ANALYSIS: Brussels Launches Five Joint Defense Projects Ahead of the NATO Summit

Twenty-six member countries, Norway, and Ukraine have joined forces

The drone and anti-drone systems project brings together 26 European Union countries, as well as Norway and Ukraine, according to Reuters. It is the largest of the five projects in terms of the number of participants, reflecting the perceived urgency in the face of the increasing number of drone incursions that have affected several European countries in recent months.

This near-universal participation reflects a shared awareness: the threat posed by drones—whether used for reconnaissance or direct attack—does not respect national borders and requires a coordinated technological response rather than twenty-seven scattered national responses.

Ukraine’s Experience as a Key Asset of the Project

Ukraine’s inclusion in this project is not merely symbolic: Kyiv now possesses the world’s most extensive combat experience in drone warfare, hard-won since 2022 in the face of waves of Russian Shahed drones and electronic jamming systems deployed by Moscow.

Combining this Ukrainian expertise with European industrial capabilities would significantly shorten the development cycle for anti-drone systems that have been truly battle-tested, rather than designed solely in a laboratory.

Including Ukraine in this project is not an act of charity; it is a smart strategic decision. No European laboratory has the combat experience that Kyiv has paid for with blood since 2022.

A project focused on the countries most vulnerable to Russia

The project, dubbed Eastern Flank Watch, brings together thirteen European Union countries, as well as Norway and Ukraine, according to Reuters. It aims to strengthen detection and response capabilities along Europe’s eastern border, from Finland to Bulgaria, according to Euronews.

This geographic area is significant: it corresponds precisely to the strategic front line most vulnerable to potential Russian aggression or provocation, including the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania—all of which have faced repeated incidents involving drones or unidentified aerial incursions.

A Direct Response to Recent Drone Incursions

A series of drone incursions has recently reignited questions about the ability of the nine countries along this eastern flank to deter and respond to potential threats, according to Euronews. This project specifically aims to fill this capability gap through a shared surveillance architecture.

Without a common, interoperable early-warning system, each isolated incident will continue to be handled on a country-by-country basis, with disparate response times and technological standards that directly benefit anyone seeking to test the limits of European vigilance.

Thirteen countries finally coordinating their surveillance on the eastern flank is exactly the kind of concrete response that the increasing number of Russian drone incursions has long required.

Protecting Submarine Cables and Critical Infrastructure

The third project focuses on maritime and seabed defense, an area that has long been underfunded despite the increasing number of suspicious incidents involving undersea communication cables and gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea in recent years.

The vulnerability of this undersea infrastructure—on which a significant portion of European internet communications and energy flows depends—constitutes a strategic weak point that hostile actors have already exploited, making this project particularly urgent.

Necessary Coordination Among National Navies

Historically, surveillance of European seabeds has relied on scattered national capabilities, often redundant in some areas and entirely absent in others—an imbalance that this joint project explicitly seeks to correct by pooling sensors and surveillance platforms.

This increased coordination among national navies would also help reduce the unit costs of underwater detection equipment—a technological field in which Europe has historically lagged behind Russian capabilities in hybrid underwater warfare.

It took several suspicious incidents involving severed cables for Europe to finally take the vulnerability of its seabed seriously. Better late than never, but this delay comes at a cost.

A Concerning Reliance on Non-European Actors

The fourth project concerns space defense, an area where Europe remains largely dependent on U.S. capabilities and, to a lesser extent, on other international partners for satellite surveillance and secure military communications.

This strategic dependence exposes the European Union to real geopolitical risks, particularly in the event of a partial withdrawal or a shift in U.S. priorities—a scenario that many defense analysts consider increasingly likely.

Building Credible European Space Autonomy

Developing a truly European space defense capability—including reconnaissance satellites, secure communication systems, and capabilities for tracking orbital threats—is an essential long-term investment for any genuine strategic autonomy.

Without this space autonomy, Europe would remain structurally dependent on third parties for functions as critical as satellite intelligence in times of crisis—a vulnerability incompatible with its stated ambition of strategic sovereignty.

A Europe that talks about strategic sovereignty without an autonomous space capability is deluding itself. This space project is perhaps the most long-term of the five, but also the most fundamental.

A fifth project directly inspired by the ongoing war

The fifth project focuses on air and missile defense as well as early warning, according to Reuters. This choice is no coincidence: the war in Ukraine has dramatically demonstrated the critical importance—and scarcity—of modern missile defense systems such as the Patriot, the shortage of which has directly affected Kyiv’s ability to intercept Russian strikes in recent weeks.

The European Union is drawing a direct lesson from the conflict in Ukraine: without sufficient stockpiles of interceptors and without industrial production capable of keeping pace with wartime demand, even the best missile defense systems become ineffective in the face of massive and repeated attacks.

Anticipating Rather Than Reacting to a Growing Ballistic Threat

This project aims to build a European production and stockpiling capacity that would prevent the Union from finding itself, in the event of a major crisis, in the same situation of critical shortage that is currently affecting Ukraine on the missile defense front.

Early warning, an essential component of this project, would also enable faster detection of ballistic or cruise missile launches, reducing the response time needed to activate European defense systems.

Had Europe learned this lesson as early as 2022, the Patriot shortage currently affecting Ukraine might have been anticipated rather than discovered in the urgency of a night of bombardment.

Integration That Goes Beyond a Diplomatic Gesture

Ukraine is participating in four of the five announced projects, according to Euronews and Adnkronos. This extensive integration of a non-EU member state into strategic defense industry projects illustrates just how much Kyiv is now viewed as an indispensable technological partner rather than merely a recipient of military aid.

This development marks a paradigm shift: Ukraine is no longer merely a recipient of Western equipment; it is now transferring unique combat expertise—forged in adversity—to European defense industries themselves.

A Winning Bet for European Collective Security

Including Ukraine in these joint projects also strengthens the overall strategic coherence of the initiative: the systems developed will be directly tested and validated in the most demanding operational context currently available in Europe—the Ukrainian front itself.

This commitment to Ukrainian integration, however, presents real practical challenges, particularly regarding the sharing of sensitive technologies and the protection of military intellectual property—issues that the Commission will need to clarify in the coming months.

Making Ukraine a full-fledged industrial partner—rather than merely a recipient of aid—means finally recognizing what Kyiv has demonstrated since 2022: a capacity for innovation under pressure that few European countries can match.

A figure that illustrates the true scale of the ambition

European Commissioner for Defense Andrius Kubilius stated that these five projects represent a combined funding target of approximately 190 billion euros by 2036, noting that they “will play a key role in strengthening Member States’ capabilities and will help keep Europe and Europeans safe,” according to Euronews.

This figure of 190 billion euros—compared to the Commission’s initial funding of 325 million euros—illustrates the considerable gap between the current institutional seed funding and the actual industrial ambition, which will have to be financed largely by member states and the private sector.

The Challenge of Turning Ambition into Firm Budgetary Commitments

The recent history of European defense cooperation—marked by the failure of the Franco-German next-generation fighter jet program—calls for legitimate caution regarding the Union’s ability to turn these quantified ambitions into concrete achievements delivered within the announced timelines.

The difference between this new EDIP framework and past attempts will lie in the Commission’s ability to maintain continuous pressure on member states to convert declarations of intent into firm contracts and verifiable production schedules.

190 billion euros over ten years is an impressive figure on paper. But Europe has already learned, from the fiasco of the Franco-German fighter jet, that big numbers never guarantee big achievements.

A flagship project scrapped last month

The Franco-German next-generation fighter jet program, the Future Combat Air System—led primarily by Dassault and Airbus—was scrapped last month, according to Euronews. This failure, which occurred just a few weeks before the announcement of five new European projects, illustrates the persistent fragility of military-industrial cooperation among major European powers.

Industrial and political tensions between French and German partners over the division of labor and technological control of the program ultimately led to the demise of a project that had been presented, at its launch, as the future pillar of European combat aviation.

What This Failure Implies for the Five New Projects

This recent failure calls for particular vigilance regarding the governance of the five new projects announced by the Commission: without a clear mechanism for allocating industrial responsibilities and resolving disputes among partners, the risk of repeating the scenario of the Franco-German fighter jet remains very real.

The structural difference this time, however, lies in the direct involvement of the European Commission as the financial and institutional coordinator—a role that Paris and Berlin had not entrusted to Brussels during the fighter jet program, which was left entirely to bilateral negotiations.

The failure of the Franco-German fighter jet project is not merely an industrial mishap; it is a clear warning: without strong institutional arbitration, even the best European intentions ultimately collapse under the weight of national egos.

A Record Loan Granted to Airbus Last Week

European Investment Bank President Nadia Calviño announced last week a record loan of 3 billion euros for Airbus, a move that demonstrates how Europe is “strengthening its capacity and strategic autonomy,” according to Euronews.

This loan, separate from the five defense projects announced by the Commission, nevertheless illustrates a convergence of European financial initiatives all aimed at the same goal: reducing Europe’s industrial and technological dependence on external suppliers in critical strategic sectors.

A financial mobilization that goes beyond the EDIP framework alone

This parallel financial mobilization—combining Commission funds, loans from the European Investment Bank, and expected contributions from the member states themselves—is shaping a European defense financing architecture that is more complex but potentially more resilient than in the past.

The proliferation of these complementary funding channels could, if well coordinated, reduce the vulnerability of the entire system to the failure or delay of a single financial instrument—a lesson directly drawn from the sector’s recurring budgetary difficulties.

A 3-billion loan to Airbus in the same week as the announcement of the five defense projects is not a coincidence in timing; it is a deliberate communication strategy designed to project an image of full European mobilization.

U.S. pressure that is now shaping the European agenda

The new defense spending target of 3.5% of GDP by 2035 for NATO members is described as a commitment spearheaded primarily by U.S. President Donald Trump, according to Euronews. This U.S. pressure, though sometimes perceived as blunt in its wording, has had the merit of accelerating a European debate on rearmament that had been dragging on for years.

The announcement of the five joint European defense projects is a direct result of this momentum: it allows the European Union to demonstrate, just days before the Ankara summit, that it takes seriously the expectations of its main transatlantic ally regarding military burden-sharing.

Trump: A Demanding but Necessary Ally for Western Resolve

While the pressure tactics Trump has employed against his European allies have drawn legitimate diplomatic criticism, the net effect of this pressure—namely, a genuine acceleration of European rearmament in the face of Russia—directly serves the West’s collective security interests.

This dynamic illustrates an uncomfortable but real reality: Europe needed persistent external pressure to accelerate defense cooperation that, in theory, it should have built on its own initiative long ago.

Whether European foreign ministries like it or not, Trump’s pressure on military burden-sharing has produced more concrete results in a few months than years of European summits on rearmament.

Only 24% of defense investments were made collaboratively

According to a finding by the European Defense Agency cited by Euronews, only 24% of defense investments made by member states in 2025 were carried out collaboratively, a proportion deemed “unevenly distributed” across countries and capability areas.

This figure reflects a persistent reality: the vast majority of European countries continue to procure their military equipment largely on an individual basis, rather than through joint procurement, which would nevertheless reduce unit costs and increase interoperability among allied armed forces.

Out-of-sync procurement cycles that limit economies of scale

The European Defense Agency also emphasizes that the acquisition and replacement cycles for military equipment remain largely out of sync among member countries, which significantly limits opportunities for joint investment and large-scale production.

Correcting this structural misalignment represents a governance challenge far more complex than simply funding new joint projects: it involves changing national procurement practices that have been deeply entrenched for decades within each European defense establishment.

Twenty-four percent of joint investments after years of talk about European defense unity is a figure that should be of greater concern to European capitals than it currently is.

A show of resolve that has not gone unnoticed in Moscow

For Moscow, the coordinated announcement of five major European defense projects—four of which explicitly involve Ukraine—sends a clear signal that Europe has no intention of easing its structural support for Kyiv, regardless of how the conflict on the ground unfolds in the short term.

This long-term signal matters more than the exact amount of initial funding: it signals to Russian military planners that the European defense industry is now organizing itself to support a prolonged war effort and deterrence, rather than one-off aid that is bound to fade away.

China, a Close Observer of an Industrial Precedent

China, for its part, is closely observing Europe’s ability to structure effective multinational defense industrial cooperation—a model that could, in the long run, be emulated by other regional blocs facing similar security challenges from authoritarian powers.

The success or failure of these five European projects will therefore have implications that extend far beyond the continent, serving as a real-world test of the viability of multinational defense cooperation in the face of common strategic adversaries.

China is not just looking at the funding figures; it is assessing whether Western democracies are still capable of cooperating effectively in the face of a common threat. These five projects are also a test of credibility in the eyes of Beijing.

The groundwork has been laid, but nothing is certain yet

These five joint European defense projects lay a solid institutional and financial foundation, but their success will depend entirely on the Member States’ ability to turn these announcements into firm industrial contracts, adhere to production schedules, and actually secure funding in the coming years.

An opportunity Europe can no longer afford to miss

Faced with the convergence of threats posed by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, Europe can no longer afford the failure of another major defense cooperation initiative. The precedent set by the Franco-German fighter jet project serves as a reminder that institutional ambition alone never guarantees industrial success.

This analysis concludes with a simple conviction: every institutional building block counts in building true European strategic autonomy, even if the road ahead remains long and littered with past failures.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist