OP-ED: Ukraine and the Constitution — EU Membership Requires a Rewrite of the Constitution

The Constitutional Ban on Long-Term Leases

One of the most politically sensitive aspects of Ukraine’s constitutional revision concerns agricultural land. The current Constitution prohibits long-term leases of agricultural land to foreigners—a protectionist provision enshrined in the Constitution to prevent sales to foreign interests following independence. European law requires harmonization in this area, which implies a relaxation of this ban.

This issue touches on a core aspect of Ukrainian society’s identity. Ukraine is the “breadbasket of Europe”—its black soil (chernozem) is among the most fertile in the world. The fear that this land might be bought up by foreign interests is rooted in history and in the memory of Soviet dispossession. Any constitutional amendment addressing this issue will be politically explosive, even if it is technically necessary for accession.

Proposed Safeguards

The Ukrainian government is exploring protective mechanisms compatible with European law that would allow for long-term leases while maintaining limits on direct foreign ownership. Several EU member states have similar measures in place to protect their agricultural sectors. The challenge is to find a formulation that meets European harmonization requirements without triggering a domestic political crisis in Ukraine.

These negotiations illustrate the complexity of the accession process: it is not merely a matter of adopting European regulations. It is about adapting a society—with its own history, its own fears, and its own red lines—to the frameworks of a shared space. The EU is aware of this. It has already negotiated such compromises with other candidate countries. But Ukraine is undergoing these negotiations under the pressure of war, which makes everything more difficult and more urgent.

Land, in Ukraine, is almost sacred. It is the country that experienced the Holodomor—the famine orchestrated by Stalin—precisely because the land had been torn from its people. Asking Ukrainians to open their land to foreign leases—even within a European framework—means asking them to move beyond a deeply painful memory. They are capable of doing so. But this must be acknowledged.

Budapest is stalling, but cannot stop it

Viktor Orbán’s Hungary has repeatedly put Ukraine’s accession process on hold since 2022. Budapest cites concerns regarding the rights of Hungarian minorities in Transcarpathia, but observers widely acknowledge that these objections serve primarily to block a process that Orbán does not want to see move forward due to his close ties to Moscow. Hungary has become the Kremlin’s Trojan horse in the corridors of Brussels.

The EU’s institutional framework, however, has evolved to limit the ability of a single member state to block progress indefinitely. Voting by qualified majority on several key issues, combined with growing political pressure on Budapest, has reduced Hungary’s ability to obstruct. It can delay, complicate, and create friction—but it can no longer stop the process if the other 26 member states are united.

Moldova and other candidates as context

Ukraine is not alone in this process. Moldova’s candidacy is proceeding along a parallel track, moving faster in some areas and facing more constraints in others. Enlargement to include the Western Balkans and other candidates creates a framework in which Ukraine’s accession is seen as a top political priority rather than an exception. This collective dynamic is helpful: it normalizes the process and makes it harder for its opponents to isolate it.

For the EU itself, this enlargement represents a major institutional challenge. Integrating Ukraine—a country of 40 million people with a massive agricultural economy—into the mechanisms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the structural funds will require profound internal reform. Some member states fear for their own budget allocations. This resistance is real and should not be underestimated.

The EU must reform itself to welcome Ukraine. And that is a good thing. The European institutions, designed for a Europe of 15 countries, need a major overhaul. Enlargement to include Ukraine could be the catalyst for this reform, which the Union has never been able to impose on itself during times of calm.

A Statement of Confidence from Ireland

On July 1, 2026, speaking from Dublin, Volodymyr Zelensky expressed his confidence that the remaining five clusters could be opened in July 2026. This statement is more than an expression of hope—it is a political message aimed at several audiences simultaneously: Brussels, which must make the technical decision; European capitals, which must give their approval; the Ukrainian public, which needs to see that accession is moving forward; and Moscow, which must understand that this path is irreversible.

Zelensky’s presence in Dublin also underscores the symbolic significance of this presidency. Ireland has one of the strongest relationships with Ukraine among the member states—historically neutral but clearly committed to supporting Kyiv since 2022. This presidency embodies the idea that Europe can be both realistic about security and ambitious about integration.

The Role of the Recovery Conference

The Ukraine Recovery Conference, held in June 2026, also highlighted the tensions between two approaches: one that views reconstruction as an investment contingent on reforms, and one that emphasizes the humanitarian and economic urgency without preconditions. This tension has not been resolved—but it illustrates the complexity of a process in which economic reconstruction, political integration, and military resistance are taking place simultaneously.

Ukraine must negotiate its European integration while waging a war, rebuilding liberated areas, maintaining a functioning economy, and reforming its institutions. No other candidate country has ever faced such a convergence of simultaneous pressures. That is why Zelensky’s ambitious timeline deserves to be commended—and supported.

Zelensky is fighting two wars at once: a war against Russian missiles and a war against European bureaucracy. The second is less lethal but nearly as exhausting. What the Ukrainians are accomplishing in terms of reforms, under these conditions, is objectively remarkable.

The Rule of Law as a Non-Negotiable Condition

The EU has set a clear condition for Ukraine: a comprehensive reform of its judicial system and an effective fight against corruption. This is not an administrative formality—it is a fundamental requirement that underpins the credibility of the entire accession process. Since 2022, Ukraine has adopted several key pieces of legislation: reform of the High Council of Justice, the creation of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), and the strengthening of the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). These institutions have begun to produce visible results, even though there is still a long way to go.

The European Commission assesses this progress on a quarterly basis. Its reports since 2023 acknowledge the efforts made, while identifying persistent shortcomings: genuine judicial independence, the speed of anti-corruption proceedings, and the ability to prosecute high-level figures. These shortcomings do not block the process, but they do slow its pace. The opening of the clusters depends in part on their resolution.

Reforms Under the Pressure of War

Reforming a judicial system in wartime is an almost unprecedented challenge. Judges, prosecutors, and civil servants are also reservists, internally displaced persons, or relatives of combatants. Human resources are stretched thin. Budgets are tight. And yet, Ukraine continues to move forward—because these reforms are a prerequisite for its European integration, and that integration is a prerequisite for its postwar economic reconstruction.

It is a virtuous cycle that is difficult to set in motion, but Ukraine has done so. European institutions, Ukrainian civil society, and partners such as the OECD and the IMF are supporting this effort. There is real energy in this process—a determination that stands in stark contrast to the cowardice of certain candidate countries that make progress on paper without being willing to change in practice.

Reforming the justice system while defending its borders is the dual burden Ukraine faces. And that is also what makes Ukraine more credible than any other accession candidate in decades. You don’t carry out reforms under this kind of pressure unless you truly want to.

A 28-Member EU and the Institutional Challenge

Ukraine’s accession to the EU—if it happens—will fundamentally transform the balance of power within the Union. With a population of 40 million, Ukraine would become one of the five most populous member states. It would be a major agricultural and industrial power within Europe. And it would bring a unique experience of democratic resilience under military pressure that would enrich the Union’s institutional culture.

European institutions will need to be reformed: the European Parliament, the Commission, and the Council—all of their operating mechanisms were designed for an EU of a different size and composition. Ukraine’s accession provides the political impetus needed for institutional reforms that member states have been unable to implement voluntarily since the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon.

The Geopolitics of Enlargement

Ukraine’s accession to the EU is not merely a matter of economic and institutional integration. It is a geopolitical event of the first order. It repositions the EU’s eastern border directly against Russia. It brings into the European sphere a country that has proven its willingness and ability to defend democratic values at the greatest cost.

For Moscow, it is the strategic defeat that the war was supposed to prevent. For Europe, it is the culmination of an integration project that the war unexpectedly accelerated. In this context, Ukraine’s constitutional revision is not a technical detail—it is a building block in the architecture of the new world.

The EU was built on ruins—the ruins of World War II, the ruins of European division. It is now expanding to include a country at war. There is a continuity in this history: Europe always moves forward from its deepest crises. Let us hope that this time, it does so quickly enough.

Organizations That Keep Going During the War

Behind Zelensky’s political decisions and the negotiations in Brussels lies a network of Ukrainian civil society that drives, monitors, documents, and advocates. Hundreds of Ukrainian nongovernmental organizations are working on judicial reform, budget transparency, the fight against corruption, and legislative alignment with European standards. These organizations have not paused their work since February 24, 2022. They have intensified it.

Groups such as Transparency International Ukraine, the Dejure Foundation, and the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union serve as watchdogs in a role that official institutions cannot always fulfill themselves. They document progress, identify roadblocks, and engage with the European Commission and the governments of member states. Their role is recognized by Brussels as an essential component of the accession process.

The Role of the Independent Ukrainian Press

The independent Ukrainian press—Ukrainska Pravda, Kyiv Independent, The Kyiv Post—continues to investigate, criticize, and uphold a culture of accountability in a country at war. This press is a prerequisite for genuine democracy, and it is recognized as such by European evaluators. Its persistence, despite political, economic, and security pressures, is one of the most positive signs of Ukraine’s democratic maturity.

The Ukraine negotiating its EU membership is not just a government signing agreements. It is a society that has developed genuine mechanisms of democratic self-regulation—imperfect, under pressure, but genuine. This is precisely what the EU requires, and it is precisely what Russia has never had. The difference is not rhetorical. It is structural.

Ukrainian journalists and activists working on transparency and the rule of law during a war are doing work that even established democracies sometimes struggle to accomplish in peacetime. They deserve to be recognized, and their work deserves to be funded unconditionally.

Rewriting to Belong

Ukraine’s constitutional revision is not merely a legal exercise. It is the act by which a people affirms, in the most fundamental text of its existence as a nation, that it belongs to a community of shared values. Transferring sovereign powers to the EU, amending rules on agricultural land, aligning institutions with European standards—all of this says: we have made a choice, and this choice is enshrined in the constitution.

Under Russian bombardment, with a war that has lasted more than four years, Ukraine is negotiating its entry into Europe while simultaneously defending its very survival. This dual effort—military and institutional—is unparalleled in the recent history of European integration. And it deserves a response that is up to the task: rapidly established clusters, an accelerated process, and a Europe that clearly tells Kyiv that the door is open.

The Timeline as a Message

If the remaining five clusters open in July 2026 under the Irish presidency—as Zelensky hopes—it will send a political message of remarkable clarity: the war is not slowing down integration. It is accelerating it. For the Ukrainians dying on the front lines, knowing that their country is moving toward Europe even as it resists Russia is not an abstraction. It is a reason to hold on. And a reason to hope.

Ukraine’s Constitution will soon be different. This is not a weakness—it is proof that democracy can reform under pressure, that institutions can evolve, that history is not inevitable. This is precisely what distinguishes Ukraine from Russia today, in 2026.

We are rewriting a Constitution. We are rewriting the future. What Ukraine is doing right now—fighting and reforming simultaneously—should serve as a model for all democracies that doubt their own resilience. Not a lesson to be taught. An example to be recognized.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist