OPINION: After Putin, Russia Will Remain a Threat — A Swedish Intelligence Chief Shatters the Illusion

A historic agreement on the very day the threat was identified

On June 30, 2026, Sweden put its policy into action by signing an agreement to deliver 16 Gripen E fighter jets to Ukraine. These aircraft, funded by the EU with British support, will join the first 16 Gripen C/D jets, which are expected to be delivered in early 2027. President Zelensky and Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov confirmed that the aircraft will be delivered with full equipment, logistics, and technical support. Ukrainian pilots are already training in Sweden.

This decision is not merely a gesture of solidarity—it is a direct strategic investment in Sweden’s security. Stockholm has explicitly stated that supporting Ukraine is an essential component of its own national security. The reasoning is crystal clear: if Ukraine holds out, Russia is blocked in the east. If Ukraine succumbs, the Baltic states and Finland become the next targets.

Arming the Swedish Coast Guard: The Baltic Sea as a Strategic Theater

In the same vein, Sweden has decided to arm its coast guard in response to rising tensions in the Baltic Sea, according to Bloomberg. This decision marks a significant shift in posture for a country that has been a NATO member for only two years. Repeated incidents in the Baltic Sea—sabotage of undersea cables, airspace violations, and activities by suspicious Russian vessels—have convinced Stockholm that a passive stance is no longer viable.

The Baltic Sea has become a zone of constant hybrid confrontation. Russia is deploying its strategies of ambiguity there: actions that fall below the threshold of NATO’s Article 5 but are provocative enough to test the allies’ resolve. The arming of the Swedish coast guard signals that Stockholm will no longer let these provocations go unanswered.

Sweden is arming its coast guard. Five years ago, that sentence would have sounded like something out of a Scandinavian dystopian novel. Today, it is sound defense policy. This shift speaks volumes about what Putin’s Russia has accomplished: it has militarized the consciousness of nations that had chosen peace as their way of life.

Seven nations, one declaration, one unambiguous message

On June 25, 2026, the leaders of Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Sweden signed a joint declaration in Gdańsk that directly echoes Sweden’s intelligence assessment. The document identifies Russia as “the most significant, direct, and long-term threat to the security, peace, and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.” This wording is not a diplomatic cliché—it is a consensus among countries whose collective border with Russia stretches for thousands of kilometers.

The declaration commits these seven nations to reaching the target of spending 5% of GDP on defense by 2035, a goal reaffirmed ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara. It calls for strengthening the Eastern Flank Watch (EFW EDPCI) project as a priority multi-domain infrastructure. It describes the eastern flank as the “first line of defense in the event of armed aggression” and as a “common good and shared responsibility” of the entire EU and NATO.

The central demand: that Russian threats remain at the heart of European strategy

These seven nations do not merely identify the threat—they explicitly demand that this threat remain at the heart of European security strategy. In the face of attempts by some Western European countries to cautiously normalize relations with Moscow following a potential ceasefire, the eastern flank is erecting an intellectual and political bulwark. They carry the historical memory of the Soviet occupation. They will not allow themselves to be lulled into complacency.

The declaration also calls for “strengthening governmental and industrial defense cooperation with Ukraine, particularly in drone and anti-drone technologies.” This is an integrated vision: its own defense, support for Ukraine, and preparation for a post-war security architecture that grants Russia no unearned trust.

The Gdańsk Declaration is the most candid document produced by European leaders on Russia since the start of the war. No political doublespeak, no naive hope, no pro forma “open diplomatic channel.” Just a statement of fact: Russia is a structural threat. And we will prepare accordingly. The rest of Europe should read this text.

Trump, Defense Spending, and the Fragility of Unity

The NATO summit in Ankara, scheduled to take place in the coming days on July 1, 2026, is being held amid internal tensions within the alliance. According to Reuters, the current draft of the summit communiqué does not mention Albania as the venue for the next summit—a decision linked to U.S. dissatisfaction with Albania’s defense spending. This minor incident illustrates the constant pressure the Trump administration is exerting on allies to meet their financial commitments.

European NATO members are seeking to demonstrate to Washington that they have made progress on their commitments. This is precisely the rationale behind the 5% of GDP commitments: not only to counter the Russian threat, but also to preserve U.S. trust, which remains essential to the credibility of Article 5. Trump is a necessary evil—he is forcing Europe to take responsibility for its own defense with a sense of urgency that it had long put off.

Poland’s Stance and the Geopolitics of Mistrust

Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski warned that Russia could stage a “false-flag operation” to justify an attack on a NATO member state. This warning, distinct from but complementary to the Swedish assessment, signals a heightened level of vigilance among countries bordering Russia. The specter of hybrid provocations and fabricated incidents looms large over strategic discussions at the highest levels.

Poland, which hosts NATO troops and maintains one of Europe’s largest armed forces in relative terms, is determined to ensure that these warnings are heard. The Gdańsk Declaration reflects this: it explicitly names “air incidents, sabotage, cyberattacks, and airspace violations” as coordinated hybrid threats carried out by Russia.

Sikorski speaks of a potential “false-flag operation.” This is not paranoia—it is historical memory. Russia used the pretext of “Finlandiae” in 1939, the “protection of Russian speakers” in 2014, and “denazification” in 2022. Each act of aggression was preceded by a staged event. For NATO allies to document this pattern is a minimal precautionary measure.

A Record of Actions Below the Threshold of Article 5

The Gdańsk Declaration cites “recent incursions by Russian drones into the airspace of Eastern Flank member states and security incidents in the maritime domain” as actions that directly harm civilian populations and infrastructure. These incidents are not accidents—they are part of an intimidation strategy calibrated to remain below the threshold for triggering Article 5 while constantly testing the alliance’s resolve.

Russia has also closed seven rail junctions along its borders with NATO members, without any official explanation, at a time when it had doubled its freight rates for those same neighbors. These economic-military decisions are part of the same arsenal of hybrid pressure as drones and acts of sabotage: creating uncertainty, costs, and dependence.

Societal Resilience as a Strategic Response

The Gdańsk Declaration emphasizes that the response to these threats requires a “proactive approach to building robust situational awareness and resilience across the entire society.” This language reflects a concrete reality: in the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland, civilian preparedness for conflict is no longer a marginal concern—it is public policy. From bunkers to food reserves, from civil defense drills to evacuation plans, these countries are preparing with a seriousness that Western Europe still struggles to comprehend.

The Swedish intelligence assessment is part of this approach to preparedness. By clearly identifying the threat—not just that of Putin alone, but that of the Russian imperial project that will outlive him—Thomas Nilsson contributes to a realistic and necessary European strategic culture.

The societal resilience referred to in the Gdańsk Declaration is something I have witnessed in Finland, where crisis preparedness is taught starting in elementary school. In France, there is still talk of “universal national service” without any real implementation. The gap in strategic culture between the eastern flank and Western Europe remains a real problem that rhetoric alone cannot bridge.

A Western Consensus on the Structural Threat from Russia

The article reported by Ukrainska Pravda also notes that the Dutch Ministry of Defense has identified Russia as “Europe’s main threat” in its plan to modernize the armed forces. This alignment between the Swedish and Dutch assessments is no coincidence—it reflects a growing consensus within Western intelligence agencies regarding the profound and enduring nature of the Russian threat.

This consensus has been built slowly and painstakingly, in the face of years of complacent denial. The 2022 war changed everything. Now, the assumption that Russia could once again become a reliable partner within a reasonable timeframe is viewed as naive by the majority of serious defense analysts in Northern and Eastern Europe.

Implications for the Postwar Security Architecture

If Russia remains a structural threat after Putin, this has direct implications for any peace negotiations in Ukraine. An agreement that would offer Moscow permanent territorial guarantees and a return to diplomatic normalcy would be built on an illusion. This is precisely why the countries on the eastern flank insist on “robust and credible security guarantees” for Ukraine in the Gdańsk declaration.

Nilsson’s statement thus resonates as a strategic preamble to any peace discussion: “We do not expect any dramatic changes.” This clinical realism serves the entire European security architecture. Peace will only be secure if it is built on an understanding of what Russia is—not what we wish it to become.

Peace with Russia will have to resemble peace with Germany after 1945—built on defeat, total reconstruction, demilitarization, and decades of oversight. Not the peace of Versailles, built on humiliation without real disarmament, which led to World War II. If the West repeats Versailles with Moscow, Nilsson is right: we’ll be back here in twenty years.

A United Front Among Nordic Intelligence Agencies

The Dutch Ministry of Defense has also identified Russia as “Europe’s main threat” in its plan to modernize the armed forces. This alignment between Swedish and Dutch assessments underscores that Thomas Nilsson’s assessment is not an isolated position—it reflects a growing consensus among the intelligence services of the countries most directly affected by a potential Russian aggression. These countries share their analyses, coordinate their assessments, and are working together to develop a common understanding of the threat.

This operational consensus is good news: it means that defense policies in these countries are based on shared data rather than on isolated national perceptions. The Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8), which brings together the Scandinavian and Baltic countries, constitutes a cohesive bloc on security issues—a cohesion that the EU and NATO as a whole would do well to emulate more systematically.

Lessons from Ukraine Incorporated into National Doctrines

The United Kingdom recently published a defense plan that explicitly incorporates the lessons of the war in Ukraine, notably by redirecting 5 billion pounds originally earmarked for warships toward drones. This decision illustrates how observations from the Ukrainian battlefield are tangibly transforming Western military doctrines. This isn’t theory—it’s real-time strategic adaptation.

Countries on the eastern flank have even more to learn from Ukraine because they share the same geographical threat landscape. The Baltic states are integrating drone units into their reserve forces. Finland is deploying its defenses in depth. Poland is modernizing its artillery at an unprecedented pace. These adaptations are made possible by what Ukraine has been teaching the world since 2022.

I am not naive. I know that defense policy is always a series of compromises, constrained budgets, and electoral cycles. But sometimes, men like Nilsson speak truths that transcend political cycles. What he said on June 30 deserves to be cited twenty years from now as the moment when at least part of Europe looked at the reality of Russia without flinching.

What Nilsson Said That Others Don’t Dare to Say

The head of Swedish military intelligence said what many think but do not voice: the Russian threat is not embodied in Putin alone. It is embedded in a culturally supported, politically unchallenged imperial project in today’s Russia—one that is structurally enduring. This assessment is not a sign of despair—it is a foundation. A foundation for building realistic defense policies, strong alliances, and unwavering support for Ukraine that prevents this threat from drawing any closer to NATO’s borders.

The Gripen E that Stockholm will deliver to Kyiv in 2029 is the tangible manifestation of this conviction. The 5% of GDP committed in Gdańsk represents its collective dimension. And what Nilsson told Bloomberg on June 30, 2026, is, in a sense, the strategic testament of a Europe that has decided to face the truth: Russia will not change on its own. It is up to us to change our defenses.

Ukraine: The Front Line in This Long-Term Struggle

From this long-term perspective, Ukraine is not just a country at war—it is the forward defense line of a Europe that took too long to recognize the threat. Zelensky knows this. The Baltic states know it. Stockholm now knows it officially. The more Ukraine resists with Western support, the more the structural Russian threat is contained. The more aid wanes, the closer the threat comes. This simple equation is the compass for any serious European defense policy over the next decade.

History will judge the European leaders who chose clarity—and those who preferred the comfort of illusion. Sweden, for its part, has chosen its side with a consistency that commands respect.

The lesson Stockholm teaches us on June 30, 2026, is simple and brutal: hope is not a strategy. Preparing, arming, and forming alliances—that is a strategy. Ukraine has paid with its blood for Europe to understand this. Sweden has understood. When will the rest of the continent follow suit?

By Maxime Marquette, columnist