ANALYSIS: How Ukrainian Airstrikes Are Forcing Russia to Import from India

Eleven refineries hit in a single month

This shortfall is not due to a weather-related incident or an isolated outage: it is a direct result of a systematic campaign. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, as cited by Reuters and the Ukrainian media outlet UNN, Ukrainian forces struck 11 Russian oil refineries, as well as fuel logistics facilities and eight military plants, in June 2026 alone, with strikes extending from occupied Crimea to western Siberia.

The Ukrainian General Staff also estimated that these cumulative strikes, carried out since August 2025, had disabled approximately 42.74% of Russia’s total refining capacity, with eight refineries hit in the last month alone and more than 60 storage tanks destroyed or severely damaged, resulting in sector-wide losses estimated at $13.5 billion, according to Ukrainian intelligence cited by Hamer Intelligence.

The Kapotnya Case: A Symbol of the Strike Strategy’s Success

The best-documented example remains the Kapotnya refinery in Moscow, owned by Gazprom Neft and supplying approximately 40% of the capital’s gasoline and nearly half of its diesel. Struck twice in 72 hours in mid-June—on June 16 and 18—the facility saw its two primary crude oil processing units taken offline; Reuters reported that it will not resume production until at least 2027, based on an estimated six-month repair period.

The fact that the largest refinery serving Moscow itself—the capital of Russian power—will remain out of service until 2027 strikes me as the strongest evidence that this war of deep strikes has changed in nature. It is no longer mere harassment; it is a campaign of industrial attrition that is achieving its objective.

Half of Russia’s Primary Refining Capacity Is Shut Down

Some estimates go even further than the official Ukrainian figures. According to Ukrainian energy analyst Mykhailo Honchar, president of the Strategy XXI research center, as quoted by Euromaidan Press on June 30, 2026, approximately half of Russia’s primary refining capacity is now offline—a figure higher than estimates from independent organizations such as the International Energy Agency, which puts the capacity taken offline at between 33% and 40% based on various industry sources cited by Reuters.

Despite this methodological discrepancy between the various estimates, there is consensus on the trajectory: the second quarter of 2026 represents the most intense and damaging phase to date of Ukraine’s campaign against Russian fuel production, a view shared by all analysts cited in the specialized press.

More than 50 attacks recorded since March by the Associated Press

According to a tally by the Associated Press reported by US News, more than 50 Ukrainian attacks have targeted Russian refineries, storage facilities, terminals, and other energy infrastructure since March 2026, with some facilities—such as the Tuapse refinery on the Black Sea—having been struck four times. Chris Weafer, CEO of the consulting firm Macro-Advisory, estimates that about one-third of Russia’s refining capacity is currently offline.

Whether one cites a figure of 33%, 40%, or 50% depending on the source consulted, all these estimates—even the most conservative ones—paint a picture of a country unable to refine its own oil for its own citizens. It is this convergence among independent sources that makes this assessment difficult to dispute.

Novak Assures That the Market Is “Fully Supplied”

In response to this situation, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated on Wednesday, July 1, that the Russian market was “fully supplied” with diesel and gasoline, according to reports from several news agencies. This official statement stands in stark contrast to accounts from the field, where drivers have reported wait times of up to 18 hours at some gas stations.

Russian President Vladimir Putin himself implicitly acknowledged the scale of the problem by mentioning, according to CNN, several emergency measures: reducing scheduled maintenance at refineries still in operation, considering a ban on fuel exports, and increasing imports, including those from India.

The Russian central bank itself cites the fuel shortage

In a further sign that the crisis goes beyond mere window dressing, Russia’s central bank cut its key interest rate by only a quarter of a percentage point on July 1, explicitly citing inflationary pressures linked in part to a “temporary contraction in motor fuel production,” according to CNN. When a country’s central bank cites a fuel shortage as a factor in its interest rate policy, it becomes difficult to argue that the situation is trivial.

This contradiction between Novak’s reassuring rhetoric and the Russian central bank’s actual decisions is, in my view, the most revealing admission in this entire affair. You don’t cite a fuel shortage in a monetary policy decision if the market is truly “fully supplied.”

India, the Largest Importer of Russian Crude Oil Since 2022

India’s role in this matter is particularly revealing of the shifts brought about by this war. Since the large-scale invasion of 2022, India has become the largest buyer of Russian crude oil shipments transported by sea, purchasing between 1.5 and 2 million barrels per day—a volume that reached a record high of 2.66 million barrels per day in June 2026, according to data cited by AP7AM.

Indian refiners have thus long served as a “safety valve” for Russian oil subject to international sanctions, transforming low-cost Russian crude into refined products that they then exported to Asian and Western markets—a practice that has allowed Moscow to continue selling its production despite Western restrictions.

Now, it is Russia that needs Indian gasoline

The reversal is striking: India exported a record volume of 400,000 barrels of gasoline per day in 2025, mostly to other Asian countries, according to the same data. Russia is now reportedly seeking to capture a portion of these flows to fill its own shortfall, thereby reversing a trade relationship in which it has long been the supplier of raw materials rather than the buyer of refined products.

There is a bitter strategic irony in this shift: the country that used to sell its crude oil at rock-bottom prices to India to circumvent sanctions now finds itself having to buy refined gasoline—at a higher price—from those very same customers. The war of airstrikes in Ukraine has succeeded in reversing this economic balance of power in just a few months.

Restrictions on Containers and Local Rationing

In addition to restrictions on Indian imports, several Russian regions have implemented local emergency measures, according to CNN: a ban on the sale of large containers to prevent individuals from stockpiling fuel, the declaration of a heightened state of alert in regions such as Irkutsk and Transbaikal, and sales restrictions limiting fuel to emergency services only in certain areas.

Cases of black-market activity have also been reported: Irkutsk police have penalized four individuals for illegally reselling gasoline at inflated prices; one of them was arrested following an undercover operation conducted by anti-corruption agents posing as buyers, who were reselling the fuel at approximately four times the national average price.

A Possible Relaxation of Fuel Quality Standards

The Russian government is also reportedly considering allowing lower-quality gasoline to be sold to increase available supplies—a measure that, if implemented, would illustrate just how much urgency now takes precedence over the usual quality standards for fuel sold to Russian consumers.

Lowering fuel quality standards rather than acknowledging the extent of the damage to the refining infrastructure strikes me as indicative of a crisis management approach that prioritizes the appearance of normality over a structural resolution of the problem. It’s a band-aid, not a cure.

Another reason to maintain oil sanctions

This Russian fuel crisis comes as Western governments continue to debate the actual effectiveness of the sanctions imposed on the Russian oil economy since 2022. Evidence that Ukraine’s campaign of deep-strike attacks is succeeding where certain financial sanctions have struggled to produce an immediate effect could strengthen the case for continued—or even increased—support for Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities.

Several Western analysts now note that targeted strikes on Russia’s refining infrastructure are producing a measurable economic impact within weeks, whereas traditional financial sanctions often take years to have a comparable effect on the Kremlin’s war budget.

A Lesson for the West’s Economic Pressure Strategy

This sequence of events could also influence how Western countries approach the provision of additional long-range strike capabilities to Ukraine in the coming months—an issue already discussed at recent NATO summits focused on military support for Kyiv.

I believe this Russian fuel crisis deserves serious consideration by Western capitals as empirical evidence that directly targeting Russia’s war economy works faster than many financial sanctions that are announced with great fanfare only to be diluted by successive exemptions.

A shortage expected to last all summer

According to analysts cited by U.S. News, even if no further damage is inflicted on Russia’s oil infrastructure, the current shortages are still expected to persist “likely throughout the summer,” as agricultural demand remains high through September. However, there are no signs of a slowdown in Ukraine’s campaign of deep strikes, which suggests the crisis will worsen rather than be resolved quickly.

What this report confirms—and what it does not

What the sources allow us to establish with certainty: a documented drop in Russian gasoline production, a series of Ukrainian strikes claimed and confirmed by several independent media outlets, and a concrete plan to import Indian fuel currently under review by the Russian parliament. What these same sources do not allow us to confirm: the exact volume that will ultimately be imported from India, nor the precise duration for which this subsidy mechanism will remain in effect. These limitations deserve to be acknowledged rather than filled in with assumptions.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist