PROFILE: The F-35 Relies on China — Beijing’s Rare-Earth Time Bomb

Maxime Marquette

2026-07-02 14:55:24

The 2025 Trade War as a Dress Rehearsal

In April 2025, in response to the trade war launched by the Trump administration, China imposed export restrictions on seven types of rare earths and magnets used in the defense, energy, and automotive sectors. The U.S. reaction? A partial capitulation. According to Foreign Policy, “the United States’ absolute dependence” on raw and processed rare earths from China led it to “back down completely to the status quo ante.” In June 2025, during negotiations in London, the two sides agreed to a truce: China would approve rare earth exports in exchange for U.S. trade concessions.

This truce is fragile. Chinese customs data show that exports of several critical resources to the United States remain about 50% below pre-April 2025 export control levels. Beijing has turned down the tap without shutting it off completely—a sustained, calculated pressure that maintains U.S. dependence while avoiding a total breakdown that could accelerate Washington’s diversification efforts.

The 2026 NDAA: An Unrealistic Goal?

The 2026 NDAA clearly states: starting in 2027, U.S. defense systems may no longer contain rare earth elements of Chinese origin. On paper, this is a firm decision. In industrial reality, however, it is virtually impossible to achieve within the given timeframe. Opening a mine, building chemical processing infrastructure, and training a skilled workforce—these are projects that take ten to fifteen years, not twelve months.

The Pentagon has become the majority shareholder in MP Materials, the operator of the Mountain Pass mine in California, with the goal of creating a U.S. “mine-to-magnet” supply chain capable of producing the magnets needed for F-35s, drones, and submarines. But even with this massive investment, the United States cannot, in the short term, do without China for heavy rare earths. As Tom Moerenhout of Columbia University put it: “Rebuilding U.S. munitions stockpiles will require heavy rare earths—exactly where China holds a virtual monopoly.”

The NDAA 2026 sets a deadline that the manufacturers themselves deem impossible to meet. Is this a real policy or a political posturing? I think it’s both—a sincere statement of intent, but one with an unrealistic timeline. The intention is good. The execution will be painful.

Japan, the First Victim of the Geopolitics of Rare Earths

Zero dysprosium, zero terbium: the strongest signal

Japan is the world’s leading importer of rare earth elements—and it is also the ally most vulnerable to Chinese pressure in this area. Data from January through April 2026 is unequivocal: Chinese exports of dysprosium and terbium to Japan have dropped to zero. These two elements are essential for the high-performance magnets used in Japanese weapons systems and components supplied to the U.S. defense industry. Without them, industrial production grinds to a halt—not immediately if stocks are available, but inevitably if the blockade continues.

Japan had already experienced this scenario in 2010, when China reduced its exports of rare earths following the Senkaku Islands dispute, causing prices to skyrocket worldwide. The $36 billion U.S.-Japan bilateral agreement on critical minerals projects, signed in February 2026, reflects precisely this sense of urgency: both countries understand that they must act quickly before their room to maneuver disappears.

Japan’s F-35s in Beijing’s Crosshairs

Japan is one of the leading operators of the F-35 outside the United States—Tokyo has ordered more than 100 F-35s of various variants. If Chinese shipments of heavy rare earths remained at zero, the production and maintenance of these aircraft would eventually be compromised. This is exactly what Beijing wants Tokyo to understand: China can undermine the defense capabilities of a key U.S. ally without firing a single shot.

The Quad—the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—has begun working on alternative supply solutions for critical minerals. Australia, which possesses significant rare earth reserves, is at the heart of this strategy. But Australia’s chemical processing capabilities are still limited, and developing a complete supply chain takes time. In the meantime, the dependence remains.

I understand Beijing’s logic. By blocking rare earth exports to Japan, China is sending a clear message: your defense capability depends on our goodwill. This is unprecedented geopolitical coercion—and there is no obvious way to respond in the short term. What do we do when faced with a supplier who is also a strategic adversary? We diversify—slowly, painfully, and insufficiently.

The Race Toward Diversification: Too Little, Too Late?

Alternatives exist, but they are not yet enough

It would be inaccurate to say that the West is not taking action. The United States, Australia, Canada, and several African countries are exploring and developing their rare earth resources. In November 2025, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent unveiled the first rare earth magnet produced in the United States in 25 years, manufactured by the South Carolina-based company eVAC. This is symbolically significant. But a single magnet does not constitute an industrial sector.

Brazil, which has the world’s second-largest known reserves of rare earths, is a target of interest for American and Japanese investors. But even alternative sources of extraction often have to rely on Chinese processing infrastructure. The chemical processing of rare earths remains the most difficult step to replicate outside of China. China controls 90% of global processing—that’s not a figure that can be reversed in just a few years.

The Ukrainian Lesson for Security in Asia

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 demonstrated the cost of relying on the goodwill of an autocratic power for one’s security. Dependence on Chinese rare earths creates a structurally similar risk for Asian democracies: a single point of control held by a strategically adversarial actor. Beijing can act without firing a shot, without a formal declaration of war, and without violating a treaty. All it needs to do is withhold export licenses.

President Zelensky has actively positioned Ukraine as an alternative supplier of critical materials to the West—one aspect of the “minerals deal” with the United States concluded in early 2025. Ukraine possesses significant reserves of rare earths and critical minerals. If the agreement holds and investments follow through, Ukraine could become a key player in the West’s supply chain diversification—benefiting both its own reconstruction and the strategic resilience of its allies.

The West has known since 2010 that this dependence is a major strategic risk. Sixteen years later, this risk has become even more acute, not less so. We have reports, analyses, and laws such as the NDAA 2026. What is missing is sustained political will and funding commensurate with the stakes. Bureaucracy and short-term political considerations continue to take precedence over long-term strategic resilience.

The Xi Doctrine: Turning a Monopoly into a Weapon

A strategy planned over decades

In 2020, President Xi Jinping publicly declared the need to “strengthen the dependence of international production chains on China,” thereby creating “a formidable countermeasure” against rival nations. China’s dominance over rare earths is a textbook example of this doctrine. China’s massive investments in the mining and processing of rare earths since the 1980s were not driven by purely economic logic—they were part of a long-term strategic vision: to transform leadership in processing into an instrument of geopolitical coercion.

In 2010, China cut off exports to Japan in response to a minor diplomatic incident involving the Senkaku Islands, causing global prices to skyrocket. In 2025, it imposed global restrictions in response to Trump’s tariffs. In 2026, it is maintaining targeted pressure on Japan. Each episode refines the technique. Every Western capitulation confirms that the tactic works.

What Russia Cannot Imitate, but China Can

Russia has used natural gas as an instrument of coercion against Europe—with mixed results, ultimately overcome at considerable economic cost. But Russia does not hold a global monopoly on gas. Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Qatar were able to step in, albeit at the cost of a painful transition. When it comes to heavy rare earth elements and their processing, China holds an unparalleled near-monopoly. There is no “Saudi Arabia of rare earths” ready to step in and compensate.

Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun, during a video call with his Russian counterpart Andrei Belousov in January 2026, called for “strengthening strategic coordination” between Beijing and Moscow. Both powers understand that by combining Russia’s energy dependence with China’s rare earth dependence, they create a system of pressure on the West that is harder to circumvent than either threat taken separately.

Russia and China are operating on two different but complementary fronts. Moscow is killing Ukrainians and depleting Western weapons stocks. Beijing is gradually choking off the supply chain of raw materials that would allow the West to rearm. This is an asymmetric coordination that NATO has not yet fully incorporated into its strategic planning.

Solutions: A Decade of Work to Overcome a Decade of Neglect

The necessary investments are well known

The solution to dependence on Chinese rare earths is no mystery—it is simply a long and costly process. The United States needs a complete “mine-to-magnet” supply chain: active rare earth mines, separation and chemical processing capabilities, magnet factories, and strategic security stockpiles. The Pentagon is investing in this direction through MP Materials and other initiatives. Europe is working on its own critical minerals projects. Japan is diversifying its supply sources to Australia, Canada, and other countries.

But the pace of these investments remains insufficient given the urgency of the situation. Analysts estimate that it will take between ten and fifteen years to establish operational alternative supply chains capable of replacing China for heavy rare earths. In the best-case scenario, a complete supply chain will not be operational before 2035. In the meantime, the F-35, missiles, drones, and all defense systems that rely on these magnets remain vulnerable to Beijing’s whims.

The Role of Allies and Multilateralism

No single country can solve this problem on its own. The G7, NATO, and Indo-Pacific partners must coordinate their investments, share the costs of developing mining and processing infrastructure, and create collective strategic stockpiles. Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen argued in June 2026 that democracies must act collectively in the face of emerging threats—including strategic economic dependencies. Dependence on Chinese rare earths should be at the top of this collective agenda.

G7 deliveries to Ukraine are an example of what multilateral coordination can achieve quickly when the political will is there. The same will is needed for rare earths. The problem is less visible than burning tanks—but it is potentially just as decisive for the outcome of future conflicts. An F-35 without a dysprosium magnet cannot fly. It’s as simple as that.

There is a remarkable irony in the fact that Ukraine, a country at war, could become a supplier of critical minerals to the armies helping it defend itself. The geopolitics of raw materials rarely come full circle like this. If Ukraine survives and prospers, everyone wins—including the West’s defense industrial security.

The U.S. industrial response: promising but insufficient

Mountain Pass and the Revival of the U.S. Mining Industry

The Mountain Pass mine in California is the only active rare earth mine in the United States. Its operator, MP Materials—in which the Pentagon has become the majority shareholder—aims to establish a complete magnet production supply chain on U.S. soil. The project, dubbed 10X, aims to produce magnets for F-35s, drones, and submarines. It is a serious undertaking, funded by U.S. taxpayer money and driven by national security concerns.

But the Mountain Pass mine is primarily productive in light rare earth elements—neodymium and praseodymium. Heavy rare earth elements—dysprosium and terbium—are much scarcer on U.S. soil. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates measured U.S. reserves at 3.6 million metric tons—compared to 44 million metric tons in China. This geological disparity is fundamental: even with the best investments, the United States will not become self-sufficient in heavy rare earth elements without access to the resources of partners such as Australia, Canada, or India.

China Is Decades Ahead

Since the 1980s, China has systematically and massively invested in the mining, processing, and production of rare-earth magnets. It has developed unique industrial expertise, a skilled workforce, and complex chemical infrastructure. Duplicating this ecosystem takes time—not because the technology is secret, but because large-scale industrial expertise is difficult to transfer and requires years of learning.

The first magnet produced in the United States in 25 years by eVAC, unveiled by Secretary Bessent in November 2025, is an important symbolic milestone. But it is just a milestone—not a solution. Between the first demonstration magnet and the millions of magnets needed for U.S. defense systems lies an industrial chasm that neither political enthusiasm nor current budgets will be enough to bridge within the deadlines imposed by the 2026 NDAA.

I’ll come back to this 2027 deadline imposed by the NDAA. It’s going to pass. And the F-35s will continue to use magnets containing Chinese rare earths, or they’ll be grounded for lack of alternative magnets. Both options are unacceptable. We need either a genuine plan for massive, accelerated funding or an honest reassessment of the deadlines. Politics cannot change the laws of industrial geology.

Ukraine as a Piece of the Puzzle of Western Strategic Resilience

Ukraine’s Reserves and the Critical Minerals Agreement with the United States

In 2025, the United States and Ukraine signed an agreement on critical minerals, recognizing that Ukraine possesses significant reserves of rare earths and strategic minerals. This agreement is more than just a trade deal—it is a strategic acknowledgment that the West’s security also depends on diversifying its supply chains for critical raw materials. A sovereign Ukraine that is integrated into the Western economy could, in the long term, play a role in reducing dependence on Chinese rare earths.

This is one of the reasons why supporting Ukraine is not just a matter of democratic values—it is also an investment in the West’s industrial and strategic resilience. Every Ukrainian resource that remains under Ukrainian control rather than Russian or Chinese control is one fewer resource in the autocracies’ arsenal of coercion. And every joint production agreement between Ukraine and its allies strengthens the collective capacity to respond to geopolitical pressure from Beijing.

The Convergence of Threats and the Urgency of Acting Together

The threat posed by Chinese rare earths cannot be separated from the Russian threat in Ukraine, nor from the North Korean threat in the Pacific. These pressures are linked within a coherent strategy to weaken the West: Moscow is depleting Western weapons stocks in Ukraine, Beijing is choking off the supply chain for the raw materials needed to replenish them, and Pyongyang is threatening stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The West’s response must be commensurate with this convergence.

The agenda for the next NATO summit should prominently feature a collective strategy on critical minerals—with measurable objectives, coordinated investments, and a realistic timeline. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that the Atlantic Alliance can act collectively under pressure. The pressure regarding rare earths is less visible, but it is real. Do we want an F-35 to be grounded because we lack the magnets to keep it flying?

I’ll conclude with this image: the F-35 providing air cover over Ukraine from Poland or Romania, whose magnets were manufactured in China on a production line that Beijing can shut down with a single administrative decision. This is the fundamental contradiction facing Western security today. It can be overcome. But it requires a level of political will that I do not yet see as commensurate with what is at stake.

Conclusion: The F-35's magnet tells the story of a war that no one declared

A Dependency That Undermines Military Sovereignty

Dependence on Chinese dysprosium and terbium is not a technical problem—it is a matter of sovereignty. As long as the United States, Japan, and their allies do not control the supply chains for the materials that power their fighter jets, missiles, and air defense systems, their military posture remains contingent on Beijing’s goodwill. This is not a hypothetical future vulnerability. It is a reality of 2026, documented in Chinese customs data, in CSIS analyses, and in Tom Moerenhout’s statements at Columbia.

The NDAA 2026 clearly states that this dependence must end by 2027. Industry leaders make it clear that this is impossible within that timeframe. What Beijing’s policy on rare earths reveals is that China has been planning this situation for decades. It has succeeded. The question now is not whether the West must diversify—that is obvious. The question is whether the West will find the political will and sustainable funding to do so before the next crisis reveals the full extent of its accumulated vulnerability.

The priority the West must set

A coordinated, ambitious plan, sustainably funded over twenty years, is needed—not political statements whose scope ends with the current term of office. The war in Ukraine has proven that democracies can act quickly and collectively when they perceive a threat. The threat posed by Chinese rare earths is real. It is well-documented. It has already had an impact in 2025 and 2026. We now need to respond with the appropriate sense of urgency—before dependence turns into capitulation.

I’ll conclude with an uncomfortable thought: Beijing doesn’t need a military invasion to coerce Western democracies. All it needs to do is control the magnets in their fighter jets. This is the war of the 21st century: invisible, silent, difficult to explain to voters, but potentially more decisive than any ground battle.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist