REPORT: RIMPAC 2026 and the Liaoning — Two Fleets Face Off in the Pacific

A carrier strike group tested on all strategic routes

The Liaoning carrier strike group had left its base for a special deployment. On April 20, 2026, it crossed the Taiwan Strait en route to the South China Sea. On May 19, 2026, it was deployed in the waters of the Western Pacific. For 40 days, the group conducted exercises in distant waters, including: early warning and reconnaissance; joint “system-of-systems” land-to-sea confrontations; tactical operations by carrier-based aircraft; air superiority and air defense; strikes at sea; amphibious support operations; and the use of live ammunition. This training agenda covers all scenarios of modern naval warfare.

The Liaoning’s Documented Limitations

Analyst Shen Ming-shih, cited in the ThinkChina analysis, put this deployment into perspective: the Liaoning is now capable of operating beyond the first island chain, but it is unlikely to be able to sustain operations beyond the second island chain for extended periods. The reason: limitations on at-sea refueling and the lack of Chinese military bases abroad comparable to U.S. logistical capabilities. The future Fujian aircraft carrier, with its more advanced design, could shift this balance when it enters operational service. For now, China’s projected naval power remains geographically constrained.

The Liaoning has traveled thousands of kilometers. Impressive. But the gap between “capable of sailing far” and “capable of fighting far” remains immense. Analysts know this. Beijing knows it, too.

A Second Island Chain Exercise

While RIMPAC was getting underway in Hawaii, Valiant Shield 2026 began in Guam on June 22. It is a U.S.-Japan bilateral exercise covering the Mariana Islands Range Complex, the waters around the Northern Mariana Islands, and Japan. Its geographical scope is precise: it operates exactly within the area that China considers its natural sphere of expansion between the first and second island chains. The simultaneous conduct of Valiant Shield and RIMPAC creates pressure on two fronts in the Western Pacific—one from Hawaii, the other from Guam.

The DF-17 Missile and Displayed Nuclear Muscle

This situation intensified further on June 20, 2026, when CCTV Military Time—China’s official military channel—broadcast footage of two realistic combat exercises involving the PLA Rocket Force. Among the equipment shown was a DF-17 missile launcher pulling over to the side of a road, erecting the launcher, and launching the missile vertically. The DF-17 is a precision-guided hypersonic ballistic missile capable of targeting aircraft carriers. Broadcasting these images two days before the start of RIMPAC was no coincidence—it was a deliberate strategic message.

Showing the DF-17 two days before RIMPAC is a way of telling allies: “We know you’re training to project power; here’s what can sink your aircraft carriers.” It is coercive diplomacy made visible.

A Shift from Simple Confrontation to “Systems of Systems”

The ThinkChina analysis published on June 25, 2026, offers an interpretation of the current situation that goes beyond a simple tally of ships: what is at stake in the Western Pacific is the shift from a confrontation between aircraft carriers to a confrontation between integrated military systems. The United States and its allies are testing integrated anti-submarine warfare, encrypted networked communications, coordinated long-range strikes, and electronic warfare during RIMPAC. On the other side, China is developing a doctrine of access denial and area denial—the famous A2/AD—combined with saturation capabilities using hypersonic missiles and permanent maritime surveillance systems.

What RIMPAC Proves—and What It Cannot Prove

Analyst Shen Ming-shih points out an important limitation: RIMPAC is a routine, large-scale exercise, and the United States will avoid presenting it as specifically targeting China. This rhetorical caution has a practical reason: participating nations include countries that trade extensively with Beijing and would not accept an explicitly anti-China framework. But the actual operational objective fools no one: to test the allies’ interoperability in a high-intensity conflict scenario in the Indo-Pacific—that is, a scenario in which China is the implicit adversary.

To say that RIMPAC is not aimed at China is an exercise in verbal diplomacy that everyone engages in but no one believes. The real language here is that of ships, missiles, and exercise zones.

Real-time intelligence gathering

The Kaiyangxing’s presence in the Pacific ahead of RIMPAC serves as a reminder that China does not passively observe allied exercises. It actively analyzes them. The data collected on the high seas by electronic surveillance ships is legal, but its operational value is tangible: identifying the command frequencies used by each allied navy, the formation patterns of combat groups, vulnerabilities in the chain of command, and the acoustic characteristics of participating submarines. It is a low-profile intelligence operation with high strategic value.

A2/AD doctrine refined through observation

Each RIMPAC exercise enriches the PLA Navy’s operational database. What China observes during these exercises directly informs the development of its access denial and area denial doctrine. The DF-17 and DF-21D hypersonic missiles were designed specifically to counter moving U.S. carrier strike groups. The more China observes how these groups operate, the more it can refine its targeting parameters. The paradox is real: the exercises that demonstrate allied strength also fuel the response that China is developing against that very same strength.

The enemy observes, learns, and adapts. This is true for China in the context of RIMPAC. It is also true for Russia in the context of Ukraine. The common lesson: open training is a gift to the enemy’s intelligence services. The question is whether visible deterrence is worth the cost.

Taiwan in the Background of Every Maneuver

RIMPAC 2026 is taking place against a particularly tense regional backdrop. The Liaoning’s passage through the Taiwan Strait on April 20, 2026, was a direct message to Taipei and Washington. China claims Taiwan as a rebel province and has repeatedly stated since 2021 that it will not rule out reunification by force if necessary. RIMPAC includes amphibious exercises that, while not explicitly targeting a Taiwan scenario, specifically test the capabilities needed to defend an island against an amphibious attack—or to project relief forces there.

North Korea as a Multiplier of Instability

North Korea complicates the regional strategic landscape. Pyongyang has accelerated its nuclear program, with Kim Jong-un visiting a new facility for producing weapons-grade nuclear material in early June 2026. According to Ukrainian intelligence, North Korea’s Rocket Forces have also benefited from Russian technological upgrades to their KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles, reducing their margin of error from several kilometers to just a few meters. This improved accuracy is directly relevant to North Korea’s ability to target South Korean or Japanese military bases—some of which specifically host RIMPAC forces.

North Korea, China, Russia. Three authoritarian powers that share a common logic: to drive up the cost of Western security until the West gives in. RIMPAC, in its own way, is the collective response that these three capitals are watching closely.

Military Competition That Never Stops

The Western Pacific in the summer of 2026 is not at war. But it is in a state of constant, ongoing competition on multiple levels. RIMPAC demonstrates the cohesion of the allies. The Liaoning demonstrates China’s maritime ambition. Valiant Shield tests U.S.-Japan bilateral defense. The Kaiyangxing collects data from everyone. And back in Beijing, generals are analyzing the results of a 40-day deployment on the high seas and planning the next one. Military competition in the Pacific is not a one-off crisis—it is the permanent structure of the balance of power in the region.

What Democracies Must Maintain

For democracies, the lesson of the summer of 2026 is clear: a continued military presence in the Pacific is not optional. Thirty-one nations at RIMPAC represent 31 governments that have decided that defending the international order in the Indo-Pacific is worth their investment. China is counting on fatigue, cost, and the allies’ domestic tensions to erode this coalition over time. RIMPAC is, among other things, the annual demonstration that this erosion has not taken place—not yet. What Zelensky says about aid to Ukraine, the admirals are putting into practice in the Pacific: credibility is measured by presence, not by statements.

RIMPAC won’t stop the Liaoning or the DF-17. But it tells the world that the United States and its allies are here, that they’re training together, and that they’re not going anywhere. Sometimes that’s all a show of force needs to accomplish.

The Pace of the U.S.-China Rivalry Is Picking Up

On June 24, 2026, as the first RIMPAC ships left their docks for the waters off Hawaii, the world watched as the Pacific was undergoing a transformation. No shots were fired, no direct confrontation took place, but a series of signals—exercises, deployments, missiles on display, spy ships—were mapping out the military geography of the coming decade. China is testing its limits. Allies are testing their cohesion. And somewhere in between, the international order that democracies have built since 1945 is struggling to hold its ground.

What RIMPAC Reveals About the West’s Ability to Hold Its Ground

The 31 nations participating in RIMPAC 2026 represent a collective response to Chinese military pressure in the Pacific. It is not a perfect response—interests diverge, budgets are strained, and political cohesion fluctuates. But it is a real response, with 40 ships, 5 submarines, 140 aircraft, and 25,000 military personnel training together. Faced with a Liaoning that has proven its ability to operate far from its bases, and with Chinese Rocket Forces flaunting their hypersonic missiles, the allied response holds firm. For now.

For now. Those two words sum it all up. Neither China nor the democracies has reached its full potential in this standoff. The Pacific of 2030 will depend on who has made the best use of the current decade.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist