PROFILE: The Chinese Navy’s 83rd Flotilla in Vladivostok Faces Off Against the Russian Pacific Fleet

Maxime Marquette

2026-07-03 16:04:37

The Qijiguang: A Training Ship for a Rising Navy

The Qijiguang is a training ship of the PLA Navy—a vessel designed to train future naval officers under real-world operational conditions. Its name pays homage to Qi Jiguang, a Ming Dynasty general who, in the 16th century, defended the Chinese coast against raids by Japanese pirates—a deliberate symbolic choice that anchors the naval training mission in a millennia-old tradition of national defense. For the cadets serving aboard it, this name speaks volumes.

This ship embodies the Chinese Navy’s training doctrine: future officers are not trained solely in simulators or at home ports—they are deployed for weeks under real-world conditions, in potentially hostile waters, over long distances. This 40-day deployment preceding the port call in Vladivostok took the cadets to the South China Sea and the Western Pacific—two theaters where tensions with the United States and its allies are high. Training its officers in these waters means preparing them for the realities of strategic confrontation.

The Kunlunshan: A Symbolic Amphibious Assault Ship

The Kunlunshan is a Type 071 amphibious assault ship—one of the largest classes of amphibious assault ships in the Chinese Navy. These ships are designed to project ground forces onto distant shores—exactly the kind of capability needed for an assault operation on Taiwan or other theaters of operations in the Pacific. Its name refers to the Kunlun mountain range, which is sacred in Chinese tradition—a reference to the grandeur and enduring nature of China’s ambitions.

The presence of the Kunlunshan in this training flotilla in Vladivostok is no coincidence. It demonstrates that the Chinese Navy is integrating its amphibious assault capabilities into cadet training missions—normalizing preparation for force projection operations in the professional mindset of its future officers. It is also a demonstration to the Russian Pacific Fleet: China has amphibious landing capabilities, and it is deploying them in Vladivostok, which is also one of the region’s most strategic maritime corridors.

An amphibious assault ship named Kunlunshan docking in Vladivostok, with cadets from the Naval Submarine Academy on deck—I can’t help but see this as more than just a courtesy visit. It’s a show of force wrapped in diplomatic politeness. The Russians have understood this well. So have the Americans. The question is: what strategic response do these two allied navies call for?

Vladivostok: A Port That Embodies the History of Sino-Russian Rivalry

From a Chinese Concession to a Soviet Stronghold

Vladivostok is a city founded by Imperial Russia in 1860 on territory that had belonged to China—ceded under the Treaty of Beijing following the Second Opium War. For a century, this origin was a source of silent resentment in the Chinese collective memory—one example among many of the “unequal treaties” imposed on a weakened China by foreign powers. The People’s Republic of China has never officially laid claim to Vladivostok, but it has never forgotten it either.

During the Soviet era, Vladivostok became the main base of the Soviet Pacific Fleet—closed to foreigners, including the Chinese, after the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s. The city was a symbol of the mutual distrust between the two communist giants vying for hegemony over the socialist world. Decades of mistrust, border tensions, and at times armed clashes—such as in 1969 on Damansky Island—had turned the Sino-Russian border into a potential line of confrontation.

Post-Soviet Reconciliation and the Emergence of a De Facto Alliance

Sino-Russian reconciliation began after the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and gradually deepened under Putin and Xi. The two countries resolved their border disputes, developed substantial trade ties, and forged a diplomatic partnership against Western pressure. The 2001 Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation formalized this reconciliation. Since 2022, the invasion of Ukraine has significantly deepened this mutual dependence: Russia needs China’s economic support to survive sanctions. China needs Russia as a partner in its confrontation with the United States.

Vladivostok physically embodies this transformation. The city, which for decades was a Soviet stronghold closed to the Chinese, is now a major trade hub between the two countries. Chinese exports pass through it. Chinese tourists visit there. And now, Chinese warships call there—in a port where the Russian flag and the flag of the Pacific Fleet fly side by side. History is turning on itself at a dizzying pace.

Vladivostok—the city China lost in 1860 and which now welcomes its sailors on official visits. There is something ironic, or perhaps deliberate, about this choice of port. Geopolitical history does not repeat itself, but it does play tricks. And Beijing, which thinks in terms of centuries, must find some satisfaction in seeing its flags flying in a city that was once its own.

The Open-Sea Training Mission: What Cadets Really Learn

A 40-day deployment in disputed waters

The 83rd Flotilla’s 40-day deployment in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific prior to its port call in Vladivostok is no walk in the park. These waters are among the most closely monitored and disputed in the world. The South China Sea is an area where China asserts territorial claims contested by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. Regular incidents there pit PLA Navy ships against U.S. vessels conducting freedom of navigation operations. Sailing in these waters for 40 days means navigating an environment of constant strategic tension.

For the cadets, this deployment is not just naval training—it is training in real-time geopolitical pressure. They learn to navigate under the surveillance of U.S. drones, manage communications under pressure, and stay the course in the face of foreign naval vessels challenging their presence. This is exactly the training Beijing wants to provide to the next generation of naval commanders—officers who have seen the contested waters with their own eyes and who know what it means to hold their ground in the face of external pressure.

The Liaoning Aircraft Carrier as the Context for the Deployment

The 83rd Squadron’s flotilla sailed in the wake of the Liaoning aircraft carrier strike group during its 40-day deployment. The Liaoning is China’s first operational aircraft carrier—a vessel converted from an unfinished Soviet hull purchased from Ukraine in 1998. An ironic detail: the Liaoning originated from a purchase from post-Soviet Ukraine, and the task force that sailed in its wake is now calling at the main naval base of Russia, which is fighting Ukraine. Naval history has its own ironies.

The Liaoning’s presence in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific is itself a strategic signal. It demonstrates the growing strength of China’s air-sea projection capability—a capability that China did not possess even twenty years ago. The cadets trained in its wake will, within a decade, command the ships of a Chinese carrier strike group that will likely be even more powerful. The PLA Navy is training the generation that will command the world’s largest navy.

Chinese naval cadets trained in the wake of the Liaoning in the South China Sea, then stopping in Vladivostok—this is the curriculum for a generation of sailors who will be at the helm of the most powerful navy in the Pacific by 2040. And this curriculum clearly states: Russia is our ally, the West is our potential adversary; stay the course. I prefer that we call this reality by its proper name.

Exchanges with the Russian Pacific Fleet: What's Being Said—and What Isn't

Chinese and Russian Officers Meet Face to Face

During the four-day visit, officers and sailors from the 83rd Flotilla held exchanges with their Russian counterparts from the Pacific Fleet. These exchanges are officially described as “courtesy visits” and cultural exchange activities. But behind the courtesy and official banquets, technical discussions take place—on naval doctrines, weapons systems, coordination tactics, and strategic sea lanes in the Pacific and the Arctic.

The Russian Pacific Fleet is a formidable naval force, though weakened by years of post-Soviet underinvestment and by the redeployment of some of its assets to the Black Sea in connection with the conflict in Ukraine. It controls maritime access to Russia’s Far Eastern ports, maintains a presence in the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean, and possesses a significant submarine component. Exchanges between the two navies focus on experiences and doctrines that can mutually enhance their operational capabilities.

The Undeclared Dimensions of Naval Cooperation

Official statements capture only part of what takes place during naval visits of this kind. The sharing of operational practices, tactical experiences, and technical knowledge often occurs informally—in discussions among officers, during guided tours of ships, and in the joint exercises that sometimes accompany these visits. Russia, with its operational experience in the Black Sea during the war in Ukraine—particularly against Ukrainian surface naval drones—has valuable lessons to share. China, with its massive investments in new naval technologies, has other knowledge to offer in return.

This informal technical cooperation is perhaps the most strategically significant aspect of the visit to Vladivostok. It represents a transfer of knowledge between two navies that are preparing their forces for future confrontations in different contexts—the Black Sea and the Pacific for China, and the Arctic and the Pacific for Russia. The lessons of modern naval warfare—particularly adapting to drones and loitering munitions—are valuable insights that both countries benefit from by sharing their experiences.

Two allied navies exchanging experiences—that is exactly what allies do. NATO does the same. But when Russia shares with China its lessons on how to counter Ukrainian naval drones, and China learns to factor this into its own doctrines regarding Taiwan—it sets off a chain of strategic consequences that stretches from Ukraine to the Pacific. The war in Ukraine has global implications that we do not yet fully grasp.

China's Rising Naval Power: A Portrait of a Transformation

From a Coastal Navy to the World’s Largest Navy

By 2026, the PLA Navy is the world’s largest navy in terms of the number of ships—surpassing the U.S. Navy in total tonnage. This transformation took place in less than 30 years: in the 1990s, China had a primarily coastal navy, incapable of projecting power beyond its territorial waters. Today, it has three operational aircraft carriers, state-of-the-art destroyers, a rapidly expanding submarine fleet, and carrier strike groups capable of operating in any sea around the globe.

This expansion is no accident—it is the result of colossal investments and a coherent military doctrine. China decided in the 2000s that naval dominance was a prerequisite for its rise to global power. A strong navy protects the maritime trade routes on which its economy depends. It bolsters its territorial claims in the South China Sea. It serves as a deterrent against U.S. intervention in a conflict over Taiwan. And it projects Chinese power across the world’s oceans, establishing China as a global power rather than merely a regional one.

The Three Aircraft Carriers and the Doctrine of Power Projection

China has three aircraft carriers: the Liaoning (its first aircraft carrier, refurbished from a Soviet hull), the Shandong (the first aircraft carrier built entirely in China), and the Fujian (the first aircraft carrier equipped with electromagnetic catapults, comparable to the U.S. EMALS system). A fourth aircraft carrier is under construction. This fleet of aircraft carriers ranks China second in the world behind the United States, well ahead of France, the United Kingdom, or Russia.

These aircraft carriers are not merely instruments of war—they are instruments of foreign policy. Their presence in a region sends a signal of strength and determination. Their port calls at allied ports—such as Vladivostok—strengthen strategic partnerships. The Naval Academy cadets training in their wake will become the officers who will command these aircraft carriers in the coming decades—and who may have to deploy them in an actual conflict. That is why their training in Vladivostok matters.

Three aircraft carriers. A fourth under construction. The world’s largest navy in terms of the number of ships. This is the naval China of 2026—not the China of junks and sampans that colonial histories had caricatured. This naval China is a strategic reality that the West must factor into all its defense planning in the Pacific. The visit to Vladivostok serves as a concrete reminder of this.

The Vladivostok Fleet in the Context of the War in Ukraine

China at the Crossroads of War and Alliance

The 83rd Flotilla’s visit to Vladivostok is taking place while Russia is engaged in a war of attrition against Ukraine with China’s economic support. This timing may not be deliberately calculated, but it is politically significant. By docking in Vladivostok with warships while Russia bombs Ukrainian cities, China is sending a signal that its support for Russia extends beyond trade and diplomacy—it includes visible naval solidarity.

For Zelenskyy and his allies, this signal does not go unnoticed. Every demonstration of solidarity between Beijing and Moscow reinforces the conviction that the conflict in Ukraine is not simply a war between Russia and Ukraine—it is one front in the broader confrontation between democracies and authoritarian regimes. China is not neutral in this conflict. It supports Russia economically, lends diplomatic legitimacy to its position, and is now sending its warships to dock in its ports during the war.

Implications for Sanctions and Economic Pressure on Moscow

The Chinese naval presence in Vladivostok also sends a signal regarding the maritime trade routes that allow Russia to partially circumvent Western sanctions. The port of Vladivostok is one of the main entry points for Chinese goods into Russia—dual-use goods, electronic components, and industrial equipment that fuel the Russian war economy. The naval visit normalizes and symbolizes this trade route as a strategic corridor protected by both countries.

For the West, which is seeking to maximize economic pressure on Moscow, this reality is frustrating. European and American sanctions are reducing Russia’s revenue and access to Western markets. But China is partially offsetting these losses—and doing so very visibly, with warships in the port of Vladivostok. The full effectiveness of the sanctions is thus limited by Beijing’s determination to keep Russia afloat.

Chinese warships in Vladivostok while Russia bombs Kyiv—I find this image deeply revealing of the West’s partial powerlessness in the face of an authoritarian alliance that openly stands in solidarity. Sanctions are weakening Moscow. China is compensating. It is not a stable balance—but it is the current status quo. And changing this status quo requires a strategic response toward Beijing that the West has not yet clearly articulated.

The Response of Regional Allies: Japan, South Korea, and the Pacific Democracies

Tokyo is watching with keen attention

Japan is the country most directly affected by China’s growing naval power and by the visit to Vladivostok. The Sea of Japan, which separates Japan from the Asian mainland, is bordered to the west by Vladivostok—home to the Russian Pacific Fleet—and to the southwest by Chinese naval bases. Any naval cooperation between China and Russia in this maritime theater directly affects Japan’s security.

The Japanese government is monitoring Chinese naval visits to Vladivostok with a level of attention that its terse official statements do not fully reflect. Japanese military intelligence analyzes every move of the 83rd Flotilla: its routes, equipment, communications, and visible interactions with the Russian Pacific Fleet. These analyses inform Japanese defense planning—particularly regarding the Tsugaru Strait and the La Pérouse Strait, through which Russian and Chinese ships must pass to reach the Pacific Ocean.

Trilateral Exercises as a Strategic Response

The response of regional allies to China-Russia naval cooperation involves strengthening their own naval exercises. Trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea exercises have been intensified since 2022. The RIMPAC naval exercises now include scenarios explicitly modeled after multi-actor coalitions similar to the China-Russia alliance. Japanese investments in long-range counter-force strike capabilities—authorized by a historic revision of Japan’s defense doctrine—are accelerating.

South Korea, which is simultaneously monitoring the North Korean threat and the rise of Sino-Russian naval power, is also strengthening its maritime capabilities. The Atlantic Council’s proposal to create a U.S. Northeast Asia Command merging forces stationed in Korea and Japan directly addresses this need for coordination in the face of a multi-actor coalition in the Northeast Asian maritime theater.

Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines—each views the visit to Vladivostok through the lens of its own specific fears. What unites them is the awareness that Sino-Russian naval cooperation is altering the regional security equation in a way that demands a collective response. An Indo-Pacific NATO does not yet officially exist. But the needs that would justify it are very real.

The Cadets of the 83rd Flotilla: Human Portraits Amid a Cold Geopolitical Climate

Young Sailors at the Heart of a Story Bigger Than Themselves

Behind the strategic analyses and geopolitical calculations, there are faces. The cadets from the Naval Engineering University and the Naval Submarine Academy who lined up on the deck of the Qijiguang in Vladivostok are likely between 20 and 25 years old. For many of them, this 40-day deployment is their first significant experience outside of China. They have sailed through disputed waters, spent weeks aboard under the strict discipline of a rapidly expanding navy, and concluded their mission with a port call at the main naval base of their Russian ally.

These young officers are trained within a specific ideological framework: China is a great power reclaiming its rightful place in the world order, surrounded by adversaries seeking to curb its rise, with Russia as a natural partner in this resistance. They do not necessarily question this framework—it is the one in which they grew up, studied, and chose a military career. They are the executors of a strategic vision that others have constructed, and they are convinced that this vision is correct.

Training as the Construction of a Strategic Identity

Naval training in China is not merely technical—it is also political and ideological. PLAN naval officers receive intensive political education alongside their naval training. They study the history of the “centuries of humiliation” that China endured at the hands of foreign powers—and they are trained to view their naval careers as a response to that history. Serving in a navy that has surpassed the U.S. Navy in size means participating in a historic revenge.

These officers will be in command in 15 or 20 years. They will carry with them the experiences of their early missions—the disputed waters of the South China Sea, interactions with Russian sailors in Vladivostok, and the pride of sailing under the flag of the world’s largest navy. Understanding who they are and what they have been trained to believe is essential to anticipating the strategic decisions they will make in a future that is not so far off.

These cadets in Vladivostok—I don’t hold it against them personally. They’re doing their job, their training, and their duty just as they’ve been taught. But I also know that in 15 years, some of them will be commanding destroyers or submarines that could threaten allies of democracy in the Pacific. Understanding who they are now is a form of strategic foresight. The visit to Vladivostok is no trivial matter for them either.

The Arctic and Maritime Routes: Another Dimension of Cooperation

The Northern Sea Route and Shared Sino-Russian Interests

China-Russia naval cooperation has an Arctic dimension that goes beyond a simple visit to Vladivostok. Russia controls the Northern Sea Route—the Arctic corridor connecting the Atlantic to the Pacific via northern Siberia. As global warming makes this route increasingly navigable, it represents a major shortcut for maritime trade between Europe and Asia. China has officially designated the Arctic as a “Polar Silk Road” in its development plans.

Joint China-Russia naval exercises in the Arctic have been increasing since 2021. Russia has an interest in commercializing its Arctic route with a powerful economic partner like China. China has an interest in gaining access to this route to reduce its dependence on strategic straits controlled by navies allied with the United States—notably the Strait of Malacca. Vladivostok, as a port of the Russian Pacific Fleet, is a hub of this emerging maritime cooperation.

Implications for Arctic Security and NATO’s Presence

Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation poses a new challenge for NATO—particularly for its Arctic members: Norway, Denmark (via Greenland), Canada, the United States, Finland, and Sweden. Russia’s growing military presence and China’s economic interests in the Arctic are converging to create an area of strategic pressure on the alliance’s Nordic members. The recent accessions of Finland and Sweden to NATO strengthen the alliance’s presence in this region, but Sino-Russian cooperation introduces an unprecedented dimension there.

The visit to Vladivostok must therefore also be viewed in this Arctic context—not merely as a demonstration of solidarity during the war in Ukraine, but as a milestone in long-term naval cooperation between the two countries on the sea routes of the future. The cadets learning to sail in Vladivostok will also, in the years to come, learn to navigate Arctic waters alongside their Russian partners.

The Polar Silk Road—a geopolitical concept that the Arctic will bring to life in the coming decades. Russia controls the route. China wants to use it. Together, they are building an alternative maritime architecture to the straits controlled by U.S. allies. The visit to Vladivostok is a touchpoint in this emerging architecture. Arctic NATO must take this into account.

A Look at the Beijing-Moscow Alliance in 2026: Strength or Fragility

An Asymmetrical but Mutually Beneficial Alliance

The alliance between China and Russia is profoundly asymmetrical. China is the world’s second-largest economy, experiencing growth and expansion in both technology and military capabilities. Russia is a power in relative decline—weakened by sanctions, exhausted by war, and dependent on Chinese economic support to keep its economy afloat. In this relationship, China is increasingly the dominant partner—it sets the terms of energy trade, obtains Russian oil and gas at preferential prices, and strengthens its influence in border regions that were long under Russian control.

But this asymmetry does not mean the alliance is fragile. It is sustained by deep converging interests: shared resistance to U.S. pressure, opposition to the post-Cold War liberal world order, and genuine economic complementarity. Russia has the natural resources that China needs. China has the markets and industrial capabilities that Russia can no longer find in the West. The visit to Vladivostok symbolizes this complementarity—an expanding navy paying a visit to a navy in difficulty, in a gesture of solidarity that strengthens both.

The Alliance’s Long-Term Vulnerabilities

But the alliance also has structural vulnerabilities that the naval visit cannot mask. The history of Sino-Russian relations is marked by mistrust, rivalries, and conflicts. The latent tensions over territories in the Russian Far East—which China considers to have been lost under the unequal treaties of the 19th century—do not simply disappear because the two countries are now de facto allies. With Russia’s relative weakening and China’s strengthening, these vulnerabilities could resurface in the longer term.

In the short and medium term, however, the Beijing-Moscow alliance is solid—strengthened by the war in Ukraine and by U.S. pressure on both countries. The 83rd Flotilla’s visit to Vladivostok is a link in this chain of solidarity. It will be followed by further joint exercises, visits, and technical exchanges. The West must shape its strategic responses by treating this alliance as a lasting reality—not as a temporary anomaly that will resolve itself.

The China-Russia alliance is asymmetrical, at times fraught with underlying tensions, and driven by divergent long-term interests. But in 2026, it holds. It holds because the two countries need each other in the face of the West. Treating this alliance as fragile would be a dangerous miscalculation. It must be taken seriously—and met with the same strategic seriousness that it demonstrates.

What the Visit to Vladivostok Hints at for the Future

From Joint Naval Exercises to Operational Coordination

The visit to Vladivostok is part of a clearly visible trajectory: goodwill visits become joint exercises, joint exercises become operational coordination protocols, and coordination protocols become common doctrines. Since 2022, joint naval exercises between China and Russia have increased in number, complexity, and geographic scope. This progression suggests that the two navies are working toward a genuine capacity for coordination in operational scenarios—not just symbolic demonstrations.

If this trajectory continues, by 2030, the Chinese and Russian navies could have the capability to conduct coordinated operations in multiple theaters simultaneously—the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan, the Arctic, and the Western Pacific. Such multi-theater coordination would pose considerable operational challenges for the U.S., Japanese, South Korean, and Australian navies, which form the core of the U.S. defense posture in the Indo-Pacific.

The Western Response: AUKUS, QUAD, and Maintaining Naval Superiority

The West has begun to develop its own responses to the rise of Chinese and Russian naval power. The AUKUS partnership (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) will provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines—a strategic capability of the highest order. The QUAD (the United States, Japan, Australia, and India) is strengthening naval cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Multilateral naval exercises involving South Korea, the Philippines, and other regional partners are building a collective security network.

These responses are real and significant. But they take time—Australia’s nuclear submarines will not be operational until the mid-2030s. In the meantime, U.S. naval superiority in the Pacific, while still considerable, is under increasing pressure from the rise of the Chinese navy and cooperation with Russia. The visit to Vladivostok is a reminder that this pressure is real, ongoing, and deliberately engineered.

AUKUS, QUAD, trilateral exercises—the West is crafting its responses. But it is doing so on a democratic timeline: slow, debated, and at times hesitant. China has been building its navy for thirty years with the consistency of an autocracy. The gap in pace between the two approaches is one of the most important strategic issues of this century. I am not pessimistic—democracies have other strengths. But we must pick up the pace.

Lessons the West Must Learn from Sino-Russian Naval Cooperation

A Wake-Up Call for NATO and Indo-Pacific Strategists

The 83rd Flotilla’s visit to Vladivostok is not a diplomatic curiosity—it is a lesson in strategy that the West cannot afford to ignore. While allies debate their defense budgets, red lines, and commitments to Ukraine, China and Russia continue to consolidate their joint capabilities in theaters of operation that directly affect Western interests. The Sea of Japan, the Arctic, the Western Pacific—these areas are no longer zones of abstract competition: they are now the arena for a military partnership that gains substance with every exercise, every visit, and every exchange between officers.

Analysts at NATO, U.S. intelligence agencies, and think tanks such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies are closely monitoring this development. Their reports are clear: the growing coordination between the Chinese and Russian navies has not yet reached the level of interoperability characteristic of a true military alliance, but it is getting closer every year. For Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul, this means that a crisis in the Indo-Pacific would no longer be merely a bilateral matter with Beijing—it would potentially involve logistical and intelligence support from Moscow.

The Western Response: Strengthening Indo-Pacific Partnerships

Faced with this reality, the Western response is taking shape, albeit slowly. The AUKUS partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States is specifically aimed at counterbalancing China’s growing naval power. The Quad—comprising the United States, India, Japan, and Australia—is attempting to create a network of maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. But these emerging structures face their own contradictions: India maintains economic and military ties with Russia, and European allies are struggling to mobilize significant naval resources in the Pacific while supporting Ukraine.

The 83rd Flotilla’s visit to Vladivostok serves as a reminder to democracies that strategic competition is being waged on all fronts simultaneously. It is not enough to commit to Ukraine in Europe while neglecting naval dynamics in the Asia-Pacific. China and Russia have long understood that applying pressure on multiple fronts simultaneously weakens Western coalitions—and they are deliberately employing this strategy.

I have carefully reviewed the reports on this naval visit, and what strikes me is the asymmetry in attention. The West is looking toward Ukraine, toward NATO, toward the next summit. Meanwhile, Beijing and Moscow are quietly building up their capabilities, visit after visit, exercise after exercise. This isn’t paranoia—it’s basic geopolitics that democracies cannot afford to ignore.

The Human Story Behind the Strategy: Sailors Caught Between Two Worlds

Chinese Cadets Aboard the Qijiguang and the Kunlunshan: A Generation Trained for Power

Behind the warships, the staff conferences, and the diplomatic handshakes are men and women. The cadets from the Naval Engineering University and the Naval Submarine Academy who took part in the visit to Vladivostok represent the military elite in training for China’s future. They have been trained in an educational system that teaches them that China is an emerging naval power, that the West is an obstacle to be circumvented, and that alliances such as the one with Russia are pragmatic tools in the service of national rebirth. It is these convictions—not just tonnage figures or missile ranges—that shape the nature of Sino-Russian cooperation.

Exchanges with officers from the Russian Pacific Fleet have an educational dimension that should not be underestimated. Russia, despite its economic weakness due to sanctions related to the war in Ukraine, retains naval operational experience that China seeks to absorb—decades of deep-sea operations, Arctic navigation, and submarine doctrine. These exchanges are shaping a generation of Chinese cadets who, in ten or twenty years, will command the PLAN’s fleets in theaters where Western interests are directly at stake.

The Human Dimension of Cold Geopolitics

It would be too easy to reduce this visit to strategic statistics. The 200 people present at the welcome ceremony on the Vladivostok pier, the exchanges between cadets and officers, the mutual visits aboard the ships—all of this creates human bonds that, gradually, are transforming two navies accustomed to operating separately into actors capable of coordinating in crisis situations. This is no small matter. The strongest alliances are not based solely on agreements on paper: they are built on interpersonal trust forged during dozens of visits like this one.

For democracies, this observation must serve as a call to action. Investing in military exchanges with partners in Asia—Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and India—is not just a matter of material capabilities. It is a matter of building long-term trust, of training generations of officers who know one another, who share compatible doctrines, and who, in the event of a crisis, can coordinate effectively. The West has the tools to respond to Sino-Russian cooperation—the question is whether it has the political will to deploy them.

What strikes me about this portrait is the generational aspect. These Chinese cadets visiting Vladivostok today will be the admirals of 2045. They will carry with them the memory of these exchanges, the trust built with their Russian counterparts, and the certainty that cooperation with Moscow is normal and natural. This is a long-term investment that democracies must take seriously—and balance with their own investments in military-to-military relations.

Conclusion: A Portrait of the Beijing-Moscow Alliance That Spans the Seas

What the 83rd Flotilla Represents in the Long History

The visit of the PLA Navy’s 83rd Flotilla to Vladivostok from June 24 to 27, 2026, may well remain a footnote in maritime history. Or perhaps not. It symbolizes the maturing of an alliance between two powers that have decided to confront the Western liberal international order together—and that express this decision through the concrete language of naval visits, officer exchanges, and flags flying side by side in a port that was long closed to the rest of the world.

The portrait of this alliance—asymmetrical, at times strained, but real and functional—is one of the most important geopolitical realities of our time. Understanding this portrait, analyzing its contours, and assessing its strengths and weaknesses is essential for any foreign and defense policy that aims to meet the challenges of the world in 2026. The visit to Vladivostok is just one image in this broader picture. But images matter.

Ukraine in the Mirror of This Alliance

For Ukraine—which is fighting for its survival against a Russia backed economically by China—this naval picture has a direct and painful significance. Every Chinese naval visit to Vladivostok, every commercial transaction that keeps the Russian economy afloat, is an indirect contribution to Russia’s ability to continue the war. Zelenskyy knows this. His allies know this. The war in Ukraine is also one front in the broader confrontation between a West that supports democracies and an authoritarian Beijing-Moscow axis that supports regimes like its own. Clearly naming this reality is the first step toward responding to it effectively.

The 83rd Flotilla has returned to its Chinese home ports after its four-day stay in Vladivostok. But the exchanges it had there, the signals it sent, and the trajectory it represents continue to shape the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific. The cadets who stood in formation on the deck of the Qijiguang are now seasoned sailors. They will remember Vladivostok. And in the years to come, they will build the navy that Beijing intends to project onto the world’s oceans.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist