Estonia Already Spends More Than 5% on Core Defense
Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal stated that “Estonia already invests more than 5% of its GDP in its core defense,” a remark made during the Berlin meeting. This political statement should be distinguished from the more precise comparative data published elsewhere, which place Estonia’s defense spending at a slightly different level depending on the calculation method used.
This nuance in no way detracts from the clearly upward trajectory of Estonia’s defense spending—a country that shares a direct border of several hundred kilometers with Russia.
Latvia and Lithuania: Same Logic, Same Soaring Figures
Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs reiterated the commitment made at the Hague summit to reach 5% of GDP. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda, for his part, announced that Lithuania was on track to devote “nearly 7% of its GDP to defense and security” this year, according to remarks reported by Euronews.
These three announcements, made on the same day in the same place, paint a picture of a region that has clearly decided to stop waiting for a NATO consensus and to act at its own pace, dictated by its own perception of the threat.
I am struck by the consistency of the message from the three Baltic leaders, who speak almost with one voice despite the nuances between their respective countries. This regional unity in the face of Russia should serve as an example to Western Europe, which is at times more divided on the true extent of the threat.
What the comparative figures from the Anadolu Agency reveal
Slightly Different Percentages, but the Same Trend
A fact box published by the Anadolu Agency ahead of the Ankara summit puts Estonia’s defense spending at 3.38% of GDP, Latvia’s at 3.73%—having already exceeded the intermediate threshold of 3.5%—and Lithuania’s at 4%, a budget that has increased fivefold since 2014. These figures, based on comparative data among allies, differ from the political announcements made in Berlin, which sometimes include security expenditures that go beyond the strict scope of defense alone.
This methodological difference largely explains the discrepancy between the figures cited by Baltic leaders and those published in international comparisons, though neither is necessarily incorrect.
Poland, a regional leader that outpaces everyone
The same factbox ranks Poland at the top of all NATO allies, with 4.48% of GDP devoted to defense—a figure that even exceeds that of any of the three Baltic countries taken individually according to this calculation method. The entire region, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, thus stands out for a defense effort significantly higher than the Western average.
This regional contrast underscores how much geographic proximity to Russia remains the most decisive factor in each government’s budgetary decisions—far more so than diplomatic pressure from Washington or Brussels.
I believe that this methodological difference between political announcements and comparative statistics should not be exploited to downplay these countries’ actual defense efforts. Whether the figure is 3.38% or 5%, the trajectory is the same: a region that invests unapologetically in its own survival.
The 5% target set in The Hague: a necessary reminder
A new threshold that replaces the former 2% target
The Hague Summit set a new target for all NATO allies: to reach 5% of GDP in defense and security spending by 2035, with an interim target of 3.5% devoted strictly to “core defense.” This new target replaces the former 2% threshold that had been in place for years and which many allies were already struggling to meet.
The Baltic countries, having already far exceeded this new intermediate threshold, are leading the way in this new budget race, well ahead of the deadline collectively set for the entire alliance.
Spain: A Counterexample That Highlights the Contrast with the Baltic States
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Spain has secured a formal exemption from the 5% threshold, negotiating a cap set at 2.1% of GDP. This striking contrast between Madrid and the Baltic capitals illustrates just how radically the perception of the Russian threat varies depending on the geographical distance separating each country from the Russian border.
This heterogeneity within the alliance itself raises a fundamental question about NATO’s true solidarity in the face of a threat that, by definition, does not affect all its members with the same immediate intensity.
I find this contrast between Spain and the Baltic countries revealing of a geographic divide that silently runs through the entire Atlantic Alliance. We cannot demand the same budgetary effort from a country 1,500 kilometers from the Russian border as from a country that borders it directly, but this reality deserves to be stated clearly rather than diplomatically sidestepped.
Merz and Germany: A Partner That Is Also Taking a Harder Line
“The security of the Baltic states is also our security”
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated during the meeting in Berlin that “the security of the Baltic states is also Germany’s security,” adding that “the threat is not abstract; it is very real on NATO’s eastern flank” and that “Moscow is testing how united and determined NATO is,” according to quotes reported by Euronews.
These remarks signal a more assertive tone in German diplomacy, which has historically been more cautious on issues of direct confrontation with Russia, particularly due to its history of energy dependence on Moscow.
Germany Pledges 3.5% by 2029, a Slower Timeline
Merz clarified that Germany would reach the 3.5% of GDP threshold “as early as 2029,” a timeline significantly later than that already achieved by the Baltic states. This difference in pace illustrates the persistent difficulty major Western economic powers face in accelerating their rearmament as quickly as the countries directly exposed along the Russian border.
The contrast between Germany’s promises for 2029 and the figures already achieved by Lithuania in 2026 alone sums up the gap in the perception of danger between the heart of Europe and its eastern periphery.
I welcome Friedrich Merz’s change in tone, but I also note that the promise for 2029 still lags far behind the reality already experienced by the Baltic states in 2026. Words matter, but timelines matter just as much, and Germany’s timeline remains significantly slower than that of its most exposed eastern neighbors.
What this money actually funds on the ground
Drones, Air Defense, and Ammunition Are Top Priorities
According to available information on regional budget priorities, the Baltic states are focusing their investments on drones, air defense systems, and ammunition production—three areas identified as critical in light of Russian military capabilities stationed in the Kaliningrad enclave and on neighboring Belarusian territory.
This set of priorities reflects lessons learned directly from the war in Ukraine, where ammunition availability and air defense capabilities proved decisive for a country’s survival in the face of prolonged Russian aggression.
A Rapidly Growing Local Defense Industry
Beyond direct equipment purchases, these sharply rising budgets are also enabling the development of a local defense industrial base in the three Baltic countries, gradually reducing their dependence on foreign suppliers for certain basic equipment.
This industrial self-sufficiency, though partial, represents a long-term investment that goes beyond merely providing an immediate response to the current threat.
I consider this growth in local industrial capacity to be the most sustainable aspect of this Baltic budgetary effort. A country that learns to produce some of its own ammunition and defense systems builds resilience that will endure well beyond the current crisis with Russia.
What This Baltic Breakthrough Reveals About the Rest of the West
A Lesson in Realism for More Distant Allies
Comparing the Baltic states with other NATO members that are geographically farther from Russia raises an uncomfortable question: How many other allies are waiting for a direct and immediate threat before seriously adjusting their own defense budgets? The Baltics did not have that luxury of time and had to act proactively, driven by their geography rather than by a general NATO consensus.
This difference in stance between frontline countries and those further away remains one of the most persistent structural tensions within the Atlantic Alliance since the start of the conflict in Ukraine.
A precedent that could influence other European capitals
The Baltic example, which received extensive media coverage ahead of the Ankara summit, could serve as a political argument for European governments seeking to justify similar budget increases to their own publics, who are often reluctant to accept budgetary sacrifices they view as abstract.
It remains to be seen whether this example will be enough to convince countries located thousands of kilometers from the Russian border, where the sense of urgency is necessarily less immediate than in Tallinn, Riga, or Vilnius.
I believe that this race toward Baltic industrial resilience should inspire broader reflection on Europe’s dependence on foreign arms suppliers. Producing locally—even partially—also means regaining control over one’s own rearmament schedule rather than depending on the goodwill of a distant partner.
The Ankara Summit as a Test of Credibility for the Entire Alliance
The Balts Are Coming with Evidence, Not Just Promises
Unlike several other delegations attending the Ankara summit, the Baltic representatives can present figures for goals they have already achieved rather than mere future commitments. This position strengthens their diplomatic credibility as they call on other allies to step up their own defense efforts in the face of Russia.
This head start also gives them particular legitimacy in calling for increased NATO support along their section of the eastern flank, where the threat remains the most immediate and well-documented.
Moral pressure on the slowest allies
By presenting such high figures even before the summit officially opens, the Baltic states are exerting a form of moral pressure on allies still far from the 5% target. This pressure, while not legally binding, carries political weight in the upcoming deliberations in Ankara.
This is a concrete example of how small countries can influence the debate within a 32-member alliance, simply through the power of their budgetary example.
I believe that this moral pressure exerted by the small Baltic countries on the major Western powers is one of the most interesting dynamics to watch as the Ankara summit approaches. Sometimes, it is the smallest who show the way forward to the largest, and that is exactly what is happening here.
Conclusion: The Social Cost of This Unprecedented Fiscal Effort
Painful Trade-offs in National Budgets
Allocating 5 to 7 percent of GDP to defense inevitably has consequences for other national budget items. Health care, education, and civilian infrastructure: these sectors often have to give up a portion of their resources due to the absolute priority given to defense in the three Baltic countries. This budgetary sacrifice, rarely highlighted in official statements, nevertheless deserves recognition.
The Baltic populations themselves seem to largely support these choices, aware that their geographic proximity to Russia leaves their respective governments with few other reasonable options.
Popular Support That Is Not Guaranteed Forever
This public support, however solid it may be today, is not guaranteed in the long term if economic pressure were to intensify without any visible improvement in the regional security situation. The Baltic governments will have to continue justifying these sacrifices to their voters, year after year, without letup.
This is a delicate democratic balancing act that few other European countries have had to face with such sustained budgetary intensity.
I deeply respect the fiscal sacrifice made by the citizens of the Baltic states—a sacrifice that few Western populations would accept so readily without major political backlash. This collective resilience deserves to be recognized as an example of both civic and political courage.
Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist
Sources
Primary sources
Ministry of Defense of Ukraine — official statements, accessed July 2026
NATO — Alliance’s official website, accessed July 2026
Euronews — “Security of the Baltics is our security,” “Merz meets Baltic leaders,” July 3, 2026
Secondary sources
Anadolu Agency — Factbox: NATO defense spending ahead of the Ankara summit, July 2026
The New York Times — “NATO defense spending, Trump, Rutte,” July 7, 2026
This content was created with the help of AI.