OP-ED: Magyar and the Hungarian Veto — Why Brussels Still Can’t Celebrate

Six clusters, only one open: the dashboard for Ukraine’s EU accession

Ukraine’s accession process to the European Union is structured around six negotiation clusters, each covering a specific area of European policy. Cluster 1—the foundations of the rule of law and European values—was opened in June 2026 after the Hungarian veto was lifted. This is a symbolically important step forward: it recognizes that Ukraine has carried out significant reforms in key areas.

But the remaining five clusters remain closed, largely blocked by Budapest. The European Commission, whose initial goal was to open all available clusters at the July summit, has had to scale back its ambitions. Only Cluster 2 (internal market) and Cluster 6 (external relations) could be discussed at the next General Affairs Council. For each of the other clusters, the agreement of all member states—including Hungary—is required.

What This Delay Means in Practical Terms for Ukraine

Each unopened cluster represents a set of reforms and legislative alignments that Ukraine must complete to comply with European standards. These reforms are demanding—they cover competition policy, financial regulation, labor law, agricultural policy, and many other areas. The later these clusters are opened, the further accession is pushed back. And every year of delay means one less year of certainty for investors, refugees hesitant to return, and Ukrainian entrepreneurs planning for the post-war period.

The Conference on the Reconstruction of Ukraine, held in Gdańsk in June 2026, highlighted the scale of post-war reconstruction needs: hundreds of billions of euros. Private investors, who will be indispensable to this reconstruction, need the certainty that Ukraine will be an EU member—that its rule of law, investor protections, and market will comply with European standards. Every delay in accession is a delay in that certainty.

There is a profound irony in the fact that the EU, which has mobilized billions of euros to support Ukraine during the war, is holding back the accession that would best secure Ukraine’s future. Military and humanitarian aid is essential. But European institutional integration is the long-term guarantee that this aid will not be wasted.

A Real Community, a Unilaterally Imposed Condition

The Ukrainian region of Transcarpathia is home to a significant Hungarian community, whose linguistic and educational rights have been a source of tension with the Ukrainian government, particularly since the 2017 Education Act, which restricted the use of minority languages in education. This dispute is real and well-documented. Minority rights are a fundamental European value, and it is legitimate for Budapest to defend them in the context of accession negotiations.

What is less legitimate is making this a condition precedent for the entire accession process, at a time when Ukraine is fighting for its survival. The European Commission and other member states have proposed monitoring mechanisms to ensure that Ukraine’s commitments on minority rights are upheld—without blocking the entire process. Magyar has opted for total conditionality over gradual trust.

A Bilateral Agreement Whose Details Remain Unknown

The bilateral agreement that allowed the veto on the first cluster to be lifted remains opaque: neither Budapest nor Kyiv has made its detailed contents public. Magyar’s Tisza Party maintains that any further progress depends on the implementation of this agreement—the terms of which it does not disclose. This lack of transparency creates an information asymmetry: how can other member states assess whether Ukraine is fulfilling its commitments if the commitments themselves remain secret?

Analyst Dániel Hegedűs of the Institut für Europäische Politik asked the question directly: “I simply wonder whether they actually communicated this position to the Ukrainian side during these bilateral negotiations. I think it is very difficult to argue that the Hungarian government is acting in good faith.” This assessment by a Hungarian expert himself is particularly significant.

A bilateral agreement whose implementation cannot be verified because its contents are unknown is no agreement at all. It is a vague condition that can be invoked at any time to justify a new blockade. The EU should not accept this lack of transparency—it should demand transparency regarding any agreement that conditions a candidate country’s accession process.

Orbán’s Legacy in People’s Minds

For more than a decade, Viktor Orbán has spread constant anti-Ukrainian propaganda in Hungary: Ukraine is an artificial state, Zelensky is a pawn of NATO, this war is not the Hungarians’ war, and sanctions against Russia are hurting the Hungarian economy. This propaganda has had lasting effects on public opinion. Magyar, who came to power promising to be different, must govern within this toxic information ecosystem.

His cautious stance on Ukraine’s accession reflects this very real electoral constraint. Moving too quickly or too far on the Ukraine issue risks alienating part of his electorate and strengthening Fidesz and the far-right party Mi Hazánk, which would accuse him of being a NATO agent betraying Hungarian interests. Hegedűs analyzes it directly: “If I had to put it simply, Magyar would like to avoid criticism from Fidesz and the far-right party Mi Hazánk, which accuse him of being too soft on Ukraine.”

The Trap of Democratic Legitimacy

This is where the essay touches on something deeper: the tension between national democratic legitimacy and collective strategic imperatives. Magyar is democratically elected. Public opinion in his country is what it is—shaped by years of propaganda, to be sure, but real in its political effects. He cannot govern entirely against the will of his electorate.

But this same logic, applied to every EU member state, leads to collective paralysis. If every prime minister can invoke domestic electoral constraints to block decisions of strategic importance to the Union as a whole, then the EU cannot make any difficult decisions. This is the paradox of unanimity in European foreign policy: it protects national sovereignty, but it renders the Union incapable of acting with the speed and coherence demanded by contemporary geopolitical crises.

I do not dismiss Magyar’s electoral constraints. I understand that a democratic leader cannot govern entirely against public opinion. But Ukraine’s accession to the EU is not a matter of abstract European preference—it is a matter of collective security. And on security issues, democracies must sometimes have the courage to look beyond the polls.

Ursula von der Leyen and the Double Game of Funds and Enlargement

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen hailed the lifting of Hungary’s veto on the first cluster as a positive step. She also signed the agreement to release the 16.4 billion euros in frozen funds for Hungary. These two decisions were presented as separate—but their timing and shared key players make it difficult to maintain this distinction credibly.

The Commission has since had to scale back its targets for July 2026: two clusters instead of five. This revision is a concession to the political reality in Hungary—and an illustration of the limitations of the EU’s current decision-making framework on enlargement issues. As long as the unanimity rule applies, a single member state can slow down the entire process. And Budapest, under both Orbán and Magyar, seems to have learned this lesson in power.

The two clusters in July: internal market and external relations

The two clusters the Commission hopes to open in July 2026 are Cluster 2 (internal market) and Cluster 6 (external relations). These two areas are particularly important for Ukraine’s path to membership: the internal market because it covers trade, competition, and free movement rules that will determine Ukraine’s economic integration; external relations because it covers foreign and security policy, an area where Ukraine has operational expertise that few accession candidates have ever possessed.

The opening of these two clusters, if confirmed, would represent real progress. But it will leave the deadlock on the other three clusters intact—several of which cover fundamental reforms in governance, the judiciary, and the fight against corruption. These reforms are precisely what will determine the credibility and sustainability of Ukraine’s accession. Opening them is not just a matter of timing—it is a matter of the architecture of post-war Ukraine.

I do not wish to underestimate the importance of opening the first cluster. It sends a clear signal to Ukraine and its people: your place is in Europe. But the distance between the opening of the first cluster and full membership is immense—and every time Hungary puts the brakes on, it lengthens that path. Ukraine deserves better than incremental progress.

Ukraine’s Strategy: Hold, Reform, Continue

Faced with Hungarian obstruction, Ukraine does not have many direct options. It cannot force the clusters to open. It cannot circumvent the unanimity rule. It can—and must—continue to implement the necessary reforms for each cluster—in the hope that the quality of these reforms will eventually make the political deadlock too costly to maintain. This is the strategy Kyiv has adopted: moving forward with reforms, even when the clusters are closed, to demonstrate its good faith and apply political pressure on those who are blocking progress.

On June 28, 2026, Zelenskyy proposed a bill to Parliament on the creation of a National Pantheon—in part to respond to Polish pressure on the issue of remembrance. Symbolic of the complexity of the negotiations: Ukraine must simultaneously wage total war, reform its institutions to comply with European standards, and manage historical disputes with several of its allies. This is an extraordinary agenda for a country under bombardment.

The Gdańsk Conference and Reconstruction Pledges

The Conference on the Reconstruction of Ukraine, held in Gdańsk in June 2026, reaffirmed the commitment of Western partners to fund post-war reconstruction. Significant financial commitments were announced. But long-term reconstruction depends on a stable European institutional framework—something that only EU membership can guarantee in the long run. Private investors will only mobilize the hundreds of billions needed if they are certain of stable legal frameworks, protections for their investments, and access to the European single market.

Every month of delay in accession is one less month of certainty for these investors. This is a concrete, measurable economic cost that adds to the human and military costs of the war. The obstacles posed by Budapest—however understandable they may be in terms of its domestic political logic—have real economic effects on Ukraine today and in the future. This is precisely what the economic analyses of accession published since the Gdańsk Conference document in detail.

I am thinking of Ukrainian companies planning for their post-war future. They need to know whether Ukraine will be in the EU in five years or in twenty years. That difference changes everything: trade partnerships, industrial investments, and the recruitment of expatriate talent. Every Hungarian veto creates uncertainty that costs billions to an economy that has already lost everything.

Enlargement as a Political Process, Not Just a Technical One

The Magyar-Ukraine case reveals what political scientists have long known: the enlargement of the European Union is not merely a technical process of aligning with the acquis communautaire. It is a political process deeply shaped by the internal power dynamics within each member state, leaders’ electoral concerns, historical disputes between neighbors, and short-term budgetary calculations.

Ukraine’s candidacy brings all these tensions to a head: a country at war, a complex shared historical legacy with several member states, significant institutional reforms to be carried out, and colossal financial needs for reconstruction. That the process is difficult comes as no surprise. That the roadblocks sometimes come from countries that claim to be friends of Ukraine is more surprising.

Reforming the voting rules: an urgent necessity

The Hungarian case urgently reignites the debate on reforming the EU’s voting system for enlargement issues. The unanimity rule for enlargement decisions means that a single Member State can block the process for all 27. Some propose adopting a qualified majority system for accession decisions, similar to what exists for other EU policies.

This reform faces predictable resistance—particularly from member states that view unanimity as a safeguard for their sovereignty. But in a world where geopolitics is evolving at a pace that the EU’s current decision-making processes cannot keep up with, this protection of sovereignty comes at the expense of collective effectiveness. Ukraine is paying the price for this inefficiency—and with it, the credibility of the European promise.

The unanimity rule was designed to protect small states from great powers. In the case of Ukraine’s accession, it is protecting a country of 10 million people from a country of 40 million that has been invaded by a nuclear power. This outcome was not the intention of the EU’s founders. It is time to revise the rules.

The General Affairs Council in July 2026

The next decisive test for the Ukraine issue will be the General Affairs Council, where member states will have to decide whether to open two additional clusters for Ukraine and Moldova. If Hungary agrees to these two clusters, it will be a significant step forward. If it blocks them again, the Commission will have to consider alternative mechanisms to maintain the momentum of the accession process.

The issue is not merely technical. It is political: to show the Ukrainian people, who are suffering under bombardment, that Europe keeps its promises. And to show Moscow, which has always bet on Western disunity, that the EU is capable of supporting Ukraine not only with weapons and money, but with the prospect of genuine, gradual, and irreversible membership.

Scenarios for 2027 and Beyond

In the best-case scenario, the accession chapters open gradually, Ukrainian reforms move forward, and membership becomes a reality by 2030. In the worst-case scenario, Hungarian and Polish obstructions mount, negotiations stall, and Ukraine remains in permanent candidate status—neither in the EU nor sufficiently protected by alternative security guarantees. This second scenario would be a disaster for Ukraine, for the EU’s credibility, and for the security of the entire European continent.

The history of European enlargement shows that processes that seem stalled eventually move forward—slowly, laboriously, in small steps. But this war demands a pace that the EU has not always been able to maintain. Magyar chose caution. History will judge whether this caution was wisdom or political cowardice. For Ukraine, the difference is vital—in the most literal sense of the word.

I don’t know if Ukraine will be an EU member by 2030. What I do know is that every obstacle thrown up by Budapest—under Orbán as well as under Magyar—delays something that is historically necessary. Europe has no secure future without a Ukraine firmly anchored in its institutions. This is the clearest geopolitical lesson of this war, and it should carry more weight than any electoral calculation in Budapest.

What Magyar Has Accomplished and What He Is Holding Back

To be fair to Péter Magyar, we must acknowledge what he has accomplished: ending the Orbán era, realigning Hungary with European institutions on several issues, and opening the first Ukrainian accession cluster. That’s no small feat. In less than a year in office, he has done more for Hungarian democracy and for relations between Budapest and Brussels than his predecessor did in ten years.

But he is slowing down a process that geopolitical urgency demands we accelerate. His refusal to open the remaining clusters, his opaque conditions, and his sensitivity to electoral pressure from the Orbán camp—all of this creates delays that come at a cost to Ukraine. Magyar is not Orbán. But he is not yet the constructive European partner that Ukraine needs.

What Brussels Can Still Do

Brussels is not without options in the face of Hungarian blockades. It can accelerate discussions on the two available clusters, demonstrate concrete results, and create momentum that makes blocking the other clusters politically costly for Budapest. It can also continue to demand that Hungary’s conditions be transparent and verifiable—to prevent opaque blockades from becoming a permanent tactic.

Fundamentally, the European Commission’s argument is the strongest: denying protection to all Ukrainian men or blocking all of Ukraine’s accession clusters en masse would constitute discrimination. Brussels must stand firm on this point—with resolve, while respecting the internal political constraints of member states, but without compromising on the essential: Ukraine is destined to be a member of the European Union, and this process must move forward.

What I will take away from the summer of 2026 is that Europe was willing to help Ukraine survive—but that it still hesitates to help it prosper. EU membership means long-term prosperity. Magyar may well lift some of its partial vetoes—but if the remaining clusters stay closed, the message sent to Kyiv remains ambiguous. And ambiguity, in times of war, comes at a real human cost.

16.4 billion euros and a lifted veto—a deal that cannot be denied

The release of 16.4 billion euros in frozen European funds for Hungary—which coincided with the lifting of Hungary’s veto on the first Ukrainian cluster—is one of the most revealing episodes in European politics during the summer of 2026. The European Commission emphasized that the two decisions were independent of one another. Magyar did the same. But attentive observers, both in Brussels and in member capitals, were not fooled.

This situation sets a structurally problematic precedent: a member state can freeze European funds rightfully owed to another accession candidate, then release them in exchange for a political concession. If this mechanism is tacitly endorsed, it will be replicated—by Hungary in other cases, and by other member states that are watching and learning. The blurring of lines between budgetary and enlargement issues undermines the entire European institutional process.

The Credibility of Rule-of-Law Conditionality

The initial freeze on European funds for Hungary under Orbán was based on documented violations of the rule of law—judicial independence, freedom of the press, and the protection of fundamental rights. Not all of these violations have been resolved since Magyar took office. The European institutions therefore had solid grounds to maintain financial pressure, regardless of the Ukrainian issue.

By releasing the funds in the context of lifting the Ukrainian veto, the Commission has undermined its own credibility regarding conditionality. It has signaled that geopolitical considerations can take precedence over the requirements of the rule of law—a dangerous signal for other member states that might be tempted to ignore their obligations in the hope of a similar deal. Hungary’s governance reform must continue regardless of the negotiations with Ukraine.

Unfreezing Hungarian funds in exchange for lifting the Ukrainian veto is the kind of pragmatic compromise the EU makes regularly—and one whose short-term logic I understand. But it creates a culture of institutional concessions that, in the long run, undermines the authority of common rules. The EU must find a way to make progress on Ukraine’s accession without sacrificing its mechanisms for defending the rule of law.

Moldova and Ukraine: Two Candidate Countries Linked in the Negotiations

Moldova is a candidate for EU membership alongside Ukraine. Its process is often mentioned in the same General Affairs Council decisions—the negotiation clusters must be opened for both countries. This joint candidacy has advantages: it dilutes the political focus on Ukraine and allows certain member states to vote for the entire package without appearing to take a solely pro-Ukrainian stance.

But it also creates risks: deadlocks over Ukraine automatically affect Moldova, a smaller country that receives less media attention and whose candidacy deserves separate consideration. Moldova has carried out significant reforms despite its own vulnerability to Russia—notably the persistent threat in Transnistria, a separatist region supported by Moscow. Its accession is in Europe’s strategic interest just as much as Ukraine’s.

The Precedent of Past Enlargements and What It Teaches Us

The history of previous EU enlargements offers useful lessons. The accession of the ten new member states in 2004 was paved by years of intense negotiations, but also by a strong political will on the part of existing member states—particularly Germany and France—to see a reunified Europe after the Cold War. This political will overcame resistance and short-term calculations.

Today, the political will for Ukraine’s accession exists—but it is unevenly distributed. The Baltic states, Poland (despite its disputes with Kyiv), Sweden, Finland, and Denmark are pushing hard. France and Germany support it but are dragging their feet. Hungary is holding things back. It is this uneven distribution of political will that is causing the deadlocks we are seeing—and this is precisely where European leadership must come into play.

The enlargements of 2004 and 2007 transformed Europe toward the east and toward democracy. Ukraine’s accession would be the third major enlargement in the history of the EU. It deserves the same political mobilization as the first two. The difference is that it is taking place amid bombings. This should be a reason to accelerate the process, not to slow it down.

Moscow and the Strategy of European Disunity

Russia has always bet on Western disunity. Since 2022, it has hoped for—and often worked to create—divisions among Ukraine’s allies: between the United States and Europe, among EU member states, and between national public opinion and their governments. Hungary’s obstruction of Ukraine’s accession objectively serves this strategy—even if Magyar does not have an overtly pro-Russian agenda.

What Putin sees when he observes the deliberations in Brussels on the Ukrainian clusters is confirmation of his assessment: Europe is divided, hesitant, and incapable of supporting its partner with the speed and consistency that the situation demands. Every month of delay in Ukraine’s accession is another month for Russian propaganda to claim that European promises are empty words.

European Credibility at Stake

The EU’s credibility as a geopolitical actor is partly at stake in the Ukrainian issue. A Union that promises the prospect of membership, mobilizes hundreds of billions of euros in support, but fails to open its own negotiation processes in a timely manner—such a Union sends a signal of institutional weakness that its adversaries, in Moscow as well as in Beijing, are taking careful note of.

The issue is not just Ukraine. It is the ability of democratic Europe to act with the decisiveness that geopolitical crises demand. If this capacity is structurally blocked by the unanimity rule and national electoral calculations, then Europe will urgently need to reform its institutions—not solely to facilitate Ukraine’s accession, but to be able to respond to the next crisis with the same speed as its authoritarian adversaries.

I believe Putin underestimated Ukraine’s resilience—but he may not have underestimated Europe’s slowness. Both can be true at the same time. Ukraine is holding its ground on the battlefield. Europe is deliberating within its institutions. These two rhythms must be synchronized. That is the fundamental challenge of our time.

NGOs and Citizens Pushing for Reform Amid Bombing

One aspect often overlooked in discussions about Ukraine’s accession efforts is the remarkable work of Ukrainian civil society. Hundreds of NGOs, judicial oversight organizations, and civil rights groups continue to push for institutional reforms in Ukraine—even during the war, even under bombardment. It is these actors who document corruption, monitor judicial reforms, and publish reports on the implementation of European commitments.

These efforts deserve explicit recognition in European discourse on accession. Too often, the process is presented as a negotiation between governments—Kyiv on one side, Brussels and the member capitals on the other. But behind the governments are thousands of Ukrainian citizens who, day in and day out, are laying the foundations of the democratic, European Ukraine that the accession clusters seek to formalize. These foundations exist. They endure. They deserve for Europe to keep its promises.

The message sent to Ukrainian reformers

Every Hungarian veto sends a negative signal to these Ukrainian reformers: your efforts are not enough; external political obstacles can undo your progress. This signal is demoralizing and potentially counterproductive. If Ukrainian civil society perceives that the reforms it is pushing for with great difficulty are not translating into concrete progress in the accession process because of Budapest’s political calculations, discouragement may set in.

Brussels must therefore find ways to recognize and reward Ukraine’s progress in visible and concrete ways, regardless of temporary political roadblocks. Preferential partnership mechanisms, early access to certain EU policies, and positive financial signals—these are all tools that can maintain the momentum for reform in Ukraine even when formal negotiations are slowed by Hungarian vetoes.

I want to conclude this essay by thinking of those Ukrainians who are reforming their institutions while their country is at war. They deserve for Europe to keep its promises—not in ten or twenty years, but within a credible timeframe. This is Europe’s moral debt to Ukraine. And Magyar, like all European leaders, has a responsibility not to ignore it for electoral reasons.

Enlargement as a Test of Consistency

The Hungary-Ukraine issue is a test of consistency for the European Union. It has promised Ukraine the prospect of membership. It has committed hundreds of billions of euros to support Ukraine’s resistance. It has repeatedly declared that Ukraine belongs to the European family. The question now is simple: Are these statements followed by concrete action, at the pace demanded by the geopolitical situation, or are they merely superficial commitments that national political calculations can render meaningless?

What Ukraine Deserves

Ukraine deserves an answer to this question that is commensurate with what its people have endured. Not membership on credit, conditional on opaque agreements with Budapest, granted cluster by cluster in step with Hungarian elections. But rather a gradual, transparent integration, based on genuine reforms and supported by all member states—including those, like Hungary, that still have hesitations to overcome. Europe put to the test by its own values: that is the legacy of the summer of 2026. And this legacy has not yet lived up to what history demands.

I am writing this essay with the conviction that Ukraine will join the EU—because the alternative, a Ukraine abandoned on its periphery, would be a strategic disaster for all of Europe. But I am also writing it with genuine frustration at the slowness of the processes, the calculated obstructions, and the delays that take a toll on real people. European bureaucracy can be a tool for peace or a tool for obstruction. The summer of 2026 reveals both sides.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist