ARTICLE: More Than 100 Russian Banks Now Subject to Western Sanctions

The Lack of a Single Central Authority in Europe

Despite this impressive figure of more than 100 sanctioned banks, Europe has often struggled to enforce its sanctions uniformly across its 27 member states, due to the lack of a single central authority capable of ensuring consistent enforcement in each national jurisdiction.

This administrative fragmentation creates loopholes that certain financial actors—whether Russian or from other countries—exploit to continue processing transactions involving banks that are theoretically subject to sanctions, a reality that tempers the immediate effectiveness of this symbolic milestone of 100 institutions.

A challenge that Brussels is seeking to address

In light of this, several European officials are calling for strengthened oversight and coordination mechanisms among national financial authorities to address these structural flaws that limit the actual impact of the banking sanctions already adopted.

I will remain skeptical until I see these sanctions applied in a truly uniform manner across all twenty-seven European capitals. The numerical target is only meaningful if it is effectively implemented in the banking sector.

Institutions Cut Off from International Markets

Sanctioned banks lose access to international payment systems dominated by Western currencies, a constraint that significantly complicates Russia’s commercial transactions with its foreign partners, including countries not aligned with Western sanctions such as China and India.

This gradual exclusion is forcing Moscow to develop alternative payment systems, which are often less efficient and more costly—an additional burden on an economy already strained by four years of war against Ukraine.

VTB: A Warning Sign from the Banking Sector Itself

VTB, Russia’s second-largest bank, plans to increase its financial reserves to protect against potential loan losses—a defensive move that reveals genuine concern within the Russian banking sector itself, despite the reassuring rhetoric from official monetary authorities.

Seeing an institution as central as VTB quietly preparing for the worst often speaks louder than any official statement. Russian bankers, for their part, do not seem entirely convinced by the Kremlin’s rhetoric of resilience.

Washington has eased certain restrictions

While Europe is tightening its banking regulations, the United States, under President Donald Trump, has eased certain economic sanctions, notably a temporary exemption that allowed the sale of Russian oil before its expiration in mid-June 2026—a divergence that complicates the overall coherence of Western pressure.

This transatlantic asymmetry potentially offers the Kremlin occasional financial leeway, precisely at a time when Brussels is seeking to further tighten the noose around the Russian banking system.

Consistency Praised on the Military Front

It must nevertheless be acknowledged that the Trump administration continues to support arms deliveries to Ukraine—a crucial distinction that sets its sometimes lenient economic policy toward Moscow apart from its firmer stance on military support for Kyiv.

I reject simplistic caricatures on this issue: Trump is neither an unconditional ally of Putin nor an unwavering defender of Ukraine. On economic matters, I strongly criticize him. On arms deliveries to Kyiv, however, I acknowledge a consistency on his part that deserves to be honestly highlighted.

A Market That Largely Ignores Western Sanctions

Several economic analysts point out that Asia continues to largely ignore Western sanctions, with China remaining a major trading and financial partner for sanctioned Russian banks—a safety net that partially mitigates the impact of European measures.

As long as these Asian trade channels remain open, the impact of the sanctions on the 100 banks will necessarily remain limited, even though each additional institution added to the list further reduces the Kremlin’s financial leeway in Western markets.

A Growing Dependence on Beijing

This increased dependence on China is gradually transforming Russia into a junior partner in an economic axis dominated by Beijing—an asymmetrical relationship whose geopolitical consequences extend far beyond the current banking issue alone.

As I often say: China, far more than Western sanctions themselves, will determine Russia’s true long-term economic resilience. This is a relationship of dependence whose strategic cost Moscow does not yet seem to fully grasp.

Pressure That Must Remain Constant

For Ukraine and its Western allies, reaching the symbolic milestone of 100 sanctioned banks is an encouraging sign, but one that must not lead to a letup in vigilance as long as the Russian financial system retains workarounds via Asia and the “ghost fleet” of oil tankers.

Ukrainian officials regularly point out that every financial institution cut off from Western markets places an additional strain on the Kremlin’s ability to finance its military operations against Ukraine.

A Quiet Economic Victory to Be Consolidated

This accumulation of banking sanctions, while less spectacular than a military victory on the ground, could ultimately weigh significantly on the Kremlin’s strategic calculations regarding the continuation of its aggression against Ukraine.

A war economy collapsing from within would be the quietest and most decisive victory of this conflict. It may be in the bank balance sheets, rather than on the battlefield, that part of the outcome of this war will be decided.

Insurers: An Often-Overlooked Link in Deterrence

Beyond banks alone, Western insurers play a key role in the actual effectiveness of these sanctions, since the majority of the world’s major marine and financial insurance companies remain based in Europe and the United Kingdom, giving them considerable deterrent power over transactions involving sanctioned Russian banks.

Strengthening coordination between financial regulators and insurers could address some of the current gaps in the system, particularly by imposing stricter compliance requirements on any transaction that passes through—even indirectly—a Russian institution that is theoretically subject to sanctions.

Transatlantic Cooperation Still Has Room for Improvement

Transatlantic cooperation on this issue still has room for improvement, as differences in approach between Washington and Brussels sometimes complicate the consistent implementation of these financial oversight mechanisms on a global scale—a discrepancy that Russian intermediaries have been exploiting with methodical consistency since the start of the conflict.

I believe that one day the West will also have to take direct action against insurers who turn a blind eye to certain questionable transactions. It is often there—in the financial paperwork rather than in political announcements—that true long-term deterrence is achieved.

One Hundred Banks: A Milestone, Not an End

Reaching the milestone of 100 sanctioned Russian banks marks a significant step in the economic war waged by the West against the Kremlin, but by no means represents a victory as long as substantial workarounds remain open via Asia and parallel maritime networks.

Consistency remains the key to success

Only sustained economic pressure, combined with strengthened transatlantic coordination and continued military support for Ukraine, will make it possible to transform this symbolic milestone into genuine diplomatic leverage capable of influencing the Kremlin’s decisions.

I’ll conclude with a note of deliberate caution: I firmly believe in the cumulative power of these banking sanctions, but I refuse to give in to the easy euphoria of a round number. One hundred sanctioned banks, on their own, do not guarantee an end to this war.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist