EDITORIAL: 40 billion to counter Russian drones—is NATO responding in time?

A Fraction, Not a Shift

NATO’s total defense spending will exceed $1.8 trillion in 2026, according to Qazinform. Relative to this annual total, the $40 billion spread over five years amounts to about $8 billion per year—a modest fraction of the Alliance’s overall defense effort. This calculation alone should temper any triumphalism.

Presenting 40 billion as a spectacular sum without specifying that it is spread over five years amounts to artificially inflating the scale of an effort that is otherwise real. Putting this into perspective does not negate the value of the plan; it simply clarifies its true scale.

A contrast with previously set spending targets

According to NATO.int, five Alliance countries are expected to reach 3.5% of GDP in core defense spending by 2026, while seventeen countries will reach at least 1.5%. This anti-drone plan is part of an already established upward spending trajectory, rather than constituting an isolated response to a new threat.

Respond after 144 documented incidents, not before

The timeline speaks for itself: the IISS report documents incursions dating back to July 2025, with a peak between September and November of that same year. The 40-billion plan was not approved until July 2026—one year after the first serious reports. An alliance that invests heavily a year after the documented onset of a threat cannot claim to have anticipated that threat.

Five years of deployment for a threat that is already active

Spreading this plan out over five years raises an immediate operational question: what happens during this period of gradual deployment, while drone incursions continue to be documented almost every month on the European continent? None of the sources consulted specify an accelerated timeline for the first deliveries of anti-drone systems under this joint procurement agreement.

The Gap Between Announcements and Deliveries

The recent history of Western defense cooperation with Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated the gap that can exist between a political announcement and the actual delivery of equipment. To be convincing, this 40-billion anti-drone plan must avoid repeating this pattern, which has already been documented elsewhere in transatlantic defense relations.

An announced plan is never a delivered plan; the recent history of Western defense promises suggests that we should reserve final judgment until the first verifiable deliveries take place.

The common market will have to overcome national interests

Pooling defense procurement among member countries requires overcoming often divergent national industrial interests, as each country has historically sought to protect its own domestic manufacturers. The success of this common anti-drone market will depend on NATO’s ability to prioritize collective effectiveness over these national reflexes—a tension that has already hindered other joint armament projects in Europe.

Verifiable initial deliveries, not just announcements

For this $40 billion plan to avoid the fate of many past defense announcements, NATO will need to produce concrete evidence of actual deliveries in the coming months, not just additional press releases. The precedent set by the Belgium–Netherlands bilateral agreement—which was quantified and detailed—serves as an example of the level of precision the entire plan should achieve.

A public timeline would signal serious intent

None of the sources consulted provide a detailed timeline for the five-year rollout of the joint anti-drone market. The publication of such a timeline, with verifiable milestones year by year, would significantly bolster the plan’s credibility in the face of legitimate criticism regarding its apparent slowness.

A Long-Standing Reliance on U.S. Systems

The composition of the Belgium–Netherlands agreement—NASAMS, SkyRanger 30, GM200 radars—illustrates a persistent reliance on systems developed primarily outside Europe or by a limited number of manufacturers. This reliance is not new, but it deserves to be acknowledged rather than glossed over amid the celebration of the anti-drone plan.

An opportunity to build a common industrial base

The common anti-drone market could, in the long term, become a tool for reducing this dependence if NATO chooses to include more collectively validated European manufacturers. Nothing in the available sources guarantees this direction; it remains a possibility opened up by the very structure of the announced initiative.

This editorial concludes that the $40 billion plan constitutes a genuine and necessary response to a threat now documented by 144 verified incidents, but that it is coming late, is being rolled out slowly, and represents only a modest fraction of the Alliance’s overall defense effort. Whether to describe it as sufficient or belated remains an editorial judgment, not a measurable fact: both interpretations are based on the same verified and cited figures.

There is no contradiction between applauding a plan simply because it exists and questioning it because it comes too late; there is simply a refusal to choose between the two interpretations before seeing the first deliveries. Forty billion over five years is neither a triumph nor a failure; it is a test whose outcome will only be known by observing what the Alliance actually delivers, system by system.

By Maxime Marquette, columnist