consistently contradicted the Kremlin’s statements regarding the damage caused by Ukrainian strikes. On July 1, 2026, Zelensky confirmed a second strike on the same refinery in Ufa.

Fuel as a Weapon: Ukraine’s Economic Strategy

Zelensky stated this explicitly in his address on June 29, 2026: “Even an oil-producing state, often referred to as a ‘gas station,’ is now facing fuel shortages. ” This shortage in 70 regions of Russia is no coincidence—it is the result of a systematic campaign of strikes on Russian oil infrastructure. Refineries in Bashkortostan, Krasnodar Krai, and the Saratov region—each one hit reduces the fuel production capacity available to the Russian military.

Behind the figures on drone strike ranges lies a coherent strategy: to deprive the Russian armed forces of the resources necessary for their offensive. A tank without fuel cannot move. An airplane without jet fuel cannot take off. An army deprived of lubricants sees its armored vehicles wear out prematurely. By targeting Russian energy infrastructure, Ukraine is striking the military machine where it is most vulnerable in the long term.

What I find remarkable about this strategy is its intellectual coherence. Ukraine isn’t bombing at random. It’s targeting the logistical hubs that fuel the Russian war machine. This is economic warfare waged with drones. And unlike Western sanctions—which have had real but limited effects—these strikes produce immediate and measurable results.

Putin: Between Denial and Admission

In a televised interview on June 28, 2026, Vladimir Putin acknowledged that Russians were facing fuel shortages, while rejecting Ukraine’s proposal to halt long-range strikes as a “ploy” to ease military pressure on Kyiv. This acknowledgment is extraordinary in its scope: the Russian president admits, before his own citizens, that the war he started has direct consequences on their daily lives.

The Russians waiting in line at gas stations are the direct result of a military strategy that Putin has imposed on them. Zelenskyy points this out with surgical precision: “Russians who have not yet been mobilized and are currently waiting in line at the gas pump should think carefully about what lies ahead for them.” This is not provocation—it is a call for clarity.

The Mayor of Moscow and the 50 Downed Drones

On June 30, 2026, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin reported a massive drone attack that began around 4 a.m. He stated that air defenses had shot down about 50 UAVs. But the sheer frequency and scale of these attacks reveal something the Kremlin can no longer hide: Moscow has become a regular target, and Russian air defense systems, however effective they may be, cannot intercept every drone.

The space communications center in Dubna, in the Moscow region, was struck the same day by what Zelensky calls Ukraine’s “long-range strikes.” This facility, used for satellite reconnaissance and the coordination of invasion forces, is located more than 500 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Its destruction or damage deprives Russian forces of a vital command and intelligence tool.

There is a striking irony in the fact that Moscow, which has bombed Kyiv hundreds of times since 2022, is now discovering what it means to hear air raid sirens at 4 a.m. I do not take pleasure in the fear of Moscow’s civilians—civilian fear is never a moral victory. But I note that this new symmetry is forcing Putin to make calculations he had not anticipated.

Russian Advances Slowed, but Not Stopped

Despite Ukrainian long-range strikes, Russia continues to make slow progress in the Donetsk region. Russian forces have captured the entire Luhansk region and large portions of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. But the pace of this advance has slowed considerably over the past few months, according to Ukrainian officials, as Ukraine intensifies its campaign of medium- and long-range strikes.

This slowdown is no accident. Fuel shortages, logistical disruptions caused by drone strikes on fuel depots and rail infrastructure, and Russia’s need to bolster its air defenses around its major cities—all of this is creating strain within the Russian military, resulting in fewer munitions, fewer fighter jets, and fewer resources available for the offensive.

The War of Attrition Shifts Sides

Since 2022, the dominant narrative has been that of a war of attrition favoring Russia: a major power with superior human and industrial resources eventually wearing down a smaller adversary. That narrative is now being challenged. Ukraine has demonstrated its ability to innovate faster than Russia can adapt, to strike deeper than Moscow had anticipated, and to impose real economic costs on an adversary whose economic model depends on hydrocarbon exports.

Russia had bet on Western exhaustion. It had bet on waning support for military aid, on political divisions in Europe and the United States, and on Ukraine’s inability to sustain its resistance over the long term. These bets are proving less and less reliable—and the FP-1 drones, with a range of 3,000 kilometers, are the most eloquent demonstration of this.

I remember the experts who, in 2022, predicted Ukraine would collapse within a few weeks. In 2024, they predicted Putin would win through attrition. In 2026, Ukraine is striking targets 3,000 kilometers away. The lesson of this war is that predictions about wars of attrition assume static adversaries. Ukraine is not static. It innovates, adapts, and resists with a vitality that no one had anticipated.

Ukraine no longer needs to be a passive protégé

For years, the Western debate over support for Ukraine has been dominated by fears of escalation. Every new weapon delivered—tanks, long-range missiles, F-16s, ATACMS—was preceded by months of deliberations over the “red lines” that Putin was supposed to be unwilling to cross. This hesitation has come at a documented human cost: every month of delay in delivering a weapons system has resulted in avoidable Ukrainian casualties.

But the Ukrainian drone revolution is changing the nature of the debate. Ukraine is no longer merely asking for Western weapons—it is developing new, more capable ones tailored to its specific war environment. The FP-1 drones with a range of 3,000 kilometers are a Ukrainian product, born of Ukrainian ingenuity and funded by the Ukrainian resistance. This is a level of strategic autonomy that no one in Western chancelleries had truly anticipated.

Trump, U.S. Aid, and the Paradox of Dependence

Since returning to the White House, the Trump administration has maintained a level of U.S. aid to Ukraine that has been variable and at times unpredictable. This context has accelerated a reality that Ukrainians have come to accept: they cannot depend on a single protector, whether it be Washington, Berlin, or Paris. They must be capable of defending themselves, with their own resources, over the long term.

The FP-1 drones are the result of this logic of survival. They also send a message to all of Ukraine’s allies: we are gaining capabilities, not losing them. Western aid remains invaluable—every Patriot system, every Gripen, every artillery shell counts. But Ukraine is no longer passively waiting for the West to decide its fate. It is actively shaping the conditions for its own victory.

I believe this is the most profound lesson of this period. Ukraine is becoming an autonomous military actor, not merely a recipient of Western aid. This is a transformation that Kyiv’s partners would do well to celebrate rather than fear. A Ukraine capable of defending itself strengthens NATO—it does not weaken it.

The People Building Drones Amid the Sirens

Behind the numbers—3,000 kilometers, 855 kilometers, 50 drones shot down—are men and women working in workshops, garages, and makeshift laboratories, amid the sound of air raid sirens, in a wartime economy where resources are scarce and every day could be their last. The engineers at Fire Point, like those at Bayraktar and dozens of other Ukrainian defense technology companies, deserve recognition that goes far beyond official statements.

These Ukrainian engineers are the face of a resistance unlike anything classical strategic literature had anticipated. They do not operate from high-tech bunkers sheltered from bombs—they innovate under the very conditions their enemy seeks to make unlivable. It is this resolve that Putin had not factored into his calculations. It is this resolve that explains the drones with a range of 3,000 kilometers.

Ukraine’s Industrial Mobilization: A Lesson for the West

In June 2026, Zelensky confirmed that Ukraine had launched a record number of strikes against the Russian defense industry that month. This coordinated campaign—long-range drones, cruise missiles, and FPV drones along the line of contact—demonstrates an industrial surge that few analysts had anticipated. Ukraine now produces hundreds of thousands of drones per year, of various types and for different missions.

For NATO members struggling to ramp up their artillery production, this Ukrainian reality serves as a lesson in industrial mobilization during times of crisis. What Kyiv has accomplished in two years—moving from near-total dependence on foreign aid to world-class domestic drone production—should inspire defense strategists from Berlin to Paris to Washington.

I often think of the engineers working through the night in Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Lviv, designing the drones that will strike an oil refinery 1,300 kilometers away tomorrow. They aren’t doing this for glory or to make headlines. They’re doing it because their country needs them. I don’t know their names. I simply want to acknowledge that they exist, and that their existence is changing the course of this war.

Air defenses Overwhelmed by Swarms of Drones

On June 30, 2026, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin announced that some 50 drones had been intercepted in a single night. This figure reveals Ukraine’s strategy: not to send a single expensive drone that could be intercepted, but swarms that overwhelm air defense systems. Even if 80% are shot down, the remaining 20% reach their targets. This is the logic behind using low-cost munitions in large numbers.

Russia has deployed some of its most sophisticated air defense systems around Moscow—the S-400, Pantsir, and Buk. These systems are effective against conventional missiles. But against hundreds of small drones equipped with artificial intelligence, flying at low altitudes and using variable flight paths, even the best air defenses reach their limits. Every drone intercepted consumes air defense munitions that Russia cannot replace indefinitely.

The Paradox of Russian Air Defenses

Russia faces a growing dilemma: to protect Moscow and its major cities, it must withdraw air defense systems from the Ukrainian front. But pulling S-400s from the front exposes its own forces to Ukrainian aircraft and ATACMS missiles. It is an impossible balancing act that Ukraine’s drone campaigns are forcing it to resolve—and every choice is a bad one for Moscow.

This strategic dilemma is one of the reasons why Ukraine’s long-range drone campaign is more effective than its immediate destructive power would suggest. It forces Russia to spread its defense resources thin, to protect the home front instead of concentrating forces on the front lines, and to explain to its own population why the capital is regularly under air raid alerts despite official assurances of imminent victory.

There is something politically significant about the fact that Muscovites are hearing air raid sirens. Russian propaganda has portrayed this war as a distant conflict, far removed from the daily concerns of Russians. Ukrainian drones are tearing down that curtain. They serve as a reminder that the war Putin chose to wage has real consequences—including for those who did not choose to fight it.

Refineries, Fuel, and the War Economy

Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure are having a measurable economic impact. The Bashneft refineries in Ufa, those in Krasnodar Krai, fuel depots in the Saratov region and elsewhere—every facility hit reduces Russia’s production capacity. In the context of a war economy where Moscow is seeking to simultaneously finance a large-scale military offensive and a civilian economy under sanctions, every refinery taken out of service creates additional strain.

The fuel shortages affecting 70 regions of Russia—as Zelensky noted in his address on June 29, 2026—are not merely a military logistical problem. They are creating social tensions in a country where the war economy has already driven up inflation significantly. The lines at gas stations are visible, documented by Russians themselves on social media. They are difficult to hide, even for a regime that controls the mainstream media.

The Sanctions War: Two Complementary Strategies

Western economic sanctions have imposed real costs on the Russian economy since 2022. But they have also shown their limitations: Russia has redirected part of its trade toward China, India, and other non-aligned partners, partially circumventing Western restrictions. Ukrainian drone strikes on energy infrastructure complement this sanctions strategy: they target production at the source, where no geographical workaround is possible.

This is why Zelensky speaks of “Ukrainian sanctions”—a term deliberately chosen to emphasize that Ukraine is pursuing its own economic policy of pressure on Russia, independent of decisions made by Western governments. It is a politically astute formulation that positions Ukraine as a sovereign actor in the economic war, not just on the military battlefield.

The term “Ukrainian sanctions” is a rhetorical masterstroke by Zelensky. It places his drone strikes on the same level as Western economic sanctions—legitimate, targeted, and proportionate. And he is fundamentally correct: targeting a refinery that fuels a war machine is more precise and less destructive to civilians than many conventional artillery strikes.

Russia’s Rejection of All Peace Proposals

In his address on June 29, 2026, Zelensky noted that Ukraine had put forward proposals to move toward an end to the war—“and Russia rejects them every time.” This reality is well documented: since the 2022 invasion, Moscow has rejected every proposal for a ceasefire or negotiation that did not involve territorial concessions unacceptable to Kyiv.

Ukraine’s long-range strikes are not a response to the failure of diplomacy—they are what remains when diplomacy has been unilaterally blocked by Russia. Zelensky states this explicitly: “If Russia does not end the war, it will have to postpone that deadline once again.” The 3,000-kilometer drones are the argument that completes this statement.

15 Deadlines for the Donbas—All Missed

In his address on June 29, Zelensky also noted: Russia has set itself 15 successive deadlines to capture the four regions of eastern Ukraine—Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson—over the course of more than four years of war. All of them have been missed. This tally is not bragging—it is a factual observation that the Russian General Staff cannot dispute. The war that Putin had expected to last three days is now in its fifth year, with no sign of the promised victory.

In this context, the FP-1 drones with a range of 3,000 kilometers are much more than a technical feat. They are proof that Ukraine has not merely resisted—it has transformed itself. It entered this war with an army inherited from the USSR and Soviet-era equipment dating back to the 1980s. It is emerging from it—if it emerges at all—with a high-tech defense industry, a deep-strike doctrine, and operational experience unmatched in Europe.

Fifteen deadlines, all missed. That is Putin’s military record in Ukraine. This figure should be included in every Western speech that still hesitates to give Kyiv what it needs. Russia is not winning. It is holding on. That is not the same thing. And while it holds on, Ukraine is building drones 3,000 kilometers away.

France, Germany, and the Red Line on Deep-Strike Operations

Several European allies have long hesitated to authorize Ukraine to use their weapons to carry out deep strikes into Russian territory. France and Germany have imposed restrictions on the use of their weapons systems against targets on Russian soil, with the aim of avoiding a direct escalation between NATO and Russia. These restrictions were intended to manage risk—but they have also slowed Ukraine’s ability to strike deep into Russian logistics.

The independent development of FP-1 drones with a range of 3,000 kilometers permanently changes this calculus. Ukraine no longer needs Western authorization to strike deep into Russian territory—it is using its own weapons, developed by its own engineers. This strategic shift should prompt European partners to reconsider the relevance of their restrictions on the use of their weapons, which no longer have the deterrent effect they were intended to produce.

The United Kingdom and the Long-Range Strike Doctrine

Among Western allies, the United Kingdom has been one of the strongest advocates for a deep-strike doctrine for Ukraine. The delivery of Storm Shadow missiles in 2023, followed by authorization to use them on Russian territory, set a precedent that other allies have been slow to follow. The Ukrainian drone revolution extends this logic: Ukraine is now developing its own Storm Shadow-style missiles, which are cheaper and more numerous, without relying on British stockpiles.

The question for London, Paris, and Berlin is now different: no longer “Should we allow Ukraine to strike deep into enemy territory?” but “How can we support a Ukraine that is already striking deep into enemy territory with its own capabilities?” This development will be at the center of discussions at the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026.

Some European allies have imposed restrictions on the use of their weapons in Russia out of fear of escalation—a legitimate concern. But now that Ukraine is striking targets 3,000 kilometers away on its own with its own drones, these restrictions appear more like political symbols than actual military safeguards. It is time to frankly reconsider them.

Moscow’s Support Network in the Face of Russian Setbacks

Ukraine’s long-range strike capability has geopolitical implications that extend beyond the Russia-Ukraine conflict alone. China, Iran, and North Korea have provided Russia with material support since the start of the conflict: North Korean artillery shells, Iranian Shahed drones, and Chinese technological components. This support has enabled Moscow to continue its war despite Western sanctions.

But a Russia whose refineries are burning, whose fuel depots are exploding, and whose space communications centers are being neutralized is a less attractive strategic partner. Beijing is constantly weighing the benefits of its support for Moscow against the cost of its relations with the West. A Russia facing growing military difficulties is a Russia whose value as a potential ally is diminishing in the eyes of the Chinese leadership.

Iranian Shahed Drones vs. Ukrainian Innovation

Iran has supplied Russia with hundreds of Shahed-136 drones, which have been used extensively against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. These low-cost drones have caused immense destruction. But Ukraine has studied their design, flight paths, and weaknesses, and has developed its own electronic countermeasures while building far more capable drones.

Ukraine’s trajectory—from receiving drones from allies to independently producing superior aircraft—is a lesson for all NATO members. If China were ever to use drones against a Western adversary, the techniques developed by Ukraine to detect, neutralize, and counter them would be of inestimable strategic value to the entire Atlantic Alliance.

China is closely watching what is happening in Ukraine. It is studying Ukrainian countermeasures, air defense tactics, and the effectiveness of Western missiles. This war is a testing ground. The West should ensure that this testing ground remains open—first for Ukraine, and second for collective security.

A strike capability that redefines the security equation

If the FP-1 drones with a range of 3,000 kilometers and the FP-9 missiles with a range of 855 kilometers enter large-scale operational service, Ukraine will possess a significant asymmetric deterrent capability. This is not nuclear deterrence—but it is the ability to impose real costs on any potential aggressor across its entire territory. For a nation whose security depends on the ability to deter a repeat of the 2022 invasion, this represents a fundamental transformation of its defensive posture.

The emerging doctrine is one of deterrence through the threat of precision strikes against an adversary’s strategic infrastructure. Not a threat of mass destruction—but the guaranteed ability to strike refineries, command centers, rail infrastructure, and military installations at any depth within enemy territory. This doctrine is consistent with Ukraine’s tradition of asymmetric warfare, which has been developing since 2014.

Integration into NATO’s Security Architecture

The question that will arise in future negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to NATO—or in the context of bilateral security guarantees in the interim—is that of integrating these capabilities into the collective security architecture. A Ukraine equipped with long-range drones and its own ballistic missiles, integrated into NATO’s planning structures, would be a considerable defensive asset for the entire Atlantic Alliance.

This prospect alarms some allies who fear being drawn into a conflict by Ukraine’s decisions. But it reassures those who understand that Eastern Europe’s security depends on a strong Ukraine, capable of defending itself and deterring further Russian aggression. The FP-1 drones with a range of 3,000 kilometers are not just a Ukrainian weapon—they are the beginning of a security architecture that Europe did not anticipate but needs.

I believe that Ukraine will eventually become one of NATO’s most valuable members—not despite its experience with war, but because of it. Its soldiers have fought the Russian military for years. Its engineers have developed drones that no one else had foreseen. This expertise is a treasure for the Alliance. Membership must be earned—and Ukraine has paid for that privilege with blood.

Fifteen Deadlines for the Donbas—All Missed

In his address on June 29, 2026, Zelensky laid out the facts with chilling precision: Russia had set itself 15 successive deadlines to capture the four regions of eastern Ukraine—Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson—over the course of more than four years of all-out war. All of these deadlines have been missed. This is not Ukrainian bravado—it is a factual observation that the Russian general staff cannot dispute. The war that Putin had expected to last three days is now in its fifth year, with no promised or announced victory in sight.

This outcome is not only humiliating for Moscow. It reveals something deeper: Russia is engaged in a war it cannot win quickly and refuses to admit it cannot end. Putin remains obsessed with the Donbas, in Zelensky’s own words. This obsession comes at a human and economic cost that Russian society is beginning to feel in the long lines at gas stations.

A war that Russia is prolonging without an exit strategy

Zelensky put it with a clarity that should resonate in every Western capital: “Russia rejects our proposals every time.” ” This is not rhetoric—it is a description of a reality that has been documented since 2022. Moscow refuses any negotiation that does not guarantee it territorial gains that are unacceptable to Ukraine. In this context, Ukrainian drone strikes are not a provocation—they are the only available response to an adversary that refuses to talk and continues to bomb.

Ukraine’s doctrine of “long-range sanctions” is precisely calibrated to make this refusal to negotiate increasingly costly for Russia. Every refinery struck, every fuel depot set ablaze, every space communications center neutralized sends a message to Putin: prolonging this war comes at a price that your economy and your military are paying every day. The 3,000-kilometer drones are the most compelling argument for a just peace that Ukraine has yet to produce.

Fifteen deadlines, all missed. If that figure isn’t enough to convince Western skeptics that Russia isn’t winning this war, I don’t know what will. Ukraine is holding its ground. It is innovating. It is striking back. And Putin is once again pushing back his deadline. The Ukrainian resistance is the most significant political event of our time—and we have yet to fully grasp its historical significance.

The Moment the Geography of the War Shifted

June 27, 2026, may go down as a turning point in the history of this conflict: the day the world learned that a democracy—invaded, bombed, and exhausted by more than four years of all-out war—had secretly developed a drone capable of striking targets 3,000 kilometers away. This is not a victory in and of itself—the war continues, the destruction continues, the deaths continue. But it is proof that Ukraine is not losing. It is transforming.

What this says about the Ukrainian will

Putin had bet on exhaustion, resignation, and surrender. He was wrong on all three counts. Ukraine is resisting, innovating, and striking farther and farther away. The FP-1s striking at 3,000 kilometers, the FP-9s at 855 kilometers, the burning refineries in Ufa and Krasnodar—all of this paints a picture of a country that has decided not to die. And that has the ingenuity, the determination, and the engineers to keep that promise. This post is for them.

The war is not over. Ukrainians will continue to die tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, in the weeks and months to come, if Putin refuses to negotiate in good faith. This reality isn’t overshadowed by drone range records. But I know this: the Ukraine that strikes 3,000 kilometers away in 2026 is the Ukraine that has decided to survive. And that decision deserves the full respect of every democracy on earth.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist