EDITORIAL: Syria Chooses Diplomacy Over War in Lebanon

A human toll that weighs on every stage of the transition

The Syrian civil war, which lasted more than thirteen years, has claimed approximately half a million lives according to the most widely accepted estimates—a figure that underscores the scale of the political and social reconstruction task facing the new government. Every institutional decision, including the formation of this new parliament, takes place in the shadow of this collective trauma, which remains fresh in people’s minds.

The issue of minority representation—particularly for Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and Christians—remains a sensitive matter that President al-Sharaa has promised to address, though many observers still describe his track record on the ground as mixed.

Rapid but Fragile Diplomatic Progress

In just over a year, al-Sharaa has become the first Syrian president in six decades to address the United Nations General Assembly and the first Syrian head of state to visit the White House. These spectacular diplomatic gestures, combined with the lifting of U.S., European, and British sanctions, have opened up opportunities for economic reconstruction that were unthinkable just two years ago.

But this rapid normalization on the international stage should not obscure the inherent fragility of a government still largely centered around a single man, in a country where democratic institutions remain in their infancy.

Being invited to the White House and the UN is spectacular. But half a million deaths cannot be erased with a few ceremonial handshakes. The true measure of this transition’s success will be seen in the coming years, not in official photos.

Trump and the Repeal of the Caesar Act

U.S. President Donald Trump lifted most sanctions against Syria in June 2025 before completely repealing the Caesar Act in December of that same year, a decision followed by the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the European Union. This lifting of sanctions, decided following an initial meeting between Trump and al-Sharaa in Riyadh at the invitation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, paved the way for increased economic and humanitarian aid from the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, the European Union, and the Arab world.

This Western gamble on Syrian stabilization—risky as it may be given the current government’s track record—is based on the idea that a stable Syria, integrated into the international diplomatic community, is preferable to an isolated Syria that could potentially be exploited by hostile powers such as Iran or Russia.

A vacuum that Iran and Russia will seek to fill

Assad’s fall represented a major strategic setback for Iran, which lost a key regional ally and a vital supply route to the Lebanese Hezbollah. Russia, for its part, saw its historic military presence in the eastern Mediterranean crumble—another severe blow to Vladimir Putin’s ambitions in the region.

This strategic vacuum left by the former patrons of the ousted regime presents a real opportunity for the West to firmly anchor the new Syria within its diplomatic and economic sphere of influence—provided it remains vigilant and committed over the long term.

Every square meter of influence lost by Iran and Russia in Syria is a net gain for regional and Western security. Recognizing this is not naivety; it is simply geopolitical clarity.

An Already Explosive Situation in Lebanon

Syria’s refusal to engage militarily against Hezbollah comes against the backdrop of a 2026 Lebanese war already marked by considerable tensions, including repeated Israeli strikes against targets linked to the Shiite movement. Adding direct Syrian military intervention to this equation could have transformed a contained regional crisis into a multipolar conflict far more difficult to control.

Al-Sharaa explicitly affirmed his support for the Lebanese government’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah, while categorically refusing to participate directly with military force—a distinction that illustrates the precarious balance Damascus must maintain.

A Pragmatic but Demanding U.S. Approach

The current U.S. strategy prioritizes a pragmatic engagement with the authorities in Damascus and Beirut, aimed at containing conflicts, preventing any renewed escalation, and reducing the space available to non-state armed groups. This approach focuses on strengthening national security institutions rather than on unilateral military solutions.

This pragmatic line, while demanding of Damascus, implicitly acknowledges the real limits of what the new Syrian government can accomplish without risking its own internal stability, which has only just been restored after decades of dictatorship.

Pushing a country that has barely emerged from a civil war to start another one in a neighboring country is the kind of short-sighted calculation that has already caused many disasters in the Middle East. In this regard, Washington’s restraint is the right approach.

A Model That Remains Uncertain but Is Being Closely Watched

Syria’s post-Assad trajectory—marked by both spectacular diplomatic openness and persistent institutional fragility—serves as a textbook case that other regional and Western powers are watching closely. The success or failure of this transition will directly influence the future credibility of any similar attempts at post-conflict reconstruction in the region.

For now, the results remain mixed: real institutional progress, such as the formation of this parliament, coexists with persistent concerns regarding respect for minority rights and the concentration of power in the hands of a single man.

Western vigilance must remain constant

Western governments that have staked their hopes on Syria’s stabilization—notably by lifting sanctions—must now assume the responsibility of closely monitoring the actual progress of this transition, rather than settling for symbolic gestures alone. Genuine respect for commitments made to minorities and effective progress toward fully democratic elections will be the true tests of Damascus’s credibility.

This vigilance, however, must not turn into punitive inaction: stability in Syria directly serves Western interests in a region where a power vacuum has historically benefited the actors most hostile to the West.

We must accompany this transition with a mix of cautious hope and firm demands—neither blissful naivety nor paralyzing cynicism. This is the only stance that truly serves Western interests in this matter.

Riyadh, the Architect of the Trump-al-Sharaa Rapprochement

The initial meeting between Donald Trump and Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, orchestrated at the invitation of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, illustrates the central role Saudi Arabia now plays in the diplomatic reshaping of the Middle East in the wake of the Syrian civil war. This Saudi mediation is part of a broader strategy by the kingdom aimed at consolidating its regional influence in the face of Iran.

Saudi economic and humanitarian support for the new Syria—mentioned among the sources of aid received by Damascus—confirms Riyadh’s desire to firmly anchor the new Syrian administration within the sphere of influence of the Gulf monarchies rather than that of Tehran.

A Regional Architecture in Flux

This Saudi dynamic, combined with U.S. engagement and European openness, is shaping a new regional architecture in which post-Assad Syria is becoming a focal point for several powers that share—for different reasons—a common interest in containing Iranian influence and stabilizing the Levant.

This convergence of interests—however fragile and self-serving it may be on both sides—paradoxically offers Syria a unique window of opportunity to consolidate its regained sovereignty after decades of foreign tutelage.

Seeing Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Europe converge—each for its own reasons—toward the same goal of stabilizing Syria is a rare alignment that should be exploited wisely before it crumbles.

Same Logic, Different Context

The parallel between Syria’s institutional reconstruction and Ukraine’s struggle for sovereignty against Russia may seem tenuous, but the two situations share a common logic: that of a West that chooses to invest politically and economically in resisting the influence of hostile powers, whether it be Russia in Eastern Europe or Iran in the Middle East. In both cases, the stakes extend far beyond the national borders in question.

Supporting the Syrian transition, like supporting the Ukrainian resistance, is part of the same Western strategic calculation: to prevent power vacuums from being filled by regimes or movements hostile to democratic interests and international stability.

A strategic coherence yet to be demonstrated over the long term

This Western strategic coherence, if it truly exists, will need to translate into a sustained commitment over several years, both in Ukraine and in Syria, rather than into sporadic bursts of action followed by premature disengagement. The recent history of the Middle East is replete with examples where an early Western withdrawal has allowed hostile actors to regain the initiative.

Maintaining diplomatic pressure and economic support on both fronts simultaneously will be a true test of the West’s ability to manage multiple strategic priorities at once, without sacrificing one for the sake of the other.

The West cannot afford to choose between supporting Ukraine and assisting the Syrian transition. Both issues test the same thing: our collective ability to uphold our commitments over the long term, not just at the most dramatic moments.

A First Real Institutional Test on July 6

The inaugural session on July 6, 2026, will be the first real test of how this new Syrian assembly functions; it will need to quickly demonstrate its ability to legislate on issues as sensitive as a new electoral law and the preparation of fully democratic elections. Its mixed composition—comprising members elected indirectly and members appointed by the presidency—will continue to be closely scrutinized by human rights organizations and Syrian civil society itself.

Syria’s refusal to become militarily involved in Lebanon, combined with this parliamentary progress, currently paints the picture of a government that prioritizes internal consolidation over regional adventurism—a choice that deserves to be encouraged by all of Damascus’s Western partners.

An Opportunity Not to Be Wasted

For the West, this Syrian transition represents a rare opportunity to see emerge, at the heart of a region dominated for decades by authoritarianism and instability, a model of institutional reconstruction that—despite all its current imperfections—is moving toward greater openness rather than toward a new cycle of repression.

Supporting this trajectory with firmness and consistency—without naivety or excessive cynicism—remains the best strategy for transforming this fragile window of opportunity into a lasting success for regional stability and Western interests in the Middle East.

I will remain cautious before claiming victory on this issue. But for once, in the Middle East, a story that begins without immediate collapse deserves to be given a chance to prove itself over time.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist