GPS Jamming and Drone Incursions
Electronic jamming, or “spoofing,” regularly disrupts air and maritime navigation in the Baltic region. Several incidents documented in May 2026 involved drones suspected of being of Ukrainian origin but diverted by Russian jamming into NATO airspace, triggering emergency meetings in Tallinn. The commander of the Estonian Defense Forces confirmed that an explosive device had struck a power plant, an incident that triggered a national alert.
These cross-border incidents, even when not directly targeting the Baltic states, reveal the vulnerability of allied airspace to Russian electronic warfare. Latvia has also reported drones exploding on its own territory, detected by radar only minutes before impact—a dangerously short reaction time for a national air defense system.
Cyberattacks and Disinformation: A Silent War
Beyond physical incidents, cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns are explicitly included among the hybrid instruments listed by the Saeima. These attacks target critical infrastructure, but also citizens’ trust in their democratic institutions—a long-standing strategic objective for the Kremlin in its effort to weaken the internal cohesion of Western societies.
The resolution explicitly calls for a unified and rapid response from the Alliance to these hybrid attacks, as well as better coordination of financial, technological, and non-military countermeasures. It is a clear call to move beyond a reactive approach and build a doctrine of permanent hybrid deterrence.
What strikes me is how normalized these attacks have become in the Baltic public discourse. People discuss cyberattacks and GPS jamming with the same seriousness as they would discuss conventional military incursions, because that is exactly what they are: war waged by other means, without an official declaration.
The Call for Enhanced Air Defense Capabilities
Eastern Sentry, a Symbol of Heightened Vigilance
The Latvian text explicitly calls for enhanced technical support for NATO’s enhanced vigilance operation, known as Eastern Sentry, deployed in Latvia. This initiative aims to strengthen the Alliance’s presence on the eastern flank and in the Baltic Sea region, an area where hybrid incidents have been on the rise for several months.
The resolution also calls for the development of modern, integrated air and missile defense systems, including effective counter-drone capabilities. This technical request reflects a concrete concern: without robust detection and interception capabilities, incidents of jamming and incursions will continue to increase without an adequate response.
Drawing on Experience from the Ukrainian Battlefield
Notably, the Saeima’s resolution calls for drawing on experience from the Ukrainian battlefield to strengthen the Alliance’s operational effectiveness, its defense industrial capacity, the resilience of its supply chains, and the rapid deployment of technological innovation. Ukraine is no longer merely a recipient of Western aid; it is becoming a major source of strategic learning for its own allies.
Latvia points out that it has allocated 0.25% of its GDP annually since 2024 to military support for Ukraine, and calls on all Allies to make this figure the annual minimum for assistance. This quantified plea contrasts with the more cautious positions of other European capitals.
I find it remarkable that a small Baltic country is proposing a concrete figure as a benchmark for the entire Alliance, rather than settling for vague promises. This is exactly the kind of quantified pressure NATO needs to turn rhetoric into verifiable commitments.
A Test of Cohesion for the Atlantic Alliance
Western Fatigue: What the Kremlin Is Hoping For
By intensifying its hybrid operations just ahead of a major NATO summit, Russia is likely seeking to test the strength of allied cohesion at the most sensitive moment: when budget decisions are being made. This is a classic Kremlin strategy, which relies on weariness and division to gradually weaken Western unity without ever triggering an open conflict with the Alliance.
The Baltic states, on the front lines of this pressure, refuse to let this strategy succeed in silence. Their joint warning is specifically aimed at ensuring that military spending commitments do not remain mere budget lines without concrete translation into air defense and anti-drone capabilities.
What the Ankara Summit Must Deliver
For Tallinn and Riga, the value of the Turkish summit will not be measured by its speeches, but by concrete and measurable commitments regarding defense spending and capability investments. The resolution emphasizes that all Allies must demonstrate tangible progress at the summit; otherwise, the credibility of collective deterrence will continue to erode in the face of a patient and methodical adversary.
This demand for concrete results reflects a broader concern shared by many members of the eastern flank: after years of summits marked by spectacular announcements but slow follow-through, the patience of the capitals most exposed to the Russian threat is wearing thin.
The Baltic countries cannot be blamed for their impatience. They are the ones living with daily GPS jamming, drones crossing their airspace, and cyberattacks targeting their infrastructure. The rest of Western Europe has the luxury of geographical distance; they do not.
China, Iran, and North Korea are watching from the sidelines
An authoritarian axis that learns from every Western hesitation
While the Lithuanian-Estonian resolution primarily targets Russia, its message extends far beyond the bilateral framework. Every sign of division or weakness within NATO in the face of Russian hybrid provocations fuels the strategic calculations of other authoritarian regimes—whether it is China observing the Taiwan issue, Iran assessing Western resolve, or North Korea continuing its own ballistic provocations.
This global dimension explains why the Baltic alert deserves attention that extends beyond the Baltic region alone. Western cohesion in the face of Russian hybrid warfare sets a precedent that these regimes are closely monitoring to adjust their own strategy of gradual escalation.
Vigilance That Must Never Waver
The recent history of the conflict in Ukraine has shown just how dearly the West pays for every strategic hesitation in the face of a determined adversary. The Baltic states, having lived under Soviet rule, know better than anyone the price of strategic naivety toward Moscow, and it is this historical memory that fuels the urgency of their message.
The Ankara summit represents an opportunity for the Alliance to prove that this vigilance remains intact, four years after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and that the lessons of hybrid warfare have indeed been learned at the collective level.
I remain convinced that China poses the most significant long-term strategic challenge, but this must never lead us to downplay the immediate and daily threat that Russia poses to its immediate neighbors. Both dangers require simultaneous vigilance, not a prioritization that would weaken either response.
Lessons from a Methodical Escalation
A strategy of attrition documented for years
Security experts monitoring the Baltic region have noted for several years a methodical escalation of Russian provocations, ranging from simple jamming incidents to incursions by armed drones capable of causing material damage. This gradual progression aligns with a well-known tenet of Russian hybrid strategy: patiently testing Western tolerance thresholds without ever crossing the line into an incident that would trigger a collective Article 5 response.
This cold calculation explains why Baltic warnings place such strong emphasis on the need for a rapid and coordinated response. Each incident treated in isolation, without a systemic response from the Alliance, reinforces the impression that hybrid warfare pays off without risk to its instigator.
The Price of Silence in the Face of Escalation
Ignoring or downplaying these provocations would amount to repeating the strategic mistakes made before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, when several warning signs were overlooked by a segment of Western Europe still wedded to the idea of perpetual peace with Moscow. The Baltic states refuse to relive this scenario, and their insistence must be understood as a lesson learned at a cost that has already been too high elsewhere on the continent.
It is in this historical context that the Saeima’s resolution takes on its full meaning: it does not call for a disproportionate response, but for vigilance commensurate with a real and documented threat.
I refuse to dismiss these warnings as alarmism. Recent history has shown that the countries geographically closest to Russia often see the writing on the wall before others do. Ignoring their on-the-ground expertise would be a strategic mistake that the West can no longer afford to make.
What the West Must Prove to Ankara
Quantified commitments rather than vague statements
The Ankara summit is a direct test of NATO’s ability to translate the concerns expressed by its most vulnerable members into concrete commitments. The Baltic states’ demands are specific: clearly established defense spending thresholds, enhanced anti-drone capabilities, rapid-response mechanisms for cyberattacks, and a guaranteed minimum level of military assistance for Ukraine.
This precision contrasts with the vagueness that has at times characterized the final communiqués of previous Alliance summits. By making quantified and verifiable demands, Estonia and Latvia are setting a standard of accountability that other capitals will not be able to easily ignore.
Collective Responsibility in the Face of a Common Adversary
At its core, the Baltic message is simple: the security of the Alliance’s eastern border is inseparable from the security of all its members. This principle, explicitly stated in the Saeima’s resolution, serves as a reminder that the solidarity enshrined in Article 5 cannot be limited to scenarios of conventional invasion; it must also encompass the response to hybrid attacks, which, when combined, have equally destabilizing effects.
It is this broader vision of collective security that the Ankara summit must, according to Tallinn and Riga, translate into concrete decisions rather than mere declarations of intent.
I believe that this demand for concrete action is the true measure of a NATO summit’s value. Group photos and solemn speeches do not protect anyone from GPS jamming or an armed drone crashing into a power plant.
The precedent of Ukrainian drones straying into allied territory
When Russia’s War Spills Over into NATO’s Territory
The incidents of March 2026, in which Ukrainian drones targeting Russian oil infrastructure were diverted by the Kremlin’s electronic jamming into Estonian and Latvian airspace, illustrate an often-overlooked dimension of this hybrid war: its spillover effects on Alliance territory. The director general of the Estonian Internal Security Service confirmed that the drone was indeed of Ukrainian origin, though no hostile intent toward Tallinn was established.
This type of incident, though unintentional on Kyiv’s part, demonstrates just how much Russian electronic warfare complicates the distinction between direct threats and collateral damage. A commander in the Estonian Defense Forces explained with reasonable certainty that it was not a reconnaissance drone, but rather a drone loaded with explosives.
This kind of episode illustrates the unpredictable nature of modern electronic warfare. Even without any hostile intent on Kyiv’s part, Russian jamming transforms a legitimate Ukrainian strike into a potentially dangerous incident for a NATO country. It is a stark reminder that this war no longer really has clear-cut borders.
Baltic Resilience Forged by History
Estonia and Latvia’s emphasis on the Russian hybrid threat does not come out of nowhere. Having lived for decades under Soviet rule, both nations maintain a keen collective memory of the methods of pressure and destabilization employed by Moscow. This historical experience fuels a particularly clear-eyed assessment of Russian intentions, often ahead of analyses formulated in other Western capitals farther from the border.
This historical vigilance also explains why both countries invest so much of their budgetary resources in defense, even though their limited economic size might justify a more modest posture. The opposite choice—that of maximum preparedness—reflects a deep conviction: security cannot be negotiated after the fact.
I sincerely believe that this Baltic historical memory is a strategic asset for the entire Alliance, not merely a source of regional anxiety. Listening to those who have already lived under Moscow’s thumb should be a reflex, not an option.
Conclusion: A warning that deserves to be heeded in Ankara
Words That Must Be Turned Into Action
The joint warning issued by Estonia and Latvia ahead of the Ankara summit highlights a reality that the West can no longer ignore: Russia’s hybrid warfare is not just a theory—it is already shaping the daily lives of people living along the Alliance’s borders. GPS jamming, cyberattacks, drones, and disinformation make up an arsenal that Moscow is relentlessly deploying, testing every crack in Western unity.
Western credibility is also at stake on this front
Responding effectively to this hybrid pressure—with concrete air defense capabilities and enhanced coordination among Allies—is a test of credibility just as important as direct military support for Ukraine. Ignoring this Baltic warning would be tantamount to leaving the field open to a strategy of attrition whose effects, in the long run, would threaten the entire European security architecture.
By Maxime Marquette, columnist
Sources
Primary Sources
Latvian Saeima — Resolution on the NATO Summit in Ankara, June 18, 2026
Euronews — Baltic drone incursions test EU security, June 1, 2026
Ministry of Defense of Ukraine — official website
Secondary sources
Defense News — Ukrainian drones hit all three Baltic States, March 27, 2026
This content was created with the help of AI.