OP-ED: Washington Slams the Door on the International Criminal Court Over Iran

Refusal to Cooperate and Extradite

Specifically, Todd Blanche announced that the United States will not cooperate with any investigation or proceedings conducted by the Court, and that it will never extradite or transfer U.S. citizens to The Hague. Washington will even go so far as to “actively oppose any effort by other countries” that seek to do so on its behalf.

If a U.S. citizen were to be detained under what Blanche describes as the Court’s “so-called authority,” the U.S. government “will take all necessary measures to secure that individual’s immediate release”—a statement that suggests the possibility of direct intervention to free a detained citizen.

A Long-Standing but Revived Legal Basis

This position is based on the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, a law that already rejects the Court’s jurisdiction over Americans and authorizes the president to use “all means necessary and appropriate” to secure the release of any American detained under a warrant issued by the Court. This law explicitly protects U.S. military personnel, government officials, and civilians.

This 2002 law, dubbed at the time the “Hague Invasion Act” by its critics, shows that U.S. mistrust of the ICC did not begin with the current administration. What has changed today is the tone and the publicity surrounding this confrontation.

A presidential order that had already targeted Court staff

This letter from Todd Blanche does not stand alone. It builds on a sanctions order signed by Donald Trump in February 2025, which directly targeted the Court’s staff. That order characterized the Court’s conduct as an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security and foreign policy, and authorized the freezing of assets as well as travel restrictions against Court officials and anyone providing material assistance to investigations targeting Americans or protected allies.

Trump had stated at the time that the United States “unequivocally opposes and expects our allies to oppose any ICC actions against the United States, Israel, or any other ally” that had not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction.

Sanctions Already Extended to Several Officials

Since 2025, the U.S. administration has expanded its sanctions to include at least nine ICC officials, citing in particular the arrest warrants issued against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant in connection with the war between Israel and Hamas.

It is difficult not to see a direct link between this escalation and Washington’s unconditional solidarity with Israel on international legal matters. This is a deliberate geopolitical choice, not a coincidence of timing.

A Legal Battle Begins in New York

In late June, three sitting judges of the Court, including Canadian Kimberly Prost, filed a lawsuit against the U.S. administration in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Their central argument: the sanctions exceed the presidential authority provided for under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and violate the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The judges are asking the court to overturn the sanctions order and unfreeze the assets of the targeted judges—a rare move that places international judges in the position of plaintiffs before a U.S. federal court.

A Test for the Balance of Powers in the U.S.

This lawsuit serves as a reminder that even an administration determined to challenge an international institution must contend with its own federal courts, which retain the authority to review the legality of executive actions taken in the name of national security.

Ironically, it may be the U.S. courts themselves—not the International Criminal Court—that will decide the legality of this sanctions policy. This is a welcome reminder that internal checks and balances still function, despite everything.

A stance that extends to all sensitive issues

While Todd Blanche’s letter does not explicitly mention Iran by name, it is part of a series of actions in which the U.S. administration is simultaneously challenging several international legal frameworks on sensitive issues, including tensions with Tehran. This rhetoric of categorical rejection of external jurisdictions reinforces the image of an America that refuses to accept any external constraints on its freedom of military and diplomatic action, including in the context of its standoff with Iran.

The timing is significant: this statement comes as the U.S. Congress is stepping up demands for transparency from the Department of Justice on several sensitive issues, creating internal institutional pressure that contrasts with the firm stance displayed on the international stage.

A Conscious Commitment to Doctrinal Consistency

This position aligns with the administration’s broader doctrine: no multilateral institution—whether the International Criminal Court or other UN bodies—should be able to constrain U.S. action, whether regarding Israel, Iran, or any other national security issue.

I note this doctrinal consistency without necessarily endorsing it. Systematically rejecting any international constraint—even a legitimate one—also deprives the West of a tool for exerting pressure that it might one day wish to use against adversaries such as Russia or Iran.

A Backlog of Oversight Requests

In early July, the U.S. Senate sent a letter to the Department of Justice demanding answers on several pending oversight matters—a bipartisan push that illustrates the growing tensions between the executive and legislative branches over the handling of sensitive legal cases.

This dual pressure—a firm stance toward The Hague on one hand, and Congress’s demands for transparency on the other—places the Department of Justice in an uncomfortable position, torn between asserting uncompromising sovereignty and the obligation to be accountable to its own democratic institutions.

A Democracy That Continues to Hold Itself Accountable

Despite legitimate criticism of the hardline stance taken toward international institutions, this internal oversight mechanism demonstrates that American checks and balances have not disappeared, even under an administration that favors unilateralism.

I find it almost reassuring that Congress continues to ask uncomfortable questions, even when the executive branch would prefer to move forward unhindered. This is one of the mechanisms that still distinguishes a functioning democracy from a purely discretionary regime.

A Precedent That Undermines the Court Far Beyond the United States

The outright rejection of the International Criminal Court by the world’s leading military power sends a signal that other states—less scrupulous about respecting international law—could in turn exploit. If Washington can ignore the Court without consequence, why would Russia or other authoritarian regimes feel any more bound by its decisions?

This is the central paradox of this case: by seeking to protect its own judicial sovereignty, the U.S. administration is weakening a tool that, historically, has also been used to prosecute Russian leaders for their actions in Ukraine—including the arrest warrant issued against Vladimir Putin himself in 2023.

A strategic contradiction that is hard to ignore

Undermining the legitimacy of the International Criminal Court—even as this institution has issued warrants against Russian officials—amounts to handing the Kremlin a free rhetorical argument, as it can now cite the U.S. example to justify its own rejection of the Court’s jurisdiction.

This, in my view, is the real flaw in this U.S. strategy: by delegitimizing the Court to protect itself, Washington is unwittingly providing Moscow with a rhetorical shield regarding the Ukraine issue. It is a consequence that the administration seems to be downplaying.

An issue that goes beyond the Iranian question alone

Todd Blanche’s letter to the International Criminal Court will stand as yet another marker of a U.S. administration determined not to recognize any international judicial authority above its own sovereign decisions. The connection to the Iran issue remains indirect, but it reveals a consistent doctrine of rejecting multilateral constraints.

A Necessary Vigilance for the Future of International Law

It remains to be seen whether this stance—appealing in the short term to its supporters—will ultimately weaken the legal tools the West might need in the future to hold leaders like Vladimir Putin accountable for their actions in Ukraine.

I conclude this report with sincere concern: every weakening of an international court—even when motivated by legitimate sovereignty-based reasons—removes yet another tool from those who hope to one day see Russia held fully accountable for its actions before international justice.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist