PROFILE: Taiwan Defends Its Preparations Against China, Rejects the Term "Provocation"

Maxime Marquette

2026-07-10 15:41:03

An Unprecedented Closed-Door Exercise

Three days before Lin Fei-fan’s statement, an exclusive Reuters investigation published on July 3, 2026, revealed details of a simulation exercise held in Nantou, bringing together more than 370 government and military officials. It was the first closed-door exercise of its kind organized by Taiwan, combining multiple simultaneous crisis scenarios.

The scenario envisioned a Chinese naval blockade, a magnitude 6.8 earthquake that caused the simulated deaths of twelve people, acts of sabotage against undersea cables and critical infrastructure, hijackings of television broadcasts, a bank run, and civil unrest, before culminating in a full-scale invasion scenario.

A Generation Learning to Defend Itself

Chi Lien-cheng, one of the officials involved in the exercise, summed up the prevailing philosophy: “Our adversary is right on our doorstep, across the Taiwan Strait. It’s very close.” He added: “If you don’t defend your own country, who else will? I think people are beginning to understand that.”

The exercise included a seven-hour classroom session and field maneuvers, such as simulating the shoot-down of a Chinese drone threatening a power plant, as well as setting up food rationing stations. A drone attack scenario left 75 officials listed as missing during the exercise—a figure that illustrates just how seriously the planners are taking the threat.

Watching a government simulate its own bank run and the disappearance of 75 of its officials is anything but theatrical. It is proof that the Chinese threat is being taken seriously—not as a public relations exercise, but as a cold rehearsal of a scenario deemed plausible.

China's Response: A Ballet of Bombers

A joint combat patrol during the exercise

While Taiwan was simulating its defense, China staged its own demonstration. According to Reuters, the People’s Liberation Army conducted a “joint combat readiness patrol” involving more than 22 military aircraft, including H-6 bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, at the very same time the Taiwanese exercise was taking place.

This timing is likely no coincidence. It illustrates a strategy of constant pressure, in which every Taiwanese defensive move is immediately followed by a Chinese show of force intended to remind everyone who, on paper, holds the raw military superiority in the region.

Beijing Accuses Lai of Being a Warmonger

Zhu Fenglian, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office, responded by accusing President Lai Ching-te of deliberately escalating tensions, calling him a “destroyer of cross-strait peace, a crisis-maker… and an instigator of war.” This Chinese rhetoric seeks to flip the narrative, portraying Taiwan’s defensive measures as the true source of regional instability.

The Taiwan Affairs Office did not directly respond to Reuters’ questions regarding Lin Fei-fan’s statement, a silence that, by implication, places the burden of proof entirely on Taiwan—a country that documents its simulations while the other side relies solely on rhetorical accusations.

Accusing Taiwan of being the instigator while H-6 bombers fly near its coastline amounts to a moral inversion that I refuse to accept without calling it out. It is not journalistic balance to ignore who possesses nuclear weapons and who organizes food rationing drills.

Lessons Learned from Ukraine and the Middle East

Direct Lessons from Other Wars

According to Reuters, Taiwanese planners explicitly drew on lessons observed during the war in Ukraine and conflicts in the Middle East to design their resilience exercise. This influence is no accident: it reflects a clear recognition that modern warfare is no longer confined to the battlefield but encompasses disinformation, infrastructure sabotage, and civilian resilience.

The relative success of the Ukrainian resistance against a supposedly overwhelming Russian army has clearly fueled the Taiwanese conviction that a well-prepared defense, backed by a mobilized society, can seriously complicate an aggressor’s calculations—even one vastly superior in numbers.

Fiction That Anticipated Reality

The 2025 Taiwanese television series titled “Zero Day Attack,” which depicts a fictional Chinese invasion, has been cited as the cultural backdrop for this national awakening. Lee I-yuan, a 75-year-old neighborhood leader who participated in the exercise, warned: “If the other side attacks, it will certainly use AI to spread disinformation.”

This statement, coming from an ordinary citizen participating in a government exercise, illustrates just how deeply the awareness of hybrid warfare—disinformation, generative AI, manipulation of public opinion—has penetrated beyond Taiwan’s military circles to reach the civilian population itself.

That the lessons from Ukraine have reached Taipei should come as no surprise to anyone. What strikes me is the speed: what was once a distant war in Eastern Europe has, in barely four years, become a survival manual studied methodically on the other side of the world.

The Strategic Calculation Behind Deterrence

Making an invasion costly rather than impossible

Lin Fei-fan summarized the deterrence logic behind these preparations: “The message to our adversary is clear: once they realize that Taiwanese society is prepared, they will have to think very carefully before launching such a costly war against Taiwan—a war that might not succeed.” This approach does not claim to make an invasion impossible, but rather costly enough to deter its launch.

It is a doctrine of deterrence through cost, not through the certainty of victory. It implicitly acknowledges the asymmetry in raw military power between Taiwan and China, while relying on combined civilian and military preparedness to tip Beijing’s calculations toward restraint.

“If we do not act today”

Lin Fei-fan also warned: “If we do not act today, the capability will not suddenly appear tomorrow.” ” This statement captures the sense of urgency felt by Taiwanese authorities in the face of a strategic window they view as narrowing, particularly as the symbolic 2027 deadline set by Beijing for the modernization of its military approaches.

He concluded with a statement that deserves to be quoted in full: “There would be immediate peace if China abandoned its military ambitions toward Taiwan. But if Taiwan now abandons its ability to defend itself, there will no longer be a Taiwan in the world.”

This final sentence sums up, better than any outside analysis, the real existential stakes. This is not empty rhetoric: it is the cold description of an equation in which one of the two sides risks disappearing if the balance of power tips in the wrong direction.

The symbolic and practical significance of civil preparedness

A Mobilization That Goes Beyond the Military

The Nantou exercise was not purely military in nature. It involved scenarios of bank runs, food rationing, and the management of a health crisis following a simulated earthquake, illustrating a total defense approach that engages the entire civilian state apparatus, not just the armed forces.

This “whole-of-society” approach promoted by President Lai Ching-te is based on the idea that a nation’s resilience in the face of an invasion or blockade is not measured solely by the number of tanks or missiles, but by its collective ability to maintain essential functions—food, energy, communications, and public order—under the pressure of a prolonged crisis.

Persistent Doubts Despite Preparedness

The scenario of a drone attack that left 75 officials missing serves as a reminder that even the best-prepared exercise cannot entirely eliminate the uncertainty of an actual conflict. The planners themselves acknowledge that simulation, however rigorous, can never replace the test of fire.

What the exercise cannot simulate is the actual reaction of a civilian population faced with an actual invasion, nor the enduring strength of the international alliances on which Taiwan implicitly relies for its long-term survival.

What the exercise does not reveal is whether Taiwan’s Western allies would actually act in the event of an invasion. Taiwan’s civil preparedness is admirable, but it cannot substitute for a clear commitment to international support, which, at present, remains largely shrouded in strategic ambiguity.

Washington's Silence and Strategic Ambiguity

An alliance that never clearly states its name

For decades, the United States has maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward Taiwan, refusing to explicitly state whether it would intervene militarily in the event of a Chinese invasion. This ambiguity, originally intended to deter both Beijing from attacking and Taipei from declaring formal independence, is now being questioned by experts who see it as a dangerous source of uncertainty.

In this context, Taiwan’s autonomous preparedness takes on added significance: it does not rely solely on external promises but builds a capacity for resistance that would exist regardless of the ultimate level of commitment from Western allies at the critical moment.

A deterrent that must be credible on its own

It is precisely this logic that explains why Taiwan is investing so heavily in civil resilience exercises rather than relying solely on a hypothetical external intervention. The most reliable deterrence remains that which the island can demonstrate on its own, regardless of Washington’s shifting calculations.

This forced strategic autonomy illustrates a reality that few Western leaders dare to address directly: at the decisive moment, Taiwan may have to rely first and foremost on its own preparedness before any external reinforcement.

I believe that U.S. strategic ambiguity—which was useful in the 1970s—is becoming dangerously obsolete in the face of a China that no longer hides its intentions. Taiwan is right to prepare as if it had to stand alone, because that may be exactly what happens.

Submarine cables: an invisible lifeline

A vulnerability rarely discussed publicly

The scenario involving sabotage of undersea cables included in the Nantou exercise highlights a strategic vulnerability often overlooked in public discussions about a potential Chinese invasion: Taiwan’s reliance on a limited number of undersea telecommunications cables to stay connected to the rest of the world.

Previous incidents of damage to undersea cables near Taiwan, attributed to China-linked vessels, have already fueled Taiwanese authorities’ concerns on this front. Coordinated sabotage of this infrastructure could isolate the island informationally even before a kinetic conflict begins.

Disinformation as a Weapon of Hybrid Warfare

Lee I-yuan’s warning about the likely use of artificial intelligence to spread false information in the event of an attack ties into this broader concern: an adversary seeking to isolate Taiwan would first cut off its reliable lines of communication before flooding the remaining information space with manipulated content.

This combination of physical sabotage and informational manipulation represents precisely the type of hybrid warfare that Western democracies have already observed, on a smaller scale, in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

It seems to me that the vulnerability of undersea cables is underestimated in Western media coverage of the Taiwan issue. There is much talk of aircraft carriers and missiles, but too little about the digital fragility that could precede any open military confrontation.

The Ukrainian precedent: a warning and a source of hope

What Kyiv Has Proven Despite Everything

Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion launched in 2022 demonstrated that a smaller nation, backed by determined civilian mobilization and substantial international support, could inflict considerable costs on an aggressor presumed to be militarily overwhelming. This precedent directly informs Taiwan’s defense doctrine.

But the analogy has its limits, which Taiwanese planners are well aware of: Taiwan is an island, with no land border allowing for continuous resupply like that enjoyed by Ukraine via Poland and other NATO neighbors. A Chinese naval blockade could prove more difficult to circumvent than a partial land blockade.

Insularity: A Unique Logistical Challenge

This geographic constraint explains why the naval blockade scenario takes center stage in Taiwanese exercises, more so than the scenario of a direct invasion. A prolonged blockade—without requiring an armed landing—could be enough to economically strangle the island and force a political capitulation without a massive direct military confrontation.

It is this geographical reality that makes civilian preparedness—food and energy reserves, banking resilience—just as central as strictly military preparedness in Taiwan’s current defensive doctrine.

A blockade, unlike a full-scale invasion, does not make headlines in the same way, but it could be Beijing’s most formidable weapon. Strangling an island without firing a single shot would, in terms of international perception, be far more difficult to condemn than an armed landing.

The Economic Dimension of a Potential Crisis

Taiwan, a Key Player in the Global Semiconductor Industry

Beyond the immediate geopolitical stakes, Taiwan occupies a central position in the global supply chain for advanced semiconductors, particularly through companies like TSMC. A conflict or a prolonged blockade of the island would have immediate global economic repercussions, extending far beyond the Indo-Pacific region alone.

For some Western analysts, this economic reality provides an additional argument in favor of a stronger commitment by Western powers to Taiwan’s defense—one that goes beyond mere democratic solidarity to address concrete and immediate economic interests.

A lever that Beijing is also aware of

This global dependence on Taiwanese semiconductors, however, works both ways: it could deter certain international actors from taking too direct action against China for fear of global economic retaliation—or, conversely, strengthen the West’s determination to protect this critical infrastructure at all costs.

This economic ambiguity adds an extra layer of complexity to an issue already fraught with strategic uncertainties, where military, diplomatic, and economic calculations intertwine without any capital being able to claim a complete picture of all possible scenarios.

I refuse to reduce Taiwan to its microchips. Twelve million people live on this island with the right to choose their political destiny, regardless of the strategic value of their semiconductor factories to the rest of the world.

What China's Silence on Specific Issues Reveals

A General Accusation Rather Than a Fact-Based Response

The Taiwan Affairs Office’s refusal to respond directly to Lin Fei-fan’s specific claims—opting instead for a blanket accusation against President Lai Ching-te—illustrates a revealing asymmetry in approach. On one hand, there are verifiable facts, documented exercises, and precise participant figures. On the other, there is accusatory rhetoric without any factual counterarguments.

This asymmetry is not insignificant in the context of a broader information war in which Beijing seeks to shape the international narrative around Taiwan as that of a rebellious province rather than a functioning democracy of 23 million people with its own institutions.

The Battle for the Narrative: As Important as the Military Battle

In a world where international opinion can influence the level of support granted to Taiwan in the event of a crisis, this battle over the narrative—which involves both provocation and defense—becomes a strategic front in its own right, distinct from but linked to military and civilian preparations on the ground.

It is precisely for this reason that Lin Fei-fan’s statement deserves to be taken seriously beyond its immediate scope: it constitutes a deliberate attempt to set the terms of the debate before Beijing succeeds in imposing its own inverted victim narrative.

The war of narratives is not incidental; it is central. If international opinion comes to believe that Taiwan is provoking China, Western support will crumble at the very moment the island needs it most. That is why I reject the false equivalence between the two narratives.

Lessons for Other Island and Border Democracies

A Model Observed Across the Pacific

Taiwan’s “whole-of-society” resilience doctrine is beginning to attract the interest of other democracies facing threatening authoritarian neighbors, particularly the Baltic states in relation to Russia. The principles of civilian mobilization, strategic stockpiles, and psychological preparedness of the population are finding direct resonance in current European security debates.

This international circulation of resilience doctrines illustrates a broader realization: national defense in the 21st century is no longer limited to conventional military capabilities, but engages the entire social and economic fabric of a threatened nation.

A Signal Sent Far Beyond the Taiwan Strait

By publicly documenting its exercises and asserting its defensive posture without rhetorical qualifiers, Taiwan is also sending a signal to other democracies that are closely observing how a technologically advanced but militarily outnumbered island can build a credible deterrent against an overwhelmingly powerful authoritarian neighbor.

This signal extends far beyond the bilateral context of China-Taiwan relations: it serves as a textbook example for any democratic nation living under the direct threat of an authoritarian neighbor determined to erase its political autonomy.

What Taiwan is building today could become, in ten years, the go-to guide for any small democracy caught between its desire for autonomy and the brute force of an authoritarian neighbor. It is a lesson that extends far beyond the Asia-Pacific region.

What 2027 Might Really Mean

A Deadline That Has Become a Strategic Obsession

The year 2027, marking the centennial of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army, has become an obsessive deadline in Western and Taiwanese analyses of the Chinese threat, based on repeated statements by Chinese officials calling for comprehensive military modernization by that date.

It should be noted, however, with a degree of caution, that there is no definitive evidence confirming that an invasion is planned specifically for that year, and that this deadline remains largely interpretive, derived from official Chinese rhetoric on modernization rather than from an explicitly dated invasion plan.

The Need for Caution Regarding Fixed Dates

This methodological nuance in no way diminishes the urgency of Taiwan’s preparations, but it serves as a reminder that rigorous journalism must distinguish between projected military capability and a confirmed intention to invade on a specific date—two things that Western media coverage sometimes dangerously conflates.

What can be stated with certainty, however, is that Taiwan’s window for preparation is narrowing as China’s military modernization progresses, regardless of the exact date on which Beijing might decide to take action.

I refuse to succumb to the fatalism surrounding the specific dates circulating in certain Western media outlets. 2027 is not a prophecy; it is a working hypothesis. But Taiwan’s sense of urgency is very real, regardless of the exact timeline Beijing chooses.

The Role of Japan and Its Regional Neighbors

Tokyo is watching with growing concern

Japan, Taiwan’s immediate neighbor and itself embroiled in a persistent territorial dispute with China, is closely monitoring every development in Taiwan’s defensive posture. Former Japanese officials have repeatedly warned that a crisis in Taiwan would automatically constitute a crisis for Japanese security, given the geographical proximity of the Sakishima Islands.

This regional interdependence explains why Taiwan’s resilience exercises are no longer viewed as a strictly bilateral matter between Taipei and Beijing, but as a test of the stability of the entire Indo-Pacific security architecture built over decades around U.S. alliances.

An Informal Coalition Taking Shape

Although no formal treaty publicly confirms it, signs of coordination between Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia are multiplying in the face of China’s growing assertiveness in the region. This informal coalition, still fragile, could prove decisive if Beijing ever decided to test the collective resolve of its democratic neighbors.

It is within this broader context that Lin Fei-fan’s statement takes on its full strategic significance: it is directed not only at Beijing, but at all regional capitals watching how Taiwan chooses to frame itself in the face of the threat.

I believe that the future of Indo-Pacific security is being played out as much in Tokyo and Manila as it is in Taipei. An informal but genuine democratic coalition could prove to be a greater deterrent than any ambiguous U.S. statement regarding a hypothetical intervention.

Conclusion: An Island That Refuses to Take the Blame

A reversal of the narrative that could set a precedent

Lin Fei-fan’s statement on July 7, 2026, may well be remembered as a turning point in the way Taiwan chooses to present itself to the world: no longer as a province awaiting an external verdict, but as a democracy that documents, justifies, and publicly stands by each of its defensive choices, while placing the blame for escalation squarely on its true perpetrator.

Whether this rhetorical strategy will be enough to have a lasting impact on international opinion remains uncertain. But it has the merit of factual clarity, supported by documented evidence, verifiable figures, and directly attributed quotes, rather than vague mutual accusations.

What History May Remember

If history draws a lesson from this episode, it may be this: a nation that prepares to survive is not one that provokes war, but one that refuses to disappear without having tried everything to avoid it. Taiwan, in 2026, seems to have chosen this path, with its eyes wide open to the risks it entails.

I’ll conclude with a simple conviction: the free world should listen to Lin Fei-fan with the same attention it eventually gave to Zelensky. Democracies threatened by authoritarian neighbors deserve to be believed when they say who is the aggressor and who is defending itself.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist