COLUMN: Xi Jinping Urges the Chinese Military to Act Before 2027, Reiterates Stance on Taiwan

Maxime Marquette

2026-07-10 15:39:25

A Purge Reaching All the Way to the Top

According to an analysis by the Institute for the Study of War published on July 6, 2026, Xi Jinping is continuing a purge of military representatives within the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, while his anti-corruption campaign now extends to military institutions created as a result of post-2015 structural reforms. This anti-corruption campaign, described by Beijing itself as “the tough, protracted, and all-out battle against corruption,” has already resulted in sanctions against more than one million officials, including several high-ranking military officers.

Two members of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, were removed from their posts in January 2026, a strong signal that even the highest echelons of the Chinese military are not immune to the purge Xi is carrying out.

An Ideological Training Camp Personally Launched by Xi

The official newspaper PLA Daily provided details on an ideological training camp held from April 8 to June 12, 2026, personally initiated by Xi Jinping, whose central theme required officers to “speak the truth, offer sincere advice, and combat wrongdoing.” This emphasis on ideological loyalty, combined with the anti-corruption crackdown, reflects a desire to tighten political control over a military still considered too vulnerable to internal abuses.

This dual dynamic—accelerated technical modernization and internal political purges—paints a picture of a military that Xi wants to be both more powerful and more loyal, two objectives that do not always go hand in hand in the history of major military institutions.

An army that is being purged at the same time as it is being modernized is not necessarily a stronger army. Military history is replete with examples where the fear of internal betrayal has paralyzed operational effectiveness at critical moments. Beijing is playing a risky game.

The Fujian aircraft carrier, a symbol of naval ambition

A New Aircraft Carrier in the Strait

The Fujian, the Chinese Navy’s newest aircraft carrier, commissioned in November 2025 and equipped with electromagnetic catapults, transited the Taiwan Strait on June 23, 2026. This transit follows two previous ones in September and December 2025, a frequency that suggests the ship is gradually being integrated into the Chinese Navy’s regular operational rotations.

According to the ISW’s analysis, this maneuver could enable the Chinese Navy to rotate three aircraft carriers among its various regional commands—a naval projection capability that no Asian power other than the United States currently possesses in the region.

Other Ships in Rotation

The Liaoning, China’s first aircraft carrier, completed its last transit in April 2026, while the Shandong has been undergoing maintenance since January 2026. This rotation of three aircraft carriers—even if only partial—illustrates China’s ambition to maintain a continuous and credible naval presence around Taiwan, without relying on a single ship that is vulnerable to unavailability due to maintenance.

This naval buildup is directly in line with Xi Jinping’s call for world-class military standards by 2027, a deadline that coincides with this modernized aircraft carrier fleet reaching operational maturity.

Seeing an aircraft carrier equipped with electromagnetic catapults regularly patrolling the Taiwan Strait is no routine exercise. It is a calculated, repeated demonstration intended to normalize a military presence that would have been unthinkable ten years ago.

The raw figures on military pressure in June

A Relative Decline but Constant Pressure

According to the ISW, Chinese air incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone totaled 134 in June 2026, down from the more than 300 monthly incursions recorded after President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration in May 2024, returning roughly to the baseline level prior to his inauguration. There were 12 days in June with no incursions across the median line of the strait.

However, this statistical decline should not be interpreted as a sign of strategic de-escalation: it could just as easily reflect a temporary tactical adjustment rather than a long-term shift in doctrine toward Taiwan.

Maritime patrols, meanwhile, are intensifying

At sea, the Chinese Coast Guard conducted three intrusive patrols around the Pratas Islands and four around Kinmen in June. At least two vessels have maintained a continuous presence in Taiwan’s eastern exclusive economic zone since June 1, while China has inspected 198 vessels to assert its jurisdiction in the region.

On June 27, approximately 10 Chinese and Russian aircraft participated in a joint exercise—the 11th long-range patrol of its kind—while Beijing sanctioned 40 entities on June 29 (20 on the control list, 20 on the dual-use watch list), officially in response to Japanese “militarism,” according to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce.

A decline in air incursions accompanied by an increase in naval patrols is not a de-escalation; it is a redeployment. Beijing never truly backs down; it simply shifts the means of pressure to whatever yields the greatest effect at the lowest political cost.

The ultimate goal: to erode Taiwan's sovereignty without war

A Documented Strategy of Incremental Erosion

According to the ISW’s analysis, China’s immediate objective is not necessarily a short-term invasion, but rather the gradual erosion of Taiwan’s sovereignty and the population’s sense of threat, in order to lay the groundwork for a future blockade or invasion aimed at forcing “reunification.” The joint blockade exercises conducted by the Chinese navy and coast guard during the major maneuvers in April and December 2025 illustrate this methodical preparation.

This strategy of gradual normalization aims to make each new incursion less shocking than the previous one, until China’s military presence around Taiwan becomes a fait accompli that the international community struggles to challenge effectively.

A Test of Psychological Resilience as Much as Military Resilience

This constant pressure, documented month after month by Western analysts, is as much a test of the Taiwanese population’s psychological resilience as it is of its military capabilities per se. It is precisely this area that Lai Ching-te’s government is seeking to strengthen through its “whole-of-society” resilience exercises.

The success or failure of this strategy of gradual erosion will depend largely on the ability of Taiwan and its Western partners to maintain constant vigilance in the face of incidents that are individually minor but cumulatively significant.

It is this strategy of incremental erosion that worries me the most—more so than a scenario of a full-scale invasion. A slow, invisible erosion, month after month, is far more difficult to counter politically than a sudden, brutal attack that would immediately mobilize international opinion.

The parallel with Putin's Russia

Two Autocracies, the Same Logic of Personal Power

Xi Jinping’s path—as he seeks a fourth term after already exceeding the traditional two-term limit established after Mao—is reminiscent in some respects of Vladimir Putin’s trajectory in Russia, where Putin himself amended the constitution to extend his power indefinitely. These two leaders share a deep distrust of any institutional limitation on their personal authority.

This convergence is significant in the context of growing military cooperation between Beijing and Moscow, as illustrated by the regular joint air patrols observed in the Indo-Pacific region, the 11th of which took place in late June 2026.

An Alliance of Convenience with Converging Interests

This Sino-Russian cooperation, while not a formal military alliance in the traditional sense, reflects a clear strategic convergence: the two authoritarian regimes share a common interest in weakening the international order dominated by Western democracies, each pursuing its own regional objectives—Taiwan for China, Ukraine for Russia.

This strategic convergence makes it all the more urgent for Western democracies to treat the Ukrainian and Taiwanese issues not as two isolated crises, but as two sides of the same systemic challenge posed by the axis of autocracies.

I refuse to treat Taiwan and Ukraine as two separate issues. Putin and Xi are closely watching how the West reacts to each of these crises, and every sign of weakness in one directly encourages aggression in the other.

Washington's subdued reaction

A Trump Administration Sending Mixed Signals

The Trump administration has, so far, maintained the fundamental framework of U.S. military support for Taiwan, while sending sometimes contradictory signals about its long-term commitment to traditional U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe. This ambiguity, already evident in the NATO context, is also reflected in the U.S. stance toward Taiwan.

This structural uncertainty leads some analysts to question the long-term credibility of U.S. deterrence in the face of a China that, for its part, is pursuing a steady and well-documented path of military modernization, regardless of U.S. election cycles.

A Test of Credibility for the Entire West

How Washington handles this issue in the coming years will serve as a test of credibility not only for U.S.-Taiwan relations but for the entire Western alliance system, which is being closely watched by Beijing, Moscow, and other authoritarian capitals seeking to gauge the free world’s true resolve.

It is precisely this constant scrutiny by authoritarian regimes that makes every sign of Western hesitation potentially costly, far beyond the specific issue at hand at any given moment.

I remain cautious in my assessment of Trump: maintaining the current support structure deserves recognition. But the ambiguity he cultivates regarding long-term commitment sends exactly the wrong signal at a time when Xi Jinping is methodically testing the West’s resolve.

The Role of Japan and the East China Sea

China’s Sanctions Against Japanese “Militarism”

The sanctions imposed by Beijing on June 29, 2026, against 40 entities—officially justified as opposition to Japanese “militarism”—illustrate how China’s sphere of confrontation has expanded beyond the Taiwan issue alone. Japan, which has gradually strengthened its own defense capabilities in the face of the growing Chinese threat, now finds itself directly targeted by this rhetoric.

This extension of the rhetorical and economic conflict toward Japan confirms that China’s strategy is not aimed solely at Taiwan, but at the entire regional security architecture built around U.S. alliances in the Western Pacific.

A Region Facing Multiple, Simultaneous Tensions

This proliferation of fronts of tension—Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and relations with Japan—reflects a Chinese strategy of applying simultaneous pressure across multiple theaters, making it more difficult for regional democracies to concentrate their defense resources on a single identified point of friction.

This dispersion of tensions itself poses a major strategic challenge for Western and regional defense planners, who are forced to divide their limited attention and resources among a growing number of potential fronts.

This multi-front pressure strategy is no accident. Beijing knows that a Western democracy distracted by multiple simultaneous crises always responds less effectively than one focused on a single, clearly identified threat.

What the 2027 deadline Really Means

A Capability Goal, Not a Confirmed Invasion Date

It is important to strictly note that the 2027 deadline—marking the centennial of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army—is a stated military capability goal, not a confirmed date for an invasion of Taiwan. This methodological distinction, often overlooked in Western media coverage, deserves to be maintained with precision.

Xi Jinping’s repeated statements on military modernization explicitly target “world-class standards,” a phrase that refers to the Chinese military’s overall ability to compete with the United States, rather than a specific, irreversible commitment to a specific military action against Taiwan.

A Real Sense of Urgency Despite Timeline Uncertainty

This nuance, however, does not diminish the sense of urgency felt by Taiwan and its regional partners: whether an invasion is planned for 2027 or a later date, the trajectory of China’s military modernization—documented by concrete indicators such as the Fujian aircraft carrier and internal purges—points to systematic preparation for a scenario of direct confrontation.

It is this combination of uncertainty regarding the precise timeline and certainty regarding the general trajectory that makes the situation particularly difficult for Western decision-makers to manage, as they are forced to act on the basis of probabilities rather than absolute certainties.

I reject the fatalism of specific dates, but I equally reject the complacency that would consist of ignoring a modernization trajectory documented over several years. Uncertainty regarding the timeline must never become an excuse for Western inaction.

The Economic Dimension of Military Modernization

A Steadily Growing Defense Budget

China’s military modernization relies on substantial and growing investments, fueled by an economy that—despite signs of a slowdown in certain sectors—continues to finance sustained military expansion. This long-term financing capacity sets China apart from other authoritarian powers, notably Russia, whose war economy rests on more fragile foundations.

This relative economic strength gives Xi Jinping a degree of strategic flexibility that Vladimir Putin does not possess to the same extent—a factor that could make China’s trajectory more sustainable in the long term than Russia’s current war effort against Ukraine.

A Systemic Risk to the Global Economy

This combination of economic power and military ambition makes China a structurally different challenge for Western democracies than Russia: a potential adversary whose economy remains deeply integrated into global value chains, making any direct confrontation potentially more costly for the entire international economic system.

It is this economic interdependence that partly explains the relative caution of Western capitals toward China, compared to the much firmer stance adopted toward Russia since 2022—an asymmetry that certainly does not escape the notice of Chinese strategic planners.

This Western economic caution toward China deeply concerns me. It could signal to Beijing that the consequences of an attack on Taiwan would, in practice, be more tolerable than those Russia has faced over Ukraine.

The Lessons Taiwan Is Learning from This Escalation

Preparations That Are Gaining Momentum in Response

In response to China’s well-documented military modernization and the accompanying internal purge, Taiwan has accelerated its own preparedness efforts, including “whole-of-society” resilience exercises and the strengthening of its asymmetric defense capabilities, relying on mobile and dispersed systems rather than an unlikely head-on confrontation in the face of China’s numerical superiority.

This asymmetric defense doctrine, inspired in part by lessons learned from Ukraine’s resistance against Russia, aims to make any Chinese military operation against Taiwan costly enough to deter its launch, rather than seeking direct military parity, which is deemed unrealistic in the short term.

Strengthened Strategic Dialogue with Regional Partners

This acceleration of Taiwan’s efforts is accompanied by enhanced strategic dialogue with Japan, the Philippines, and other regional partners facing the same trajectory of Chinese assertiveness, gradually shaping an informal but increasingly coordinated security architecture in response to Beijing’s military modernization.

This regional coordination, though still far from a formal alliance comparable to NATO, could prove decisive in the coming years in deterring Beijing from testing the collective resolve of its democratic neighbors.

I see this emerging regional coordination as the only credible long-term response to China’s military modernization. No Asian democracy can confront this trajectory alone; it’s together or not at all.

What the Anti-Corruption Effort Reveals About Internal Vulnerabilities

A Powerful but Potentially Fragile Military

Xi Jinping’s massive anti-corruption campaign—which has punished more than one million officials, including several very high-ranking military officers—implicitly reveals a structural fragility within the Chinese military apparatus itself. An army that requires such a vast and repeated purge is not necessarily the monolithic and perfectly controlled instrument that official propaganda would have us believe.

This internal fragility, evidenced by the dismissal of such key figures as Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, could introduce delays or unpredictability in the execution of a potential complex military operation against Taiwan—a scenario that would require flawless coordination among multiple branches of the Chinese military.

Uncertainty That Potentially Works in Favor of Deterrence

This uncertainty regarding the actual cohesion of the Chinese military command could, paradoxically, work in favor of Western and Taiwanese deterrence: a military apparatus weakened by repeated purges might prove more cautious before committing to an operation as risky and complex as an invasion or blockade of Taiwan.

This optimistic interpretation must, however, be handled with caution: an army in the midst of an internal purge may just as easily be tempted to stage an external show of force to close ranks and divert attention from internal tensions—a dynamic historically observed in other authoritarian regimes under pressure.

I am wary of overly optimistic interpretations of China’s internal purges. History shows that weakened authoritarian regimes sometimes seek an external victory precisely to consolidate their threatened internal legitimacy. Caution remains warranted.

The South China Sea: A Second Silent Front

Tensions That Persist Away from the Cameras

While international attention is focused on Taiwan, China continues to consolidate its disputed positions in the South China Sea, particularly with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands. These tensions, which receive less media coverage than the Taiwan issue, are part of the same strategy of gradual territorial assertion that Beijing is pursuing on several fronts simultaneously.

Repeated incidents between Chinese and Philippine coast guards—including documented collisions and the use of water cannons against Philippine supply ships—illustrate a strategy of graduated harassment similar to that observed around Taiwan, applied here against a treaty ally of the United States.

A Test of the Credibility of U.S. Treaties

These incidents constitute a direct test of the credibility of the mutual defense treaty between Manila and Washington—a precedent that Beijing is closely monitoring to gauge its own assessment of U.S. determination to honor its alliance commitments in the region, including toward Taiwan.

In China’s strategic calculations, every instance of U.S. hesitation toward the Philippines becomes another factor in assessing the actual risk associated with more direct action against Taiwan.

I believe the South China Sea deserves far more Western attention than it receives. What is playing out off the coast of the Philippines today is a full-scale test case of what Beijing might attempt against Taiwan tomorrow.

Technological Dependence and Semiconductors

China’s Race Toward Self-Sufficiency

China’s military modernization, driven by Xi Jinping, is accompanied by a massive parallel effort to reduce China’s dependence on foreign technologies, particularly the advanced semiconductors needed for next-generation weapons systems—a field in which Taiwan and its companies, such as TSMC, hold a dominant global position.

This race toward technological self-sufficiency is closely linked to Beijing’s obsession with Taiwan: controlling or neutralizing the island’s semiconductor industry would instantly eliminate one of the main economic levers the West could use to deter Chinese aggression.

A long-term calculation that goes beyond the purely military sphere

This technological dimension adds another layer to the 2027 deadline: beyond conventional military capability alone, Beijing could also calculate the optimal timing based on its own growing technological autonomy, thereby reducing its vulnerability to Western sanctions that would inevitably follow any military action against Taiwan.

It is this convergence of military ambition, technological calculations, and the domestic political calendar that makes accurately assessing the Taiwan risk so complex for Western analysts, who are forced to juggle multiple simultaneous variables.

I believe that China’s push for self-sufficiency in semiconductors is underestimated as a factor in its strategic timing. The day Beijing no longer needs Taiwan technologically may well be the day it feels most free to act militarily.

Conclusion: A trajectory that requires constant monitoring

Neither Panic Nor Complacency

Xi Jinping’s July 1, 2026, speech, combined with documented evidence of China’s military modernization, internal purges within the military, and constant pressure around Taiwan, paints a picture that demands constant vigilance on the part of Western democracies—without succumbing to either alarmist panic or reassuring complacency.

What the documented facts reveal—aircraft carriers on rotation, repeated purges, joint patrols with Russia, and sanctions extended to Japan—is a power that is methodically preparing, on several fronts simultaneously, for a future in which the use of force would no longer be ruled out from China’s strategic options toward Taiwan.

A deadline that still lies in the future, but is drawing nearer

Whether or not 2027 marks a decisive turning point remains uncertain. What is certain, however, is the general direction Beijing has been taking for several years: greater internal control, increased projected military capability, and an increasingly explicit political narrative regarding the inevitability of reunification—by force if necessary.

I’ll conclude with a conviction: the West does not have the luxury of choosing between supporting Ukraine and keeping an eye on Taiwan. The two fronts are linked, and they must be defended together, without ranking the threatened democracies in order of importance.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist