ANALYSIS: Bangladesh: Muhammad Yunus’s Fragile Democracy in the Wake of Hasina’s Departure

The Origins of the Measure

In May 2025, citing security concerns, the interim government suspended the Awami League’s activities pending decisions by the International Crimes Tribunal regarding the party’s role in the violent crackdown of the summer of 2024. The Election Commission suspended the party’s registration shortly thereafter, according to a report by the Tribune India.

In April 2026, the new BNP-dominated Parliament passed an amendment to the anti-terrorism law that formalized this ban by designating the AL and its affiliates as terrorist organizations. A decision that, according to a researcher cited in the Congressional Research Service report, places Bangladesh in a constitutionally untenable position: holding elections while legally barring a major party from participating in them.

A Continuity That Raises Questions

Ironically, it is the BNP itself—despite being the AL’s historic rival—that chose to maintain and even strengthen this ban once in power. The Carnegie Endowment highlights the troubling nature of this continuity: a country that claims to be turning the page on authoritarianism is repeating a pattern in which the opposition does not have a level playing field.

Bangladesh’s Jamaat-e-Islami, which was itself banned for many years before being reinstated ahead of the 2024 elections, has capitalized on the vacuum left by the AL, appealing particularly to young voters disillusioned with traditional parties.

A stable democracy cannot be built by borrowing the tools of the very authoritarianism one claims to be fighting. The ban on the AL may be justified by the severity of the alleged crimes, but its continuation by the new government smacks far more of political expediency than of transitional justice.

The Content of the Agreement

Signed in October 2024 by more than twenty parties—notably excluding the AL—the July Charter forms the foundation of the reforms sought by the student movement. In particular, it provides for the establishment of a bicameral Senate, term limits for the office of prime minister, and greater oversight of the executive branch, according to a report by the Indian Council of World Affairs.

A constitutional referendum on this charter was held simultaneously with the legislative election on February 12. Its adoption was widely hailed as a step toward democratic renewal, although some analysts doubt that it will actually be implemented under a Parliament now two-thirds dominated by a single party.

Persistent Divisions

The think tank BTI Transformation Index warns of unresolved tensions between factions: the Jatiyo Nagarik Committee and the National Citizen Party (NCP), both stemming from the student movement, are calling for local elections to be held before the national election, while the BNP insists that the parliamentary election take precedence, according to the BTI Country Report 2026.

This disagreement over the sequence of elections illustrates a deeper rift between the actors who sparked the 2024 revolution and those who ultimately reaped its political benefits.

The July Charter is perhaps the most ambitious document Bangladesh has produced in a generation. But a law is only as good as the willingness of those who inherit it to abide by it, and the BNP now controls enough seats to ignore it if it so chooses.

A Campaign Under Military Escort

According to figures cited by Al Jazeera, approximately 108,000 members of the security forces, including military personnel, were deployed to secure the February 12 election. More than 32,000 polling stations were classified as high-risk and received the majority of these reinforcements.

Despite these measures, violent incidents were reported during the pre-election period, notably the death of a BNP activist on January 7, 2026, as well as clashes that left about 20 people injured in the Lalmonirhat district, on the Indian border.

The Role of Collective Memory

The report by ACLED, an organization specializing in conflict monitoring, emphasizes that this election took place in the lingering shadow of the 2024 violence, which, according to ACLED, left hundreds dead during the state’s crackdown on student protests.

This memory directly weighs on the perceived legitimacy of the new government: every act of electoral violence reignites the question of whether Bangladesh has truly shifted paradigms or merely changed hands.

An election that requires more than 100,000 soldiers and police officers to proceed without collapse is not yet a stable democracy. It is a democracy propped up by security measures, and this must be stated clearly rather than prematurely celebrating an incomplete transition.

From a Marginalized Party to the Main Opposition

Long sidelined from Bangladeshi politics, the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami had its registration reinstated by the Supreme Court in June 2025, paving the way for its full participation in the 2026 election. Its 11-party coalition won approximately 77 seats, a dramatic increase compared to its historical results, according to The Diplomat.

This success can be attributed in part to the absence of the AL, but also to an effective strategy to mobilize young voters, who were disappointed by both the traditional BNP and the interim government, which they viewed as too slow to deliver concrete results.

A Geopolitical Concern for the West

The rise of a well-organized Islamist party in the second-most populous country in Muslim South Asia poses a direct challenge to Western interests in the region, particularly as China steps up infrastructure investments and India watches the situation with growing suspicion.

Washington, which awarded Yunus the Congressional Gold Medal, is following this issue with particular attention, aware that political instability in Bangladesh could open up a strategic space that Beijing would certainly exploit.

The rise of Jamaat-e-Islami should not be demonized on principle, but it warrants serious vigilance. A Bangladesh shifting toward organized political Islamism, in a region already shaped by Chinese ambitions, is a strategic problem that the West cannot afford to ignore.

Yunus’s Controversial Outreach to Beijing

During his tenure as head of the interim government, Muhammad Yunus sparked controversy by making a series of overtures toward China—a move seen by some observers as an attempt to diversify Bangladesh’s economic partners away from its historical dependence on India, according to the Indian Express.

This shift has fueled tensions with New Delhi, which continues to host Sheikh Hasina in exile and views any Sino-Bangladeshi rapprochement with concern in a region where the balance of power remains extremely delicate.

A Test for Western Doctrine in South Asia

For Western capitals, Bangladesh presents a textbook case: how can they support a fragile democratic transition without pushing the country into the arms of authoritarian powers if results are slow to materialize? Yunus’s bet on multipolar diplomacy could backfire on Western interests if Beijing fills the void left by Western aid deemed insufficient.

The competition for influence between China, India, and Western powers in Bangladesh illustrates, on a small scale, the broader struggle for South Asia, where every national election becomes a geostrategic issue extending far beyond national borders.

I see this as a wake-up call: every time the West neglects a fragile democratic transition due to a lack of attention, China methodically moves in. Bangladesh must not become the next example of this strategic neglect.

Unfulfilled Promises

According to Human Rights Watch’s annual report, the interim government led by Yunus struggled to maintain public order and deliver on promised human rights reforms, despite its initial mandate focused on transitional justice and holding perpetrators of violence accountable, according to Human Rights Watch.

The security operation dubbed “Operation Devil Hunt,” launched in February 2025 to crack down on post-Hasina violence, has itself been criticized for methods deemed disproportionate by several human rights organizations.

The Issue of Rohingya Refugees

Alongside the political transition, Bangladesh continues to host one of the world’s largest refugee populations: the Rohingya fleeing repression in neighboring Myanmar. This humanitarian crisis, largely overshadowed by election news, remains a constant test of the administrative capacity of a government already overwhelmed by its own internal challenges.

The new BNP government inherits this responsibility without having, to date, proposed a policy that is clearly distinct from that of the outgoing interim government.

The plight of the Rohingya refugees deserves more than a footnote in the Bangladeshi political narrative. While parties vie for power in Dhaka, hundreds of thousands of people are surviving in camps with no clear future, and this should carry greater weight in Western public discourse.

A Variable Form of Neutrality

The refusal of the military, led by General Waker-uz-Zaman, to crack down on protesters in August 2024 was the decisive factor in Hasina’s downfall. Since then, the armed forces have maintained a discreet but constant presence in managing the transition, notably through the massive deployment of troops during the February 2026 election.

This close involvement of the military in the political process raises legitimate questions about the true balance of power in Bangladesh, a country that has experienced several episodes of direct or indirect military rule since its independence in 1971.

The Risk of a Step Backward

The BTI Transformation Index report explicitly mentions the risk of military intervention if political factions fail to agree on the sequencing of reforms and local elections—a scenario that would echo the darkest hours of Bangladesh’s political history.

For now, the military appears to favor a role as guarantor rather than a direct actor, but this stance could change rapidly if the legitimacy of the BNP government were to erode further.

A democratic transition that depends so heavily on the goodwill of the generals is never entirely secure. Bangladesh lives under the tacit protection of its military, and this dependence should concern anyone who claims to celebrate a full return to civilian democracy.

A Double-Edged Transition Model

The case of Bangladesh illustrates the limitations of transitions led by well-intentioned technocrats who lack traditional political roots. Despite his international moral stature, Muhammad Yunus was unable to prevent his leadership from being perceived as favoring certain factions at the expense of a truly inclusive process.

For Western foreign ministries observing or supporting this type of transition elsewhere in the world, Bangladesh offers a clear warning: the moral legitimacy of an interim leader is not enough to guarantee an electoral process perceived as fully fair by all political actors.

A Need for Continued Vigilance

Bangladesh remains an important strategic partner for the West in containing Chinese influence in South Asia, which justifies sustained engagement despite the obvious shortcomings of the current democratic process.

Abandoning this issue in favor of challenges deemed more urgent elsewhere would be a strategic mistake, given the country’s demographic and geographic importance to the regional balance of power.

Strategic support should never be confused with unconditional moral endorsement. The West can and must continue to work with Bangladesh without turning a blind eye to the political exclusion that marked this election.

The schedule yet to be set

According to the official election schedule, the election for seats reserved for women was set for May 12, 2026, as the next step toward the full implementation of the new parliamentary framework adopted under the July Charter.

Local elections, strongly demanded by the Jatiyo Nagarik Committee and the NCP, remain, however, an unresolved point of contention among the various factions that emerged from the 2024 movement, with no firm date announced to date.

Political Reintegration: A Volatile Issue

The question of the Awami League’s possible reintegration into Bangladesh’s political landscape remains one of the most explosive issues for the country’s future. The BTI Transformation Index emphasizes that the new government will need to develop a clear strategy on this issue, lest the tensions that sparked the 2024 revolution resurface.

Without a credible mechanism for political reconciliation, Bangladesh risks repeating the pattern of exclusion and polarization that fueled two decades of instability even before Hasina’s downfall.

The real test for Bangladesh will not be this election, but the next one. A country does not become democratic by holding a single election without its largest historical party. It becomes democratic when it finds the courage to reintegrate its opponents into the debate rather than eliminating them by law.

A Community Divided Over the Interpretation of Events

The Bangladeshi diaspora, which is particularly large in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, remains deeply divided over how to interpret Hasina’s downfall and the legitimacy of the new government. Some see it as a well-deserved democratic liberation after years of authoritarian drift, while others denounce it as a coup disguised as a popular revolution.

This divide is directly reflected in Bengali-language media broadcast abroad, where competing narratives clash with an intensity rarely seen for a country of this size, blurring the ability of outside observers to distinguish fact from partisan propaganda.

The Impact on Western Diplomacy

Western governments, mindful of the electoral and economic clout of their respective Bangladeshi communities, must navigate these conflicting pressures when formulating their policy toward Dhaka. The United Kingdom, in particular, has had to manage significant internal tensions among its citizens of Bangladeshi origin who support one side or the other.

This dynamic complicates the formulation of a unified and coherent Western position on Bangladesh’s transition, as each capital fears alienating a significant portion of its immigrant electorate by taking too firm a stance in favor of one of Bangladesh’s political camps.

Diasporas are not mere spectators of their home countries’ politics; they are often their most passionate advocates. The West must learn to listen to these voices without allowing itself to be exploited by one faction or the other.

The Textile Sector Under Pressure

Bangladesh remains one of the world’s largest exporters of apparel, a sector that employs millions of workers—mostly women—and remains extremely vulnerable to political instability. Major Western brands, which depend on this supply chain, are closely monitoring every political upheaval that could disrupt production.

Yunus’s economic team has managed to avert the feared financial collapse following Hasina’s ouster, but foreign investors remain cautious until the country’s political trajectory is fully stabilized under the new BNP government.

Trade Negotiations with Washington

Bangladesh has also begun trade discussions with the United States, focusing in particular on issues related to cotton and liquefied natural gas, as Dhaka seeks to diversify its economic partnerships away from exclusive dependence on India and China.

These negotiations, still in the preliminary stages, could become an important lever for further anchoring Bangladesh within the Western economic sphere, provided that domestic political stability allows for securing long-term commitments.

The Bangladeshi economy is perhaps the best lever the West has to positively influence the country’s political trajectory. It would be irresponsible to leave this lever unused while China steps up its own investment offers.

From Street Heroism to Institutional Disappointment

The students who led the 2024 uprising now occupy an ambiguous position in Bangladesh’s new political landscape. Some, such as Nahid Islam and Asif Mahmud, have joined Yunus’s cabinet as advisors, while others have founded the National Citizen Party in an attempt to transform their revolutionary capital into a lasting political force.

But eighteen months later, a significant portion of this activist generation expresses deep disappointment at the slow pace of the promised reforms and at the way in which traditional parties—led by the BNP—have ultimately reaped the political benefits of a movement they did not initiate.

The NCP: A Still Marginal but Symbolic Force

Having won only 6 seats in the February 2026 election, the National Citizen Party failed to translate the energy of the streets into a significant electoral victory—a gap that illustrates the classic difficulty protest movements face in transforming themselves into effective partisan machines.

This disconnect between the student movement’s symbolic influence and its actual parliamentary clout has fueled the frustration of a youth that paid the price in blood for a change from which it has, so far, reaped only a fraction of the political rewards.

There is something deeply unjust about the fact that those who braved bullets to topple Hasina now find themselves marginalized in the new Parliament. A revolution that primarily benefits the established parties is only half accomplished.

A Country at a Crossroads

Eighteen months after the fall of Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh has reached a major electoral milestone, but the strength of its new democracy remains to be seen. The legal exclusion of the Awami League, the rise of Jamaat-e-Islami, persistent tensions between factions stemming from the student movement, and China’s growing influence paint a picture far more complex than the simple narrative of a triumphant return to democracy.

The BNP government, bolstered by its two-thirds majority, now bears the responsibility of proving that this transition was not merely a transfer of power between two rival political dynasties.

The West must remain vigilant

For Western capitals, the stakes extend far beyond Bangladeshi domestic politics alone. At stake is the preservation of a strategic partner in a region where competition with China and the growing influence of organized Islamist forces are continually reshaping the balance of power.

Bangladesh deserves rigorous, demanding, and honest monitoring—neither complacency toward its current leaders nor indifference to the real risks that still threaten its future stability.

I conclude this report with a simple conviction: Bangladesh is neither a success to be blindly celebrated nor a failure to be condemned without nuance. It is a country in a precarious balance, and the West has every interest in supporting it with the same rigor it applies to its own democracies.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist