Strategic Control of the Straits
Turkey’s geographic position—controlling access to the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean—gives Ankara considerable strategic leverage over Russian and Western naval movements in this critical region of the Ukrainian conflict. This geographic reality, more than any ideological consideration, explains Erdoğan’s calculated caution toward Moscow.
Under the Montreux Convention, Turkey has the authority to restrict the passage of warships through these straits in times of conflict—a tool Ankara has effectively used to limit certain Russian naval movements since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
An Economic Partner That Is Difficult to Sanction
Trade between Turkey and Russia remains substantial, particularly in the energy and tourism sectors, placing Erdoğan in a delicate position in the face of Western calls for stricter economic isolation of Moscow. This mutual dependence structurally limits Turkey’s diplomatic maneuvering room, regardless of the pressure exerted by its NATO partners.
This economic reality explains why Ankara has systematically refused to join the Western sanctions regime against Russia, while continuing to supply significant military equipment to Ukraine, notably combat drones known for their effectiveness on the front lines.
I understand the geographical and economic constraints weighing on Ankara, but I refuse to see them as a sufficient excuse. One cannot claim to be a reliable NATO ally while categorically refusing to participate in the effort to apply economic pressure against the aggressor.
Dual military support: an acknowledged contradiction
Bayraktar Drones That Have Shaped the War
Paradoxically, Turkey has remained one of Ukraine’s most important military suppliers since the start of the conflict, particularly through its Bayraktar TB2 combat drones, which played a well-documented role in the early stages of Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion. This direct military contribution stands in stark contrast to Turkey’s refusal to impose economic sanctions on Moscow.
This apparent contradiction between military support for Kyiv and the maintenance of normalized economic relations with Moscow is precisely the hallmark of Erdogan’s diplomacy: an ability to compartmentalize its international relations according to distinct logics, without ever locking itself into an exclusive camp.
A Recognized but Limited Mediating Role
Ankara has also hosted several rounds of negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian representatives since the start of the war—a mediating role that Turkey claims with a certain diplomatic pride, even though these negotiations have so far failed to produce any lasting peace agreement.
While this mediating role has not yet borne fruit diplomatically, it nonetheless grants Erdoğan international visibility and a special status within NATO—that of the only member capable of maintaining an open channel of communication with Moscow under all circumstances.
I recognize the practical utility of this Turkish channel with Moscow, but I remain skeptical of its sincerity. A mediator who sells drones to one side and buys gas from the other is not neutral; he is simply skilled at making people believe he is.
Erdoğan vs. Trump: A Game of Mirrors
Two Similar Political Styles
The personal relationship between Erdoğan and Trump is based on a form of mutual recognition between two leaders with similar political styles, characterized by assertive nationalism and a shared distrust of traditional multilateral institutions. This personal rapport could prove valuable in defusing the tensions expected during the Ankara summit.
Several European diplomats quoted by Reuters are explicitly counting on this relationship to prevent Trump’s repeated criticism of European funding for NATO from escalating into an open crisis during the summit’s official discussions.
A Test of Credibility for the Turkish Presidency
This role as an informal facilitator between Washington and European allies represents both an opportunity and a risk for Erdoğan: successfully mediating would significantly bolster his international standing, while failure would expose the real limits of his personal influence over a U.S. president known for being unpredictable.
This personal dimension of international diplomacy—where relationships between leaders sometimes matter as much as the official positions of states—illustrates a reality of contemporary foreign policy that Erdoğan has mastered with considerable skill for years.
I find it telling that the outcome of a NATO summit depends as much on the personal chemistry between two men as on the official positions of their respective countries. It’s fragile, but it’s the diplomatic reality of our time.
Dinner with Zelensky: A Symbol of Cautious Support
Hospitality That Doesn’t Tell the Whole Story
The official dinner that Erdoğan is to host for Volodymyr Zelensky on the sidelines of the summit is a significant diplomatic gesture, reaffirming Turkey’s recognition of the Ukrainian government’s legitimacy in the face of Russian aggression. This gesture is in line with Turkey’s ongoing support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, a position Ankara has consistently maintained since 2022.
This diplomatic hospitality, however, should not obscure the real limits of Turkey’s commitment: Turkey continues to refuse any participation in the Western sanctions regime, a reservation that clearly distinguishes its support from that of other NATO allies who are more economically engaged against Moscow.
Kyiv, aware of this ally’s limitations
Ukrainian officials, accustomed to distinguishing between rhetorical support and concrete commitments, maintain a pragmatic relationship with Ankara, valuing Turkish military deliveries while remaining realistic about the impossibility of getting Turkey to fully align with the West’s hardest line against Moscow.
This pragmatic relationship, built on mutual and accepted compromises, clearly illustrates the complexity of Western alliances in the face of Russia: not all NATO members share the same level of commitment, and Kyiv must work within this reality to maximize the available support, even if it is only partial.
I believe Kyiv is right to accept this imperfect relationship with Ankara rather than demand a perfect one. In an existential war, a partial ally that supplies drones is better than a perfect ally that offers nothing but rhetoric.
Internal Tensions Within NATO That Ankara Is Managing
An ally that divides as much as it unites
Turkey’s ambiguous position has, over the years, sparked recurring tensions with other NATO members, particularly regarding its purchases of Russian military equipment or its economic relations, which some more hardline partners—such as the Baltic and Nordic countries—consider too lenient toward Moscow.
These internal tensions, however, have never led to a fundamental questioning of Turkey’s membership in the Atlantic Alliance, as Turkey’s strategic position and military power remain too valuable for its Western partners to seriously consider marginalizing Ankara.
A role that could become even more decisive
As transatlantic tensions escalate under the Trump administration, the balancing act Erdoğan is performing could become even more central in the coming months, particularly if the United States continues to reduce its direct military commitment in Europe while demanding more from its European allies.
Ankara’s growing centrality within NATO raises a fundamental question that Western capitals will sooner or later have to address: Can we continue indefinitely to tolerate an ally that refuses to impose sanctions on Russia while fully benefiting from the Atlantic Alliance’s collective guarantees?
I’ll put the question bluntly: at what point does Turkey’s ambiguity become incompatible with membership in a collective defense alliance against Russia? I don’t have a simple answer, but the question deserves to be asked publicly rather than avoided for the sake of diplomatic convenience.
What the Ankara Summit Reveals About Turkey's Strategy
A Carefully Chosen Symbolic Location
The choice of Ankara as the host city for this NATO summit is no coincidence: it allows Erdoğan to showcase, on his own soil, his role as an indispensable balancer between Washington, Brussels, and, indirectly, Moscow. This geographical symbolism strengthens Turkey’s diplomatic position at a pivotal moment in transatlantic relations.
Hosting both Zelensky and Trump simultaneously on Turkish soil, against a backdrop of intense tensions among Western allies, constitutes a show of diplomatic strength that Erdoğan will undoubtedly exploit politically, both on the domestic Turkish stage and internationally.
A strategy that could either advance or delay peace
Erdoğan’s gamble remains risky: by cultivating a position of indispensability among all parties to the conflict, he could indeed help facilitate, one day, a negotiated resolution to the war in Ukraine. But this same strategy of constant balancing could just as easily delay the difficult decisions that the situation demands, by perpetuating the illusion of a neutrality that primarily benefits Turkey itself.
It is this fundamental ambivalence—between useful mediation and the calculation of national interest—that defines Turkey’s role in this war and will likely continue to shape Ankara’s diplomacy as long as the conflict in Ukraine remains unresolved.
I conclude with a nuanced conviction: Erdoğan is playing a dangerous but skillful game—making himself indispensable to everyone without truly submitting to anyone. History will judge whether this strategy has served the cause of peace or merely the personal interests of a man who excels in the art of never definitively choosing a side.
The energy card: another tool Turkey can use to exert pressure
Russian Gas: A Persistent Dependence
Turkey remains a major importer of Russian natural gas, particularly via the TurkStream pipeline—an infrastructure that supplies a substantial portion of Turkey’s energy needs and serves as yet another reason for Ankara to refuse to join Western sanctions against Moscow.
This energy dependence, combined with economic interests tied to tourism and Turkish agricultural exports to Russia, creates a web of interdependencies that neither Brussels nor Washington seems able to break in the short term, despite repeated diplomatic pressure on Erdoğan.
A Difficult-to-Break Energy Balance
Western attempts to convince Turkey to further diversify its energy supply sources are hampered by long-term contractual realities and the lack of immediately available alternatives at comparable costs, which keeps Ankara in a position of structural dependence on Moscow for years to come.
This energy reality further reinforces the logic of permanent balance that Erdoğan has embraced for years—a logic that will likely continue to shape Turkish foreign policy well beyond the duration of the current conflict in Ukraine.
I believe that this energy dependence explains Turkey’s behavior more than any ideological consideration. Erdoğan does not go easy on Moscow out of sympathy; he does so out of cold energy calculations, and this is perhaps even more troubling for the future of Western cohesion.
Conclusion: The tightrope walker who doesn't want to fall
A Role Tailor-Made for Erdoğan
The Ankara summit confirms, once again, the unique position Recep Tayyip Erdoğan holds within NATO: that of an ally whose loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance never translates into a complete break with Moscow. This calculated ambiguity, far from being a diplomatic accident, has been at the very heart of his foreign policy strategy for years.
A balance that cannot last indefinitely
It remains to be seen how long this balance can hold, as the war in Ukraine enters its fifth year and Western pressure for a clearer alignment against Russia is unlikely to stop intensifying in the months and years ahead.
I’ll conclude with a question that will remain without a definitive answer for a long time: Will Erdoğan one day preserve peace through this ongoing balance, or will he have merely delayed the moment when the West will ultimately have to force Moscow to make difficult choices?
Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist
Sources
Primary Sources
Ministry of Defense of Ukraine — official statements, July 2026
Reuters — NATO leaders gather in Ankara aiming to smooth over tensions with Trump, July 3, 2026
Armyinform — official Ukrainian statements, July 2026
Secondary sources
Foreign Policy — analyses of Turkish foreign policy, 2026
The Guardian International — coverage of the NATO summit, 2026
Anadolu Agency — infographic on Turkey’s position within NATO, 2026
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