ANALYSIS: Ukraine-France and the SCALP License — What These “Initial Steps” Really Mean

What Happened at the Élysée

According to statements by Fedorov reported by NewsUkraine RBC, it was during President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to France that discussions regarding the SCALP license were initiated at the highest level. Fedorov had a “very productive” discussion with President Emmanuel Macron about the possibility of granting Ukraine a license to manufacture SCALP missiles. This was a discussion between heads of state, which was then carried out at the technical level by the ministers.

The fact that Macron himself was involved in initiating these discussions is significant. It means that the issue has political backing at the highest level, and not just at the bureaucratic level. Such a sensitive decision—transferring the intellectual property rights to a precision cruise missile—requires precisely this kind of political support at the highest level to overcome the institutional, legal, and commercial barriers standing in its way.

Fedorov’s Cautious Wording

Fedorov was explicitly cautious in his statements: “These are the first steps. We are cautiously continuing these discussions to achieve results.” He added that it is “still too early to announce concrete results.” This caution is not merely rhetorical—it is a realistic assessment of the state of the discussions.

According to Fedorov, the negotiations focus on three main areas: intellectual property rights, the launch of production, and legal and technical aspects. These three areas are precisely the most complex in any defense technology transfer. The intellectual property rights for a joint Franco-British missile are shared among two countries, two companies (MBDA France and MBDA UK), and potentially third-party component suppliers. Resolving this complexity cannot be done in a matter of weeks.

I’ll be honest: “initial progress” in a cruise missile licensing process can take years to materialize. The history of military technology transfers is full of announced agreements that took five years to translate into actual production. Fedorov knows this. Macron knows this. What matters is that discussions have begun at the right level. The rest depends on patience and political will.

Intellectual Property Shared Between France and the United Kingdom

The SCALP-EG / Storm Shadow is a joint Franco-British development program managed by the joint venture MBDA. Intellectual property rights are therefore shared between Paris and London. Any decision to license production to a third party—in this case, Ukraine—requires the agreement of both parties. The United Kingdom has closely monitored French decisions regarding the Storm Shadow/SCALP; its position on granting a production license to Ukraine has not been publicly stated as of this writing.

According to the source Fakti.bg, which reported on the same negotiations, the discussions involve “the French government and the company concerned”—which presumably refers to MBDA. The company will have to give its commercial approval for any license transfer, regardless of the political decisions of the two governments. MBDA is a private company with shareholders—Airbus, BAE Systems, and Leonardo—whose commercial interests must be taken into account in any licensing agreement.

ITAR Restrictions and U.S. Components

The SCALP almost certainly contains electronic components subject to U.S. ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) regulations. Any U.S.-origin component in a weapons system transferred to a third party requires re-export approval from the U.S. government. This restriction applies to nearly all transfers of Western military technology.

This explains why Fedorov also mentioned parallel negotiations with the United States regarding arms licenses. These discussions, conducted at the level of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), are inseparable from the negotiations with France. If the United States does not approve the retransfers of ITAR-controlled components to Ukraine, the French license alone would not be sufficient to launch full-scale production.

ITAR is the silent bureaucratic weapon of U.S. defense policy. Thousands of weapons systems around the world contain U.S. components that create an invisible dependence on Washington. For Ukraine, obtaining ITAR waivers for SCALP components would be just as important as obtaining the French license. These two sets of negotiations are, in reality, one and the same conversation.

Discussions at the CNSD level—unprecedented and significant

Negotiations with the United States regarding weapons manufacturing licenses are taking place at the level of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council. Fedorov was emphatic about the exceptional nature of these discussions: “It is unprecedented that this has even been announced, and that such talks have begun.” He declined to provide further details on the weapons systems in question.

The fact that talks on U.S. weapons production licenses have begun—even without public details on the systems involved—is in itself significant news. Before 2022, the idea that the United States would grant Ukraine production licenses for advanced weapons systems was unthinkable. The fact that these discussions are taking place at the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) level in 2026 illustrates just how much Ukraine’s strategic status has changed in Washington’s eyes.

Trump and Ukrainian Defense Policy: A Complicated Context

The context of the Trump administration complicates these discussions. Donald Trump, whose stance toward Ukraine has oscillated between pragmatic support and unfavorable rhetoric, has allowed his representatives—Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, mentioned by Putin himself—to conduct parallel discussions with Moscow. In this context, Washington’s approval of production licenses for Ukraine is politically sensitive.

Nevertheless, Trump is a pragmatic man—this is precisely the trait defined as a “necessary evil for the West” by those who observe him. If he calculates that allowing Ukraine to produce its own weapons reduces pressure on the United States to make politically costly direct deliveries, his interests could align with Ukraine’s needs. This isn’t sentimentality—it’s political calculation.

Trump is not a friend of Ukraine in the sense that Zelensky would like to think of him. But he isn’t necessarily an enemy either. He is a negotiator looking for a deal. And for Trump, a deal in which Ukraine defends itself with its own locally manufactured weapons—reducing the political cost of this conflict for the U.S.—could be exactly the kind of deal he would seek to strike. Pragmatic realpolitik sometimes holds pleasant surprises.

Existing Capabilities and Shortcomings

The question of Ukraine’s ability to produce cruise missiles as sophisticated as the SCALP is complex. Ukraine already produces domestically made long-range cruise missiles—the Molniya-1 missile drones and other variants that have struck targets in Russia hundreds of kilometers away. These systems demonstrate a capability to develop and produce guided missiles.

However, SCALP missiles are considerably more sophisticated: they feature turbojet propulsion, DSMAC metric-precision guidance, survivability against heavy air defenses, and a tandem penetrator warhead. The production of such systems requires precision manufacturing lines, specialized materials, and sophisticated testing processes that Ukraine has not yet fully developed. The path from licensing to operational production is therefore long, but not impossible.

The MBDA-Armor precedent: a sign of hope

A parallel development worth noting in this context is that the German defense company MBDA has signed a strategic agreement with the Ukrainian firm Armor to develop long-range strike systems. This is not the same as the SCALP license, but it illustrates the same underlying trend: Western defense contractors are entering into co-development partnerships with Ukrainians, not just sales agreements.

European Commissioner for Defense Andrius Kubilius has described the Ukrainian defense industry as “one of the most innovative in Europe.” This high-level institutional recognition creates a favorable environment for licensing agreements such as the one under discussion with France. When European institutions legitimize Ukraine’s industrial capacity, private companies and governments are more likely to follow suit.

I am not familiar enough with the technical details of cruise missile production to say with certainty whether Ukraine can produce SCALP missiles in five years. What I do know is that, since 2022, Ukraine has proven it is capable of accomplishing things that everyone thought were impossible. I choose to trust Ukraine on this point as well.

A Qualitative Leap in Long-Range Strike Capability

If the SCALP production license is granted, the impact on Ukraine’s strike capability would be transformative. Currently, Ukraine’s SCALP stockpiles are depleted—deliveries are limited by available French stockpiles. Domestic production would mean the ability to strike targets at 250+ km with meter-level precision on an industrial scale, at a pace determined by Ukraine.

In this scenario, every Russian military infrastructure in the occupied territories, every logistics depot, and every command post deep within Russian strategic territory would be within range. The logistical pressure illustrated by the June 29 bridge strikes would increase exponentially. And Russia, which is investing heavily in its air defense to intercept current Ukrainian missiles, would face an infinitely replenished cruise missile threat.

The Strategic Signal to Moscow

The announcement of these discussions—even at this early stage—sends a message to Moscow. If Russia fails to reach a negotiated peace agreement, Ukraine will gradually develop a domestic long-range strike capability that will render any Russian strategic depth obsolete. This message is intentional—Fedorov did not choose to keep these negotiations secret. He announced them.

The transparency of this announcement is in itself a tool of diplomatic pressure. It tells Putin: the West is not limiting its support for Ukraine to existing arms deliveries. It is considering transferring the production capabilities themselves. And this trajectory, once set in motion, is difficult to reverse. The cost to Russia of continuing the war increases with every step of this kind.

Fedorov is a brilliant minister. Announcing “initial progress” on the SCALP license in public is not a reckless move—it’s a calculated decision. It keeps the pressure on Paris not to back down. It signals to Moscow that Western aid is moving in only one direction. And it reassures the Ukrainian people that their allies are working on lasting solutions. One sentence, three audiences, three messages. That’s Fedorov through and through.

Kyiv’s Long-Term Vision

Fedorov has placed the negotiations on the SCALP license within a broader context: Ukraine’s strategy to develop its own defense industrial base. This is not just for the current war. It is for the postwar period, for the decades to come, for a Ukraine that wants to be a sovereign actor in its own defense—not a client dependent on foreign supplies.

This vision is consistent with the ambition to join NATO. A NATO member that can produce its own precision cruise missiles is a member that contributes to the Alliance’s defense industrial base—not just a beneficiary. Ukraine wants to transform its position from a “defense client” to a “defense partner.” The SCALP license, if it materializes, would be a major step toward that goal.

Other Licenses Under Discussion

The SCALP license is not the only one under discussion. Fedorov mentioned negotiations with the United States regarding other arms licenses without specifying their nature. Analyses from the defense sector suggest that other systems—potentially guidance systems, missile components, and propulsion technologies—are involved. The overall direction is clear: Ukraine wants to produce, not just receive.

Other co-production agreements are already underway with European partners. Poland, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and other countries are in discussions with Ukrainian companies. The Danish model funds this domestic production. The Kongsberg-DevDroid agreement for UGVs is an example of this. The SCALP license, if it comes to fruition, would be the most powerful symbol of this direction—a Franco-Ukrainian cruise missile produced in Kyiv or Lviv.

A Ukraine capable of producing its own SCALPs would be a Ukraine that no longer needs to ask Paris for permission to strike this or that target. That is what full military sovereignty means: not only deciding what to strike, but having the capability to strike it without depending on anyone. That is what Zelensky and Fedorov are working toward. And I think it’s the right direction, even if it takes a long time.

MBDA’s Commercial Interests

MBDA, the company that manufactures the SCALP missiles, is a commercial entity with obligations to its shareholders. Transferring a production license to Ukraine could potentially create a competitor in the precision cruise missile market. A Ukraine capable of producing SCALP missiles could sell them on export markets, competing directly with MBDA itself. This commercial tension is real and must be resolved through negotiations.

Solutions to this tension exist: a production license limited to the Ukrainian market and Ukraine’s national defense, with restrictions on re-export. License fees paid to MBDA for each unit produced. Obligations to source certain key components from MBDA or its suppliers. These mechanisms are standard in defense licensing agreements, and they help reconcile the commercial interests of the technology holder with the sovereign needs of the licensee.

MBDA’s Track Record with Other Clients

MBDA has already granted production licenses to third countries for some of its systems. A precedent therefore exists. The question is whether Ukraine meets the usual conditions for obtaining such licenses: institutional reliability, nonproliferation guarantees, and sufficient industrial capacity to produce to the required quality standards. On these three criteria, Ukraine is making measurable progress.

Commissioner Kubilius’s recognition of the quality of Ukraine’s defense industry helps establish this credibility. The certification of Ukrainian systems by Western partners, the co-production agreements that have been signed, and the proven quality of Ukrainian drones and missiles in actual combat—all of this constitutes a de facto application for Western production licenses.

MBDA must weigh the short term—potentially losing market share if Ukraine can produce SCALPs—against the long term: being the preferred partner of a country that will be a massive importer of defense equipment after the war. I believe the business decision will lean toward the long term. And I hope to remember that I wrote this when the contract is signed.

Announcing a License During Peace Negotiations

The announcement of these discussions regarding the SCALP license comes at a time of two parallel sets of negotiations—on one hand, the peace talks being discussed between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States; on the other, Ukraine’s efforts to build its long-term capabilities. These two developments are not contradictory—they are complementary. A militarily stronger Ukraine in the long term is also a Ukraine better positioned to negotiate from a position of strength.

Putin, for his part, reaffirmed on June 29 that Russia will not change its negotiating positions. He continues to demand Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donetsk and Luhansk. Faced with this intransigence, Ukraine is developing its long-range capabilities. This is not contradictory—it is rational: if negotiations fail, Ukraine must be capable of holding its ground and making Russia pay a heavy price for its persistence.

France: Between Diplomacy and Armaments

France faces a difficult role in this matter: it is both an active diplomatic player seeking a negotiated solution—the June G7 summit in Évian, ongoing contacts with Moscow—and a military supplier considering the transfer of cutting-edge technology to Ukraine. These two stances are not incompatible for Paris: supporting Ukraine militarily strengthens its negotiating position, and thus the chances of a viable peace agreement.

Macron, who initiated the discussion on the SCALP license with Zelensky, understands this dual logic. He knows that France cannot be both the country seeking peace and the one that leaves Ukraine without sufficient capabilities to defend that peace. The SCALP license, if it goes through, would be the embodiment of this dual policy: diplomatic support accompanied by long-term military support.

Macron embodies a vision of French foreign policy that I respect, even when I do not always agree with his decisions. On Ukraine, he has evolved from his initial caution in 2022 to a significant military commitment in 2024–2026. The discussion over the SCALP license shows that this commitment continues to deepen. That is more than many European capitals have done. I take note of that.

Negotiations on Intellectual Property

The intellectual property rights for a cruise missile such as the SCALP include patents on propulsion, guidance systems, warhead design, navigation software, electronic countermeasure systems, and thousands of subsystems. Mapping out this intellectual property to define the terms of its transfer is a legal and commercial process that takes several months.

The specific issue of the DSMAC (Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator)—the SCALP’s ultra-high-precision terminal guidance system—is particularly sensitive. This technology is among the most precise available in Western cruise missiles. Its transfer to a third party—even a friendly one like Ukraine—raises security concerns about the potential proliferation of this technology to potential adversaries. This is a real debate that negotiators must address.

Legal Aspects: International Law and Ukrainian Law

An arms production licensing agreement involves complex provisions under international law: nonproliferation treaties, bilateral defense agreements, revocation clauses in the event of a regime change, and end-use verification mechanisms. Ukraine is not yet a member of NATO or the EU, which creates legal uncertainties regarding some of these provisions.

Progress on the Ukrainian side in harmonizing its legislation with Western standards for arms management is a positive factor. Since 2022, Ukraine has demonstrated that it is capable of managing advanced weapons systems with the levels of security and accountability required by the allies. This operational credibility is an implicit prerequisite for any license transfer, and it is currently being established.

International law governing arms transfers is one of the most obscure and important areas of defense policy. Few people outside of specialists truly understand it. What I do know is that it is in Ukraine’s best interest to invest in this legal expertise as much as in its technical capabilities. The best weapons in the world are of no use if licenses cannot be formalized due to a lack of legal expertise.

U.S. Negotiations: The Documented Mystery

Discussions with the United States regarding arms licenses are the most intriguing—and the least documented. Fedorov flatly refused to provide details: “We cannot disclose any details yet.” He did, however, confirm that these discussions are taking place at the National Security and Defense Council (CNSD) level and are “unprecedented.”

Speculation is tempting, but the fact-checker must resist. What can be said without speculating: the U.S. systems most relevant to Ukraine—whose production under license would be transformative—include missiles such as the ATACMS (if the maximum-range version could be produced locally), precision-guidance systems, or air defense technologies. But without confirmation, these possibilities remain mere conjecture.

The F-16 Precedent and What It Teaches Us

The case of the F-16s delivered to Ukraine offers an instructive precedent. Initially, the very idea of delivering fourth-generation fighters to Ukraine seemed impossible. Then it became possible—with conditions. Then those conditions were lifted. Then the deliveries took place. The process took about two years from the first serious discussion to the first deliveries.

If a similar pattern applies to production licenses, the June 29, 2026, discussions on the SCALP license could lead to actual Ukrainian production by 2028 or 2029. This does not mean the war will last that long—it may end sooner. But even in peacetime, having the capability to produce precision cruise missiles is strategically essential for Ukraine.

The F-16 precedent gives me hope for the SCALP license. It took two years of “it’s impossible” before the F-16s took flight to Ukraine. The trajectory for the cruise missiles could be similar. I’m marking June 29, 2026, as the start of a process whose results, if all goes well, will be measured in years—and in kilometers of range.

What We Know for Certain

The “initial progress” in the SCALP license negotiations, announced on June 29, 2026, by Mykhailo Fedorov, represents a real step forward in a complex process. Discussions took place at the presidential level—between Zelensky and Macron—and are continuing with the French government and MBDA. The key issues to be resolved have been identified: intellectual property, the start of production, and legal matters.

Parallel negotiations with the United States have been confirmed and described as “unprecedented.” They are being conducted at the level of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, which underscores their strategic importance. The overall direction is clear: Ukraine aims to transition from being a recipient to a producer of advanced Western weaponry.

What These Negotiations Reveal About the Future

Discussions regarding the SCALP license are part of a broader transformation of the defense relationship between Ukraine and the West. This transformation will not happen in a matter of months—it will take years. But the trajectory has been set, and every announcement, such as the one on June 29, marks a verifiable step forward.

For Putin, who believed in 2022 that Ukraine would be brought to its knees in a matter of days, watching Kyiv negotiate licenses to produce French cruise missiles is likely one of the most bitter images of this war. The Ukraine he sought to destroy is building its military sovereignty, brick by brick, license by license. This image, more than any spectacular strike, perhaps best sums up the fundamental strategic failure of the Russian invasion.

Putin wanted a disarmed, subjugated Ukraine, incapable of resistance. Instead, he has created a Ukraine that is negotiating the production of precision cruise missiles with France and the United States. The irony would be funny if it weren’t so costly in human lives. But the direction is clear. And it is irreversible.

Assumed Areas of Uncertainty

This analysis has its limitations. I do not know the exact wording of the documents exchanged between Paris, MBDA, and Kyiv during these negotiations. I do not know which specific U.S. weapons systems are involved in the parallel discussions. I cannot predict whether these negotiations will succeed or whether they will be derailed by unforeseen technical, commercial, or political obstacles.

What I can say for certain is that the sources are reliable, the statements are those of a defense minister made on the record, and the overall context is consistent with other available information. Fedorov’s caution in his own statements—“first steps,” “too early for concrete results”—suggests that I am not overinterpreting an announcement that he himself presents as preliminary.

The Necessary Follow-Up

This issue warrants close monitoring in the coming months. Key next steps to watch for include: a formal announcement of an agreement in principle on the license, the publication of details regarding production conditions, and any updates on the progress of parallel U.S. negotiations. These milestones will allow us to assess whether the “initial progress” of June 29, 2026, translates into concrete results—or whether it remains, for now, in the realm of well-founded hopes.

I am committed to following this story with the same rigor as this analysis. Because if the SCALP license is granted, it will be one of the most significant developments of the war—and it deserves the serious journalistic coverage it may not yet have received to the extent it deserves.

Journalists covering wars tend to chase headlines—airstrikes, casualties, front-line advances. Negotiations over missile production licenses are less spectacular. And yet, this may be where Ukraine’s future is truly at stake. I prefer to cover what matters in the long term rather than what makes for good visuals in the short term.

An irreversible process, provided the political will remains

Negotiations over the SCALP production license illustrate a broader reality: the war in Ukraine has set in motion a process of building Ukrainian military sovereignty that, provided the allies’ political will holds, will become irreversible. This process no longer depends on a few isolated political decisions—it is rooted in trade agreements, industrial partnerships, and gradual technology transfers that create lasting realities.

Fedorov has understood this, Macron has understood this, and even Trump—in his pragmatic way—is beginning to understand it. A militarily autonomous Ukraine is a Ukraine that costs the allies less in the long run. This calculation, as pragmatic as it may be, is pushing things in the right direction: toward technology transfers, toward production licenses, toward a Ukraine that defends its own borders with its own weapons.

Fedorov’s statement from June 29, 2026, will stand the test of time

In a year, two years, perhaps five years, if a SCALP production line is up and running somewhere in Ukraine, we may look back on this statement from June 29, 2026. Fedorov’s understated remark—“initial progress has been made”—will be the first public record of a process that will have transformed Ukraine’s long-range strike capability. Great stories always begin with initial advances. What matters is what comes next.

And Ukraine, more than anyone, knows that what comes after the first advances is hard work—relentless, patient, and systematic. Exactly as it has been doing since February 24, 2022.

I conclude this analysis with the feeling that history’s great transformations are forged in the details: a memorandum signed here, an initial breakthrough announced there, a license granted after months of negotiation. The Ukraine of 2030 will be defined by these decisions made in 2026 during meetings that no one was covering live. That’s why we must keep analyzing the news, even when the headlines are understated.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist