COLUMN: Brussels is preparing a Plan B to freeze the Russian oil production cap on July 14

$44.10, a figure that weighs on the Kremlin’s budget

The current cap of $44.10 per barrel, in effect since January 15, 2026, aims to limit the revenue Russia can derive from its oil exports while maintaining a sufficient supply on global markets to prevent a widespread spike in energy prices. Freezing this cap separately would help avoid any legal vacuum should the full package be delayed until the fall.

European negotiators view this measure as the most urgent in the package, as it strikes directly at the heart of the matter: oil revenues that, even today, finance a significant portion of the Russian military budget despite five years of cumulative sanctions.

The 170 banking designations postponed until the fall

The postponement of the 170 new banking and cryptocurrency designations until September constitutes a tactical setback, but not a abandonment, according to diplomats cited by the Ukrainian press. The goal remains to ultimately secure unanimity on the entire package, including measures targeting the parallel financial channels used by Moscow to circumvent existing sanctions.

Distinguishing between what is urgent and what is important is a bureaucratic survival tactic. I understand the logic, but I also note that every postponement is a window of opportunity that the Kremlin knows how to exploit to reorganize its circumvention networks even before the new rules take effect.

Hundreds of Oil Tankers Off the Radar

The package under discussion also includes new designations targeting the Russian “ghost fleet”—these aging oil tankers, often without valid Western insurance, that transport Russian oil while circumventing the price cap. This fleet, estimated by maritime analysts to consist of several hundred vessels, remains one of the main mechanisms for circumventing current sanctions.

The postponement of additional designations targeting this fleet until the fall leaves, in the meantime, a window of opportunity for these vessels, which continue to operate under flags of convenience—often registered in jurisdictions that are lax about the actual origin of their cargo.

A seemingly endless game of cat and mouse

Each new wave of maritime sanctions is followed, a few weeks later, by new Russian logistical adjustments: changes in flag, cargo transfers on the high seas, and falsification of origin documents. This perpetual cycle raises questions about the long-term effectiveness of a system that must constantly chase after a shifting reality.

The ghost fleet is, in my view, the perfect symbol of this economic war: we win individual battles, but never the war itself. As long as shipowners are willing to charter rusty hulls to transport sanctioned oil, the ceiling will remain a leaky dam.

A difficult adoption process that left its mark

The 20th sanctions package, adopted after weeks of similar negotiations, had already illustrated the growing difficulty of maintaining cohesion among the 27 member states on measures that were becoming increasingly technical and targeted. European diplomats interviewed at the time acknowledged that each additional package was becoming harder to negotiate than the previous one.

This precedent is now fueling discussions on the 21st package: some member states are advocating for qualified majority voting on future sanctions—an institutional reform that, however, faces resistance from countries committed to the right of national veto.

The institutional debate that no one really wants to start

Reforming the voting rules on European foreign policy would require a revision of the treaties—a lengthy and politically risky process that few leaders are willing to undertake in the midst of a war. The status quo, despite its well-documented slowness, therefore remains the norm, for lack of a politically viable alternative in the short term.

I believe this war will at least have had the merit of revealing, without sugarcoating, the structural flaws in European decision-making. But recognizing a problem and correcting it are two different things, and Brussels still seems far from the latter.

Every delay is interpreted as a political signal

On the Russian side, circles close to the Kremlin are closely monitoring these European negotiations, seeing them as further confirmation of their favorite theory: that Western unity is gradually crumbling as the war drags on. This interpretation, while somewhat exaggerated, is not entirely unfounded given the repeated deadlocks observed in Brussels.

Russian officials had not publicly commented on the European “Plan B” at the time of this writing, but their official silence has not prevented Russian state media from extensively reporting on internal EU divisions over this issue.

A War of Communication Running Parallel to the Economic War

This media exploitation of European divisions is part of a broader strategy by Moscow aimed at undermining Western public confidence in the effectiveness of the support provided to Kyiv. In this narrative, every European bureaucratic delay becomes further proof of the alleged futility of sanctions.

I refuse to give in to this Kremlin narrative, but I acknowledge that it is based on real facts: our own institutional slowness. The best response to this propaganda remains, quite simply, to move faster and go further with the sanctions themselves.

A Budget Deficit That Has Already Been Documented

Russian oil and gas revenues fell by about 30% year-over-year in the first half of 2026, according to data compiled by economic analysts, creating a budget deficit estimated at tens of billions of dollars. Maintaining—or even raising—the oil price cap is directly in line with this trajectory of cumulative financial pressure on Moscow.

Freezing the cap at its current level—without the further reduction once considered by some negotiators—would nevertheless represent a missed opportunity to further intensify this pressure at a time when the global market is already driving down Russian oil prices.

The window of opportunity that Brussels could miss

In early July, the price of a barrel of Urals crude hovered around $42, below the current cap, meaning that lowering the threshold would have had a real, rather than merely symbolic, immediate impact. Simply freezing the existing cap amounts, in effect, to failing to take full advantage of this market environment favorable to increased pressure.

I see this as a frustrating missed opportunity. The market is doing some of the work for European diplomats, and Brussels is choosing caution over boldness—precisely at a time when boldness would be the least politically costly.

Washington and London, Indispensable Partners

The European oil price cap will only work effectively if it remains coordinated with similar measures adopted by other G7 members, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. Any divergence among these jurisdictions would create immediate loopholes that Russian exporters and their intermediaries would exploit without delay.

This transatlantic coordination—already fragile on other issues related to the U.S. administration’s policy toward Russia—adds an extra layer of complexity to a system already strained by internal European divisions.

U.S. Uncertainty: An Aggravating Factor

The U.S. position on strictly maintaining the oil cap has not always been entirely clear in recent months, with certain signals sent by the Trump administration casting doubt on its long-term commitment to this specific sanctions regime.

I view this U.S. uncertainty as one of the greatest structural risks weighing on the entire sanctions architecture. A divided Europe can still move forward with steadfast allies; a divided Europe without steadfast allies risks total paralysis.

Costly Legal Uncertainty for Operators

European oil companies, insurers, and financial institutions required to enforce these sanctions regularly find themselves in a situation of legal uncertainty when the adoption of a package is delayed, as they do not always know precisely which new compliance obligations will take effect or on what exact date.

This regulatory uncertainty imposes a real economic cost on the affected companies, which must maintain costly compliance systems in anticipation of measures whose final timeline remains unclear until the very last moment.

The Private Sector’s Quiet Call for Greater Clarity

Several European professional associations in the financial sector have, in the past, quietly advocated for more predictable sanctions timelines, arguing that uncertainty undermines both the effectiveness of the measures and the competitiveness of European companies required to implement them.

I understand the frustration of businesses, but I refuse to equate it with the humanitarian and military crisis in Ukraine. Administrative complexity is an acceptable price to pay for a sanctions policy that, despite its flaws, produces measurable results.

Dublin: An Unlikely but Committed Mediator

The Irish presidency of the Council of the EU, which is currently leading these negotiations, found itself in the position of having to find a technical compromise acceptable to all 27 member states—a delicate diplomatic exercise given the positions of certain member states that are difficult to reconcile.

In this sense, the “Plan B”—a separate freeze on the oil price cap—represents a typically pragmatic compromise, seeking to preserve the essentials rather than risk a total deadlock that would have left the sanctions regime in a troubling legal vacuum.

An approach that could become the future norm

If this approach of splitting sanctions packages into urgent and secondary measures proves effective, it could well become the preferred method for future packages—a pragmatic way to circumvent deadlocks without waiting for a broader and politically riskier institutional reform.

I see this splitting method as an implicit admission: unanimity, as it currently exists, no longer works for a war of this duration. Better an imperfect compromise than an ideal stuck indefinitely in the corridors of Brussels.

Kyiv, a helpless spectator to its own allies’ delays

For Ukrainian authorities, every week of delay in adopting new sanctions translates into additional time before financial pressure on Moscow reaches a level capable of truly affecting Russia’s military capabilities on the ground. Kyiv has no direct say in these internal EU negotiations, but suffers the consequences firsthand.

Ukrainian officials, while publicly welcoming each new package adopted, regularly express their frustration in private over the slowness of the European decision-making process—a sentiment shared by several Western think tanks specializing in monitoring sanctions.

The Human Cost of a Bureaucratic Timeline

Behind every technical discussion about Coreper dates and dollar thresholds lies a harsher reality: Ukrainian soldiers who face, every day, weapons financed in part by Russian oil revenues—the very revenues these sanctions are specifically designed to reduce. The European bureaucratic timeline is never neutral for those fighting on the front lines.

This may be the harshest statement in this column, but I must write it: every day of delay in Brussels comes at a cost measured in human lives on the Ukrainian front lines. This is not an exaggeration; it is moral arithmetic.

A last-minute agreement remains a possibility

Despite the current deadlock, a last-minute agreement on the entire 21st package remains possible ahead of the July 13 meetings, as European negotiations often come to a resolution in the very last hours before a formal deadline. Diplomats familiar with this type of issue remain cautiously optimistic about this possibility.

If such a comprehensive agreement is reached, the Plan B—a separate freeze on the oil cap—would then become obsolete, and the entire package, including the 170 designated banks, could take effect simultaneously as early as mid-July rather than in the fall.

The scenario of a complete postponement: a risk that cannot be ruled out

Conversely, a more pessimistic scenario could even see Plan B fail if Hungary or Slovakia were to block this isolated measure on the oil cap as well—a risk that several European diplomats consider limited, however, given that this specific measure is already in place.

I’m betting—with due caution—on a partial compromise rather than a total deadlock. But this war has taught me never to underestimate the ability of certain European governments to spring an unpleasant surprise at the worst possible moment.

A Sign of Resolve Despite Everything

Even in its minimal form—a simple extension—freezing the oil price cap at $44.10 sends a signal of continuity in Europe’s commitment, avoiding any legal vacuum that could have been interpreted in Moscow as a loosening of Western pressure as summer approaches.

This maintenance—however imperfect it may be compared to a more ambitious reduction—preserves the overall structure of the oil sanctions regime established since 2022, a framework that the diplomatic war of attrition constantly threatens to undermine.

The real test lies ahead this fall

The true test of European determination will come this fall, when the full package—including the 170 designations that were postponed—must finally be adopted. Another postponement by that deadline would confirm deeper fears that European political will is waning in the face of a protracted war.

I take one thing away from this episode: Europe’s ability to hold itself accountable in September. The true judgment on this situation will come in the fall, when we’ll know whether this postponement was a tactical pause or a disguised surrender.

When Brussels Has Previously Split Up Sensitive Issues

This is not the first time the European Union has resorted to a strategy of splitting issues to overcome a deadlock on a sensitive matter. During previous crises—whether regarding migration policy or fiscal regulation—Brussels has already demonstrated its ability to isolate the measures with the broadest consensus to prevent a total deadlock from paralyzing an entire strategic issue.

This culture of piecemeal compromise, while reflecting a certain institutional pragmatism, also fuels recurring criticism of the structural slowness of European decision-making in the face of adversaries—such as Russia—who do not have to contend with such a high degree of internal democratic constraints.

The Political Cost of Slowness in the Face of an Authoritarian Regime

Authoritarian regimes like Vladimir Putin’s do not need to secure the unanimous consent of 27 parliaments before acting, which gives them a clear tactical advantage in terms of decision-making speed—even if that speed comes with a total absence of democratic checks and balances worthy of the name.

I wouldn’t wish it on anyone to live under a regime that makes decisions quickly simply because no one dares to contradict it. But I recognize that, on this specific issue, this asymmetry in decision-making speed works in the Kremlin’s favor, and Brussels must find a way to counterbalance it.

A Necessary Compromise, Not a Victory

Brussels’ Plan B to freeze the Russian oil cap separately on July 14 illustrates both the resilience of the European decision-making process in the face of internal deadlocks and its persistent structural limitations. This technical compromise averts the worst-case scenario—a complete legal vacuum—without, however, representing the escalation of pressure that the situation on the ground would require.

See you in the fall for the real verdict

The true measure of Europe’s commitment will come in September, when the 170 banking and cryptocurrency designations still pending will—or will not—clear the hurdle of unanimity. Until then, every week will continue to count, both on the oil markets and on the Ukrainian front.

I conclude this column with the same conviction as in the first paragraph: slowness is never neutral in times of war. Brussels can afford to make technical compromises; Ukraine, however, cannot afford to wait until fall to breathe a little easier.

Signed, Maxime Marquette, columnist