FACT-CHECK: NATO has indeed reduced its response time from 17 hours to 1 hour

Maxime Marquette

2026-07-04 21:28:43

A Response to a Wave of Underwater Sabotage

The Baltic Sentry mission was launched on January 14, 2025, by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in response to a series of suspicious incidents that have damaged power cables, telecommunications links, and gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. According to NATO’s official website, this mission aimed to strengthen the Alliance’s military presence in the region and improve its ability to respond to destabilizing acts.

The most well-documented incident remains that involving the oil tanker Eagle S—suspected of belonging to Russia’s “ghost fleet”—which reportedly dragged its anchor for nearly 62 miles on December 25, 2024, damaging the Estlink 2 power cable as well as several communication cables connecting Finland and Estonia.

A Reinforced and Sustainable Military Framework

According to some analyses, for the first time in the history of the Atlantic Alliance, NATO has deployed a permanent military operation specifically dedicated to protecting critical undersea infrastructure. The force includes frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, and approximately twenty unmanned surface vehicles conducting systematic patrol patterns at the points where the cables cross major shipping lanes.

This deployment combines traditional human surveillance with advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence to analyze navigation patterns and detect suspicious behavior before an incident occurs.

Establishing, for the first time in its seventy-year history, a permanent operation dedicated to a specific type of threat shows that NATO has finally grasped the reality of the hybrid warfare Russia is waging just below the threshold of open conflict.

The figures vary depending on the military source

Slightly Different but Converging Estimates

It is important to note, for the sake of factual accuracy, that not all sources cite exactly the same initial figure. While United24 Media and the Ukrainian report ua.news cite an initial response time of 17 hours, Commander Craig Raeburn, the British Chief of Staff of SNMG1, mentioned in another statement an improvement ranging from “seven to eight hours” down to one hour.

These variations are likely due to slightly different reference periods or distinct calculation methodologies among the military units surveyed, but the order of magnitude of the improvement—a dramatic reduction to a response time of approximately one hour—remains consistent across all sources consulted.

Converging Accounts from Several Officers

A CNN report from January 2025, for its part, quoted Commander Arlo Abrahamson referring to a target response time of “between half an hour and an hour,” compared to the 17 hours it had taken to intercept a ship suspected of sabotage the previous year. This convergence of accounts from separate military sources reinforces the overall credibility of NATO’s central claim.

Despite these slight variations in the figures, none of the sources consulted contradicts the underlying trend: a dramatic and verifiable improvement in the Alliance’s response time to suspicious incidents in the Baltic Sea.

The fact that different officers cite slightly different initial figures does not discredit the central claim—on the contrary, this natural variation among independent witnesses is often a sign of authentic information rather than a figure fabricated for public relations purposes.

No confirmed major acts of sabotage for one year

Operational data supporting the claim

According to United24 Media, no significant cases of sabotage were recorded between January 2025 and January 2026, a period that directly coincides with the deployment of the Baltic Sentry mission. This fact, if independently verified by maritime security reports, constitutes a tangible indicator of the effectiveness of NATO’s enhanced measures.

An academic report from the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies also confirms that the Baltic Sentry mission “has already demonstrated its effectiveness as a deterrent, as evidenced by the absence of any suspicious cable incidents since its launch,” thereby corroborating NATO’s assertion regarding its concrete results.

Twelve boardings over the past year

The summary in the fact sheet also mentions twelve boardings conducted by allied navies over the past year—a figure that, although we have been unable to independently verify the exact details through an additional primary source, is consistent with NATO’s statements regarding increased inspection and the potential seizure of suspicious vessels.

Mark Rutte had, in fact, warned from the very start of the mission that NATO would respond “robustly” to such incidents through increased boarding of suspicious vessels and, if necessary, their seizure.

Twelve boardings in one year is not merely a symbolic figure for institutional communications—it is proof that deterrence is now accompanied by concrete and repeated action on the ground.

The limitations acknowledged by NATO itself

A Sea Too Vast for Complete Surveillance

In an honest fact-checking exercise, it is essential to acknowledge the limitations that NATO itself recognizes. According to a documentary report, even though the Baltic Sea is relatively small compared to other bodies of water, it remains virtually impossible to monitor its entire expanse at all times. The goal of NATO’s rapid response is therefore as much to deter as it is to systematically intercept every incident.

This limitation, publicly acknowledged by Alliance officers, paradoxically reinforces the credibility of NATO’s overall communication on this issue: an institution that openly admits its operational limitations is generally more credible in its claims of success than one that would claim total and absolute effectiveness.

The International Legal Framework That Complicates Interception

Another limiting factor, documented by several specialized analyses, concerns the international maritime legal framework: NATO cannot intercept a vessel based solely on suspicion. International maritime law requires the confirmation of an actual and documented act of sabotage in real time, which inherently limits the capacity for total prevention, even with an optimized response time of one hour.

This legal constraint explains why, despite the dramatic improvement in response time, some maritime security experts continue to call for an evolution of the international legal framework to allow for more preventive action in the face of the persistent threat of sabotage.

Recognizing the legal and geographical limits of one’s own mission, rather than claiming perfect effectiveness, is precisely what distinguishes honest military communication from a pure propaganda operation.

The Role of the Russian Ghost Fleet in This Case

A hybrid threat that is difficult to attribute definitively

According to several Western analyses, the majority of suspicious incidents in the Baltic Sea since 2022 are linked to the “ghost fleet” used by Russia to circumvent international sanctions on its oil exports. However, it must be strictly noted that, in several documented cases, it remains difficult to establish with absolute certainty a formal and legally indisputable attribution of these acts of sabotage to Moscow.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has systematically denied any Russian involvement in these incidents, calling Western accusations “absurd.” This consistent denial by Moscow, documented by several news agencies, has not, however, convinced any major Western government, which continues to view Russia as the prime suspect behind this wave of hybrid sabotage.

A Well-Known Strategy of Plausible Denial

This deliberate ambiguity regarding attribution corresponds precisely to what security experts describe as a “hybrid warfare” strategy: acts destabilizing enough to create strategic pressure, yet ambiguous enough to avoid a direct and proportionate military response from NATO.

In the face of this calculated ambiguity, the Alliance’s response—strengthening its detection and rapid-response capabilities rather than seeking a direct confrontation based on incomplete evidence—appears to be a measured and proportionate approach to the true nature of the threat.

Faced with a hybrid war designed precisely to evade any formal attribution, the best Western response is not rhetorical escalation but concrete and measurable improvements in detection capabilities—exactly what this report demonstrates.

The multinational cooperation behind this success

A Mosaic of Coordinated Allied Navies

The operational success of Baltic Sentry relies on close coordination among the navies of several NATO member countries, including Germany, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. This multinational coalition, united under the Joint Expeditionary Force and under NATO’s direct command, exemplifies exemplary regional military cooperation.

Ships such as the Dutch vessel Johan de Witt and units of the Estonian Navy have actively participated in the enhanced patrols, demonstrating a concrete sharing of efforts among allies rather than an excessive reliance on a single naval power.

The Key Role of Artificial Intelligence and Sensors

The Nordic Warden system, developed as part of this mission, uses sensors placed on the seabed capable of detecting a falling anchor even before it begins to drag on undersea cables, enabling an early warning to be transmitted directly to command centers. This technological advancement largely accounts for the dramatic improvement in response time.

This successful integration of advanced detection technologies and multinational human coordination exemplifies a modern model of collective defense, combining technological innovation with traditional military cooperation among Western allies.

Seeing ten different navies coordinate their efforts with such measurable efficiency is the best possible response to those who still doubt NATO’s actual operational capability in the face of hybrid threats.

Lessons for Other Vulnerable Coastal Theaters

A model that could potentially be replicated elsewhere

The measurable success of Baltic Sentry raises a broader strategic question: Could this model of enhanced surveillance and multinational coordination be replicated in other sensitive maritime areas, such as the Black Sea or certain strategic straits monitored by critical undersea infrastructure? Several defense analysts believe that the lessons learned from this NATO mission could indeed be applied elsewhere, provided that comparable budgetary resources are available.

The replication of this model will depend largely on the political will of coastal nations to invest in underwater sensors similar to those of the Nordic Warden system, as well as in naval coordination as close as that observed in the Baltic Sea since the mission’s launch.

Budgetary Constraints That Could Hinder Expansion

Despite its proven effectiveness, maintaining a reinforced naval presence such as that of Baltic Sentry over the long term represents a significant financial cost for participating NATO member countries. Some military officials have already expressed concerns about the budgetary sustainability of this level of commitment over several consecutive years, particularly in the context of competing pressures on defense spending.

This budgetary constraint could, in the long run, limit the Atlantic Alliance’s ability to extend this model to other regions without a significant redeployment of resources currently allocated to other collective defense priorities against Russia.

A success that cannot be replicated elsewhere due to a lack of funding is only a half-won victory; the West must demonstrate that it can sustain this effort over the long term, not just for the duration of a one-off demonstration.

Conclusion: A verified fact that deserves to be commended

The Final Verdict of This Review

At the conclusion of this fact-check, NATO’s central claim—a dramatic reduction in response time to suspicious incidents in the Baltic Sea, from several hours to about one hour—is largely corroborated by multiple independent military and journalistic sources. Minor variations in the exact figures cited by different sources do not invalidate the underlying trend, which has been consistently confirmed.

This concrete result deserves to be highlighted in a geopolitical context where the West is often criticized—sometimes justifiably—for its institutional slowness in responding to the hybrid threats posed by Russia. This report demonstrates that rapid and measurable improvement remains possible when the necessary political will and resources are brought together.

What This Means for Western Deterrence

This operational success, however limited in its geographic scope, sends a clear signal to Moscow: the window of opportunity to carry out acts of hybrid sabotage with impunity in the Baltic Sea has narrowed considerably since the launch of the Baltic Sentry mission. It is a concrete example of Western deterrence in action, and one that deserves to be recognized as such.

In a world saturated with bad geopolitical news, this case deserves to be highlighted as proof that a coordinated and well-funded Western response can, in practical terms, push back against a Russian hybrid threat.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist