FACT-CHECK: Rutte Visits Trump Before Ankara — What Lies Behind the NATO Secretary General’s Visit

Maxime Marquette

2026-07-03 16:04:26

What Rutte Said

Mark Rutte publicly stated that NATO allies had reached $1 trillion in total defense spending, and that European allies and Canada had increased their spending by more than $90 billion in real terms compared to the previous year. He called this increase incredible. The central argument of his visit was based on this point: NATO is generating massive investments, partly thanks to pressure from Trump.

VERDICT: TRUE BUT INCOMPLETE. The $1 trillion figure is indeed reached when adding up the defense spending of all 32 NATO members, including the United States itself, which accounts for about 70% of that total. The additional $90 billion from European countries and Canada is real. But this should not obscure the fact that several countries—including Spain, Italy, and the Czech Republic—are still described as “laggards” in the alliance’s official reports.

The Reality of Spending by Country

Belgium has only recently reached the long-standing symbolic minimum threshold of 2% of GDP. Spain remains well below 2%, despite repeated promises. The 5% of GDP target by 2035 that Trump is demanding is considered by the majority of defense economists to be practically unachievable for most European economies—except perhaps for countries like Poland, which has already exceeded 4% due to its geographical position vis-à-vis Russia. The overall figures are accurate. The uneven progress is just as evident.

Last year’s Hague agreement had set the 5% target as a common goal. But the agreement did not establish a binding timeline or a penalty mechanism for countries that fail to meet this target. Trump interprets this agreement as a firm commitment. Most European allies treat it as a political aspiration. This divergence in interpretation lies at the heart of the tension Rutte had to manage during his visit.

A trillion dollars sounds impressive in a speech—until you realize that the United States alone accounts for 700 billion of that amount. What Rutte doesn’t mention in his glossy charts is that the European effort, though on the rise, remains structurally dependent on the U.S. guarantee. And Trump knows it. It is precisely this leverage that he uses to demand ever more.

CLAIM 2 — Trump supported NATO during the war in Iran

What Trump Claims: Allies Failed During the War in Iran

Trump said during the meeting with Rutte: “We spent all that money. And then, when we might want some help with small things… They say no, we’d rather not help.” ” He added that NATO was an “empty piggy bank” and clearly implied that European allies had refused to participate in the U.S. war effort against Iran. His Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, went even further, calling NATO a “paper tiger” during a meeting in Brussels.

VERDICT: PARTIALLY TRUE. It is true that the majority of European allies did not participate directly in U.S. military operations against Iran in the spring of 2026. However, Rutte responded to this accusation by pointing out that European air bases were used for U.S. operations—with 4,000 to 5,000 sorties by U.S. aircraft from bases in Europe during the conflict with Iran. The allies provided critical logistical infrastructure without necessarily sending their own forces into combat.

The Argument for Indirect Support and Its Limitations

The distinction between “direct support” and “indirect support” lies at the heart of the debate. From the American perspective, the United States fought and won (in Trump’s words: “We defeated them in just the first week”)—and its allies stood by and watched. From the European perspective, the war in Iran was not a defensive war covered by NATO’s Article 5—it was a unilateral U.S. operation in which the allies were not required to intervene militarily. Both positions are defensible under international law and within the framework of the NATO treaty.

What Trump fails to mention: the war in Iran was fought in less than two weeks and ended in a decisive American victory, according to official White House statements. It is therefore somewhat ironic to criticize the allies for not participating in a war that ended so quickly. What Rutte fails to say: if the war had lasted for months, the pressure on the allies to contribute would have been much greater—and their refusal far more damaging to the alliance’s cohesion.

The war in Iran as a bone of contention within NATO—one has to admit that the situation is absurd. The Europeans provided their bases and airspace, but Trump wants them to send their soldiers to die in a war he himself started without consulting the alliance. That is the very definition of a one-way partnership. Rutte was right to stand firm on this point.

CLAIM 3 — Rutte called Trump the “leader of the free world”

Flattery as a Diplomatic Tool

According to diplomatic sources close to the negotiations, Rutte reportedly referred to Trump as the “leader of the free world” during their meeting at the White House. This statement is part of Rutte’s long-standing tradition of managing presidential egos—it’s worth noting that at the previous summit, he reportedly called Trump “daddy” in the context of his handling of the conflict in the Middle East. The charts presented to Trump were reportedly designed explicitly to show him “just how great a leader he is.”

VERDICT: NOT OFFICIALLY VERIFIED BUT PLAUSIBLE. These statements are reported by anonymous sources close to the negotiations, not by official public statements from Rutte. The NATO Secretary General has publicly confirmed that he presented data on defense spending and Trump’s influence within the alliance. The exact wording remains unofficially unconfirmed. However, the account is consistent with Rutte’s documented diplomatic behavior toward Trump since 2025.

The Diplomacy of Flattery and Its Risks

Rutte’s approach is deliberately controversial. His defenders argue that it is a pragmatic necessity: if flattering Trump keeps NATO united and preserves Article 5, then the price of a few excessive compliments is acceptable. His critics—notably some Eastern European leaders—believe this approach normalizes erratic presidential behavior and undermines the alliance’s institutional credibility in the long term. In the meantime, NATO continues to function. That’s no small feat.

The tangible outcome of this meeting is that Trump has finally confirmed his attendance at the Ankara summit—his presence had been contingent, according to diplomatic sources, on the attendance of Turkish President Erdogan. But it was also facilitated by Rutte’s preparatory visit. On this specific objective—ensuring Trump’s presence in Ankara—Rutte’s mission appears to have succeeded.

There is something deeply uncomfortable about the image of the NATO Secretary General parading golden charts to keep a U.S. president’s interest piqued. But we must also acknowledge a reality: without NATO and without the United States, Ukraine would have fallen. So if golden charts are the price to pay to keep Trump at the table, I prefer that to a NATO without Trump.

The Pentagon's Deployment Review: A Real Threat to European Defense

What the Six-Month Review Means in Practice

The Pentagon’s announcement of a six-month review of its military deployments in Europe—with “drastic” cuts expected—is one of the most concrete threats to Europe’s security architecture. This review concerns the 80,000 U.S. troops deployed in Europe since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It could lead to a partial withdrawal or a significant reconfiguration of the U.S. presence—particularly in Germany, where Trump has already announced the withdrawal of 5,000 troops following criticism by German Chancellor Merz of the U.S.-Israeli strategy toward Iran.

This review is not merely a tool for political pressure. It reflects a profound transformation of U.S. military doctrine under Trump: prioritizing the Asia-Pacific region in the face of China, reducing commitments in Europe, and demanding that European allies take charge of their own defense. If the announced cuts go through, Europe will have to either develop its own high-intensity military capabilities much more quickly than anticipated or accept a significant reduction in its collective security.

The Challenge for the Ankara Summit

The Ankara summit on July 7 and 8 must therefore produce a collective commitment on defense spending that is concrete enough to convince Trump not to follow through with the announced cuts. The summit’s agenda includes spending on European and Arctic security, the need to significantly increase defense production, and commitments regarding financial and operational contributions to support Ukraine. The 70-billion-euro package for Ukraine spearheaded by Germany represents one of the concrete signals that the allies hope to present to Trump as proof of their commitment.

The difficulty lies in the fact that Trump does not judge the allies by their stated intentions or their commitments on paper—he judges them by immediately visible and quantifiable results. The final declaration from the Ankara summit—if it is not accompanied by binding short-term budgetary commitments—may not be enough to appease U.S. demands. This is the existential stake of this summit.

A review of troop deployments that could lead the Americans to withdraw 10,000 or 20,000 soldiers from Europe—at the very moment Russia is maintaining massive military pressure on Ukraine—is the kind of strategic decision that is measured in human lives. I hope the strategists at the Pentagon are doing the math correctly. Because every American soldier withdrawn from Europe sends a signal that Moscow will interpret.

The 5% of GDP Target: Realistic or Political Fantasy?

The History of the 2% Commitment and Its Results

The target of 2% of GDP for defense spending was set by NATO at the 2014 Wales Summit, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In 2014, only 3 of the 28 member countries met this target. By 2026, the majority of member states will meet or exceed this threshold. This progress represents a historic transformation of Europe’s defense posture. But it took twelve years to reach 2%—and now Trump is demanding 5% in less than ten years.

The jump from 2% to 5% is not arithmetically proportional to the challenges it represents. At 2%, defense spending primarily covers salaries, existing equipment, and its maintenance. At 5%, it entails massive defense industrialization, significant military recruitment, new weapons programs, and a reorganization of the national economy around the priority of defense. For an economy like that of France or Germany, moving to 5% of GDP would represent hundreds of billions of euros in additional spending per year—a mobilization unprecedented since World War II.

Countries That Can Achieve This and Those That Cannot

Poland has already exceeded 4% of GDP in defense spending—a record within NATO—due to its border with Belarus and its proximity to the conflict in Ukraine. The Baltic states have also significantly increased their spending. These countries have a geographic and existential reason to spend so much. But Spain, which has no land border with Russia and whose economy is under constant fiscal pressure, cannot reach 5% without a major domestic political transformation. Demanding this of all members in the same way is a mechanical application that ignores geopolitical and economic realities.

The 2025 Hague Agreement wisely included some flexibility: the 5% figure includes spending on civilian infrastructure used for military purposes—roads, bridges, communications—which allows countries like Germany to count investments that would not have been included under strict definitions of defense spending. This flexibility is real but contested by some allies, who see it as a way to artificially inflate the figures.

The 5% of GDP target is a good thing—if we truly want Europe to be capable of defending itself. What Trump doesn’t say is that if Europe were to actually reach 5% of GDP in defense spending, it would no longer need the United States in the same way. This would make NATO less dependent on Washington. Is that really what Trump wants? I’m not sure he’s thought it through to that conclusion.

The Ankara Summit: Trump Is Hesitant, Erdogan Is Indispensable

Why Ankara and Why Now

The choice of Ankara for this summit is no coincidence. President Erdogan’s Turkey plays a complex diplomatic role in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture: it is both a NATO member and a mediator between Ukraine and Russia, as well as a formal Western ally and a significant economic partner of Moscow. The fact that Trump made his attendance contingent on Erdogan’s presence—according to diplomatic sources—underscores the importance Washington attaches to Turkey in the dynamics of this summit.

Ukraine will be at the center of the discussions. The 70-billion-euro package spearheaded by Germany represents a collective commitment by the allies to provide military and financial support to Kyiv. Macron has announced a meeting of the Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine on July 13, two weeks after the summit, which is expected to amplify this political momentum. Zelensky is expected in Ankara—his presence or absence will itself send a strong political signal about the state of relations between Ukraine and NATO.

What the Summit Must Deliver

For this summit to be a success, it must produce three concrete outcomes. First, a clear, quantified commitment on defense spending that satisfies Trump without being unachievable for the allies. Second, a strong signal of support for Ukraine—ideally a commitment to a timeline for accession or, failing that, more formal security guarantees. Third, an agreement to maintain U.S. deployments in Europe for the duration of the Pentagon’s review.

The absence of any one of these three elements would make the Ankara summit a missed opportunity—and would send Moscow a signal of transatlantic division that Putin would know how to exploit. The pressure on the negotiators is at its peak. Whether it’s Rutte, the national delegations, or the diplomatic teams, everyone knows that the outcome in Ankara will partly determine the course of the conflict in Ukraine.

Ankara is the city of paradoxes for this summit: a country that maintains trade ties with Moscow is hosting an alliance that is fighting Moscow by proxy in Ukraine. Erdogan relishes this role as a balancing act. He derives considerable diplomatic power from it. The West must decide whether it wants to continue granting him this leverage or whether it wants to recalibrate its relations with Ankara.

Ukraine-NATO Relations: Between Hope and Reality

The Issue of Ukraine’s NATO Membership

Ukraine continues to seek a formal invitation to join NATO. This request is politically blocked by several allies—notably the United States and Germany—who fear that a formal invitation could be interpreted by Russia as an escalation justifying an intensification of hostilities. Zelensky has reiterated on numerous occasions that the lack of a NATO invitation leaves Ukraine in a permanent security gray area—neither in nor out, neither protected nor abandoned.

The compromise solution being explored by some allies is that of a bilateral security guarantee—agreements between Ukraine and several NATO members that provide for commitments of military support without going through the alliance treaty. France, the United Kingdom, and Germany have signed such agreements. But they do not replace the guarantee of Article 5—and everyone knows this, including Putin.

The 70-billion-euro package: symbolic or transformative

The 70-billion-euro package spearheaded by Germany for Ukraine is the largest collective financial commitment since the start of the conflict. It includes both direct military aid—ammunition, weapons systems, training—and support for the country’s economic reconstruction. This figure is both impressive in scale and insufficient given Ukraine’s actual needs.

For the Ankara summit, this package serves as a key argument: the allies aren’t just talking about supporting Ukraine; they’re putting concrete and sustainable financial mechanisms in place. The challenge is to convince Trump—who had initially suspended part of U.S. aid to Ukraine early in his term—that the allies are bearing their fair share of the burden. If this message gets through, the Ankara summit could lead to a renewal of the U.S. commitment to Ukraine.

70 billion euros is a lot—and yet it’s still not enough. Ukraine needs a sustained war economy, not one-off injections of funds. But I’d rather have 70 imperfect billion than zero perfect billion. And if this package convinces Trump to maintain the U.S. commitment, it will have served a fundamental purpose.

Pete Hegseth and NATO as a “paper tiger”: a serious statement

The Defense Secretary’s Attack on the Alliance

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth called NATO a “paper tiger” during a meeting in Brussels in June 2026. This statement, reported by the Wall Street Journal, is not mere rhetorical posturing. It reflects a profound strategic vision of the Trump administration: NATO in its current form no longer meets the security needs of the United States in the 21st century. It is too slow, too bureaucratic, too dependent on U.S. contributions, and too reluctant to take direct military action.

VERDICT: TRUE AND DOCUMENTED STATEMENT. Hegseth did indeed make this statement, which has been confirmed by diplomatic sources and U.S. media outlets. It is part of a series of statements by members of the Trump administration that call into question NATO’s value to the United States. This rhetoric has not yet been followed by concrete action to weaken or withdraw the U.S. from the alliance—but it creates an atmosphere of uncertainty that is itself destabilizing for NATO’s cohesion.

The Allies’ Response and the Impact on the Alliance’s Credibility

Hegseth’s statement sent shockwaves through European capitals. Several defense ministers responded publicly that NATO had proven its worth by maintaining peace in Europe for 75 years and by supporting Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. These responses are defensive in nature—and the very need to make them reveals the problem: an alliance whose most powerful member publicly doubts its value is a weakened alliance, regardless of the military realities on the ground.

For Rutte, the June 24 visit was also intended to implicitly counter Hegseth’s narrative by presenting tangible evidence of NATO’s value to U.S. interests—jobs created, bases used, intelligence shared. The question is whether this counter-narrative convinced Trump himself, or only his immediate inner circle.

Hegseth calling NATO a “paper tiger” in front of allied ambassadors—if that scene doesn’t shock you at least a little, I don’t know what will. This isn’t the personal opinion of a junior officer. It’s the position of the U.S. Secretary of Defense. It’s a deliberate institutional degradation. And Rutte responds with fancy charts. That’s where we stand.

The Ukraine Issue at the Ankara Summit: Zelensky Takes Center Stage

Zelensky’s Expected Attendance and Its Implications

Volodymyr Zelensky is expected to attend the summit in Ankara. His physical presence in the same room as Trump, Erdogan, and the 32 allied heads of state represents a unique diplomatic opportunity—and a major political risk. It is unique because Zelensky can directly articulate Ukraine’s needs to the leaders who are in a position to address them. It is risky because any visible disagreement between Zelensky and Trump would be immediately amplified by the media and used by Moscow as evidence of fractures within the pro-Ukraine coalition.

The relationship between Zelensky and Trump remains delicate. The two leaders have had difficult public exchanges since the start of Trump’s second term. The initial suspension of U.S. aid, pressure to negotiate with Moscow, and Trump’s statements about the need for a “deal” quickly—all of this has created underlying tension that the Ankara summit will have to manage carefully. Rutte has clearly been working to lay the groundwork for this during his visit in June.

What Ukraine Specifically Expects from Ankara

Ukraine expects three specific things from the Ankara summit. First, a renewal of bilateral security guarantees with key allies. Second, a commitment to provide the weapons systems it needs most—notably air defense, long-range artillery, and guided munitions. Third, a clear political signal that NATO will not abandon Ukraine in the face of Russian pressure, regardless of how long the conflict lasts.

These three requests are politically feasible—some allies are already prepared to meet them. The difficulty lies in reaching a consensus among all 32 members on language strong enough to carry real political weight, without being so binding that it creates new tensions within the alliance. This is the usual challenge of any NATO summit final declaration—finding the words that say something without saying everything.

Zelensky in Ankara facing Trump—that’s the scene I’m watching most closely. A man fighting for his country’s survival stands opposite a president who thinks the war can end with a real estate deal. This gulf in understanding between the two men is the main risk of the summit. I hope Rutte has laid the groundwork on this front as well.

The German Issue: Merz, Trump's Criticism, and the Withdrawal of 5,000 Troops

The Merz-Trump Clash Over Iran Strategy

German Chancellor Frederic Merz had criticized the U.S.-Israeli strategy on Iran as “ill-conceived”—a direct and rare statement by a German leader directed at a sitting U.S. president. Trump’s response was immediate: he announced the withdrawal of 5,000 U.S. troops stationed in Germany. This punitive decision perfectly illustrates Trump’s approach to alliances: respect is treated as a bargaining chip, and public criticism comes at the cost of national security.

It had taken Germany decades to gradually rearm after World War II. Its dependence on the U.S. presence was not only military—it was political and psychological. Trump’s decision to withdraw 5,000 troops based on a diplomatic disagreement signals that U.S. guarantees are no longer unconditional. This is a profound paradigm shift that Germany will need to incorporate into its long-term defense planning.

Germany as a Pillar of Support for Ukraine Despite Tensions

Despite these tensions, Germany remains the main driving force behind the 70-billion-euro aid package for Ukraine. Merz has maintained a firm pro-Ukraine stance while navigating the complications of the relationship with Trump. This balancing act—criticizing American methods without jeopardizing the fundamental alliance—is delicate but politically necessary for a German leader.

Germany arrives at the Ankara summit with mixed political capital: it is the leader of the largest aid package for Ukraine, but its leader has publicly offended Trump. Merz will have to navigate this duality skillfully so that Germany can maintain its influence within the alliance without worsening its bilateral relationship with Washington.

Trump withdrawing 5,000 troops from Germany because Merz criticized his strategy in Iran—this is the most dangerous politicization of European security in decades. The security of allies should never depend on the whims of a president. But that is today’s reality. And that is exactly why Europe must invest heavily in its own defense.

Absentees and Silences: What the Ankara Summit Will Not Address

France and Its Proposals for a “Coalition of the Willing”

Since 2024, Macron’s France has been promoting the concept of a “coalition of the willing”—a support structure for Ukraine that operates outside the formal framework of NATO and may include countries willing to make more direct commitments than the alliance as a whole. The meeting of this coalition, scheduled for July 13, is no coincidence—it is intended to complement the Ankara summit for allies who wish to go beyond what the NATO consensus allows.

The tension between this French approach and NATO’s institutional approach is real. If the coalition of the willing becomes too visible and too active, it risks splitting the alliance into two camps—those who truly support Ukraine and those who are content with political statements. Trump would exploit this rift to justify a U.S. withdrawal: “If the Europeans are handling Ukraine among themselves, why should the United States contribute?”

The Silence on the Post-War Security Architecture

What the Ankara summit will not openly address—but which is on everyone’s mind—is the question of Europe’s post-war security architecture. How can Ukraine be integrated into a system of collective guarantees? How can we ensure that peace—when it comes—does not resemble a precarious armistice like the one in 1918? These existential questions will not be answered in Ankara. But they will be present in every hallway, every informal conversation between delegations.

NATO needs a vision for its own transformation for the world of 2030 and beyond. The Ankara summit will be too preoccupied with the urgent matters of the present to address them. This is the perennial paradox of major alliances: the vast amounts of energy devoted to managing crises in the immediate term leave little room for long-term strategic thinking. Rutte knows this. Perhaps this explains his approach: keeping the alliance alive today so that it can be transformed tomorrow.

People talk about the post-war security architecture in Ukraine as if the war were about to end. That is by no means certain. But preparing for peace during the war is a necessity—and NATO still does not have a clear answer to the question: What do you offer Ukraine if it cannot join the alliance? This question cannot remain unanswered indefinitely.

The Macron Doctrine of Coalition and Its Implications for NATO

A parallel structure that complements or competes with NATO

Since 2024, Emmanuel Macron has been building a doctrine of a coalition of the willing that operates outside NATO’s formal structures. This coalition brings together countries willing to go further in supporting Ukraine—potentially even to the point of sending military trainers to Ukrainian territory. It includes France, the United Kingdom, the Nordic and Baltic countries, and certain Central European nations. It operates without the consensus of all 32 NATO members, which gives it a flexibility that formal NATO lacks.

This parallel structure raises a fundamental question for the Ankara summit: Does the coalition of the willing complement NATO or compete with it? Rutte must address this diplomatically tricky question—integrating the coalition too closely into NATO’s structure risks alienating reluctant members, while allowing it to operate too independently risks fracturing the alliance. This is one of the most complex institutional dilemmas that the summit will at least have to acknowledge, even if it cannot fully resolve it.

July 13 and the meeting of the coalition of the willing

The meeting of the coalition of the willing scheduled by Macron for July 13, 2026—five days after the Ankara summit—is no coincidence. It is designed to amplify the summit’s results by demonstrating that certain allies are prepared to go even further than the NATO consensus. This sequence—NATO on July 7–8, the coalition on July 13—creates a dynamic of political escalation that favors Ukraine if managed well. It can also create visible divisions among NATO members if the countries participating in the coalition are perceived as implicitly criticizing those that do not.

Rutte will be paying close attention to this sequence. His role is to ensure that the coalition of the willing remains a complement to, not a substitute for, NATO. The July 13 meeting will also be an opportunity for Macron to announce new decisions on Ukraine—decisions that Moscow will scrutinize to gauge Western resolve. Every signal sent during this two-week window counts.

Macron and his coalition of the willing—this is the only true pro-Ukraine diplomatic innovation of the past two years. It allows those who want to do more to do so without waiting for unanimity among all 32 members. But it also reveals an uncomfortable truth: formal NATO is no longer fast or flexible enough to meet the demands of war. The coalition of the willing is a necessary institutional crutch. It is not a permanent solution.

What's True, What's False: A Summary of the Fact-Check

Verified Claims and Their Final Verdict

This fact-check analyzed the main statements surrounding Rutte’s visit to Trump. Conclusion: The figure of $1 trillion in NATO spending is TRUE but requires context. Trump’s accusation that the allies did not support the United States in Iran is PARTIALLY TRUE—the allies did not send troops but did provide bases. The golden graphics designed to flatter Trump are UNOFFICIALLY CONFIRMED but consistent with Rutte’s documented behavior. Hegseth’s statement about NATO being a “paper tiger” is TRUE AND DOCUMENTED. The withdrawal of 5,000 U.S. troops from Germany is TRUE.

What this fact-check cannot verify with certainty: the exact details of the closed-door conversations between Rutte and Trump, the specific commitments made during the meeting, and the actual impact of this visit on Trump’s position regarding the Ankara summit. Diplomacy at this level operates in spheres that even the best journalists cannot fully penetrate. This fact-check is limited to public statements, attributed diplomatic sources, and verifiable facts.

The Overall Verdict on the Rutte-Trump Meeting

Rutte’s visit to Trump on June 24, 2026, achieved its minimum objectives: Trump confirmed his attendance at the Ankara summit, public tensions were eased, and no new punitive measures against allies were announced in the immediate term. These results are real but fragile—they depend on Rutte’s ability to keep Trump satisfied enough that he does not make unilateral decisions that would undermine the alliance. This is short-term diplomacy, not a structural transformation. But in the current context, that is already a significant achievement.

What is missing—and what no preparatory visit can provide—is a rebuilding of the transatlantic bond on foundations more solid than the personality of a single president. NATO needs institutions, rules, and commitments that outlast changes in government on both sides of the Atlantic. This structural reform is not on the agenda for the Ankara summit. It should be.

Rutte did what he had to do—and I don’t hold it against him. He’s managing an ongoing crisis with the tools at his disposal. But I can’t help thinking that NATO deserves better than a diplomacy of constant flattery just to stay alive. An alliance that depends on the whims of a single man is not a strong alliance. It’s an alliance on life support.

Conclusion: NATO After Ankara—A Precarious but Vital Balance

The Alliance’s Resilience Despite Everything

NATO in 2026 is an alliance under immense pressure—from within due to tensions within the U.S., and from without due to the war in Ukraine and China’s rise to power. And yet, it holds. Not because conditions are favorable—they haven’t been this favorable since the Cold War. It holds because leaders like Rutte understand that keeping the alliance united, even imperfectly, is infinitely better than a fractured alliance that would leave Europe alone to face Putin’s Russia and an expansionist China.

Rutte’s visit to Trump and the Ankara summit are two links in a diplomatic chain seeking to maintain this unity under extraordinarily difficult conditions. The results will be imperfect. The final statements will be worded with the calculated precision of institutional compromise. But if Ankara sends a clear signal of support for Ukraine, makes a credible commitment to defense spending, and ensures the continued U.S. presence in Europe, this summit will have fulfilled its essential purpose.

What NATO Must Become After Ankara

After Ankara, NATO will need to begin thinking about its post-Trump transformation—not by betting on a change in U.S. policy, but by laying the groundwork for greater European strategic autonomy. This autonomy is not at odds with the United States—it complements the Atlantic alliance. A Europe capable of defending itself is a more credible partner for Washington than a Europe perpetually dependent on the U.S. security guarantee.

The Ankara summit will be an opportunity to lay the groundwork for this transformation—or to once again miss the mark when it comes to strategic necessity. History—that of Ukraine and Europe—awaits the answer.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist