ANALYSIS: 144 Russian drones flew over NATO nuclear bases without being shot down

The Missing Figure in the Report

None of the 144 drones identified by the IISS were shot down or captured, according to the sources consulted. It is not the incursion itself that should be of greatest concern; it is the total lack of a physical response over eighteen consecutive months. This observation clearly distinguishes this case from that of the Baltic mission, where drones were recently shot down for the first time.

A partial explanation from the NATO Secretary General

When asked about this lack of interception, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte explained, according to Stars and Stripes, that the Alliance does not systematically shoot down all detected drones; the decision is made “on a case-by-case basis.” This explanation leaves one question unanswered: on what specific criteria is this decision based?

A “case-by-case” decision repeated 144 times without ever resulting in an interception looks like an undeclared policy.

Oil Tankers with No Verifiable Identity

According to the report carried by Fox News, the drones were likely launched from ships in Russia’s “ghost fleet”—oil tankers evading sanctions by turning off their AIS transponders. Two ships are explicitly named: the Hav Dolphin and the Seasons 1, both oil tankers in this parallel fleet.

This link between the ghost fleet and the drone incursions remains, based on current sources, a strong presumption rather than an absolute certainty. No official Russian acknowledgment has been reported, and this article refrains from treating an inference as an established fact.

The Decline Correlated with the First Seizures

The decline in sightings following the start of seizures of ships from the ghost fleet in 2026 constitutes the strongest indication of this presumed link. A temporal correlation is not legal proof, but it deserves to be taken seriously. It would suggest that launch capacity depended on these ships’ freedom of movement.

The Specific Case of Germany

A separate figure is circulating in parallel and should not be confused with the 144 incidents recorded by the IISS: Germany alone recorded more than 1,000 reports of suspicious drones in 2025. This German figure covers a broader scope than the nuclear sites studied by the IISS, including airports and critical infrastructure.

Confusing these two statistics would amount to exaggerating the specific nuclear problem or downplaying Germany’s broader vulnerability. Two figures that are similar but do not overlap deserve to be treated with the same rigor as two separate investigations.

A Documented but Unpatched Vulnerability

Eighteen months of repeated incursions without a single interception constitute, in and of themselves, an unintended demonstration of persistent vulnerability. The sites in question house the West’s most sensitive weapon, and their repeated exposure to unauthorized overflights over such a long period raises a fundamental question about the priority given to their immediate protection.

A Structural Response That Comes After the Report

The publication of the IISS report came shortly before the announcement, in early July 2026, of a $40 billion NATO plan to counter low-cost drones—a separate issue addressed independently, but whose timing suggests a cause-and-effect relationship with the public exposure of this vulnerability. A multibillion-dollar plan announced just days after the revelation of an 18-month-old vulnerability is likely no coincidence in timing.

Eighteen Months Without Public Information

The fact that these 144 incidents remained largely hidden from the general public for eighteen months constitutes, in itself, a cost in terms of trust distinct from the military cost. Residents living near bases such as RAF Lakenheath or Kleine-Brogel lived in the vicinity of repeated incursions without being informed by their own governments.

A population that learns, eighteen months later, that its local nuclear base has been flown over dozens of times without a response has not only lost information; it has lost time in demanding accountability.

Transparency—Belated, but Real

The publication of the report, though belated, nevertheless represents a gesture of institutional transparency that other defense matters have not always received. The Guardian and Stars and Stripes were able to document this flaw precisely because the IISS chose to make its work public rather than keep it confidential.

This analysis establishes three verified facts: 144 drone overflights were documented by the IISS over NATO nuclear sites between August 2024 and February 2026; none of these drones were intercepted; and Secretary General Mark Rutte confirmed a “case-by-case” response doctrine. The link to the Russian “ghost fleet” remains a strong presumption, not a certainty.

What this analysis cannot determine is whether this failure to intercept stemmed from a deliberate strategic choice or from a genuine operational inability to deal with a threat that is still poorly understood. The difference between choosing not to fire and being unable to fire is not merely cosmetic; it determines whether the vulnerability was intentional or simply endured.

One hundred forty-four incidents document one failure; the eighteen-month silence, for its part, documents a second, distinct failure—that of public information.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist