OPEN LETTER: Forty billion for drones, after years of silence

A German base flown over from the sea

At Ramstein Air Base in Germany, drone flights were recorded between November 2024 and early 2025. According to IISS data, these drones were likely launched from Russian-linked vessels operating as far away as the North Sea or the Baltic Sea. The operation appeared designed to map allied vulnerabilities and probe weaknesses in civil-military decision-making.

This use of ships from Russia’s “ghost fleet”—clandestine vessels already known for circumventing oil sanctions—as drone launch platforms illustrates a hybrid war that never speaks its name but strikes methodically.

The Open Refusal to Shoot Down Everything Systematically

Mark Rutte himself acknowledged that the alliance did not intend to systematically shoot down every detected drone, preferring a case-by-case approach. This caution makes military sense—to avoid uncontrolled escalation—but it also comes at a political cost: it conveys the image of an alliance that tolerates the intrusion rather than categorically rejecting it.

In September, NATO fighter jets shot down a swarm of drones heading toward Poland, an episode marking the first time in history that alliance aircraft opened fire on potential threats in allied airspace. This precedent exists. It proves that swift action is possible when the political will is there.

This distinction between what is militarily prudent and what is politically transparent strikes me as crucial. I understand Rutte’s logic of restraint in the face of drones of uncertain origin, but I also believe that this caution—repeated for months without a structural response—has ultimately come to resemble resignation in Moscow’s eyes.

A coalition of twelve, not thirty-two

According to statements made in Ankara, the $40 billion initiative involves Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey, according to the Jerusalem Post. Twelve countries out of the alliance’s thirty-two members. It’s a start, not unanimity.

Rutte summed up the philosophy of this expanded coalition in a simple sentence: “We can do more when we do it together. And we must do more.” He added that NATO allies are joining new multinational procurement coalitions, a mechanism designed to speed up deliveries by pooling orders rather than fragmenting them country by country.

What this letter asks of the other twenty

To those who have not yet joined this anti-drone coalition, this letter poses a simple question: How many more incursions will need to be documented before your name appears on the list? The threat does not stop at the borders of the twelve participating countries. It looms, literally, over the entire continent.

Pooling procurement, if done properly, can reduce costs and speed up production rates. But it requires political coordination that NATO has not always been able to demonstrate, as the IISS report rightly points out regarding the lack of unity and consistency in the European response to past incursions.

I sincerely commend the twelve countries that chose to act before they themselves were directly targeted. But I am addressing here, without mincing words, the twenty other members of the alliance: your absence from this list is not neutral; it is a choice, and that choice comes at a price that others will pay in your stead if an attack were to succeed where your defense remains merely hypothetical.

Saab and the 450-million-bet on GlobalEye

In practical terms, this announcement is already translating into contracts. Saab, the Swedish defense contractor, could begin deliveries of its GlobalEye surveillance aircraft as early as 2030 if NATO signs the contract soon, according to its CEO, Micael Johansson. The final price has not yet been set, but it is expected to range between $400 million and $450 million per aircraft, according to reports in the Jerusalem Post.

This delivery timeline—four years after the order is placed—perfectly illustrates the problem this letter aims to highlight: even when the political will exists, the Western defense industry struggles to keep pace with the threat. Four years is the time Russia has already had to perfect its low-cost drone tactics.

Northrop Grumman and the Uncertainty That Causes Concern

European countries are also purchasing surveillance drones from the American company Northrop Grumman, though the exact number of drones, the specific purchasing countries, or the total value of the contract were not specified at the time of the announcement. This lack of clarity, in and of itself, is worth noting: an alliance that announces deals worth billions without detailing the deliverables runs the risk of seeing its credibility undermined if results are slow to materialize.

Transparency regarding timelines should be the next logical step following this announcement; otherwise, the 40 billion will remain a public relations figure rather than a verifiable commitment.

I cannot help but point out this contrast between the magnitude of the announced figure and the lack of clarity surrounding its concrete implementation. A contract without a specific timeline or an obligation to deliver results is merely an intention—and intentions have never shot down a single Shahed drone flying over a nuclear base.

Zelensky in Ankara to Negotiate His Own Agreements

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky took advantage of the same summit to announce that Ukraine plans to sign new agreements on drones and other deals with its partners. Upon arriving in Ankara on Tuesday, he said he expected a “substantial and productive” summit and noted that he would hold nearly twenty bilateral meetings with leaders, according to the Jerusalem Post.

Zelensky summarized his priority in a message posted on X: “We will continue to work on strengthening Ukraine’s air defense. New systems, missiles for them, and the issue of production licenses—all of this is our priority.” This statement deserves careful attention: Ukraine is no longer asking just for weapons; it is asking for the industrial capacity to produce them itself.

Ukrainian expertise: an asset underutilized by the West

No one knows drone warfare better than the Ukrainian military, which has been facing swarms of Russian Shahed drones on a daily basis for more than four years. Ignoring this expertise in the development of the West’s new anti-drone architecture would be a major strategic error—almost an insult to the experience Ukrainian operators have gained on the ground.

This letter therefore advocates for a far more systematic integration of Ukrainian lessons learned into future Western contracts, rather than a simple supplier-client relationship.

I believe that Ukraine should be viewed not merely as a recipient of this Western anti-drone architecture, but as its primary real-world testing ground. Ignoring this hard-won expertise would be an inexcusable strategic waste at a time when the West is precisely seeking to catch up.

Trump: A Low-Key but Decisive Presence

This budget announcement comes amid constant U.S. pressure on European allies to increase their defense spending. The Ankara summit brings together 32 NATO leaders, as well as external guests, at a time when Washington is closely monitoring the distribution of the financial burden among allies.

Without this constant U.S. pressure, one might wonder whether this 40-billion coalition would have come together so quickly. It is an uncomfortable but honest observation: Western deterrence owes part of its recent acceleration to an ally that regularly threatens to scale back its own commitment.

An Equation Where Every Euro Counts Double

For European countries, every dollar invested in anti-drone measures must now be justified both to their own publics and to a U.S. partner that demands concrete evidence of effort. This dual constraint complicates the swift implementation that the situation nevertheless demands.

This letter does not ask for the impossible. It simply asks that the promise made to Ankara be fulfilled within weeks, not years.

I find it uncomfortable—but necessary—to say that the acceleration of this anti-drone coalition owes as much to pressure from Washington as to the Russian threat itself. A European defense that acts only under external pressure remains a fragile defense, dependent on the goodwill of an ally whose priorities could change overnight.

The Precedent of Delayed Patriot Deliveries

The recent history of the conflict in Ukraine is rife with examples where Western promises of military aid took months, or even years, to materialize on the ground. The Patriot air defense systems, for example, were the subject of countless announcements before actual deliveries followed—often too late to prevent certain documented civilian casualties.

This letter draws directly on that bitter experience to make a clear demand: that the 40 billion announced to Ankara not follow the same winding path from announcement to actual delivery.

Trust is measured by results, not by press releases

A Western leader can announce any figure at a defense forum. What matters, in the end, is the number of radars actually installed, jamming systems actually operational, and civilian lives actually spared thanks to this new architecture. Everything else is just summit rhetoric.

It is this demand for concrete results that this letter seeks to convey—without excessive cynicism, but without naivety either.

I choose to remain demanding rather than cynical in the face of this announcement. The history of delayed Patriot deliveries has taught me to be wary of impressive figures announced at press conferences, but I still prefer demand over resignation, because it is the only attitude that stands a chance of bringing about change.

A Lesson Learned by the West’s Adversaries

It would be naive to believe that Russia is the only one observing the West’s slow response to drones. China, Iran, and North Korea—all three engaged in growing military and technological cooperation with Moscow—are also drawing lessons from this situation. If low-cost drones can operate with impunity over NATO nuclear bases for more than a year, why wouldn’t other hostile actors attempt similar scenarios elsewhere in the world?

This global dimension of the threat alone justifies the scale of the investment announced in Ankara, but it also underscores the urgency of its rapid implementation.

Deterrence depends as much on perception as on equipment

An alliance perceived as slow to react sends a signal of weakness that extends far beyond the European theater. This is precisely what this letter seeks to avoid: that $40 billion remain a symbol of good intentions rather than proof of actual capability in the face of an increasingly coordinated adversarial axis.

NATO’s credibility depends as much on interception statistics as on the image it projects to its potential adversaries on other continents.

I believe we too often underestimate the extent to which the West’s adversaries meticulously study every publicly documented instance of Western hesitation. This IISS report, as embarrassing as it may be for NATO, has likely already been dissected in the military headquarters of Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang—and that is yet another reason to demand swift implementation of this announcement.

A Public Timeline, Not Just an Aggregate Figure

This open letter makes a specific request: that each country that is a signatory to this anti-drone coalition publish a detailed timeline of its acquisitions, with milestones that can be verified by the public and the independent press. Transparency is not a superfluous democratic luxury; it is a prerequisite for strategic credibility itself.

Without this timeline, citizens of member countries will have no way of verifying whether the promised 40 billion is actually being spent on operational defense or whether it is evaporating into endless industrial negotiations.

Formal, Not Just Symbolic, Integration of Ukraine

This letter also calls for Ukraine’s participation in future anti-drone contracts and exercises to cease being a mere diplomatic gesture and instead become structured technical collaboration, with genuine sharing of combat data accumulated since 2022.

The real-world combat experience gained by Ukraine is worth more than any Western simulation, no matter how sophisticated it may be.

I’ll conclude this section by emphasizing a point that seems to me to be too often overlooked in official statements: transparency is not merely a democratic ideal; it is a strategic tool. An adversary who knows they are being publicly monitored is more hesitant than an adversary who knows that Western promises usually end up gathering dust in a drawer.

Ankara, a geographic crossroads of all tensions

The choice of Ankara as the venue for this announcement is no coincidence. Turkey occupies a unique geographic position, at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, and has the second-largest military in NATO after that of the United States. Announcing a major anti-drone initiative from this crossroads sends a signal both to Moscow and to adjacent theaters where hostile drones could also pose a future threat.

This geographical choice also reinforces the growing industrial role that Turkey wishes to play within the alliance, as it develops its own internationally recognized drone capabilities.

An alliance that must prove it is learning from its mistakes

Ultimately, this $40 billion announcement will only be meaningful if it marks a genuine break from the sluggishness documented in the IISS report. History will judge this coalition not by the figure announced in Ankara, but by the number of future incursions that are actually prevented.

That is the only criterion that truly matters to the people living near these sensitive bases, whether in Germany, the Netherlands, or elsewhere on the continent.

I conclude this section convinced that the choice of Ankara as the venue for this announcement speaks volumes about Turkey’s ambitions within the alliance. But I remain just as convinced that this geographical symbolism will never replace the operational proof that this coalition will have to deliver in the coming months.

An architecture designed for yesterday, not for today

The IISS report puts it bluntly: Europe’s air defense architecture was designed to detect and defeat conventional air threats, not repeated, low-cost, and easily deniable incursions such as those carried out by drones launched from civilian ships. This structural mismatch largely explains why it took until 2026 to see a budgetary response on this scale.

Recognizing this shortcoming is the first necessary step. Correcting it quickly will be the real challenge.

The Political Cost of a Response That Is Still Too Slow

Every additional month without a clear legal framework for neutralizing drones of uncertain origin over allied territory is a month of prolonged vulnerability. The report states this clearly: the path toward a credible European response first requires legal clarity that the alliance has still not fully established.

This letter therefore calls for—in addition to funding—the rapid adoption of harmonized rules of engagement among all members of the alliance.

I believe that funding, however necessary it may be, will not solve anything until NATO resolves the legal question of the right to shoot down a drone of unknown origin. Without this clarity, every incident will continue to trigger endless internal debates while the threat itself continues to fly over our bases with impunity.

The Right to Scrutinize How Public Funds Are Spent

Forty billion dollars is public money, drawn from the national budgets of twelve NATO member countries. The citizens of these countries have the right to know, line by line, how this sum will be allocated among radar systems, interceptors, jamming systems, and command centers. A democracy that funds its defense without a clear public debate runs the risk of having this spending challenged at the first change in the political majority.

This letter therefore calls on national parliaments to exercise genuine oversight over the implementation of this commitment, rather than merely rubber-stamping a figure announced abroad.

Educating the Public About Threats: A Governmental Duty

All too often, European citizens only discover the scale of a threat after the publication of a shocking report like the one from the IISS. Governments should instead explain, in advance, why such investments are necessary, rather than letting the independent press reveal the extent of the problem after the fact.

This lack of public education partly explains why European public opinion remains divided on the scale of defense efforts needed to counter Russia.

I firmly believe that educating the public about the threat is a democratic duty just as important as the funding itself. A European citizen who understands why their country is investing billions in anti-drone technology will support this effort far more consistently than a citizen who is simply asked to trust their leaders.

Russia’s neighbors who didn’t wait for forty billion

While the anti-drone coalition was taking shape at the NATO level, the Baltic states had already taken the initiative on their own, increasing their defense budgets well beyond the alliance’s standards. This national foresight, which predated the collective announcement from Ankara, illustrates what a keen awareness of the threat can achieve when it does not wait for a consensus among all thirty-two members to act.

This letter acknowledges the head start taken by countries located directly on Russia’s borders and urges allies who are geographically farther away to draw inspiration from them rather than wait for the threat to approach their own borders before reacting.

Solidarity that must now be demonstrated in practice

The 40-billion anti-drone coalition must not become a means for certain more distant allies to shift their responsibility onto frontline countries. Western solidarity is measured by the actual distribution of the effort, not merely by the collective signing of a communiqué in Ankara.

This is a point that this letter wishes to emphasize with the same firmness as the rest of its arguments.

I conclude this section convinced that a figure, however enormous it may be, can never replace the political will that must accompany it through to the very end of its implementation. Forty billion dollars is only worth as much as the allies decide to make of it in the coming months—not in the coming years.

One final demand before closing

This letter sincerely hopes it will never have to be followed by a second version documenting the failure of this promise.

I believe that the example set by the Baltic states should serve as a model for the entire alliance rather than remain a regional exception that is merely paid lip service. Those who live closest to the danger have already shown the way; it is now up to the others to follow it with the same determination.

Forty Billion: A Promise Under Scrutiny

This open letter ends as it began: with a cautious acknowledgment. Forty billion dollars over five years is a significant commitment, announced by Mark Rutte before the defense industry gathered in Ankara. But this figure alone will not make up for the months of incursions documented by the IISS over bases such as Ramstein and Volkel.

The real question is no longer whether NATO has grasped the urgency of the situation. It has clearly done so, at least on paper. The question is whether this understanding will translate into action before the next incursion, or whether it will join the long list of announcements followed by too few concrete results.

What History Will Remember About This Summit

History will either remember this as a decisive turning point in Western anti-drone defense or as just another entry in the long list of summit promises. This letter, addressed to decision-makers, sincerely hopes for the former scenario, while preparing—based on experience—to document the latter if necessary.

Nuclear bases that have been flown over with impunity for over a year deserve better than a mere budget line item. They deserve protection that works, not just a reassuring promise.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist