A Diplomatic Note with Far-Reaching Consequences
In a note dated July 1 and reviewed by Reuters, the United States indicated that it would no longer support the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), whose total budget is approximately $500 million. Washington also stated that it would block any additional logistical support from the UN to the African Union mission before the Security Council.
The United States funds approximately 26% of the UN’s budget through assessed contributions, according to The EastAfrican. Its withdrawal of this specific funding therefore deprives the African Union mission of a significant portion of its logistical support in the form of fuel, food, and medical services.
Washington justifies its decision by citing a lack of progress
According to reports from several media outlets, including CGTN Africa, Washington believes that Somalia has not made “sufficient progress” in the fight against Al-Shabaab and has not assumed greater responsibility for its own security. This argument is not entirely unfounded in terms of the facts, but it ignores the structural dependency that the United States itself has helped create over the past nearly two decades.
A spokesperson for the U.S. State Department confirmed that the United States would no longer support UNSOS operations, according to Zeit Online, though the spokesperson did not publicly detail all the strategic motivations behind this decision.
To criticize Somalia for not having made enough progress after twenty years of a war largely funded and directed by external powers is a bit like pulling the ladder away from someone you yourself helped climb, and then blaming them for not knowing how to fly.
Al-Shabaab, an enemy that has never really retreated
A counteroffensive that wiped out years of gains
According to the Crisis Group, Al-Shabaab launched a counteroffensive in 2025 that wiped out nearly all of the territorial gains made by the Somali government between 2022 and 2023. The group regained control of most of the Middle Shabelle and Hiiraan regions during the first half of 2025, before its advance slowed in the face of a government counteroffensive backed by international forces.
According to the Hiraal Institute, this 2025 counteroffensive did indeed alter Al-Shabaab’s tactical behavior, driving the group out of urban centers, but it did not reduce its overall rate of attacks, which has reportedly even increased since then.
A Threat That Still Controls Vast Portions of the Territory
Despite nearly twenty years of war, Al-Shabaab “still controls vast swaths of the country,” in the words of Vanguard News. Human Rights Watch, in its 2026 World Report, confirms that Al-Shabaab’s offensives have enabled the group to retake territory previously recaptured by the government in 2022, particularly in central Somalia.
The group’s resilience, year after year, despite considerable Western and African military investments, illustrates just how a purely military solution has never been enough on its own to defeat a movement so deeply rooted locally.
We must be honest about this: if Al-Shabaab still holds so much ground after two decades of war, it is also because Western strategy has often prioritized targeted strikes over long-term investments in local governance.
The final offensive promised by President Mahamoud
An Independence Speech Turned Declaration of War
On the 66th anniversary of Somalia’s independence, President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud stated that the government now had “a clear plan to put an end to Al-Shabaab,” adding that Somali troops “would launch a final offensive to eliminate the group from the country,” according to remarks reported by the SONNA news agency and cited by Infobae.
The president also reiterated an offer of amnesty to jihadist fighters willing to leave the ranks of the extremist organization—an approach that combines military pressure with incentives to defect, in the hope of weakening Al-Shabaab from within.
Airstrikes Already Underway Against the Group’s Positions
The Somali Ministry of Defense announced on Thursday the “elimination” of 27 suspected Al-Shabaab members during new airstrikes carried out on July 1 and 2 in coordination with international partners, targeting the group’s positions in the Lower Shabelle region, south of Mogadishu, according to Infobae. The ministry had already announced earlier in the week the deaths of 35 other suspected members of the group in the same region.
These operations, presented as tactical successes by Mogadishu, come at a time when the Somali government’s ability to turn these isolated gains into a lasting strategic victory remains, historically speaking, highly uncertain.
Promising a “final offensive” is nothing new: several Somali presidents before him have made similar statements, and I prefer to remain cautious rather than give in to the enthusiasm of a declaration that remains, for now, a political intention rather than a fait accompli on the ground.
An African Union mission already running out of funds
Funding shortfalls that have been mounting for years
Long before the U.S. announcement on July 1, the African Union mission in Somalia was already suffering from chronic underfunding. According to the IPI Global Observatory, the mission has received only about half of its funding needs for 2025, on top of substantial arrears from previous years, while no funding has even been pledged for 2026.
Of an estimated budget of $166.5 million for the 2025–2026 period, according to a note from the London School of Economics, only a small fraction had actually been disbursed even before the announcement of the U.S. withdrawal, illustrating a structural financial fragility that predated Washington’s decision by far.
An emergency meeting convened by the African Union
In response to this announcement, the African Union convened an emergency meeting on Friday to discuss the future of its military mission in Somalia, according to Vanguard News. A senior diplomat warned that “a major advance by Al-Shabaab cannot be ruled out” if funding were to actually dry up by the end of the year—a warning that illustrates how seriously African officials themselves view the situation.
This emergency meeting reflects a concern that goes far beyond mere budgetary considerations: it is the very credibility of the collective security model in East Africa that is being directly put to the test by this U.S. decision.
Calling an emergency meeting is an implicit acknowledgment that no credible contingency plan exists if Washington stands by its decision, and this lack of a Plan B worries me far more than the U.S. decision itself.
The 12,000 African Union soldiers: the backbone of a fragile state
A logistical pillar on which the survival of the Mogadishu government depends
According to The Straits Times, the African Union mission, with a force of nearly 12,000 troops, supports a fragile government in Mogadishu and helps it repel al-Shabaab militants, whose previous offensives had already brought them within just a few kilometers of the capital. These troops rely heavily on logistics provided by the UN, particularly for food, fuel, and medical care.
Depriving these troops of this basic logistical support will not make them disappear overnight, but it will drastically reduce their actual operational capacity on the ground, in a context where every week of reduced military pressure directly benefits the enemy.
A long-planned withdrawal, now at risk of being accelerated
The UN Security Council had already planned a phased withdrawal of African Union troops beginning in 2028, as part of Resolution 2809 adopted in December 2025. But according to the IPI Global Observatory, there is no indication that the security situation will improve sufficiently by that deadline to allow for a smooth transfer of responsibility to Somali forces alone.
The U.S. withdrawal of funding for UNSOS therefore risks precipitating a scenario that even the most optimistic UN planners already deemed risky by 2028—let alone a sudden acceleration as early as the end of this year.
Accelerating a withdrawal already deemed risky in the medium term is not fiscal prudence; it is a gamble that Somalia will be able to stand on its own much sooner than expected—a gamble that I personally am not prepared to endorse, given the track record of the past twenty years.
A strategy of containment rather than victory
A goal that has been scaled back for several years now
According to LinkedIn Editors and several analysts cited by specialized publications, there is now a broad informal consensus that defeating Al-Shabaab under current funding conditions is unrealistic. The objective is increasingly limited to containment: keeping the threat largely confined within Somalia’s borders and away from strategic international shipping lanes.
This shift in ambition—from a decisive victory to mere containment—speaks volumes about the waning international political will to sustainably fund a war that has seemed endless for nearly two decades.
What this shift means in practical terms for Somali civilians
Accepting containment rather than victory means, in practice, accepting that millions of Somalis will continue to live under the direct or indirect threat of a group that has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to carry out indiscriminate attacks against civilians, according to Human Rights Watch. This is not a geopolitical abstraction: these are real lives being sacrificed on the altar of Western budgetary fatigue.
I refuse to frame this strategic shift as a mere technical issue of resource management: it has a direct human cost, measurable in Somali lives, which decision-makers in Washington should at least have the honesty to acknowledge publicly.
Shifting from the language of “victory” to that of “containment” is a tacit admission of a twenty-year collective failure, and I believe that Western leaders should at least have the courage to state this clearly rather than glossing it over as a mere budgetary adjustment.
Why the West Can't Afford to Look the Other Way
The Horn of Africa: Strategic for Global Security
Somalia occupies a major strategic position, in close proximity to the world’s busiest shipping lanes, connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. A security breakdown in this country would have repercussions far beyond its borders, particularly on the safety of international commercial shipping—an issue that directly affects Western economies, including those in North America and Europe.
It would be naive to believe that instability in Somalia would remain a purely regional problem: the recent history of piracy off the Somali coast already demonstrated, some fifteen years ago, just how quickly a local security vacuum can become a global economic problem.
The precedent this withdrawal sets for other theaters
This withdrawal of U.S. funding also sends a signal to other international partners engaged in stabilization missions elsewhere in the world: Western commitment can be unilaterally withdrawn—even in the midst of a critical phase of a conflict—as soon as the results fail to meet expectations set solely by Washington, without any real prior consultation with the allies directly concerned.
This precedent should be a cause for concern for all governments that currently rely on sustained Western support to stabilize their own territories in the face of comparable jihadist threats, from the Sahel to South Asia.
I sincerely believe that this withdrawal goes far beyond the Somali case alone: it is a signal sent to all Western partners in stabilization missions around the world, and that signal will not reassure anyone at a time when China and Russia are actively seeking to fill every diplomatic vacuum left by the West.
What This Withdrawal Reveals About Current U.S. Priorities
A Foreign Policy Shifting Its Focus Elsewhere
This decision is part of a broader trend of reassessing U.S. military and financial commitments abroad, a shift that appears to prioritize other strategic priorities deemed more immediate for U.S. national security. This refocusing is not necessarily irrational in itself, but its execution raises serious questions about the timing and method chosen.
Cutting off critical funding at the very moment an African ally is launching a major offensive against an al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group sends a mixed message about the long-term reliability of U.S. commitments to its security partners.
The Discrepancy Between Anti-Terrorism Rhetoric and Budgetary Actions
There is a clear tension between the United States’ consistent rhetoric on the need to combat global Islamist terrorism and this concrete decision to reduce logistical support for one of the most important counterterrorism missions on the African continent. This contradiction deserves to be stated plainly, rather than diluted in vague diplomatic jargon.
This inconsistency between words and deeds is, unfortunately, nothing new in Western foreign policy toward Africa, but it remains just as problematic every time it recurs.
One cannot claim to be the global spearhead in the fight against Islamist terrorism while, at the same time, cutting off funding for one of the most important counterterrorism missions on the African continent: this contradiction deserves to be called out in no uncertain terms.
Regional players that could benefit from the vacuum
A Potential Opening for Other Powers
A lasting weakening of the Western presence in Somalia could pave the way for increased involvement by other regional or global powers, whose priorities do not necessarily align with democratic stability or human rights. China, which already has a strong economic presence in the Horn of Africa, could seek to expand its strategic influence amid a gradual Western withdrawal.
This dynamic is not hypothetical: it has already been observed in other regions of the world where a Western withdrawal has left a vacuum that other powers—less concerned with governance issues—have been quick to fill.
A Worrying Precedent for the Regional Geopolitical Balance
The Horn of Africa remains an area of intense geopolitical competition among several world powers, each seeking to secure strategic access to this pivotal region between Africa and the Middle East. A prolonged security vacuum in Somalia would likely not go unfulfilled for long, given the already heightened international rivalry.
It is precisely this dynamic that should concern Western foreign ministries far beyond the immediate budgetary considerations tied to this U.S. decision.
Leaving a strategic vacuum in Somalia invites other powers—ones less concerned with human rights—to establish a lasting presence there, and I sincerely doubt that this was the strategic outcome Washington actually intended with this decision.
Somali civilians: Once Again, the Forgotten Ones
Population displacements that have been building up for years
Successive offensives and counteroffensives between the Somali government and Al-Shabaab have triggered repeated waves of population displacement, particularly in the Middle Shabelle and Hiiraan regions, according to Human Rights Watch. These displaced civilians often live in precarious humanitarian conditions, with no certainty that they will ever be able to return permanently to their original homes.
Forced evictions are also continuing in the capital, Mogadishu, where demographic pressure stemming from the influx of internally displaced persons further complicates an urban situation that is already fragile in terms of security and basic infrastructure.
International Fatigue Leaves Little Room for Humanitarian Action
Faced with a growing number of international crises that are capturing global media and diplomatic attention, Somalia is struggling to remain a priority on the international humanitarian agenda, despite the continued significant needs of millions of people directly affected by this protracted conflict.
This relative international indifference should never serve as a pretext for downplaying the real urgency of the humanitarian situation in Somalia, regardless of where it currently stands on Western diplomatic priorities.
I refuse to write about Somalia solely through the geopolitical lens of the major powers: behind every displacement statistic are families rebuilding their lives for the third or fourth time in just a few years.
What Could Still Be a Game-Changer by the End of the Year
A diplomatic window that is still theoretically open
The U.S. decision, although described as “irreversible” by a diplomat quoted by Vanguard News, will not take effect until the end of 2026. This leaves, in theory, a window of several months for alternative diplomatic efforts, whether by the European Union, other international partners, or a revision of the U.S. position itself under pressure from African allies.
However, this window remains narrow, and there is no guarantee that a credible alternative financing solution can be put together in such a short time frame to offset the withdrawal announced by Washington.
The Somali offensive as a decisive factor in the coming months
The success or failure of the “final offensive” promised by President Mahamoud in the coming weeks could also influence the U.S. position, should significant and sustainable territorial gains be demonstrated on the ground before the year-end deadline.
But given the track record of previous offensives—which Al-Shabaab largely recaptured in the months that followed—caution remains warranted before drawing definitive conclusions about the outcome of this new military campaign.
I wish I could write that this final offensive will be a lasting game-changer, but the recent history of this conflict compels me to be cautious: too many proclaimed victories have, within a few months, turned into new setbacks on the ground.
What this letter specifically asks of Western decision-makers
An Urgent Review of the Withdrawal Timeline
Through this letter, I am asking for one simple thing: that U.S. decision-makers at the very least reconsider the timeline for this withdrawal, aligning it with the actual outcome of the offensive currently promised by Mogadishu, rather than imposing it according to a budgetary schedule disconnected from the reality on the ground.
This is not a naive request for unlimited and unconditional funding: it is a request for a minimum level of consistency between the stated counterterrorism objectives and the concrete resources allocated to achieve them.
A Shared Responsibility Among Western Allies
If Washington stands by its decision, it is then up to other Western partners—particularly European ones—to seriously consider filling at least part of this funding gap, rather than leaving Somalia and the African Union to face this sudden budgetary constraint on their own.
The West cannot claim to defend an international order based on the fight against terrorism while, one after another, backing away from its most concrete commitments in this specific area.
This letter asks for nothing extraordinary: just that the West align its budgetary actions with its own anti-terrorism rhetoric—a minimal level of consistency that should not be so difficult to achieve collectively.
The role Europe could still play in this equation
A partner that has remained relatively on the sidelines on this issue
The European Union, despite its existing financial contributions to Somalia’s stabilization, has not yet announced a significant increase in its commitment to offset a potential complete U.S. withdrawal from UNSOS funding. This relative European caution is partly due to internal budgetary constraints, but it leaves a void that few actors currently seem eager to fill.
However, several European countries—some of which already have direct security interests in the region through the fight against maritime piracy—would have the necessary resources to at least partially mitigate the consequences of a U.S. withdrawal, provided that a clear political will were to emerge quickly.
An Opportunity to Demonstrate European Strategic Autonomy
The situation in Somalia could also serve as a litmus test of Europe’s ability to act autonomously on international security issues without systematically depending on U.S. budgetary decisions. A Europe capable of filling—even partially—this funding gap would send a strong signal about its determination to exert real influence on international security issues beyond its immediate neighborhood.
However, there is no guarantee that such a European mobilization will materialize in a timely manner, as European budgetary decision-making processes often remain slower than the actual urgency of the situation on the ground in Somalia would require.
If Europe truly wants to prove that it can play a strategic role without waiting for U.S. approval on every international security issue, Somalia represents a concrete opportunity to demonstrate this, rather than yet another issue to simply observe from afar.
Conclusion: A letter that has, for now, gone unanswered
A risky gamble for which Somalis will pay the price
What this U.S. decision ultimately reveals is the structural fragility of a collective security model that relies heavily on a single dominant donor. When that donor decides to withdraw—even partially—the entire Somali security framework is immediately weakened, with potentially devastating human consequences for millions of civilians.
President Mahamoud promises a final offensive, but this promise rings hollow at a time when the logistical resources needed to carry it out are in danger of disappearing before the military campaign has even had time to produce lasting and verifiable results.
An open letter, in the hope that it will not go unheard
I close this letter without any certainty as to its actual impact, aware that U.S. foreign policy decisions are not generally made based on a column published thousands of kilometers from Mogadishu. But I continue to believe that clearly pointing out a contradiction remains the first essential step toward hoping, one day, to correct it.
Somalia deserves better than budgetary abandonment disguised as a strategic adjustment, and Westerners who pride themselves on defending global security should, at the very least, have the courage to publicly acknowledge the human consequences of their own financial decisions.
I close this letter hoping I am wrong: I hope the final offensive will succeed, that funding will be maintained one way or another, and that a year from now, this article will appear to have been needlessly pessimistic rather than tragically prescient.
Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist
Sources
Primary sources
The Straits Times — Somalia peacekeeping mission at risk as US blocks UN support, July 3, 2026
Wikipedia — Timeline of al-Shabaab-related events
Secondary sources
The EastAfrican — US funding withdrawal casts doubt on AU peace mission in Somalia, July 3, 2026
Human Rights Watch — World Report 2026: Somalia, January 14, 2026
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