COMMENT: Ukraine and Moldova are pushing their way into Europe

A President Who Has Made EU Membership a Matter of Survival

Moldovan President Maia Sandu confirmed that she had signed the decree allowing accession negotiations to move forward, explicitly presenting entry into the European Union as the path to stability for her small country wedged between Romania and Ukraine. For Chișinău, EU membership goes far beyond mere economic integration: it represents an existential bulwark against repeated attempts at destabilization orchestrated from Moscow.

According to the European Commission, Moldova has been deemed ready to open all six clusters as early as July 2026—a faster pace than that of Ukraine, which is hampered by the added complexity of an ongoing war on its territory.

A Possible Divergence in the Two Paths

At an EU-Moldova summit held in Brussels on June 22, 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen suggested that a divergence in the two accession paths might become inevitable, with each candidate country now expected to be held accountable for its own progress and specific reforms. This announcement was welcomed by Chișinău, which has long argued that it should no longer be held back by Ukraine’s pace.

The President of the European Council, António Costa, praised the speed with which the Moldovan government has implemented its reforms, noting that this pace could allow Moldova to quickly unlock the remaining five clusters.

Maia Sandu is literally staking her country’s democratic future on this European accession. Those who downplay the importance of this issue have clearly never looked at a map to see just how caught between European hope and the Russian threat Moldova is.

Magyar Lifts Veto but Remains Cautious on the Timeline

While Péter Magyar agreed to lift the veto blocking the opening of the first cluster, he clearly signaled his opposition to any form of fast-track procedure for Ukraine’s accession. He even raised the possibility of holding a referendum in Hungary if Ukraine were to close all 33 of its chapters within ten to fifteen years—a timeframe that illustrates just how determined Budapest remains to slow the pace of the process.

On June 23, 2026, Hungary was, in fact, the only member state not to immediately give the green light to the Cypriot presidency’s proposal regarding the EU’s common positions for opening the five remaining clusters—a move that European diplomats, however, characterized as a mere “reservation for further consideration” rather than firm opposition.

Brussels Scales Back Its Ambitions for the Summer

Faced with this persistent resistance from Budapest, the European Commission had to revise its initial ambitions, which had called for opening all five remaining clusters before the summer break. The Irish Council presidency, which took office on July 1, 2026, opted for a more pragmatic approach, opening the clusters one by one rather than simultaneously.

This gradual strategy appears to be bearing fruit: Cluster 6, considered relatively less sensitive than others, received unanimous approval from the 27 member states, including Hungary, which bodes well for the rest of the process.

Seeing Budapest agree—even if only half-heartedly—to the opening of a new cluster is an encouraging sign. But one should never underestimate Hungary’s ability to wield its veto at the most inopportune moment for Kyiv.

Negotiating Membership While Fighting the Russian Invasion

Ukraine is navigating this complex accession process under circumstances that no other candidate country has ever faced: in the midst of an active war against the full-scale invasion launched by Russia in February 2022. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated, following discussions with G7 leaders, that no one currently sees any obstacle preventing the opening of all accession chapters within the European timeline.

Ukraine’s determination to pursue its European integration despite the war sends a powerful political message: Kyiv refuses to let Russian aggression dictate the pace of its democratic and economic future—a choice that deserves the full support of all Western capitals.

The symbolism of a Russian attack on the very day of the opening

Particularly telling is the fact that Russia launched an attack on Ukraine precisely on the day of the official opening of the first negotiation cluster, June 15, 2026. European officials have emphasized that this timing “speaks for itself,” interpreting the strike as a deliberate attempt by Moscow to symbolically sabotage Kyiv’s European progress.

This coincidence—if one can still call it a coincidence at this stage of the conflict—illustrates the extent to which the Kremlin perceives Ukraine’s European integration as a direct strategic threat to its historical influence in the region.

Bombing Ukraine on the very day it begins its EU accession negotiations is no mere coincidence in military timing. It is a clear message from Moscow, and Europe would be wrong not to read it exactly for what it is.

Should We Abandon Unanimity to Speed Up Enlargement?

In March 2026, the European Parliament adopted a resolution proposing to abandon the unanimity rule for intermediate stages of the accession process, such as the opening and closing of chapters—a measure seen by several observers as a direct attempt to circumvent Hungary’s veto power. The final decision on accession would, however, still require unanimity among Member States.

Although this proposal is still far from being formally adopted, it illustrates a growing frustration within the European institutions over the ability of a single member state to paralyze for years a process supported by a large majority of the other capitals.

The Debate Over Future Members’ Veto Rights

The European Commission is also considering proposals to delay the automatic granting of veto rights to future new members—including Moldova and the countries of the Western Balkans—for several years following their accession. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has even proposed a form of “associate status” for Ukraine, allowing it to participate in European discussions without full voting rights—a transitional solution tailored to the specific context of a country still at war.

These institutional debates reflect a genuine realization in Brussels: the rapid expansion of the Union will require profound structural adjustments to prevent a new member state from, in turn, replicating the kind of obstruction Hungary has exercised over the past two years.

Reforming European voting rules to prevent a single country from holding the future of twenty-six others hostage is an urgent and necessary conversation, even if it risks offending certain legitimate national sensitivities.

The Sensitive Issue of the Common Agricultural Policy

The integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the European single market raises particularly sensitive economic issues, especially regarding their future participation in the Common Agricultural Policy. Countries such as Poland and France, whose farmers benefit greatly from this program, might resist the rapid integration of Ukraine’s vast agricultural sector, which represents significant potential competition.

These internal economic tensions, although receiving less media attention than Hungary’s political roadblocks, could prove to be an equally significant obstacle in later stages of the negotiations, particularly when the chapters on agriculture and European structural funds are opened.

Enormous Long-Term Economic Potential for the Union

Despite these challenges, Ukraine’s economic integration would, in the long run, represent a considerable asset for the European Union, in terms of agricultural resources, a skilled workforce, and the potential for post-war industrial reconstruction. Several European economists point out that Ukraine could become, once the war is over, one of the continent’s most dynamic growth markets.

In the eyes of many European leaders, this long-term prospect justifies the considerable political and diplomatic investment required to overcome the current obstacles to the accession process.

Polish and French farmers have legitimate concerns, but Europe cannot afford to sabotage Ukraine’s accession to protect short-term sectoral interests. The geopolitical stakes far outweigh these narrow economic calculations.

European Integration as a Guarantee of Security

For many Western analysts, in the absence of rapid NATO membership, accession to the European Union represents one of the best security guarantees available to Ukraine in the face of Vladimir Putin’s revisionist ambitions. A strong institutional anchor within European structures would make any new Russian aggression against Ukraine considerably more costly for Moscow, both diplomatically and economically.

This logic partly explains why several Western capitals—including Berlin under Chancellor Friedrich Merz—have described European enlargement as a “geopolitical necessity,” far surpassing the traditional economic considerations that have historically guided such decisions.

A Signal of Resolve Sent to Moscow

Every step taken in the accession process, however technical and laborious it may be, sends a clear political signal to the Kremlin: Europe has no intention of abandoning Ukraine to its fate, nor of yielding to Russian military intimidation aimed at curbing its integration into the West. This message is particularly significant in a context where some observers feared that European support would wane as the war drags on.

The continued progress on this issue, despite Hungarian obstacles and technical complexities, demonstrates, on the contrary, a European institutional resilience that deserves to be highlighted—especially in the face of an adversary who is counting precisely on Western weariness to achieve his strategic objectives.

Each cluster that is approved is another nail in the coffin of Putin’s strategic gamble, as he has always hoped that the West would tire before he did. For now, despite bureaucratic delays, Europe continues to move forward.

Romania, an Active Advocate for the Moldovan Cause

The Romanian president has actively advocated for accelerating the accession processes of Moldova and Ukraine, a natural stance given the close historical, linguistic, and geographical ties between Romania and Moldova. This regional solidarity illustrates how certain member states are taking on the role of active champions of enlargement, partially counterbalancing Hungarian resistance.

This Romanian support, combined with that of the Baltic and Nordic countries—which have historically favored Ukraine’s rapid integration—forms an informal coalition within the EU that continues to push Brussels to stay the course, despite repeated attempts by Budapest to slow the process.

The United States: An Interested Observer

Although EU accession is the exclusive purview of the Union’s institutions, the Trump administration is following this issue with keen interest, as Ukraine’s successful integration into Western economic and political structures would reduce pressure on Washington to provide direct, long-term military and financial support. This transatlantic dynamic, though rarely explicitly acknowledged publicly, indirectly influences the strategic calculations of several European capitals.

A solid European anchorage for Ukraine would thus serve U.S. interests as much as those of the European continent, by consolidating a united Western front against the combined ambitions of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

Even Washington, under an administration that has at times seemed ambivalent toward NATO, understands the strategic value of a Ukraine firmly anchored in European structures. This is a rare point of transatlantic convergence that must be nurtured.

Far-Reaching Judicial and Anti-Corruption Reforms

The first “fundamentals” cluster, which is to remain open until the very end of the process, requires Ukraine and Moldova to implement far-reaching and sustainable reforms in the areas of the rule of law, the fight against corruption, and judicial independence. These reforms—which are particularly demanding for Ukraine in the midst of a war—will require years of sustained effort before they can be considered fully satisfactory by Brussels.

The difficulty of carrying out these far-reaching structural reforms amid active warfare is one of the greatest practical challenges facing the Ukrainian government, which must simultaneously manage a national defense effort and the complex institutional transformation demanded by its European partners.

An Ambitious but Realistic Timeline, According to Brussels

Despite these considerable challenges, European officials, including Commissioner Marta Kos, continue to express measured optimism regarding Ukraine’s and Moldova’s ability to maintain the pace of the necessary reforms. The target timeline—potential Moldovan accession around 2028 and Ukraine’s technical accession finalized within four years, according to some officials—remains ambitious but is considered achievable if the current political momentum is sustained.

The exact date of Ukraine’s actual entry into the European Union will, however, according to several European officials, remain an eminently political issue, closely linked to the possible outcome of a peace agreement with Russia.

Setting a timeline for accession while a country is literally fighting for its territorial survival requires an almost reckless optimism. But it is precisely this kind of structured optimism that allows the institutions to continue moving forward despite the uncertainty.

A Demonstration of European Institutional Resilience

The fact that the European Union has managed—albeit slowly and imperfectly—to overcome a political deadlock that lasted a full two years demonstrates a genuine institutional capacity to absorb internal tensions without abandoning its fundamental strategic objectives. This resilience stands in sharp contrast to the image of a fragmented Europe incapable of collective action that certain critics—particularly in Moscow and Beijing—like to promote.

Every step taken, however modest it may seem, helps demonstrate that Western democracies, despite their legitimate internal disagreements, retain the ability to build lasting consensus on major strategic issues.

A Test for the Credibility of Future Enlargement

The way the European Union handles the Ukrainian and Moldovan situations will inevitably set a precedent for future enlargements, particularly those involving Western Balkan countries such as Montenegro and Albania, which are currently further along in certain technical aspects of their own accession processes.

Successfully navigating this complex integration—amid active warfare and internal political resistance—would significantly bolster the European Union’s credibility as a geopolitical actor capable of fulfilling its most ambitious strategic commitments.

Europe often engages in navel-gazing about its own bureaucratic shortcomings. But succeeding—even if with great difficulty—in integrating two candidate countries of such strategic importance would be a victory that deserves to be recognized for its true value.

Neighbors Who Have Everything to Gain from a European Ukraine

Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are among the most steadfast advocates of Ukraine’s swift accession to the EU, a position that stems directly from their own historical experience with Russian imperialism. These countries view a Ukraine firmly anchored in European structures as the best possible bulwark against any future westward expansion of Vladimir Putin’s territorial ambitions.

This regional solidarity, based on a shared and clear-eyed assessment of the Russian threat, stands in sharp contrast to the more ambiguous stance of Hungary, whose economic and energy ties with Moscow continue to influence its foreign policy, even under the new administration of Péter Magyar.

Constant Diplomatic Pressure on Brussels

These Eastern European countries do not hesitate to exert sustained diplomatic pressure on European institutions to maintain the pace of accession negotiations, regularly reminding their Western partners that every additional delay directly benefits the Kremlin’s strategy of attrition.

This informal coalition of countries on the front lines with Russia serves as a vital counterweight to the temptation to slow down the process, a temptation that, to varying degrees, emanates from several other European capitals farther removed geographically from the front lines.

Countries that have lived directly under Soviet rule instinctively understand what is at stake with Ukraine’s accession. Their voices should carry more weight in this debate than those of capitals that have never experienced this existential threat firsthand.

Montenegro and Albania: More Advanced Candidates, but Lower on the Priority List

Montenegro, currently the most advanced candidate among the nine countries officially seeking EU membership, hopes to become the 28th member of the Union by 2028, while Albania aims to conclude its negotiations by the end of 2027. These two Western Balkan countries demonstrate that an accession process, even a laborious one, can succeed with sufficient political resolve on both sides.

The contrast between the relatively rapid pace of these Balkan cases and the slowness of the Ukrainian case—largely due to Hungarian obstruction rather than shortcomings specific to Kyiv—highlights just how much the collective political will of the EU-27 remains the determining factor in the actual accession timeline.

A Lesson in Institutional Patience for Kyiv and Chișinău

The Balkan experience, marked by decades of sometimes frustrating negotiations, serves as a reminder to Ukraine and Moldova that the path to full membership remains long, even when European political will appears favorable. This institutional patience, however difficult it may be for countries facing an immediate existential threat to accept, nevertheless remains the rule of the game in Europe.

It remains to be seen whether the geopolitical urgency created by the Russian war will, in this specific case, accelerate a process historically known for its proverbial bureaucratic slowness.

Comparing the Ukrainian situation to that of the Western Balkans clearly shows that Europe knows how to move forward when the political will is there. The real question remains whether that will endures over the long term in the face of a war that drags on.

Moscow Denounces a Western Maneuver Against Its Interests

Russian diplomats were quick to label this move to form a cluster as a purely political maneuver orchestrated by Brussels to further isolate Russia—an interpretation that conveniently ignores the fact that it was Ukraine and Moldova themselves that sought membership following Russia’s February 2022 invasion. This rhetoric from the Kremlin, echoed by state-run media outlets such as TASS, seeks to portray EU expansion as a provocation rather than the legitimate exercise of these two nations’ sovereign right to choose their own alliances.

This information war, waged in parallel with the military conflict, aims to undermine the legitimacy of the accession process in the eyes of European public opinion, which is weary of the war’s duration—a strategy that exploits the Union’s internal divisions rather than offering a credible alternative to the European aspirations of Kyiv and Chișinău.

Disinformation as a Complementary Weapon on the Military Front

Russian intelligence services are stepping up disinformation campaigns specifically targeting Moldova, where false accusations of Western interference and electoral fraud regularly circulate on local social media, in a repeated attempt to undermine the legitimacy of President Maia Sandu and her resolutely pro-European stance.

This information war confirms, if confirmation were needed, that the Kremlin views the European integration of its former satellite states as a strategic threat of the highest order, justifying the investment of considerable resources in influence operations rather than in constructive diplomacy with its neighbors.

The fact that Moscow is expending so much energy denouncing a mere technical negotiating group speaks volumes about the Kremlin’s genuine unease regarding this accession. Russian disinformation is itself unwitting proof that this issue is a thorn in Putin’s side.

Cluster 6 is just one of many steps to come

The upcoming opening of the sixth cluster, formally scheduled for July 14, 2026, is merely another step in an institutional marathon that will require years of sustained effort from Ukraine and Moldova, as well as continued commitment from European institutions to overcome persistent internal resistance, particularly in Budapest.

But the mere fact that this process continues to move forward, despite the ongoing war and repeated political deadlocks, sends an important strategic message: Ukraine’s and Moldova’s integration into Europe remains a priority that Brussels refuses to abandon, regardless of the difficulties encountered along the way.

A Pyrrhic victory for Putin if he fails to respond

Every step forward in this process represents, by implication, yet another setback for the Kremlin’s strategy, which initially hoped that its February 2022 invasion would further isolate Ukraine from the West rather than precipitate its accelerated integration into European structures. This strategic irony deserves to be highlighted with every milestone reached by Kyiv and Chișinău.

For the West, firmly supporting this path to accession—despite its complexity and inevitable slowness—remains one of the most profitable geopolitical investments available in the face of Russia’s revisionist ambitions and the broader threat posed by China, Iran, and North Korea to the rules-based international order.

This accession process, however technical and slow it may seem from the outside, will remain one of the most concrete responses the West could offer to Russian aggression. History will record that Kyiv and Chișinău continued to move toward Europe precisely because Moscow sought to prevent them from doing so by force of arms.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist